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Cover:

Mangbetu woman, Zaire
(Museum of African Art,
Eliot Elisofon Archives)

Secretary Vance

Victor Palmieri

President Carter

David D. Newsom

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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
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 Rubber tire plant, Tanzania (ICA photo
 by Richard Saunders)
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Fulani woman (Museum of African
 Art, Eliot Elisofon Archives)



Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States—Part 2

This is the second of a two-part discussion paper, compiled by former Ambassador G. Edward Clark. Part 1, which was printed in the March 1980 issue of the Department of State Bulletin, focused on the geography, history, people of Africa and their culture, and economic and political conditions. Part 2 examines the role the United States has played in postcolonial African development.

Americans once thought of Africa as "dark Continent"—mysterious, unknown, and remote. Without colonial interests or responsibilities, the United States knew little of Africa and was content to permit European powers to govern and exploit. The United States, however, share in exploitation through the slave trade. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, U.S. involvement began to increase slowly and more actively through the activities of missionaries, explorers, and commercial ventures. Slavery and related problems began to be eliminated in the United States through the passage of interdiction laws by the 1780s, the Civil War, and passage of the 14th and 24th Amendments. World War II changed many American perceptions and began to shift U.S. priorities and policies. Africa, the "sleeping giant," was beginning to wake, bringing the realization that the United States, along with the rest of the world, soon would have to account of its potential power and own goals and ambitions.

Having played a major role in drafting provisions of the U.N. Charter, which provided the philosophical base for the end of colonialism, the United States from that point onward has taken stands which reflect common interests and has endeavored to insure that the emerging countries are accorded the opportunities which the United States had in its postindependence years.

IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA TO THE UNITED STATES

While U.S.-Africa relations today are strongly influenced by humanitarian considerations, Africa is also important to the United States for the following pragmatic reasons.

- Africa has political clout. In addition to its own bloc of 45 (50 with North Africa) African nations, in concert with other nations of the Third World, constitute two-thirds of U.N. membership. They play an important, often decisive, role in most international fora, including U.N. specialized agencies and political-economic agreements of great importance to the United States, such as one now being negotiated on the law of the sea.

- Africa, as indicated earlier, is rich in increasingly important natural resources—oil, copper, bauxite, uranium, cobalt, gold, and diamonds. Its largely unharnessed rivers can provide hydroelectric power to increase industry and agricultural irrigation.

- The potential exists for greatly increased trade and economic cooperation. While the United States needs to buy African raw materials, Africa requires capital investment, new technology, and markets for a wider range of other products.

- The continent is strategically located; many countries possess safe ports, good airfields, and controlling positions in relation to major waterways, air corridors, and disputed territories.

- Continuing liberation struggles, political instability within countries, and friction between countries make portions of Africa a potential arena for large-power confrontation.

- North-South issues, highlighting the poverty of most Third World countries, if not resolved, could create increasing envy, hostility, and resentment

toward the United States and other industrialized nations.

- Africa assumes particular significance for Americans of African descent, who are increasingly concerned about many of the problems of the continent.

U.S. POLICY

Elements of U.S. foreign policy involving Africa have shifted from time to time, depending on various Administrations, changing congressional attitudes, and shifting circumstances on the continent itself. To a degree, flexibility is desirable in order that U.S. actions can be responsive to changing conditions. Resulting moves, however, must not be merely reactive but must be integrated with long-term, worldwide goals.

Somewhere between the inevitable variables and the need for consistency, there has emerged in the past two decades a broad outline of U.S. policy toward Africa, which contains the following ingredients.

Preservation of the independence of African states

Forces of African nationalism are vital components of African political, social, and economic development.

Strong African states act as a bulwark against outside intervention.

An interrelationship exists between political stability and economic development.

Pursuit of peaceful solutions to African conflicts

Armed conflict has a negative effect on the nation-building process.

Resort to arms drains funds from the development process and sets back

Information in this article is intended to provide background for study and discussion; it is not designed to be read as a formal statement of U.S. policy, except where the material is specifically described as such. The article summarizes currently available information and raises relevant questions (some of which admittedly may be unanswerable) as an aid to public discussion of important issues in U.S. foreign policy. All material in this article is in the public domain except where copyright is indicated.

achievement of the goals of economic development.

Armed conflict acts as an invitation to continued and heightened foreign intervention.

Ending racial injustice in southern Africa

Africa is united on the need for transition to majority rule; most nations favor a peaceful transition process.

U.S. interests—including trade, access to minerals, strategic concerns, continued political influence—are best served by a peaceful transition to majority rule in Africa.

Avoiding an East-West conflict in Africa

East-West conflict would neutralize other U.S. goals for Africa.

Africans themselves do not wish to become embroiled in such conflicts nor to allow their continent to be used by superpowers for their own purposes.

True nonalignment by African nations is compatible with U.S. interests.

Support for Africa's legitimate defense needs

The United States is not willing to enter an arms race in Africa. However, recognizing that certain African nations have legitimate defense needs, the United States has limited military assistance programs, including training, in certain countries.

Promoting respect for human rights

U.S. concern with this issue is not confined to Africa.

The United States believes that such respect is fundamental to the success of political and economic development.

Promoting U.S. trade, aid, and investment

Most African leaders see development as absolute top priority.

The Western world is best able to respond to this urgent need.

A sustained U.S. response is needed.

The United States needs African resources.

Adherence to the foregoing principles has contributed to African achievement of some of its most impor-



Freighter *African Comet* in New York harbor (ICA photo)

tant goals and a steady improvement in U.S.-African relations. Secretary Vance has credited this improvement to:

Our willingness to work with African nations in a spirit of cooperation and understanding;

Our active support for majority rule and racial equality in southern Africa;

Our serious efforts to deal with the many economic issues which are part of the North-South dialogue and which directly affect the lives of Africans; and

Our genuine interest in African problems on their own terms, and not only in the context of East-West relations.

Illustrative of American support are: the roles which the United States has played in conflict resolution efforts in southern Africa, the Horn, and Shaba Province of Zaire; support of African regional organizations (i.e., OAU) in their effort to deal with political and developmental problems; U.S. stands against dictatorial regimes in the former Central African Empire, Equatorial Guinea, and Uganda; increasing levels of U.S. assistance, bilateral and multilateral; responsiveness to emergency needs, such as the Sahel drought and refugee problems; and efforts to promote investment and trade through the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and special missions.

POLICY ISSUES

African countries are making progress on many fronts, but they still face serious problems and occasionally suffer setbacks in their efforts to achieve national goals. In offering economic, political, and sometimes moral support, the United States shares many of the aspirations and concerns of African nations, which will be discussed in the following section.

The question of decolonization following years of strife in Zimbabwe and Namibia, has been a volatile one. Closely related, and to a degree involving these countries, is the issue of human rights, most systematically violated by the apartheid structure of South Africa but abused elsewhere on the continent as well. Efforts to rejuvenate national unity and institute reforms needed to satisfy post-independence dreams of constitutional democracy and economic progress can be observed in Zaire and Nigeria. Equally pressing developmental needs are being tackled, for example, in the Sahel on a regional basis as in Nigeria, which is able to use its petroleum and mineral wealth. The presence of Soviet, Cuban, and other Communist troops and technicians in the Horn and other parts of Africa presents strategy concerns, not only for the Africans but for the West.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has been the focus of international attention for many years and the scene of an expanding guerrilla war.

nce the early 1970s. A British colony
nce 1890, it is populated by about
0,000 whites and 7 million blacks. Its
ling white settlers instituted a
ciopolitical system that severely lim-
d black rights. In November 1965,
ime Minister Ian Smith announced a
ilateral declaration of independ-
ce" from the United Kingdom. The
N. Security Council, with U.S. sup-
rt, imposed economic sanctions on
odesia in 1966 and 1968 in an attempt
force the Smith regime to end its il-
gal rebellion and take steps toward
jority rule.

In the early 1960s, Rhodesian
tionalists formed two rival groups,
e Zimbabwe African National Union
ANU) and the Zimbabwe African
ople's Union (ZAPU), which ad-
ed majority rule. They ultimately
med to guerrilla warfare from bases
neighboring countries. Eventually a
se ZAPU-ZANU alliance, known as
Patriotic Front, was formed. Inside
odesia, other nationalist groups, in-
ding Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United
frican National Council (UANC),
re formed.

On March 3, 1978, the Smith re-
ne and three black nationalists, in-
ding Bishop Muzorewa, signed the
isbury agreement, which provided
qualified majority rule under which
ites would retain considerable
ver. The external nationalists de-
nced the settlement and did not par-
pate in it. After elections in April
9, Bishop Muzorewa was installed as
first black Prime Minister of "Zim-
we Rhodesia." Following the elec-
a of Prime Minister Margaret
tcher's Conservative government in
y 1979, the British undertook a new
iative which culminated in the Lan-
ter House settlement signed De-
ber 21, 1979, by all the interested
ties and the British.

The parties agreed on:

- A new, democratic constitution
t will institute majority rule while
tecting minority rights;
- A short transition period during
ich Rhodesia would return to legality
er an all-powerful British Governor;
- British-supervised elections; and
- A cease-fire.

The transition period, which saw a
lining level of violence, climaxed in

ull city well provides security for Tim-
tu, Mali (above right); the dry well
lls disaster in the Sahel (below right).

photos)



February with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's ZANU party winning a majority of 57 seats in the House of Assembly. Subsequently, Mr. Mugabe took a number of steps which fostered a climate of reconciliation in Zimbabwe. The date for Zimbabwe's independence is April 18, 1980.

The United States has fully supported the British throughout the Lancaster House negotiations and thereafter. The United States urged the various Rhodesian parties to make the necessary compromises that were eventually required for a final settlement. The United States assisted in the British airlift to Salisbury of material used to monitor the cease-fire. Also, the United States has pledged \$5 million to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for use in the effort to repatriate an estimated 200,000 Rhodesian refugees. In the near term, the United States has indicated willingness to cooperate in a multidonor regional transportation and economic development program for the region that will include Zimbabwe and its neighbors.

Namibia

Following World War I, South Africa was given a League of Nations mandate to administer the former German colony of South West Africa until it was ready to become independent. After World War II South Africa refused to place Namibia under U.N. trusteeship and instead continued to subject the black majority of its 900,000 residents to South African law, including apartheid and racial discrimination. In 1966 the U.N. General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate and in 1971 the International Court of Justice stated in an advisory opinion that South Africa was obligated to withdraw its administrator from Namibia immediately.

Through the 1975 Turnhalle conference of representatives (acceptable to South Africa) from most elements of the territory's population, South Africa sought to engineer a unilateral internal settlement based on a weak federation of ethnic states. Since this plan was internationally unacceptable, the then five Western members of the U.N. Security Council, including the United States, began a unique cooperative effort in 1977 to find a way to implement Security Council Resolution 385, passed unanimously the previous year with the intent of insuring free and fair elections in Namibia under U.N. supervision and control.

The Western Five plan, endorsed by the Security Council, calls for the creation of a U.N. Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) with military and civilian components and withdrawal of South African forces before independence. South Africa accepted the plan but raised problems concerning its implementation and proceeded with its own election of a "constituent assembly" (later "national assembly") in December 1978.

The Western Five have continued in their efforts, however, and despite the election have slowly gained more South African acceptance of the Secretary General's proposal for implementing the plan. Recent acceptance by South Africa of the concept of a demilitarized zone between Angola and Namibia to help monitor adherence to the plan is taken as a hopeful indication of the republic's willingness to cooperate with the United Nations. Settlement efforts accelerated in early 1980 with the dispatch of a U.N. technical team to southern Africa. Near settlement of the Zimbabwe problem may also have a positive effect on South Africa's attitude.

However, a transitional period leading to elections could be tense and fraught with further controversy, both in the delicate relations between South Africa and the United Nations and among the various aspirants to political power. Failure of the present initiative would probably increase the bloodshed and the involvement of outside powers. Success here, on the other hand, especially coupled with success in Zimbabwe, could point the way toward amelioration of the most intransigent of southern Africa's problems—apartheid in South Africa itself.

Apartheid

From the establishment of a Consulate in Cape Town in 1799, through the era of British colonies and independent Boer republics, the Union of South Africa and finally the Republic of South Africa, the United States has maintained official relations with the various governing entities. Rich in resources and strategically located, South Africa has been an important trading partner and wartime ally. However, during the past several decades, and particularly since the Sharpsville riots of 1960, U.S.-South African relations have been adversely affected by the republic's racial policies, generically known as "apartheid" or "separate development."

Rigidly codified and often brutally enforced, apartheid laws offend concepts of racial justice and human rights held not only by the United States but also by the independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In order to demonstrate opposition to apartheid and support for nonviolent evolution toward racial justice, the United States has imposed restraints on its relations with South Africa.

Among these are an embargo on arm sales, police weapons, and equipment and a ban on U.S. naval ship visits to South Africa. In the commercial field the United States prohibits direct Export-Import Bank loans to finance U.S. sales and limits trade promotional activities.

The United States, like the rest of the international community, has refused to recognize South Africa's bestowal of so-called "independence" upon the Transkei and other homelands. The homelands policy—which purports to define all black South Africans as citizens of one of the homelands—is a fundamental element of the apartheid strategy. The United States has never provided economic or developmental assistance to South Africa.

The United States has endeavored to use its influence to encourage peaceful evolution through maintenance of contact with leaders of all racial groups, through encouragement of private American firms to improve pay and working conditions of their black employees, and through support of constructive measures in the United Nations and other international bodies. However, the effect of U.S. efforts is indeed those of other countries and the United Nations has been limited.

There are indications that elements of the present government in South Africa, recognizing that their system is presently constituted is not viable, may be willing to make minor modifications in the government's racial policies. Near settlement in Zimbabwe and progress regarding Namibia have encouraged exponents of change within the South African ruling establishment. However, minor concessions regarding "petty apartheid" fall far short of basic demands of the black majority of citizens and their international supporters for demonstrable progress toward the ultimate goal of full participation of all races in the political, economic, and social affairs of the country. The intensity of black demands and expectations is increasing, along with heightened racial

larization and growing militancy. This issue is the major political concern of all of black Africa.

The fundamental dilemma facing the United States and other concerned powers is how to promote racial justice without external involvement and violence, while simultaneously maintaining effective relations with the government and maintaining credibility with the black leadership. Another important policy objective is securing South Africa's cooperation with U.S. and international nuclear nonproliferation goals.

the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa, which includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, occupies a strategically important location on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean close to volatile areas of the Middle East. The region has become a focus of U.S. concern because deepened historic and ethnic rivalries have erupted in recent years into open conflict. The situation has been exacerbated by the involvement of Soviet and Cuban forces, the latter now numbering an estimated 15,000 troops. Two scenarios are particularly worrisome.

Eritrean liberation forces, including both Moslem and Christian elements, have been waging an insurgency over 16 years in an effort to bring independence to the Eritrean people. Supported by Arab states, the insurgents had succeeded by mid-1977 in liberating most of Eritrea from Ethiopian domination. Since then, Ethiopia has endeavored to reassert its control with only limited success despite massive Soviet military assistance.

Following the replacement of Emperor Haile Selassie by a new revolutionary Ethiopian government, Somalia commenced an effort to end Ethiopian rule over the Somali people of the Ogaden region in mid-1977. Regular Somali military units were withdrawn in 1978, but fighting within the territory has continued.

The United States remains deeply concerned about the overall future of the region, and recent developments have produced a curious reversal of American relations with the countries of the Horn. Relations have improved with Somalia, which a few years ago was pro-Soviet. They have deteriorated with Ethiopia, once a close ally and now increasingly involved with Cuba and

The Horn of Africa



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Russia, with which it has a close military relationship. The United States, in fact, has suspended developmental assistance and preferential trade treatment for Ethiopia (although continuing humanitarian assistance) because of the expropriation without compensation of U.S. property.

Consistent with general policy, the United States endeavors to support moves toward negotiated, peaceful settlement of problems in the Horn. Faced, however, with Soviet-Cuban encouragement of military actions and with the growing threats to security in broad northwest portions of the Indian Ocean, the United States is increasingly willing to consider requests for assistance in efforts to maintain security in the region.

Zaire

Just after the Congo obtained independence from Belgium in 1960, the army mutinied, political authority broke down, and the Governor of Katanga (now Shaba) declared his province an independent country. Now called Zaire, the republic has been involved in turmoil, internal and external, political and economic, ever since. Katanga was reintegrated in 1963, but rebellions occurred in Kwilu and Kivu Provinces in 1964-65 and former Katangans invaded Zaire from neighboring Angola, first with insurgent white mercenaries in 1967 and then on their own in 1977 and again in 1978. Political instability in Zaire can have repercussions well beyond its national boundaries due to its size, its

mineral wealth, and the fact that it borders on nine other states.

Zaire has rich deposits of copper, cobalt, and diamonds; an extraordinary hydroelectric potential; navigable rivers; and much good agricultural land. Unfortunately, the economy has suffered severely from political instability, mismanagement, and corruption in high places. International debts are now far too large, and Zaire, with the help of the IMF, Belgium, France, the United States, and others, is trying to fight its way out of its economic morass.

Many critics blame Zaire's economic plight on President Mobutu's authoritarian style of government. The United States has strongly encouraged current Zairian attempts to work with the IMF to reorganize the country's financial sector and to live with the fiscal constraints of the Fund's economic stabilization program. The United States has also urged President Mobutu to halt human rights abuses and adopt changes in the political structure of the country that would allow for stability and improve the prospect for a peaceful transfer of authority at such time as government leadership passes to others.

U.S. assistance is designed to assist the needy people of Zaire as directly as possible and to reinforce economic and political reform. Some reform measures have been implemented and others announced. How well these will work in the long run remains to be seen, but there has been a start toward reestablishment of economic health and toward healing of some of the human, regional, and ethnic wounds that have plagued Zaire since its independence.

Sahel

The Sahel (meaning "desert's edge"), drought-stricken in the early 1970s and today suffering from continuing desertification, provides an encouraging example of donor countries and international organizations working together with affected countries in a coordinated effort to meet emergency and long-range development needs on a regional basis. The region includes those countries which lie along the southern edge of the Sahara Desert—Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Senegal, Upper Volta, The Gambia, plus the islands of Cape Verde.

The Sahel is populated by 30 million persons, whose livelihood depends largely on livestock and agriculture. Rainfall is scarce and erratic. In times

of drought rural and nomadic people lose their crops, pasture land, and, consequently, their herds. The immediate effects can be starvation and death for thousands. Equally serious, as fodder disappears, herdsmen must forage farther southward, thus desolating new belts of land.

It was a cyclical drought which caused the major disaster in 1968-73, resulting in immense economic losses; the disruption of the precarious balance among man, animals, and environment; and starvation. With the United States among the leaders, many countries, international bodies, and private organizations mounted relief efforts which reduced the human tragedy but did not reach the underlying problems. Initially, assistance was offered largely on bilateral terms to countries affected, and they themselves attempted relatively little regional coordination.

Out of the crisis in the early 1970s came two positive developments. Prior to that time, the Sahelian states, even though sharing the same ecological conditions, shaped their development plans in isolation from each other and individually sought assistance to finance them as well as emergency requirements. Donors also failed to coordinate with each other.

The drought, however, illustrated dramatically the regionality of the Sahelian ecological disaster and emphasized the need for regional planning and solutions. Thus these countries formed the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) to devise a Sahel development program, through which today they work together in a regional framework while international donors pool resources, avoiding competition and duplication. The program is focused on rural populations and the deprived in small urban areas. Decisions regarding project selection are made jointly by recipients and donors.

The United States has often taken the lead and is a major participant in both emergency and long-range Sahelian problems. U.S. help to the Sahel is based on a mix of humanitarianism and on an honest desire to help these countries make economic progress (all, except one, are classified by the United Nations as economically "least developed"). U.S. contributions for the past 4 years are: 1976—\$39.5 million, 1977—\$45.9 million, 1978—\$80.1 million, and 1979—\$77.3 million (all exclusive of food aid). This is the largest U.S. aid program in Africa.

Major West African Oilfields



geria

geria merits special attention, not as contentious issue, but because of its unique position in Africa and its importance to the United States.

As seen from previous references, Nigeria has had a turbulent history since becoming independent in 1960—witnessed disintegration of the original federation, three coups placing armies of military governments in power, and the Biafran secession attempt in 1967. For most of this period the country was beset by severe economic problems, corruption, mismanagement, and political wrangling. However, the great increase in oil income during the mid-1970s and the return in orderly manner to civilian government (under a federal system much like that of the United States) in late 1979 have dramatically improved the prospects and status of this major country.

Nigeria's population numbered at most recent count 79.8 million persons, with estimates going over 80 million. Nigeria has a GDP of \$42.7 billion and a rising per capita figure of \$522. Nigeria plays a powerful role in the United Nations, other international bodies, and African councils. It strongly supports regional economic cooperation, helps coordinate African positions on many issues (such as apartheid), and helps mediate African disputes.

The United States is the major foreign market for Nigeria's crude oil. Nigeria ranks second only to Saudi Arabia as the most important supplier of petroleum to the United States. It buys over 1 million barrels a day of the highly desirable, light, low sulfur "sweet crude." With Nigeria's oil wealth, it is no longer necessary for the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) to assist it with major development grants or loans, but Nigeria does seek from the U.S. managerial and technical expertise to help it use efficiently its resources, attract foreign investment, and transfer of technology.

Probably as many as 20,000 Nigerians were studying in the United States in 1979. American private investment, exceeding \$335 million (book value—net private direct investment of 1977), is welcomed by Nigeria as a source of managerial talent and training.

Despite its impressive economic progress and political strides, this vast and complex country still faces prob-

lems. Even with its oil profits (over \$10 billion annually and steadily increasing) the Federal Government of Nigeria is saddled with debts from previous regimes and demands for improvement in education, health, and other sectors of its infrastructure. The average Nigerian is clamoring for a greater share of the country's new-found wealth. Renewed challenges to the solidarity of the country are coming from minority groups and once-prominent political figures. Controversy, perhaps normal, is developing between newly elected President Shagari and the equally new bicameral Federal Legislature.

Many other African nations are watching with interest Nigeria's bold experiment in democracy and economic development. So, indeed, is the United States, which not only relies on Nigerian resources but looks to it as a strong, responsible voice in world councils.

Human Rights

With attention focused for so long on human rights violations in southern Africa, much of the world and Africans themselves paid relatively little attention to flagrant excesses in various other parts of the continent. Serious problems did develop in a number of newly independent sub-Saharan countries. The United States has shared international concern over resulting violations of human rights but is now encouraged by evidence that many African states are taking steps to restore and protect the rights of their citizens. As mentioned earlier, a number of despots have fallen, several countries have returned to civilian rule, and others have strengthened their commitment to the rule of law.

The OAU has passed a resolution calling for the drafting of a charter on human rights in Africa. The United Nations is studying the feasibility of creating an African human rights regional commission. Seminars and conferences on human rights matters have been held in Dar es Salaam, Butare, Dakar, Freetown, Cape Town, Khartoum, Kinshasa, and Lubumbashi.

Where human rights problems continue to exist, the United States seeks to induce improvements through the following means:

- Government-to-government communications;
- Meetings with opposition political figures, exiled victims of human rights

abuses, human rights advocates, lawyers, journalists, and a wide cross section of citizens;

- Reexamination of U.S. assistance relationships;
- Exercising votes in multinational development banks;
- Support of human rights programs in international organizations; and
- Distancing the U.S. Government from abusive practices.

Communism

Communism, as espoused and supported by foreign Communist powers, has been a disruptive and often destructive force in sub-Saharan Africa for the past two decades. Initially the philosophy had an ideological appeal for the leaders of newly independent states, many of whom adopted Socialist forms of government. Later, however, various Communist powers—notably the U.S.S.R., China, and recently Cuba—began to exploit these fertile philosophical grounds, lingering anticolonialism, continuing racial discrimination, and intractable economic problems with escalating offers of advice, military assistance, involvement, and, in a few instances, domination.

Today, Communist influence, exerted through the presence of military personnel and economic technicians, threatens the future of several countries and the stability of various regions. U.S. interests are jeopardized, and concern is growing that Africa might become the stage for big power confrontation.

At the same time it should be noted that most African states are determined to maintain their hard-earned independence, believing, as several African leaders have remarked, "Having rid ourselves of one form of colonialism, we do not intend to subject ourselves to another." While making gains in some countries (Angola, Ethiopia) the Soviets in particular have lost ground in others (Ghana, Guinea, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Equatorial Guinea).

According to the most reliable estimates, there were over 41,000 Communist military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa in 1978. Of these, the largest numbers were 35,500 Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia and 3,815 from the

Soviet Union and East Germany primarily in seven countries.

Communist country technical experts were estimated at 37,225, of whom 18,615 were Cuban, 10,970 Chinese, and 7,640 from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, most of whom are more widely dispersed throughout the continent than military personnel.

In the face of Communist initiatives, the United States has continued to build relationships which appear to serve overall the best interests of both the African nations and the West. The thrust of this general approach (cited earlier) is to promote:

- Resolution of those African problems which threaten the peace and provide opportunities for Communist exploitation;
- Constructive participation of African nations in international fora; and
- Peaceful economic development of these nations.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The United States endeavors to help African countries in their sometimes successful and sometimes frustrated efforts to deal with their difficult economic problems. In doing so, American motives are a mix of altruism and pragmatism. In either case they reflect a high degree of interdependence between Africa and America. U.S. actions are based on the following considerations.

- Americans have a genuine humanitarian interest in helping African countries meet the basic needs of their people—proper nutrition, good health, availability of proper water, and the ability to achieve a decent standard of living.
- Achievement of African prosperity is important because the United States relies increasingly on the developing world as a market for its exports.
- The United States needs African minerals and raw materials.
- A good economic relationship with Africa can provide the foundation for a good political relationship. It is important that the United States identify with the basic development aspirations of Africans.

Communist Military Personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978¹

Country	TOTAL	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe ²	Cuba ³	China
Angola	20,300	1,300	19,000	—
Equatorial Guinea	290	40	150	100
Ethiopia	17,900	1,400	16,500	—
Guinea	330	100	200	30
Guinea-Bissau	205	65	140	—
Mali	195	180	—	15
Mozambique	1,130	230	800	100
Other	1,330	500	485	345
TOTAL	41,680	3,815	37,275	590

¹Number of persons present for a period of 1 month or more during 1978. Rounded to the nearest 5.

²Mainly Soviets. Among Eastern Europeans, most are believed to be East Germans.

³Includes troops.

Communist Economic Technicians in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978¹

Country	TOTAL	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe ²	Cuba	China
Angola	9,910	1,400	8,500	10
Ethiopia	1,400	650	500	250
Gabon	75	10	—	65
Gambia	75	—	—	75
Ghana	175	95	—	80
Guinea	1,035	700	35	300
Guinea-Bissau	405	265	85	55
Kenya	30	25	—	5
Liberia	210	10	—	200
Madagascar	200	—	—	200
Mali	1,025	475	—	550
Mauritius	15	—	—	15
Mozambique	1,270	750	400	120
Niger	160	10	—	150
Nigeria	1,750	1,625	—	125
Rwanda	60	10	—	50
Sao Tome and Principe	260	20	140	100
Senegal	500	100	—	400
Sierra Leone	310	10	—	300
Somalia	3,050	50	—	3,000
Sudan	775	125	—	650
Tanzania	1,365	165	200	1,000
Zambia	5,645	125	20	5,500
Others	7,525	1,020	1,090	5,415
TOTAL	37,225	7,640	18,615	10,970

¹Number of persons present for a period of 1 month or more during 1978. Rounded to nearest 5.

²More than half are Soviets; nearly 1,000 are believed to be East Germans.

The United States endeavors to help Africans achieve national and regional goals, while at the same time serving U.S. interests, through economic assistance, trade, and investment.

Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance is relatively small (about 10% of total foreign assistance through bilateral and multilateral channels) development role of the United States in Africa through the 1970s has been helpful when combined with the cooperative efforts of the countries involved. For example:

- Efforts in institution building have helped African governments to expand their capacity to absorb both private and concessional resources. These institutions include research centers, universities, veterinary schools, secondary and vocational institutions, agriculture credit banks,
- Infant mortality and longevity statistics have been improved by African countries when assisted by AID-financed hospitals, inoculation and immunization programs, rural health care systems, and health training.
- Essential capital infrastructure projects of African countries have been implemented by roads, bridges, schools, marketing centers, ports, and railways built with U.S. aid.
- Grain exports have been augmented and national nutrition improved in several countries through the cooperative development and dissemination of new hybrid cereals.
- The quality of livestock has been upgraded, often in joint projects.

Increasing emphasis in U.S. assistance has been directed in recent years at alleviating the most critical needs of the most poor. To this end, bilateral AID programs are designed to concentrate even more than in the past on these persistently serious problems:

- Declining per capita food production;
- Shortage of employment opportunities relative to rapidly growing populations;
- Lack of access to health and other basic services;
- Shortage of skilled manpower training opportunities; and
- Desertification of the land and shortage of energy.

While many of the foregoing needs must be met on a national basis, other problems require regional cooperation for effective resolution. In some cases

multicountry approaches are the most cost effective allocation of scarce resources, such as through the Concerted Action for Development in Africa. AID, therefore, is increasingly attempting to address critical problems, such as those of the Sahel and southern and eastern Africa, through regional programs.

There are other special programs, some of which involve AID but in other instances extend beyond or outside the agency. These include:

- Refugee assistance—Africa has an estimated 4 million refugees, the largest number in the world. There are 475,000 refugees in camps in Somalia as of January 1, 1980, with a possible 700,000 more being outside camps. There are also large numbers of refugees of other nationalities in southern Africa, in or near Zaire, and elsewhere. In addition to giving refugee assistance to host governments, the United States has made major contributions to programs administered by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

- The Peace Corps has 2,000 volunteers in Africa performing a wide variety of humanitarian and developmental services on a unique person-to-person basis.

- Under circumstances when legitimate self-defense is the criterion, the United States has provided limited military assistance to a few countries. For FY 1980 the United States is considering providing \$45.5 million in foreign military sales credits and \$3.4 million for participation in the U.S. international military education and training program.

- From the accompanying table, it will be noted that U.S. economic assistance to Africa has been steadily rising, at rates averaging more than 20% per year. Bilateral assistance, not including military assistance or Peace Corps funding, will total over \$600 million for 1980 and a projected \$768 million for 1981. This does not include U.S. contributions through multilateral channels, which in 1978 totaled an estimated \$305 million.

Trade and Investment

In 1978, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for a mere 3.7% of world trade, the same proportion as in 1969. U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa remains small, accounting in 1978 for only 2.3% of our exports and, with Nigerian oil, 5.4% of our imports.

Direct foreign investment is also small and stagnating. U.S. net direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) amounts to about \$1.8 billion (mainly in oil and mineral extraction), which represents less than 5% of U.S. investments in South America.

Manufacturing activities are minimal, constituting only 9% of all exports, compared to the 43% average for other developing regions.

Unfortunately barriers inhibiting expansion of trade and investment exist on both sides of the Atlantic. In Africa, these include inadequate infrastructure, lack of economic diversification, shortage of economic institutions and expertise, deficient government investment policies, and frequent incidences of political instability. On the part of the United States, there is insufficient understanding among U.S. firms concerning opportunities and ways of doing business in Africa, as well as difficulties in competing successfully with Europeans and Asians in the African marketplace. Nevertheless, expansion of U.S. trade and investment involving sub-Saharan Africa is in the interest of both African countries and the United States for the following reasons.

- As intimated earlier, during the 1980s the United States will become even more dependent on Africa's natural resources. While large known reserves have been mentioned earlier, many regions, which have not yet been explored, hold promise of additional mineral and petroleum wealth.

- The U.S. trade deficit with sub-Saharan Africa, primarily due to oil im-

U.S. Trade With Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978
(\$ millions)

	Exports	Imports
Total Sub-Saharan trade	3,371	9,965
of which:		
South Africa	1,080	2,346
Nigeria	985	4,977
U.S. total worldwide trade	143,660	183,136
% of U.S. total worldwide trade	2.3	5.4

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade

ports from Nigeria, was over \$6.5 billion in 1978.

- Economic progress in Africa will lead to expanded markets for U.S. products.

- Given the limitations on aid resource flows, the private sector holds the potential for providing the goods, technology, and capital necessary for economic progress.

Opportunities and hopeful signs, however, do exist for increasing U.S. commercial activities in the longer term. There is growing awareness in Africa of the need for workable economic policies, including the role of foreign investment. These involve and, in some cases, rely on U.S. investment. Governments are seeking to improve their investment climate. There are renewed efforts to promote regional economic cooperation. Total Western aid, while still too little to meet Africa's basic needs, offers direct opportunities to U.S. firms for sale of capital goods, supplies, and specialized services.

Industrialized countries have begun to respond to developing countries' demands for special trade and financing benefits. The U.S. generalized system of preferences, various commodity pricing arrangements, expanded IMF help, and the Lomé II Convention can lead to higher and more stable export earnings and therefore enhance African countries' ability to pay for needed imports. U.S. Government financing institutions, such as the Eximbank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation, are attempting to do more in Africa. Additional funding for the African Development Bank and Fund and any major increase in the oil-producing countries' aid to Africa through OPEC or the Arab Development Bank will open more possibilities for U.S. trade and investment.

Additional effort, however, will be necessary to take advantage of the foregoing and other opportunities to promote further trade and investment in sub-Saharan Africa. There needs to be close cooperation between the U.S. Government and private sector. African governments can also take additional measures to create a favorable environment for enhanced foreign trade and investment ties.

U.S. Economic Aid to Africa (\$ millions)

	1979	1980	1981
BILATERAL AID¹			
Development Assistance	248	318 ²	393 ⁴
PL-480 (food aid)			
Title I (concessional sales)	83	87	118 ⁴
Title II (grants)	87	105 ⁵	105 ⁵
Economic Support Fund	53	100 ³	140 ⁵
Refugees	15	14	12
TOTAL	486	624	768
% Increase	(10)	(22)	(23)
MULTILATERAL AID⁷			
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development			
U.S. share	583	788 ⁸	788 ⁸
	139	197	197 ⁹
International Development Association			
U.S. share	619	794 ⁸	794 ⁸
	188	238 ¹⁰	238 ¹⁰
African Development Fund			
U.S. share	228 ⁹	280 ⁹	NA
	21 ¹⁰	25 ¹⁰	NA
TOTAL	1,430	1,862	NA
Total U.S. share	348	460	NA

¹The United States also provides assistance in the form of loans from the quasi-commercial U.S. Export-Import Bank totaling \$157 million in 1977 and \$551 million in 1978 (1979-81 figures not available).

²"Best guess" assuming passage of FY 1980 appropriation at current conference levels.

³"Best guess" assuming FY 1980 appropriation. Of this 60 is for southern Africa, 40 for Sudan.

⁴Congressional presentation level for FY 1981.

⁵Congressional presentation level for FY 1981 of which 90 for southern Africa, 50 for Sudan.

⁶For Title II, FY 1981 level is estimate based on FY 1980.

⁷Figures from Treasury Department. Imputed U.S. share is roughly 25% for IBRD, ranges from 37% (1977) to 30% (1979) for International Development Association and from 8% to 9% for African Development Fund.

⁸Based on averaging planning figure for FY 1979-83.

⁹Estimates for calendar years.

¹⁰Assumes U.S. share is 30%.

CONCLUSION

ence all U.S.-Africa policy goals are simultaneously attainable or easily achieved, in the 1980s the United States will have to make some difficult choices, for example:

In endeavoring to help bring about sound development of African states, will the United States be willing to step out dramatically economic assistance? How best can such assistance be used?

What are legitimate defense needs of African states; where is the line between self-defense and partnership in superpower maneuvering?

What are the best ways to avoid East-West conflict in Africa—more economic assistance, investment, trade with the independent countries?

Is there a point where the idea of conflict avoidance may have to be subordinated to stop the exertion of political control through increased military assistance and advisers or even naked intervention in a strategic area?

How can we minimize the opportunities and gains of our global adversaries without interfering in the internal affairs of independent states?

In an effort to end racial injustice in southern Africa, is the United States doing all it can? What strategy is most likely to promote our objectives in that troubled region? How?

In encouraging respect for human rights elsewhere in Africa, can the United States do more in certain countries where they are still being violated (Libya or Ethiopia)? Is the U.S. house small enough in order to give credibility to U.S. demarches?

How can the United States better promote trade and investment to the mutual advantage of itself and African countries?

Has the United States done its fair share in responding to calls for humanitarian assistance—for drought victims, political refugees?

(Copies of the complete discussion paper, sub-Saharan Africa and the United States, may be purchased for \$2.50 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed when ordering 100 or more discussion papers mailed to the same address). ■

Background Notes on African Countries

Background Notes—a unique series of short, authoritative pamphlets on the countries of the world—are written by officers in the Department of State's geographical bureaus and edited and published by the Editorial Division of the Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs.

The 47 *Background Notes* on each country of sub-Saharan Africa includes information on the people, land, history, government, political conditions, economy, foreign relations, and U.S. policy. Included also are a profile, brief travel notes, maps, a list of principal government officials, and a reading list.

Background Notes may be purchased for 75¢ each from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (orders of 100 or more copies of the same *Notes* mailed to the same address are sold at a 25% discount). Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, in the form of a check or money order must accompany orders. ■



(AID photo)

Afghanistan: America's Course

by Secretary Vance

Address before the Council of Foreign Relations in Chicago on March 3, 1980.¹

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations has a proud tradition as a forum where major world issues can be explored and discussed. For nearly 60 years, this organization has been a center of thought, education, and reasoned debate on America's course in the world.

I want to speak with you today about that course. For as much as at any time in recent years, it is essential that our people be clear about our nation's goals and about the actions we are prepared to take in their pursuit.

As long as Americans remain in captivity in Iran, their safe release is uppermost in all our minds. The situation is now at a delicate and difficult stage. It would not be proper for me to comment on that situation in detail today.

Let me simply say that our objective is to bring the present crisis to an early end. We expect the work of the U.N. commission of inquiry to contribute to that objective. Our hostages must be released and safely returned to the United States. At the same time, we hope for an independent and secure Iran and have no desire to interfere in its internal affairs.

Today, I want to speak with you about another serious challenge we face: Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and the actions we have taken in response. Specifically, I want to discuss the purposes that underlie our actions and how they relate to the long-term goals of American foreign policy.

Let me begin by underscoring what is at stake.

Because of our commitment to the principles of national independence, territorial integrity, and human rights, we cannot turn our backs when national boundaries are violated, when the independence of another nation is destroyed, when the popular will is suppressed through brute military force.

What is at stake first in Afghanistan is the freedom of a nation and of a people.

We are concerned as well with the broader threat that Soviet actions pose to the region of southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. We now depend upon this area of the world for roughly 25% of our an-

nual imports of oil. Our allies and others—developing nations as well as industrial—are even more dependent on oil from this region. Approximately two-thirds of Western Europe's oil imports and three-fourths of Japan's come from the Persian Gulf. And we must remember that our own economic health is intimately tied to theirs.

Our stake in the region, however, goes beyond oil, beyond economics.

Peace and stability in the region are critical to the future of our friends there. The strength and skill we show in supporting their independence will demonstrate to them and to others the constancy of our purpose. This is important to the character of our alliances, to our ties to friendly nations in every region of the world, and to the future of our relations with the Soviet Union.

So it is entirely accurate to say that the vital interests of the United States—in fact, of much of the world—are involved in this region. An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be an assault on these vital interests. As the President has said: It "... will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Not even the most penetrating analysis can determine with certainty Soviet intentions in the region—whether their motives in Afghanistan are limited or part of a larger strategy. The fact is that tens of thousands of Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. The fact is that Soviet actions have created a potential threat to the security of nations in the region and to the world's free access to vital resources and shipping routes.

To respond firmly to the potential threat is not to be apocalyptic; it is simply to be prudent. In such a situation, our own people, our allies—and the leaders of the Soviet Union—must understand not only what the United States is doing in this crisis, but why.

A few days ago, I went to Europe at the President's request to consult with a number of our allies about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We discussed our common interests and our common responsibilities. I explained how America's

actions support five key objectives.

Today I want to outline them briefly for you and for the larger audience beyond this room.

U.S. Objectives

Our first purpose is to impose a heavy price for this aggression—because of our abhorrence of what is being done to the Afghan people and to help deter similar actions elsewhere. The Soviet leadership must understand that the international reaction to aggression will be swift and firm.

The steps we have taken—on grain on technology, on the Olympics, on fisheries, and in other areas—convey our determination in the clearest terms. These measures do not stand alone. For the Soviets are facing staunch, broadly based Afghan resistance. And they have been condemned by the overwhelming majority of nations in the world.

The measures we have taken involve sacrifice—for our farmers and our businessmen, our athletes, our scientists—indeed, for all of us. But the American people are prepared to make sacrifices for the peace we cherish.

The steps we have taken are also designed to move us toward our second goal: the withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

Let me affirm today that the sanctions we have undertaken in response to the Soviet invasion will remain in force until all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. Let me be equally clear that when those actions cease—when Soviet troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan—our intention is to remove the sanctions we have imposed since the invasion of that nation.

To encourage that withdrawal, we are also ready, as the President has said to support efforts by the international community to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghan Government that would be responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. With the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the United States would be willing join with Afghanistan's neighbors in a guarantee of Afghanistan's true neutrality and of noninterference in its internal

fairs. Such a political settlement would end an end to brutality and bloodshed in Afghanistan. It would threaten the interests of no nation; it would serve the interests of all.

But let me be frank. There are no signs at this time of a Soviet withdrawal. Anything, current signs point to the contrary, the Soviet buildup continues, and permanent facilities are being constructed.

This makes our third objective all the more important. While imposing penalties for aggression for as long as necessary, it is deeply in the interests of the United States and our allies to manage east-West relations in ways that preserve their essential framework.

Our relations with the Soviet Union have been and will be essentially competitive. Our fundamental values differ. Our interests frequently diverge. We will promote our interests and our values, and we will oppose aggression. But our competition must be bounded by restraint and sensitivity to each other's vital interests. For such a relationship between the two superpowers is central to peace.

We seek no return of the cold war, of an indiscriminate confrontation of earlier times.

We will continue to pursue our national interests in balanced and verifiable arms control agreements—in the SALT process, on conventional and theater nuclear forces in Europe, on banning tests of nuclear weapons, and in other areas. Specifically, the offer to negotiate an agreement on limiting theater nuclear forces in Europe remains on the table. The Soviet Union should pursue it with us.

Our nation has benefited from the arms control agreements we have achieved. In 1963, we halted poisonous nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. The SALT I Interim Agreement froze the number of offensive strategic missiles when the Soviets were building up in this area and we were not. The Antiballistic Missile Treaty headed off a potentially costly and destabilizing arms race in these defensive weapons.

The SALT II Treaty we have negotiated also serves America's security interests. It would restrain Soviet strategic programs through 1985. It would limit the threats we will face and thus make our own defense planning more certain. It would preserve our ability to monitor Soviet strategic developments. And it would permit our own modernization efforts to proceed.

SALT II is not a carrot. It is not a stick. It stands on its own merits as an integral part of our national security policy. It is especially important during a time of increased tension between the two superpowers.

We remain deeply committed to ratification of the treaty. It is not in our interest to forego its security advantages. Nor is it in our interest, during a period of heightened tensions, to dismantle the framework of East-West relations that has been built over more than two decades.

To help preserve this framework, and because we adhere to international law, we are not abrogating formal agreements with the Soviet Union.

We are pursuing preparations for the next review Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to be held this year in Madrid. We will continue our policy of building stronger relations with the nations of Eastern Europe. And we remain prepared to build a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union when circumstances permit.

Our fourth objective is to work with the nations of southwest Asia and with others to strengthen the security, stability, and independence of the region.

We firmly believe that the nations of the region should control their own destinies. Most emphatically, we believe that the resources of the region belong to its nations and peoples. Their independence poses no threat to us. The threat would lie in the loss of their independence.

We are strengthening our ability to respond swiftly and effectively if our vital interests are assaulted. We have increased our naval presence in the Indian Ocean. We have held positive discussions

with nations in the area on U.S. access to air and naval facilities. Our own military preparedness, however, is only one element of our strategy in the region. Creating a framework for security cooperation in the region must, of its essence, be a cooperative undertaking.

This means that we will work with the nations of the region to help strengthen their ability to defend their independence and enhance their political and economic stability. It means that we will continue to work with others toward peaceful resolutions of the tensions between nations in the region—most importantly, between Israel and its Arab neighbors. And it means that we will work to improve our relations with nations throughout the area, wherever there is a basis of shared interests. The United States welcomes the growing vitality of the Islamic world and sees in it a creative contribution to a world based on diversity and self-reliance.

Our fifth goal must be to draw from these events a renewed commitment to building the basic military and economic strength of America.

Our nation has initiated the most comprehensive modernization of our defense forces in over a decade. We will proceed expeditiously with the programs underway—to modernize each leg of our strategic forces, to implement NATO's decision last December on our theater nuclear weapons in Europe, and to upgrade our conventional forces.

Afghanistan brings the importance of those long-term defense investments into sharp focus, and it gives new focus to the need to increase our military mobility.

These programs will require increased defense budgets this year and for the foreseeable future. We must be clear in our determination to meet the requirements of safety and security for our nation and our allies.

Events in southwest Asia must also strengthen our determination to forestall a future energy disaster. For, quite simply, that is what we could face.

We should need no reminder of the costs and risks of our energy dependence.

... the sanctions we have undertaken in response to the Soviet invasion will remain in force until all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan.

It fuels our inflation. It strains the dollar. It drains our balance of payments. It increases our vulnerability.

The message is clear. Energy policy is central to our foreign policy. We cannot, over the long run, be independent, strong, and free and at the same time remain heavily dependent on foreign energy.

We have made some progress in the past few years. Our overall oil consumption was down in 1979. So was gasoline

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consumption. Under the President's leadership, we have taken important steps toward greater energy security. But, as the President has said, far more needs to be done. Gaining control over our energy future is an essential part of a prudent response to recent events in southwest Asia.

National Interests

Each of these objectives—to gain the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan, to deter further Soviet aggression, to manage sensibly U.S.-Soviet

factories, and our farms; it is rooted in the determination and good sense of our people when they are united in a common purpose. For the shape of our future depends on our will and our wisdom: the will to respond to aggression with renewed national strength and the wisdom to find, in our response to immediate crisis, a new national unity behind our foreign policy for the future.

That leads me to my final point.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had a definite impact on our foreign policy—on U.S.-Soviet relations and the common agenda with our allies. But it

Energy policy is central to our foreign policy. We cannot . . . be independent, strong, and free and at the same time remain heavily dependent on foreign energy.

relations in a period of heightened tensions, to help strengthen the nations in the region, and to build America's strength—each serves the interests not only of America but of all nations which have a stake in world peace and stability. And they involve the efforts of others as well as ourselves.

As we move ahead together, our allies need to know that the United States will remain strong. And we will.

They need to know that we are committed to the common defense. We are, and we will remain so.

They need to know, at the same time, that the United States, for its part, would welcome a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union. And we would.

We are not asking our allies to dismantle the framework of East-West relations. We do ask that they take measures designed to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and to deter the Soviets from new adventures that will produce new crises.

Detente cannot be divorced from deterrence. To oppose aggression now is to promote peace in the future—to foster the conditions for progress in East-West relations. To assume that we can obtain the benefits of detente while ignoring the need for deterrence would be shortsighted and dangerous. I am convinced that we will not do so.

As we work with other nations, we also seek the understanding and support of the American people behind the objectives I have described.

America's strength lies not only in our weapons and our laboratories, our

should not—it will not—turn us away from the fundamental goals our nation has been pursuing in the world. They remain deeply in our national interest.

- It is in our national interest to lend America's full support to the negotiation of peaceful solutions to regional tensions.

Festering regional disputes fuel local arms races that drain resources from pressing human needs. They present opportunities for foreign intervention and exploitation. And they can erupt into open conflicts that bring the threat of wider wars. Precisely because the world has become a more dangerous place in recent months, we will continue to work to defuse its dangers.

- It is in our national interest to continue to strengthen our traditional alliances, to open new relationships—as we have with China—and to stay on course in building cooperative relations with the developing world.

The best way to thwart Soviet interference in the Third World is to pursue our own affirmative policy there, one that addresses the real interests we share in the freedom of developing nations—freedom from the dominance of outside powers, from the bitterness of racial injustice, from the waste of regional conflict, from the burdens of poverty.

That strategy does not mean that we should hide our differences with developing countries. But we can work together most effectively on issues of critical importance to us when they know we share their goals of political independence and economic justice.

This approach builds on our strengths, for it is most often to the West that these nations first turn for assistance in meeting their economic and security concerns. And this approach is working. There are serious trouble spots. But the fact is that our relations with most of the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are stronger today than they have been in years.

- And finally, it is not only in our national character but deeply in our national interest to translate our dedication to freedom into practical support for human liberty in other nations.

Nations that respect the rights of their citizens, that are open to the expression and accommodation of conflicting views and interests, are in a stronger position to maintain their national balance and their national independence.

We are well aware that seething frustrations can explode into radicalism and violence which imperil America's interests. But it remains true that more often today, change is taking place peacefully, and it is leading toward human freedom.

It is in our interest to be part of the tide. And it is in our interest to defend human rights when they are threatened.

Indeed, a central issue raised for a world by Soviet actions in Afghanistan is one of human rights: the right to determine one's own government; the right to religious liberty; the right to live in peace.

We will continue to strive not to impose our own institutions but to help others give expression in their own way to the irrepressible human right to be free.

Ultimately, the purpose and the measure of our foreign policy are its impact on the lives of our people and others.

For over 200 years the United States has been on the side of freedom and progress. While we have known the world is a dangerous place, requiring our strength and our vigilance, we have also known that it need not be a hostile one. As the human condition is improved, as people everywhere find better and more secure lives, the world becomes a safer place for America.

It is this belief that has marked the American character throughout the life of our Republic. It remains our faith today.

¹ Press release 52 of March 4, 1980.

Question-and-Answer Session Following Chicago Address

Q. You referred to your discussions with French President Giscard d'Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who later, after the invasion of Afghanistan, issued a strong statement bolstering alliance unity. Nevertheless, many analysts have commented on the frictions within the alliance in recent months. How unified are our European allies behind you on policy in the Middle East and southwest Asia?

A. First, let me say that what we're talking about is a set of common objectives, a set of common goals.

The principal purpose of my trip was to discuss with the leaders of the nations which I visited both our assessment of the threat we faced and the short-term and the long-term goals we saw them. In addition to that, we then discussed the question of what actions should be taken to achieve those objectives.

Insofar as the assessment of the threat was concerned and both the short-term and long-term goals, I found that there was a great degree of similarity—that we were, indeed, on the same track. When it came to the question of specific actions, there were differences of views on some of the items. I think that is to be understood—it is understandable to me. We will be continuing our consultations as we work together to implement these common goals and objectives, and we will be seeking to find both common actions and parallel actions which will lead to the achievement of the common goals.

I believe, contrary to much of what we hear from time to time, that there is unity among us.

Q. A number of the questions, predictably, deal with different aspects of the situation in Iran and Afghanistan. A number complain about why our allies allegedly haven't provided us with more support; a number ask about the Olympics. Will we, in fact, go through with the boycott? How comparable is the current situation to the Olympics in Nazi Germany in 1936? Are we hurting our athletes and ourselves more than we're hurting the Soviets?

A. Let me start with the latter and then you will have to remind me of what each of the others is. [Laughter]

Insofar as the Olympics is concerned, we have taken our decision on the Olympics, and we have said that we would not participate in Olympics which were being held in the capital of a nation which is invading another nation. That decision has been taken; that is our decision. That is the decision that we will follow.

Q. Among the critics of the Administration's strong response to the Afghan invasion have been Ronald Reagan and George Kennan. Kennan noted that from a geopolitical point of view, there is merit to the view which allegedly has been stated by Mr. Reagan, that it would make more sense to take a strong action against Cuba, 90 miles from our shores, than to seek to influence Soviet behavior 5,000 miles away in a country located on the Soviet border. What is your response?

A. My response is that the suggestion by Mr. Kennan is very difficult for me to understand. To suggest that we should blockade Cuba at this point, with all the dangers that that would carry with it—and we have memories of that back in 1962—does not, in my judgment, make sense at this time.

I think it is very clear that there is a danger to our vital national interests and to those of our allies posed by the action which has been taken in Afghanistan by the Soviets in sending tens of thousands of troops into that country, is not only violating all the precepts of the U.N. Charter, international law but also the human rights of the people of that country, and at the same time, posing a threat to the surrounding countries; and as I indicated earlier, a potential threat also to the vital interests which we all have in the flow of oil from that important region.

Therefore, it seems to me that is where we should concentrate our attention; and that view is shared by our allies.

Q. A number of questions from the audience follow up on your point

about the need for a strong defense. People are concerned, specifically, about the problems with the volunteer military. Will the proposals for draft registration of young men and authority to register young women lead to conscription? And do you have views on what should be the limits on women in terms of service in combat units?

A. On the question of conscription of draft, I have very strong personal views. I've held them for a long while. They often don't agree with other people's views.

I think it was a mistake to do away with the draft and go to a volunteer army. I believe not only should there be a draft, but I believe there should be universal service and that everyone should have to serve their government. I do not believe that that service necessarily has to be military service, but they should give at least 1 year to some kind of service to their country.

Q. There is a question referring to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey a year ago when the majority of the respondents expressed great concern about the declining position of the United States in the world. When asked for the principal reason for this decline, the greatest number of respondents attributed the decline to the diminishing value of the U.S. dollar, not to growing Soviet military power. The question is, what has the Carter Administration done, or is it doing, to arrest the decline of the dollar?

A. One of the main things which the Administration must do in connection with the problem of the dollar is to take the necessary steps on the energy front, which I talked about. That is a key element of the actions which we must take there because that has a very major impact on what happens to the value of the dollar.

In addition to that, obviously, we must take steps here at home to curb inflation, and that, I think, is obviously the key domestic item at this point and the one to which this Administration and the Congress must address their attention now and in the months ahead.

Q. There are a number of questions about different aspects of energy problems and our international relationships dealing therewith. What are the chances that the International Energy Agency (IEA) may be made, in the reasonably near future, into an effective consumers' cartel or consumers' alliance to oppose the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries?

A. My judgment is that the International Energy Agency will continue to operate generally as it is at the present time, and that is that it will serve as a body which can be called into action at such time as prices rise above the trigger point, when it will then become necessary for them—namely the 20 nations that participate in the IEA—to share the burden which is being thrust upon them. I believe it will adhere to that form rather than taking a different form.

Q. Many are concerned about the effects of the grain embargo on food producers and processors. The *London Economist* has argued that U.S. farmers or taxpayers are more likely to be hurt, possibly, than the Soviet Union. What are the economic consequences in the United States and how much are we hurting the Soviet Government through this embargo?

A. On the latter question, I think that the grain embargo on 17 million tons that will not be shipped by the United States is having an effect and will have an effect on the Soviet Union. I believe it will also have an effect on some of the countries which are dependent upon the Soviet Union in this area, so that I think that the grain embargo, in its combined action and effect, will be meaningful.

It is an action which requires sacrifice, but, as I have said, others are going to have to sacrifice and are sacrificing. This is necessary if we are going to take the steps to demonstrate our firmness and our resolve in light of the situation which faces us, which is, indeed, a critical situation.

Q. The Vietnamese have been creating a good deal of havoc in Kampuchea and elsewhere in the region. There is also the poignant question covered in a *New York Times Magazine* article yesterday on children of American servicemen who were left behind in Vietnam. How likely is it that we will be establishing diplomatic relations with Vietnam in the near future, diplomatic relations of some kind? And how ominous is it that the Vietnamese Army will continue to make significant gains in that region?

A. I think that it is unlikely that we will be establishing relations with Vietnam in the near future. At the outset of the Carter Administration, we indicated that we would be prepared to move in that direction should there be reciprocity on the other side.

First, we were met with demands from the Vietnamese for "reparations," as they called them. We said, under no circumstances would that be done, and that was a block which remained in the way of any progress until they withdrew that. At about the time they withdrew it, however, they embarked upon the program of pushing out into the sea tens of thousands of refugees—the "boat people." At the same time that they were doing this, they were preparing themselves for the invasion of Kampuchea.

We told them at that time that as long as these two actions on their part

continued that we could not make progress on normalization. There has been some progress made in the area of the boat people; there has been a moratorium for a period of time on the boat people being pushed out of Vietnam. But insofar as Kampuchea is concerned, Vietnamese troops remain in Kampuchea and have not been withdrawn and, therefore, this remains an obstacle.

In the long run, we would like to normalize relationships, but we have dealt with these pressing issues, and these kinds of issues must be removed before we can come to that point.

Q. In the view of some, there is greater threat to world stability posed by the instability that might result in Eastern Europe through the death of President Tito. Is the Soviet Union likely to exploit any crisis situation that might develop after Tito's death and seek to reverse the world balance of power?

A. The leadership in Yugoslavia is able, strong, resolved; and we have confidence that in a post-Tito period, they can lead their nation with strength and wisdom.

Insofar as we are concerned, we fully support their staunch position with respect to the importance of the independence, their sovereignty, and their territorial integrity.

Insofar as our own relations are concerned, our relations with Yugoslavia are good—indeed, I think they are deep and strong. I do not believe that in the post-Tito period that there is danger to Yugoslavia. It is a good, strong leadership, and they will be able to lead their country well and wisely.

Press release 52A of Mar. 4, 1980. ■

\$787 Million Request for Economic and Security Assistance

*Statements by Goler T. Butcher, Assistant Administrator for Africa of the Agency for International Development (AID), and Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 7, 1980.*¹

IRS. BUTCHER

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss AID's economic assistance program for Africa. I acknowledge with appreciation the support of this committee for our program in Africa.

For FY 1981 the Africa Bureau is requesting a total of \$533.1 million; this includes \$140 million in economic support funds (\$90 million for southern Africa and \$50 million for Sudan).

This compares with recent AID levels for Africa of \$219 million in FY 1977 (which included \$54 million in security supporting assistance); \$329.7 million in FY 1978 (which included \$10.7 million in security supporting assistance); \$317.2 million in FY 1979 (which included \$53 million for economic support funds, and \$15 million for African refugees); and a planned FY 1980 program of \$455.7 million (including \$118 million for economic support funds).

In addition in FY 1981 we are announcing PL 480 programs totaling \$205 million. This compares with \$169 million in FY 1979 and \$142 million in FY 1978. Title III programs have been started in Sudan and are being developed for Senegal in FY 1980 and Somalia in FY 1981. We will be preparing food for development programs in other countries either through title I or title II of section 206 during the year.

While our AID levels for Africa have been increasing steadily in recent years, inflation both in the United States and Africa, and the addition of new country programs have offset much of the apparent increase in resources for the Africa program. Relative to the severe problems Africa faces in the 1980s, available development resources are extremely limited.

Africa's development problems, often due to factors beyond the control of national states, are complex and in many cases worsening. These prob-

lems, however, can be solved. The sub-Saharan portion of the continent has the potential for self-sustaining economic development and for an important economic role in the international community. Its markets and exports may now be modest in global terms, but in the coming two decades Africa's contribution can be significant and critical to a rapidly growing world demand for vital minerals—for oil as well as for raw materials and food supplies—in addition to providing investment opportunities and new markets.

Untapped Potential

I would like to discuss further the significance of Africa's untapped potential.

With world food shortages projected to reach near 100 million tons by 1995, Africa possesses sufficient underutilized land and water resources to feed its growing population and eventually to be a net exporter of food. In many areas only 10% of the arable land is under cultivation and major irrigation resources go undeveloped.

In an increasingly energy deficient world, the greatest undeveloped hydroenergy capacity is in Africa. Today 80% of the population's energy needs are satisfied by wood burning, a factor which contributes significantly to desertification. Over time, combination efforts in reforestation, hydropower, and coal development can reduce the heavy economic vulnerability Africa faces from current reliance on cutting forests and costly imported energy and could release surplus energy for world consumption.

In the past, illiteracy and unusually difficult health conditions have limited the full utilization of Africa's significant human resources. Today, literacy is expanding significantly, and health conditions are improving. The peoples of Africa have developed great skill in locally adapted agricultural techniques. If supplemented by outside technology, productivity can be considerably enlarged.

Sub-Sahara Africa is, minerally speaking, the most unexplored of the world's accessible regions. There are known mineral resources yet to be exploited. There is great promise of new mineral wealth. The United States will become increasingly dependent on regular supplies of Africa's petroleum and is already importing other strategic

minerals, such as vanadium, chrome, manganese, and uranium. The growing interdependence between Africa and the United States is only beginning to be felt.

The Third World, specifically Africa, was the fastest growing market for U.S. exports in the 1970s. We now sell more goods to the developing world than we do to Europe and Japan. One out of nine industrial jobs in the United States today is due to exports to the Third World. These trends, mutually beneficial to both Africa and the United States, can show continuous growth only if economic stagnation can be avoided and minimum acceptable levels of development progress sustained.

Key Problems

There are, however, serious and often alarming problems which, in aggregate, could severely inhibit Africa's potential for economic growth and social progress.

We have highlighted, in the Africa overview of the congressional presentation, the most serious of these trends and their implications. In this regard, we believe that we must take the necessary steps in succeeding years; first, to concentrate our efforts in the five most serious problem areas; second, to encourage much greater intra-African development cooperation; and third, to redouble our collaboration efforts with other Western and OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) donors and international organizations.

Regarding the key problems, we will in FY 1981 begin more systematically to harmonize resources from all the development assistance accounts, economic support funds, and PL 480 to have a greater impact on five core constraints in Africa.

The highest priority will be given to reversing the sub-Sahara's declining per capita food productivity. While overall food production has increased, it has fallen behind population growth. We will be working with international groups and other donors in coming months to reevaluate past strategies and, where appropriate, to propose new directions. We have highlighted in the overview some of the important actions that must be taken.

An employment strategy must be developed to create critically needed

jobs for rapidly growing populations. The modern sector labor force in Africa is enlarging by more than 9% annually, whereas jobs are increasing by less than 1%. Aside from job formation in rural sectors, we must increasingly encourage the U.S. private sector to assist.

We will work to substantially expand the public access of poor populations to improved health and family planning, basic agricultural services, safer water, sanitation, and improved rural transportation systems. These are imperative if progress is to be made in social and economic development.

We will seek broader methods of attacking the key absorptive capacity constraints in Africa, the shortage of skilled and trained human resources. Broader participation in the benefits of development will be sought through nonformal and agricultural education, vocational training, and professional-level training and greater participation of women in development.

We will increase support for energy programs—including afforestation, renewable energy technologies, and soil conservation—to begin to address the twin and interrelated problems of energy shortage and desertification. Fifty-two percent of Africa's land area today is desert or subject to desertification, far greater than any other developing region.

Even with our most efficient concentration on these core constraints, we are seeking more and more to facilitate new forms of intraregional development cooperation between African states. Since 1970 trade between African states has declined from 18% of all trade to 12%. At a recent colloquium on trade and investment opportunities in Africa, U.S. companies identified the phenomenon of small national markets in Africa as a major disincentive to U.S. private investment. Many of Africa's difficulties today stem from the colonial fragmentation of the continent.

Today, increasingly, there is recognition by donors and Africans of the need to institutionalize African subregional cooperation, resolve common problems, exploit common resources—such as river basins—engage in selective market integration, and participate in joint projects that address national priorities. We will increase our support to African efforts in economic and development cooperation.

For instance, in southern Africa the five front-line states are working together on a plan for a systematic

process of cooperation, starting in transportation and later moving to other areas in agricultural research, food production, livestock diseases, and technical training. They have indicated their desire that Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, and eventually independent Zimbabwe and Namibia join in this important precedent. These fledgling steps initiated by the front-line states in pluralistic approaches to economic cooperation merit the strongest support.

In FY 1981, we are proposing new regional programs in transportation and technical education to support the southern African initiatives. These new regional programs will also provide us the means, if appropriate, to respond to assistance requirements of a new elected government in Zimbabwe within the framework of the priority regional development concerns.

We will continue to support similar region-specific forms of collaboration in the Lake Kivu crescent, among the Economic Community of West African States, and in East Africa.

As I turn to the issue of project evaluation and program impact, I would like to recall the development situation which confronted most African nations at independence.

Development Situation in the 1960s and 1970s

There were very few institutions of higher learning, virtually no agricultural research institutions working on food crops, and extremely limited major infrastructure and health care services. Disease was widespread, illiteracy pervasive, and the departure of colonial technicians left services and facilities unfunctioning in many countries, as few if any Africans had been prepared for higher level positions. These were beginnings not faced in most other developing regions.

In the 1960s, U.S. assistance to Africa was very limited and represented between 3% and 4% of total worldwide U.S. aid.

The primary objective of U.S. economic assistance in Africa through the 1960s and early 1970s was to help develop the manpower, limited infrastructure, and institutional bases for short-term national integration and eventual efforts of macroeconomic development. Progress toward achieving these objectives is indicated by the following accomplishments.

In Nigeria AID financed contract teams from a dozen U.S. universities cooperated with Nigeria to expand facilities to reshape the Nigerian education system. Teacher-training institutions were expanded or created. Comprehensive secondary schools were developed at Ayetoro and Port Harcourt offering, for the first time ever in Nigeria, vocational and commercial courses. A technical college was developed at Ibadan. Several faculties of agriculture were developed, as well as school of veterinary medicine. Considerable effort was devoted to establishing and training the faculty for the University of Nigeria—now with approximately 7,000 students.

Vocational training institutions were established in Togo, Guinea, Zaire, Benin, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Niger by 1965.

By the early 1970s, AID had supported the establishment or expansion of the faculties of eight higher education and 26 subprofessional institutions in Africa (including teacher-training institutions). In the period 1960-70, AID assisted in building institutions—including 15,000 classrooms housing 800,000 students—in which agriculture, education, and veterinary medicine degrees have been granted to 3,000 students and certificates awarded to another 14,000 during the period and in which in-service training had been provided to more than 100,000 teachers and training in U.S. or third-country institutions of higher education was provided to 14,000 participants.

One hundred million people in West and central Africa have been vaccinated against smallpox. The disease was eliminated from the area. (Later, with U.S. assistance, the World Health Organization eliminated smallpox from Ethiopia and Somalia and, with the successful conclusion of these campaigns, eliminated it entirely from the face of the Earth.)

Twenty million children in West and central Africa have been protected from measles.

More than 5 million people in Ethiopia were protected from malaria and new farm lands were opened in areas earlier affected by malaria.

In infrastructure in the decade of the 1960s, the Volta hydroelectric project and related projects added 500,000 kilowatts of electric power generation and added considerably to Ghana's industrial potential.

Throughout Africa road systems were extended by 8,500 miles. AID

participated with other donors in constructing the Trans-Cameroon Railway which has contributed substantially to Cameroon's impressive growth rates.

The programs started in the mid-1970s in response to the new directions mandate, the Sahelian drought, and the concern over the plight of the southern African states are still too new to determine the full magnitude of their impact. There has already been a discernible increase in food production in the Sahel.

U.S. Programs

AID together with numerous other donors has been deeply involved in this effort. In addition assistance to agriculture research has increased with the creation, in Africa, of the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture and the International Livestock Center for Africa. Applied research in cereal crops—rice, maize (corn), sorghum, and millet—has been expanded. Seed multiplication programs are being supported in every region of the continent.

In Kenya AID assisted in nearly tripling the numbers of Agriculture Finance Corporation loans made to small farmers in the period 1971-79 (from 0,000 to 30,000). In addition AID contributed significantly to the successful research efforts leading to the introduction and widespread utilization by small farmers of Kenyan hybrid maize which increased small-holder production by as much as 25% per hectare.

In Tanzania AID has assisted in institutionalizing the capability to train maternal child health aides to staff 600 rural dispensaries and 184 rural health centers throughout Tanzania. It is estimated that 70-80% of women of childbearing age are attending maternal child health clinics staffed by these trained aides.

Overall literacy rates in Africa have risen rapidly and health programs have been steadily lowering infant mortality and adult morbidity.

But our expectations of impact and success should be evaluated with an historical perspective. Our general assistance policies of the 1960s and even early 1970s held that the former colonial powers were primarily responsible for assisting Africa's development. Moreover, policies were accepted that concentrated U.S. assistance to Africa in only 10 of the now more than 46

countries. AID had virtually no bilateral programs in Francophone and southern Africa until the 1970s.

New U.S. Initiatives

The program for which we are requesting your support recognizes the role of AID as a catalytic though minor donor in Africa. In terms of overall assistance flows to Africa, AID will provide in FY 1981 approximately 8%. We believe, however, that our programs fall into the areas of the most critical

U.S. Aid to Refugees in Somalia

Two cargo planes carrying 166,000 pounds of medical supplies arrived in Mogadishu, Somalia, on January 23, 1980. These shipments, worth about \$313,000, are the first deliveries of nonfood aid for relief of refugees in Somalia. The U.S. Government has pledged \$2.5 million in nonfood aid to meet refugee needs as determined by the Government of Somalia and the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. Future shipments, which will be coordinated by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, will include blankets, tents, cloth, used clothing, and kitchen utensils.

While the problem of refugees in the Horn of Africa is severe, it has received little publicity. There are more than 475,000 refugees in camps in Somalia, and there may be as many as 700,000 living outside the camps. A recent U.N. study estimates the number in camps will reach 600,000 by the end of this year. That could mean over a million refugees in a country whose normal population is estimated at 4 million. Most of the refugees are nomads or subsistence farmers fleeing the fighting in Ethiopia. Their plight has been aggravated by poor "short rains" this past autumn.

In addition to nonfood aid, the United States, through Food for Peace, is providing 13,400 metric tons of various food commodities worth about \$3.7 million. These shipments should begin arriving in February. Requests for additional assistance are under consideration by the U.S. Government.

Press release 18 of Jan. 23, 1980. ■

priorities and where the United States has special capabilities. Our assistance, hopefully, can be the linchpin in rendering other donor assistance more effective. In this regard, we are participating in several new initiatives.

In December 1979 the concerted action program for Africa was announced. Through this process of concertation with the five major Western donors, in close collaboration with Africans, more concentrated resources can be brought to bear in major programs of a regional nature that might not get underway in a normal bilateral project approach.

In June of this year we will meet with other Development Assistance Committee donors, six OPEC nations, and with Africans to consider some key problem strategies in food production, energy, transportation, and employment. We will present to the OPEC funding sources a number of projects for cofinancing. We believe that mechanisms can be found to assist the OPEC funds in designing projects so that OPEC's low rates of disbursement to Africa can be consistent with their pledges.

In southern Africa, the southern African development analysis, sent to Congress in April 1979, was completed in close cooperation with Africans and other donors. As a result there are several projects that will be undertaken as multidonor programs. The major effort will be in transport rehabilitation, the critical short-term problem of the area.

Later this year we will be encouraging the organization of a "coming together" of donors and African states to completely reevaluate our collective approaches to food production, to see where and how the currently declining per capita food productivity trends can be reversed. No other economic problem in Africa has higher priority.

In Africa today we find a continent with the capability of sustaining its socioeconomic growth and contributing to U.S. and global needs. In Africa today we find a continent with the resources and markets increasingly needed by the United States and other Western countries. But this potential is shadowed by the fact that Africa today lies squarely in the path of the food, energy, and ecological crises projected for the world as a whole later in this century. Moreover, the indivisible link between U.S. political and economic interests and African development is now a demonstrable fact.

We must, therefore, redouble our efforts to participate with Africa in the

fullest realization of the continent's human and economic potential. The FY 1981 budget before you is an important first step in the initiation of such a policy for the 1980s and 1990s.

MR. MOOSE

It is a pleasure to appear again before this committee which has done so much to promote an effective and enlightened policy toward Africa.

Recent events, especially in Rhodesia, offer convincing evidence that the basic direction of this Administration's policy toward Africa is sensible and sound. We are under no illusion that there are many problems that remain, both in southern Africa and elsewhere on the continent; however, we are convinced that in the long run, our national interest and the interests of African states are best served by our continued contributions to the growth of strong, economically viable nations in Africa.

Our efforts, therefore, will continue to be directed toward that end through our development assistance, through the economic support fund, through our security assistance, and through our contributions to international development lending institutions.

Aid alone, however, is not sufficient: There is an equal if not greater need for more U.S. trade and investment. Far more than is the case on other continents, Africa's economic strength will depend on transnational, regional cooperation. We hope to use our resources to encourage regional economic cooperation as well as development on a national basis.

At the moment, our diplomacy has the following major goals:

- To help consolidate the historic breakthrough achieved at Lancaster House;
- To carry forward our negotiations toward an internationally acceptable transition to majority rule in Namibia;
- To continue to promote the concept of human rights in Africa and, most specifically, in South Africa; this, of course, includes our efforts to assist refugees throughout Africa; and
- To assure that key African states remain willing to support us in our efforts to protect and promote a peaceful international political order.

Our economic and security assistance programs in Africa provide tangi-

ble resources without which policy must remain rhetoric. The proposed total for FY 1981 is \$787 million. This includes \$393 million in development assistance, \$140 million in economic support funds, over \$205 million in PL 480 food aid (including titles, I, II, and III and our contribution to the World Food Program but not emergency feeding programs), and over \$49 million in military aid—\$45.5 in foreign military sales (FMS) credits, and \$3.7 for the international military educational and training (IMET) program.

Mrs. Butcher has described for you the objectives that we hope to achieve with \$393 million in development assistance. I shall concentrate my remarks on our proposals for economic support funds, FMS, and IMET for FY 1981.

Economic Support Funds

Our economic support funds will provide the underpinning for our policy in two critical areas—the Sudan and southern Africa. For the Sudan the proposed level of \$50 million is the same as that requested for FY 1980. For southern Africa we are requesting \$90 million, an increase of \$22 million over what we hope will be appropriated for FY 1980.

In the Sudan, President Nimeiri has been supportive of the search for peace in the Middle East and of our actions on both the Iranian and Afghan crises. He has demonstrated an equally courageous commitment to development in spite of the fact that the initial measures required, such as price stabilization, have exposed him to domestic political risk. Our \$50 million in economic support fund assistance, which takes the form of financing commodity imports vital to development, will help the Sudan overcome one major development constraint—a severe and continuing balance-of-payments shortage. It is designed to complement and support our project and PL 480 assistance (including a title III food for development program) and to support the economic reforms suggested by the International Monetary Fund.

The remaining \$90 million in economic support funds will be devoted to development in southern Africa. As you are all aware, the next few months may determine whether or not we are, in fact, entering a new era in this region. We currently face the twin challenges of fragile independence for Zimbabwe and economic reconstruction in the region. As you all know, residual hos-

tilities and suspicions continue to threaten the momentum toward peace. Our support, both economic and political, will continue to be required even more in the future than it has been in the past.

The economic support fund program for southern Africa will support the peace in several ways.

- It will provide an immediate response to humanitarian needs generated by conflict and resettlement.
- It will stimulate development by easing immediate balance-of-payment constraints and facilitating the importation of essential commodities.
- It will foster an integrated, regional approach to rehabilitating and extending regional transportation link upon which sustained development in this area must depend.

In short, our aid will both respond to and reinforce the basic desire for economic progress, which can be achieved once peace and stability come to the region.

Three countries will be the direct bilateral recipients of southern Africa economic support funds. In Zambia the money will be used for programs aimed primarily at financing imports of commodities required for increasing food production and covering foreign exchange shortfalls. In Mozambique our assistance will support improved farm production and enhanced food distribution and storage capacity. In Botswana we will continue to support transportation, food production, and rural development projects.

We realize that aid to Mozambique is controversial. There are continuing signs that despite its Marxist ideology the Mozambican regime is attempting to build a sound basis for economic progress and wants expanded economic contact with us. We believe that U.S. aid will encourage such pragmatism as enable Mozambique—which provides vital transport links between the sea and South Africa and four other states in the region—to play the constructive role that it *must* play in order to support the economic consequences of the peace. I should add that Mozambique made a significant contribution to the success of the negotiations at Lancaster House, particularly in their final stages, and since then the Government of Mozambique has cooperated with [British Governor] Lord Soames' administration in Salisbury.

As you can see, our economic support fund aid to southern Africa is developmental in its orientation.

In addition to the bilateral programs I have just described, we are opposing a regional program aimed at strengthening efforts toward closer economic coordination by the countries of southern Africa. Improvement of the transport system, as well as manpower training, are high priority sectors to which we intend to contribute. Beyond this, however, the economic support program is intended to support an explicitly political scenario—the peaceful reintegration of southern Africa. It also provides us with the flexibility that we need to deal with the unexpected. This brings me to my final subject, Zimbabwe.

At the time of the Lancaster House talks, the United States indicated that, subject to congressional approval, it could be prepared to cooperate in a multilateral effort to assist in the agricultural and economic development of independent Zimbabwe within the framework of a wider development concept for southern Africa as a whole. Our planning in this effort is at a very preliminary stage. The regional activities I have just mentioned would provide solid benefits for Zimbabwe. Following discussions with the new government, expected to be formed in March, we will be in a better position to discuss in specific terms the needs of this new nation and our assistance alternatives.

Finally, let me mention the proposed worldwide special requirements aid of \$50 million that the Administration is proposing for FY 1981. It is designed to enable the President to respond quickly to unforeseen situations such as economic problems resulting from political upheavals, balance-of-payments crises, or natural disasters—occurring between budgetary cycles. While we cannot predict now to what uses such a fund will be put in Africa during FY 1981, I am sure the committee can appreciate how welcome such aid would have been to us for use in countries such as Uganda and Equatorial Guinea in FY 1980 and how important it could be during the next fiscal year.

MS and IMET

Let me begin my testimony on our proposed security assistance programs for FY 1981 by explaining briefly how we determine which countries should be opposed for an FMS program and the context in which our African programs operate.

A number of factors are weighed and balanced before we determine that the security of the United States and world peace would be promoted through our entering into an FMS relationship with a given country, whether it be in Africa or elsewhere. These factors include, but are not limited to:

- Our political and economic relationship with that country;
- The nature of the threat posed to its security;
- The nature of its defense supply relationships with other nations;
- A possible desire to facilitate U.S. access to a country's military facilities; and
- The priority of the country within the region and on a worldwide basis.

In the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (Section 18, PL 96-92), the Congress expressed its opinion that the problems of sub-Saharan Africa are primarily those of economic development, that U.S. policy should assist in limiting military conflict in that region, and that the President should exercise restraint in selling or providing financing for defense articles and services to that continent.

To date, we have pursued a policy of arms restraint in Africa, and we have not wished to become involved in an arms race on that continent. We have done so despite the massive transfers of arms by Soviet bloc nations to Africa since 1975. While we continue to believe that it is in our—and Africa's—long-term interests to direct our primary efforts to fulfilling the basic economic and developmental needs of African nations, we realize that events elsewhere in the world, especially to the northeast of Africa, are having an impact upon the African Continent itself. We cannot ignore those events nor can we turn a deaf ear to requests from friendly African nations for the upgrading and/or expansion of their military establishments.

For FY 1981, we are proposing an FMS program totaling \$45.5 million and IMET programs totaling \$3.7 million.

In the time remaining, I would like to review briefly with you our major country programs. Before I do so, however, let me say a brief word about our IMET programs. For FY 1981, we are proposing IMET grants for 20 African nations. The value of these programs cannot be measured in dollar terms.

Through IMET, we are able each year to bring to U.S. military schools African officers who often return to their countries to play leadership roles. The education they receive, the friendships they make, the impressions of the United States with which they return, all contribute to making this program one of our least costly but nevertheless most important.

For FY 1981, we are proposing an FMS program of \$30 million and an IMET program of \$746,000 for the Sudan.

As you are well aware, the Sudan, under the leadership of President Nimeiri, has played and continues to play a crucial role in inter-African affairs and as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. President Nimeiri's support for the Camp David accords is a matter of record. Domestically, the Government of the Sudan has followed a policy of political reconciliation, an ambitious economic development program coupled with economic reforms and efforts to assist with a growing refugee population numbering over 350,000 persons.

\$5 Million Pledged for Rhodesian Refugees

On January 23 the Department of State notified the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) that in response to its appeal of January 14, the United States would pledge a total of \$5 million to that organization for use in the repatriation of the more than 200,000 Rhodesian refugees. The UNHCR, which is coordinating the refugee repatriation effort in cooperation with other international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, expects to begin this operation later this month.

The return of refugees to Rhodesia was an integral part of the Lancaster House agreement on a settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. The United States fully supports the complete and successful implementation of that accord. It is our hope that our support of the return of refugees and their reestablishment in their nation will contribute to the ongoing process of reconciliation and peaceful change in Zimbabwe.

Unnumbered press release. ■

We believe strongly that it is in our national interest to support the Government of Sudan. Sudan is expected to use the FMS funds to finance a military modernization program. The Government of Sudan may wish to purchase engineering and air defense equipment and other equipment, such as armored vehicles and artillery for self-defense.

The proposed IMET program, which would provide some 50 officers with professional/technical training in U.S. military schools in FY 1981, complements the acquisition of U.S. weapons and provides training in the essentials of modern military management.

The stability and economic strength of Zaire are important to the United States and our Western allies. We cannot agree with those who would have us wash our hands of Zaire's problems. To do so, we believe, would not be in our national interest. Instead, our policy begins with the premise that Zaire's strategic location, as well as its deposits of strategic minerals, renders that country's welfare important to us. Zaire's economic problems remain acute, as do its problems related to political participation and military accountability. Our position is that, together with our allies and the international financial institutions, we shall continue to assist Zaire's efforts to correct these problems as long as sustained progress is also made by the Government of Zaire in these same areas.

Our security assistance program for Zaire has already proven valuable in both Shaba invasions, when U.S.-provided spare parts, petroleum products, rations, medical supplies, and C-130s were of considerable assistance to the Zairian Armed Forces. We continue to be receptive to the Government of Zaire's request for modest security assistance and, in cooperation with our allies, expect that this assistance will contribute to the creation of a more disciplined and mobile armed forces. For FY 1981 we are proposing FMS financing of \$8 million, which we expect the Government of Zaire to use for the maintenance and support of previously supplied C-130 and Cessna aircraft, as well as U.S.-origin transport communications equipment. Zaire may also request financing to purchase ammunition and basic transport and communications equipment for those brigades currently being trained by the French and Belgians.

Our proposed \$897,000 in IMET for Zaire includes command and staff

college-level courses plus a broad program in basic and advanced military operations, logistics, and maintenance.

We are proposing a \$1 million FMS program and a \$50,000 IMET program for Cameroon. For a nation which has played a lead role in international fora as a moderate, and one which has made considerable progress in economic development, our modest security assistance is designed to help strengthen Cameroon's defense capabilities and help diversify its sources for defense purchases. We expect Cameroon to request use of these proposed funds to purchase jeeps, trucks, communications equipment, and spare parts. The proposed IMET program would provide training for four or five officers in engineering, logistics, and communications courses.

We are proposing a \$1.2 million FMS program and a \$249,000 IMET program for Liberia, whose small Armed Forces depend almost entirely on U.S. assistance for equipment and military training. For one of our oldest and closest friends in Africa, U.S. support is designed to contribute to the modernization of Liberia's Armed Forces. Our proposal is, indeed, a modest one. Liberia has supported the United States in many ways: through its moderate positions in international fora, through the responsible leadership exercised by President Tolbert at home and in the Organization of African Unity, and through the important communications facilities we maintain in Liberia. We expect the Liberian Government to request FMS training to purchase support vehicles, field and engineering equipment, and mortar and small arms ammunition. Some of these credits may also be used for military housing construction. The IMET program would provide training for officers in operations, maintenance, and supply courses in the United States or one military training team to train a unit of personnel in Liberia.

The \$500,000 proposal FMS and the \$30,000 IMET program are designed to improve Botswana's ability to defend its neutrality and control its borders. The small defense force Botswana formed in 1977 for border patrols requires additional vehicles and equipment. A small but well-equipped border defense force can be important in helping secure Botswana's territory from those who would use it for infiltration purposes.

For FY 1981, we are proposing new FMS programs in four countries—

Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, and Gabon. A are modest programs, and their total value is \$4.8 million.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Africa's Refugee

by Frank E. Loy

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 13, 1980. Ambassador Loy is Deputy U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.*¹

I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss assistance for African refugees. As you are well aware, refugee problems are of an immense magnitude in Africa. Yet they are often overshadowed by developments in other parts of the world. In the past, this subcommittee has played a key role in focusing attention on African refugee problems, as well as in generating congressional support for increased U.S. contributions for both bilateral and multilateral refugee assistance. I look forward to working with you to make sure that the United States does all it can do to strengthen international relief efforts in Africa.

This hearing is particularly timely because just 2 days ago Karl Beck, the officer responsible for Africa in the State Department's Office of Refugee Programs, returned from a 2-week tour to the Horn of Africa to assess current needs and the adequacy of existing international relief programs and contingency planning.

This hearing is also timely because recent developments in southern Africa and the Horn have forced the international community to reassess the need for outside refugee assistance in Africa. On January 14, 1980, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued a special appeal for Zimbabwean repatriation. In the next few days, we expect the U.N. Secretary General to issue a sizable appeal for assistance to Somalia.

To date, the Administration has requested a total of \$95 million in food and nonfood aid for African refugees for FY 1980. The nonfood items are valued at \$49.85 million. Of this, we already

have contributed \$16.9 million to the regular African program of the UNHCR. This figure represents one-third of the UNHCR's announced 1980 budget for Africa of \$50.3 million.

The urgency we attach to African refugee needs is reflected in the fact that we already have contributed all of our one-third contributions this early in the year. At the same time, we have committed \$5 million of section 533 economic support funds to the UNHCR's appeal for Zimbabwean repatriation and have received assurance that our \$5 million, together with the amounts contributed by other donors, will insure adequate funding for the current phase of that operation.

Meanwhile, we are aware that due to the situations in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, the UNHCR at present is undertaking a substantial revision of his African budget, and we already have begun the contingency planning necessary to enable us to attempt to respond to the UNHCR's increased requests.

In 1980 we will also provide \$5 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for its African programs. And we will support a combination of bilateral and multilateral programs aimed at care and maintenance, infrastructure development, and education and training to the value of 19.85 million.

In addition, our 1980 Food for Peace contributions for food aid to African refugees will total \$22 million, at the current Food for Peace budget level. Food for Peace's pending supplemental request would provide an additional \$22 million in title II foods for African refugee-related programs.

For 1981 the State Department is requesting \$54 million for nonfood aid for African refugees. This includes \$35 million for the UNHCR, \$7 million for the ICRC, and \$12 million for direct bilateral assistance. Since these figures originally were compiled last summer, we have received information about increased needs that makes it apparent that additional funding will be requested by the international agencies concerned. In addition to nonfood aid, the Administration will be requesting substantial amounts for food aid.

At this time, I will turn to an analysis of the African refugee problem as we see it.

AFRICAN REFUGEES

Country of Asylum	Number of Refugees	Principal Country of Origin	Comments
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Angola	9,100	Western Sahara	Access not allowed to determine accurate numbers.
Botswana	20,300	Namibia Zaire South Africa Namibia Zimbabwe Lesotho Rwanda	Repatriation to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) should end substantial problem.
Burundi	50,000	Equatorial Guinea	Self-settled, some for as long as 20 years.
Cameroon	30,000	Ethiopia (mostly Eritreans)	Political refugees becoming economic refugees.
Djibouti	20,000	Sudan Somalia Equatorial Guinea	Urban refugee problem special; govt. encouraging resettlement in third country.
Ethiopia	10,900 ¹	Uganda Ethiopia	Refugee status being withdrawn Mar. 1, 1980.
Gabon	60,000	South Africa Zimbabwe	Numbers decreasing.
Kenya	6,500	Equatorial Guinea	Repatriation should end problem.
Lesotho	250	Burundi Uganda Ethiopia	Political refugees becoming economic refugees.
Mozambique	120,000	22 camps; great, long-term aid needed.	Fairly well integrated.
Nigeria	370	Additional assistance required.	
Rwanda	8,500		
Somalia	500,000 ²		
Sudan	330,000		
Swaziland	3,700		
Uganda	112,400		
Tanzania	160,000		
Zaire	653,000		
Zambia	80,000		

¹ Does not include displaced persons, estimated to be as many as 1 million.

² Does not include 500,000-700,000 refugees outside camps.

Overview

The continent of Africa, which has a majority of the world's least developed countries, also has the greatest number of refugees. There are estimates of up to 4 million refugees and displaced persons in Africa. The UNHCR estimated that there were 2.24 million refugees in Africa in December 1979, of which upwards of 1.7 million are in need of substantial assistance.

The discrepancies in estimates are due to a variety of factors, including differences in the definition of refugee status, political and economic incentives felt by various African governments to inflate or deflate figures reported, and the large number of African refugees who are "self-settling"; that is, who cross borders with livestock and other possessions to resettle among related ethnic groups in neighboring countries of first asylum, outside of organized refugee resettlement programs.

The exact numbers of refugees are less important than the impact of their rapid growth in recent years on host countries, many of which are engaged in struggles to assure the survival of their own peoples.

A significant aspect of the refugee problem in Africa is the extent to which the African nations share their scarce resources with refugees seeking asylum within the borders. In the past 2 weeks, we have surveyed U.S. embassies in Africa in an attempt to quantify the burden which African countries shoulder in caring for refugees. The almost universal response was that, although impossible to quantify, the refugee assistance given by African countries, in the context of their limited resources, is substantial and generous. In almost every instance, refugees receive land and access to whatever health and education facilities are available. Often, as well, refugees in Africa are given food, clothing, and shelter by the people and governments of their countries of asylum. Mr. Beck tells me, for example, that in Somalia, the government has deployed 1,500 of its own personnel to care for the refugees and that the relief effort has nearly depleted the Somali Government's own stocks of food and medicines.

The African governments and people extend this hospitality despite

the negative effect which this generosity has on their own development programs. It is incumbent on donors, such as the United States, to take this fact into consideration when providing development assistance. African countries seriously affected by refugee problems,

natural catastrophes, discourage refugees from returning to their homelands.

Unfortunately, we cannot be optimistic about prospects for declining numbers of refugees in 1980 and 1981. In fact, we can expect major increases for the foreseeable future in areas

ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN REFUGEES

	1978	1979	1980	1981
U.S. Government (millions \$)	\$31.8	\$60.2	\$93.9 ¹	54
UNHCR Budget (millions \$)	27	45	60 ²	105
U.S. Contribution to UNHCR (millions \$)	6	16	20 ³	35

¹ Contingent on approval of the PL 480 supplemental request pending in the Congress.

² Estimate.

³ What is expected to be appropriated.

⁴ Requested in the 1981 budget.

such as those in the Horn and in southern Africa, should not only receive direct refugee assistance but should be given special development assistance as well.

The magnitude of the refugee problem in Africa is awesome, not because of the sheer numbers alone but also because of the potential for political and economic havoc which the problem poses. Four of the six countries which are hosts to refugees in excess of 100,000 are numbered among the 25 least developed nations in the world. Also, civil strife and systematic oppression, which are the principal causes of refugee outflows, in turn heighten tensions among neighboring countries and reduce opportunities for political and economic cooperation that could improve the lives of all the people in any given region.

In addition to the factors that generate refugee problems in Africa like civil strife and oppression, several other factors contribute to the size of refugee populations and the duration of refugee problems in Africa.

- African governments have traditionally been hospitable to refugees from neighboring countries and have been reluctant to adopt a policy of forced repatriation.

- In many parts of Africa, people move with relative ease across national boundaries, yet remain among people of similar ethnic origin.

- Generalized poverty, often exacerbated by droughts and other

where there are already large refugee populations. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, we do not anticipate the kind of political accommodation between the Ethiopian Government and the insurgents that would permit the return to Ethiopia of the million or so refugees who have fled to the Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia. The scope of the refugee problem in this area will probably remain massive for a long time to come.

Somalia

In Somalia alone, refugees have been arriving in the camps at the rate of 1,700 a day during the last 3 months. The current camp population of about 500,000 could easily reach 1.1 million by the end of this year. And in addition to this camp population, another 500,000–700,000 refugees are reportedly subsisting outside camps in a fragile economy and ecology.

Consequently, there is a good possibility that the Somali host-country nationals themselves will require assistance, especially in light of indications from the Food and Agriculture Organization early warning system that near-drought conditions may devastate both the spring and fall crops this year.

In response to its growing refugee problem, the Somali Government issued a worldwide appeal for \$71 million in October 1979. The U.S. Government has already agreed to provide food aid valued at \$13.6 million and nonfood items valued at \$3.8 million, including

shipping costs. The nonfood items include drugs and medical supplies, domestic utensils, clothing, blankets, tents, and tarpaulins, which are being transported to Somalia now by air and sea.

In light of recent increases in the Somali refugee populations, the U.N. relief agencies have reassessed the needs for outside assistance in Somalia. Secretary General Waldheim is expected to issue an appeal this week for 120 million in emergency assistance and an additional amount for long-term development support.

In anticipation of the U.N. appeal or the World Food Program, the Agency for International Development's (AID) Food for Peace office has included \$15 million in additional food including freight) for Somalia in a 1980 supplemental request. Unless this request is acted upon by the Congress in timely fashion, however, it will not be possible to deliver the food early enough to avoid certain starvation. In addition, we will be seeking to reprogram funds for the UNHCR's programs in Somalia which, together with the \$3.8 million that we have already committed, would bring our contribution immediately to the one-third level at which we traditionally have supported refugee assistance in Africa. However, because of the critical nature of the need in Somalia, we would continue to assess the situation in order to determine if further support should be given.

Zimbabwe

As the subcommittee is aware, the dimensions of the Zimbabwe refugee problem will only become clear in the weeks and months ahead. The agreements reached at Lancaster House concerning Zimbabwe-Rhodesia provide, *inter alia*, for the repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees, estimated to number as many as 250,000. The first phase of the repatriation effort is to be completed by February 22, in anticipation of the national elections February 7-29. The balance of the refugees, many of whom are children—including students whose education ought not be interrupted—will have been repatriated by July-August. Last month UNHCR mounted a \$22 million appeal to fund the repatriation effort—\$14 million for the first phase and \$8 million for the second. The U.S. Government has contributed \$5 million to this fund. We

hope the Zimbabwe repatriation program will be followed by development programs proposed by the new majority government for implementation in 1981.

General Trends

Following these comments about geographic areas, let me make some general observations about refugee problems throughout Africa. First, we see the following trends: There is a widespread and deep interest in education among all Africans, including refugees; refugees face ever-increasing difficulty in seeking access to agricultural land; and consequently, a growing number of refugees are creating new problems in urban areas. The possible implications of these trends, if they continue, would seem to be:

- Higher costs in refugee programs;
- The desire for greater control of refugees and their camps by host governments;
- Possible backlash among the citizens of host countries and, therefore, greater reluctance to accept massive numbers of refugees by their governments; and
- A need for more research and training to assist in the greater Africanization of refugee programs and activities.

Second, refugee problems are not a new phenomenon in Africa, nor are they apt to be resolved soon. Some refugees in Africa today have been outside their countries of origin for more than 15 years. It would be unrealistic to expect that the many intricate political differences that have uprooted these people could be settled in the near future. Despite the plan to return some 250,000 refugees to Zimbabwe, we are not sure that refugee problems in southern Africa will be entirely solved.

Third, we believe that the U.S. Government, as the largest single supporter of international refugee assistance, has a responsibility to encourage international relief agencies to broaden their view of refugee problems in Africa to include both emergency relief and the longer term support necessary to help refugees become self-sufficient in the countries where they are now located. In the past, multilateral aid has been too little and too temporary in nature to deal with the magnitude of the problem. As a result, the international community has probably ex-

pected more in continued food and other subsistence relief than would have been necessary to insure that the refugees could take care of themselves.

Recently, the governments of Somalia and Sudan have expressed their intention to request additional assistance for development programs specifically aimed at the permanent settlement and economic and social integration of refugees within their countries. These requests present our government with unusual opportunities to assist in effecting the long-term solutions, which in many instances will be the only answer to the refugee problem. I am assured by the African Bureau of AID that they will accord high priority to such requests.

Fourth, the practical needs in Africa are thus quite different from refugee assistance in other areas of the world, such as Southeast Asia where the primary goal is to provide care and maintenance to refugees while they are awaiting offers of permanent resettlement elsewhere. We need to be realistic about the quantity and kind of assistance needed to meet the circumstances in each area. And at the same time, we need to be sensitive to wishes of host-country governments that refugees not be perceived as having a better standard of living and having greater opportunities than the indigenous inhabitants.

Finally, there is growing recognition of the need for durable solutions in Africa. The current refugee assistance plans of both Somalia and Sudan, the two countries with the largest numbers of refugees, have called for assistance for permanent settlement programs.

In closing, I wish to assure you that we are well aware of the feeling of many people in Africa, in our country, and elsewhere that too little assistance has been offered African refugees. We are in the process of reassessing African needs for outside assistance, and we welcome your thoughts on ways to strengthen our contributions to this critical humanitarian problem.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Political and Economic Interests in Africa

Addresses by Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), and Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, on December 13, 1979, in Detroit before a regional foreign policy conference on Africa cosponsored by the Department of State and the Economic Club of Detroit; more than 35 other organizations in the Detroit area—representing business, organized labor, and educational, ethnic, civic, and professional groups—also cooperated in the conference program.

MR. BENNET

We are about to enter the last two decades of the 20th century. Looking back, the last two decades have been tumultuous ones for sub-Saharan Africa.

Today there are 46 independent states; in 1955 there were only two. In the past two decades political, social, cultural, and economic changes of enormous magnitude have swept across the continent. Change came so fast that in the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. policymakers found forces racing ahead of their ability to adjust to the unfolding of African nationalism and the breakdown of colonial empires. Although Africa had emerged as an important global factor in the early 1970s, U.S. policy still tended to view Africa as weak and economically and politically unimportant. U.S.-Africa trade was minute, and our economic assistance to Africa decidedly token—only 6% of our worldwide totals. U.S. policy held that Africans should find their own answers to worsening problems.

Since 1976 a more active and sensitive U.S.-Africa policy has emerged. In contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s when policy was largely a series of reactions to events, today we see the United States taking a positive and activist role in searching for peaceful solutions to conflicts that persist in several corners of Africa. Relations with most African states have improved markedly. U.S. economic assistance to Africa had risen to \$443 million in FY 1979, a doubling of 1975 levels. This still represents only 9% of our total worldwide assistance. However, our fastest growing economic aid program today is in Africa.

As our own policy has been maturing, we have seen a maturing of African nationalism which permits closer cooperation. In the immediate postcolonial period, it was natural for African leaders to concentrate on the politics of independence, and we were sometimes viewed as adversaries-by-association with excolonial masters.

Now, however, African leaders must turn time and more attention to economic and social development. Their people are pressing hard for results. We are able to provide some of that help, and most African governments are becoming more expert as well at tapping foreign private investment in ways compatible with their own natural development goals.

Today African leaders are committed to economic and social development, to gaining political and economic equality among the nations of the world, to limiting, where possible, foreign or outside meddling in African affairs, and to ending once and for all minority rule where it stubbornly resists inevitable change. The United

... it costs more to move a bushel of grain 700 miles into the interior of any African country than it does to ship it 7,000 miles from New Orleans.

States today supports those goals.

Moreover, we realize that the long-term success of U.S.-African policy depends on the not-too-distant realization of African development aspirations. This is where we confront the most difficult challenge to the United States' Africa policy of the 1980s and 1990s. Just when U.S. policy has caught up with Africa's vision of itself, serious and unmet development needs and economic deterioration portend new crises and instability.

Challenges Facing Africa

In 1978, the average per capita GNP growth for all non-oil-producing African states was near zero. There are indications that the situation in 1979 is worse. Africa is projected to fall much farther behind the rest of the developing world during the next 10 years.

Consider these trends, their potential aggregate impact on Africa, and the challenge they present for U.S. policy in the near future.

First, per capita food production in Africa is now declining by 1.4% annually. During the period 1960-79, there has been no significant shift from Africa's highly vulnerable and predominantly subsistence agriculture. Average per hectare production in Africa lags far behind other developing regions. The increased production that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s came through expanding the area under cultivation rather than through increased yield. International research groups now estimate a food grain deficit in Africa of 23 million tons in 1990. Nigeria alone will then have to import as much grain as India. Even assuming sufficient world supplies, balance-of-payments trends suggest that most African nations will have insufficient foreign exchange to finance the food imports they require.

Second, desertification, deforestation, and erosion are threatening the essential agriculture resource base of the majority of the continent's countries. LANDSAT satellite photos show that 52% of Africa's land is now desert or subject to serious desertification. The capacity to produce food and meet basic human needs could be permanently and irreversibly damaged if this land degradation continues.

Third, population and urbanization growth rates, at 2.65% and 9.5% respectively, are the highest in the world. We can anticipate accelerating movements of migrant workers and refugees that will further aggravate food shortages and unemployment, possibly leading to serious social conflict.

Fourth, despite substantial progress in eradicating selected communicable diseases, the majority of Africa's population still has no access to basic health services. The presence of some debilitating disease in most of the African adult population is a predominant factor in the low productivity of labor. Life expectancy averages 45 years in Africa compared with 53 years in the developing world overall and 72 years in the United States.

Fifth, the World Bank forecasts a real per capita growth of less than 1% in Africa during the 1980s.

Sixth, accelerating rates of inflation and deteriorating terms of trade, fueled largely by recent energy price

increases, will further undermine Africa's fragile economies. An estimated debt service burden in 1990 of 27.6% of export earnings, more than any other geographic region, will seriously reduce Africa's capacity to import food and required capital resources.

Seventh, transportation systems are poor, developed largely for extractive industries with little regard for internal needs and domestic populations. Africa ranks last of all the continents in transport systems. The limited capacity that does exist is so expensive that it discourages investment and raises prices. For instance, it costs more to move a bushel of grain 700 miles into the interior of any African country than it does to ship it 7,000 miles from New Orleans.

In summary, for 70% of the African countries, per capita growth was lower during the 1970s than in the previous decade. This group was, in other words, *undeveloping*. Unless reversed, he trends I have cited could turn today's development plans into nothing more than tomorrow's short-term, crisis-oriented relief programs.

Importance of Development to U.S. Interests

With such serious economic problems in Africa, not to mention here at home, we might legitimately ask: Is there anything we can do to help, even if we want to? Is Africa's development really that important to U.S. interests? The answers are clearly yes, for several reasons.

First, with ever-increasing global interdependence during the 1980s and 1990s, the United States will become considerably more dependent on regular, dependable supplies of Africa's natural resources. The region, the most unexplored of the continents, holds great promise of mineral and petroleum wealth. Today more than 25% of our imported petroleum comes from sub-Saharan Africa, five times what we used to import from Iran.

Several of the poorest African countries are only now discovering or beginning to develop important deposits of the strategic minerals uranium, manganese, vanadium, cobalt, chrome, titanium, and bauxite. These are essential to us for the production of high-grade metals for jet engines, for aircraft, and for defense and nuclear energy uses, and the earnings they represent are just as essential to the future prosperity of Africa.

Second, despite the discouraging economic and environmental trends, Africa, with untapped major river basins and extensive land, does have the physical potential to produce surplus food grains late in this century, when global deficiencies are projected to reach new records. Africa has the potential for increasing annual production of food grains by 16 million tons from rain-fed agriculture and 9 million from irrigated land. This would represent a 47% increase over the approximately 55 million tons of cereal produced in 1979. In addition, from another energy standpoint, most of the world's undeveloped hydroelectric power is in Africa.

Third, we are seeing today important and encouraging political transitions in Africa. Nigeria and Ghana have recently moved from military to civilian rule. Upper Volta and Mali are moving in similar directions. A peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe may now be a reality. These transitions are encouraging to all who believe more strength lies in democracy than in totalitarianism. These changes should mean more human rights and more human energies liberated for the task of development. They also make it all the more imperative that the African people see some tangible benefits of development progress.

Fourth, we should not forget that it was the rapidly rising U.S. exports to the developing world that played a key role in pulling the U.S. economy out of the 1973 recession. Africa is potentially a very important part of that market, depending on the continent's growth and capacity to import.

Moreover, with one-third of the independent nations of the world being African, and all of them voting members of the United Nations, Africa plays a major role in the ongoing North-South dialogue that is vital to our future welfare as well as to Africa's.

But clear interests do not constitute a policy. A policy expressed in material terms is narrow, short-sighted, and too much like the colonialism and paternalism that held Africa back for years.

A U.S.-Africa policy for the 1980s and 1990s must offer much more. It must start out with a shared hope for the future of the continent which is painfully far behind the rest of the world in unlocking its enormous human and physical potential. It must con-

cretely support African aspirations in the drive for racial justice and economic and social development. An affirmative U.S.-Africa policy for the 1980s and 1990s must state with clarity that we, the most developed of the world's nations, will not allow Africa's alarming economic and environmental decline to continue, because it portends a loss of human potential and political instability that are contrary to both U.S. and African interests.

Our country has the wealth and the know-how in both its public and private sectors to help Africa move forward.

Today more than 25% of our imported petroleum comes from sub-Saharan Africa, five times what we used to import from Iran.

We know it, the Africans know it, and the world knows it.

Some say African development will take many decades, because they are so far behind. I say we no longer have the luxury of such patience. As we look back at the turn of the century, the test of the realism and effectiveness of our Africa policy in the 1980s and 1990s will certainly be whether we had the capacity to craft, in full partnership with Africa and with other donors, comprehensive solutions that will reverse the decline in Africa's development progress.

With this in mind, what new initiatives can be undertaken? Ideas will emerge from your deliberations here today particularly in the individual workshops on "African Economic Prospects" and on "U.S. Strategic Interest and Africa's International Role." We look forward to studying the results of your deliberations.

There are some important areas in which African nations can help themselves substantially.

There is room in some countries for cautious decentralization and greater local initiative in the development process. A strong central authority may have been necessary in the first stage of nationbuilding but can become a dead end if a few ministries attempt to manage all aspects of the development process. The greatest single development resource in any country is the liberated energies of its people.

One factor that is particularly important in liberating these energies is seeing that farmers receive economic prices for their labor. We frequently see farm prices held down artificially in

an understandable but frankly self-defeating effort to protect consumer prices, particularly in politically volatile cities. The result is less food grown and sold, less income for farmers to reinvest, stronger incentives for urban migration, and mounting costs for food imports. The transition to a policy which pays farmers an incentive price for their product is always painful, but it's essential. We are prepared to work through these complex issues in close partnership with the African countries and in some cases help ease the way by judicious use of PL 480 food.

U.S. Initiatives

For our part, we in AID, along with our colleagues in the State Department, are undertaking the following initiatives designed to integrate a more comprehensive U.S. development effort into our overall Africa policy.

First, the establishment of the International Development Cooperation

take advantage of the tariff concessions that are, in theory, allowed under these trade policy vehicles. From this we will see where and how U.S. trade policy can and should have greater benefits for African development.

Third, we will work in concert with other Western donors and international organizations to design more comprehensive problem-solving programs rather than piecemeal projects. The major programs needed in food production, environmental reclamation, energy, infrastructure, etc., can often, by their nature, be undertaken only as multidonor programs. Following on the Sahel experience, we will be considering more significant multidonor programs in the Lake Kivu area and in the southern African region. We will be meeting with OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] donors to identify ways and means for interested OPEC agencies to play a larger development role in Africa. In addition, we will be taking various

The economic progress of Africa may well depend on how effectively many small and fragmented African states can work together. The United States can have a catalytic impact on what may become an important new era of African cooperation.

Fifth, the question of increased financial resources is an essential part of any set of new initiatives. We hope to see at least some increases in our concessional aid levels for Africa in FY 1981 and beyond.

The United States will seek congressional authority to join the African Development Bank in FY 1981. For the first time, the African Development Bank is being opened to nonregional capital, and the bank's significance will take on renewed importance in the difficult times ahead. The United States will propose in FY 1981 a capital input of \$360 million representing 17% of the bank's nonregional capital. The United States would then be the largest single nonregional member.

These are but a few of the initiatives this Administration will be undertaking to support U.S. policy interest and African development.

All of this will require the support and determination of the American people. I believe all Americans now fully understand that we are not alone on this planet. We are fully aware today of our interdependence with other people whose attitudes toward the United States can have a very direct bearing on our own well-being. We may wish it were not so, but we know it is so.

We have shown in recent weeks that we are capable of deliberateness, and forceful moderation, even when unconsciously provoked. In recent years, we have found our voice again as advocates of the human rights to which all people aspire. We have wealth and power. And I believe we do have the capacity and boldness to translate these assets into a program that will, indeed make a difference to Africa.

AMBASSADOR MCHENRY¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk to you today about U.S.-Africa policy. My topic, however, is something of a misnomer. For the United States has an "Africa policy" only in the same sense that is has a "European policy" or an "Asia policy." Most of our policies in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, are bilateral; they pertain to our relations

... U.S.-Africa policy ... must state with clarity that we, the most developed of the world's nations, will not allow Africa's alarming economic and environmental decline to continue, because it portends a loss of human potential and political instability that are contrary to both U.S. and African interests.

Agency (IDCA) presents a new opportunity for the United States to relate more coherently all of this country's various development instruments to Africa's most serious problems. These include development grants, food aid (PL 480), technical assistance, non-governmental and voluntary organizations, Peace Corps, Export-Import Bank, trade policy, and private sector investment. We are acutely aware of the indispensable role private investment must play in Africa—in the creation of jobs, in overall growth, and in establishing a revenue base so that "basic human needs" is an affordable policy and not merely an empty passing slogan. Concessional funding must not only be increased but used creatively to expand the continent's absorptive capacity for private sector investment, both foreign and domestic.

Second, we are studying the U.S. general schedule of preferences and recently completed multilateral trade agreements to determine why most African countries have been unable to

steps to reinforce Western donor collaboration in Africa.

Fourth, also following our Sahel experience, we will encourage more intra-African cooperation in the various subregions. Many of Africa's difficulties today stem from the fragmentation that occurred in the "divide-and-conquer" policies of the old colonial empires. Today all the Western donors and many of the African states recognize the political and economic payoffs of institutionalizing African subregional cooperation to resolve common problems, exploit common resources, such as river basins, and enter into selective kinds of market integration. Despite the unfortunate demise of the East African Community, the new Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), southern African efforts at economic cooperation, and other new efforts deserve our active support. Dormant or ineffective African regional organizations can be animated with new mandates, programs, and resources.

with each of the 52 individual independent African countries.

But certain concerns cut across national boundaries. Africans share common aspirations. They are working to resolve common problems, many of which can be met only by cooperative and regional effort.

For three decades, the dominant concern of Africa has been its emergence from colonialism. The United States played a major role in drafting the provisions of the U.N. Charter that provided the philosophical base for the end of colonialism. During the decades since, American interest in Africa has waxed and waned.

- We had not been a colonial power.
- We carried on little trade with the black African states.
- We looked to those countries which had been colonial powers to play the major role in developments following independence.

Too often, what passed for policy was a series of responses to particular incidents and disorders that punctuated those years.

Today, the long struggle to end colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa is drawing to a close. I do not mean to suggest that Africa has put his period entirely behind it. In Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, the right of the people to determine their own future and to govern themselves has remained elusive. And in South Africa, the full political participation of all its citizens remains but a distant dream. But even in these last outposts, there has been progress.

The complex negotiations aimed at settlement in Southern Rhodesia have nearly reached their conclusion. Despite initial skepticism, only a few differences regarding the cease-fire remain. So optimistic is the United Kingdom that the British Government has taken the first steps in the transition process. A British Governor arrived in Southern Rhodesia earlier this week. Other steps in the transition process leading to elections are underway. It is unimaginable that the remaining differences on the cease-fire can be allowed to stand in the way of an agreement. Clearly, the interests of the parties in reaching agreement outweigh the differences that continue to exist.

What happens in Southern Rhodesia may very much affect the possibility of a peaceful settlement in Namibia. There, the United States, Canada, France, West Germany, and

the United Kingdom have been engaged for over 2 years in frustrating negotiations with South Africa in the hope of reaching an accord that will permit Namibia to gain its independence without further bloodshed. A reasonable basis for settlement has been proposed

None of the nine non-African nations invited to participate in last summer's Southern African Development Conference was an Eastern European state. But we were there, along with most of the countries of Western Europe.

and enjoys wide support. However, South Africa has objected to two important aspects of implementation. Our hope is that the remaining differences can be overcome through technical discussions during the next few weeks so that the bloodshed can end and the people of Namibia can get on with the process of governing themselves.

So while the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism and racial discrimination remain a high priority, Africa has reached an important transition point. Its nations can increasingly focus their attention on other issues—issues that have important long-term consequences for life and for the quality of life.

Human Concerns

Not surprisingly, economic development and modernization head the list of these concerns. As Doug Bennet pointed out so graphically in his remarks this morning, economic conditions, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, have reached crisis proportions.

- Food production is declining while the population increases.
- Inflation and trade deficits soar as the cost of energy rises and the price of the industrial goods Africa must import follows suit.
- Transportation and communications systems remain inadequate. An African foreign minister seeking to travel from Nairobi to Dar es Salaam finds himself having first to go to Europe.
- And while the world focuses its attention on the enormous refugee problems in Southeast Asia, Africa has painfully and quietly borne the burden of an even larger and more permanent displacement of people.

Without inter-African cooperation and without large-scale world assist-

ance, the outlook for growth and development is indeed grim.

But even in southern Africa, where the political problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa continue to receive priority attention, plans are already in motion to confront the serious

developmental problems that exist. At the Southern Africa Development Conference, which was held last July, the "front-line" states of southern Africa—looking forward to the early independence of their neighbors in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia—laid the groundwork for cooperation on a regional development scheme. Economic development was also a principal topic at last summer's meeting of the Commonwealth countries in Zambia.

African states are active proponents of readjustments in the world's economic, financial, and trading systems. Along with other developing countries, they seek to replace or adapt the economic systems that were developed before they came into being, so that what they call the "new international economic order" will take into account the unique problems they face in a world dominated by developed nations.

While economic concerns are pressing, they are not the only important questions with which the new African nations are coping. In Africa, as elsewhere, human rights issues have assumed a new importance. In the last year, the tragic and brutal regimes of Idi Amin, Bokassa, and Masiac have been driven from power. The need for collective condemnation of evils like those practiced by these despots has resulted in the adoption of a draft outline for the creation of a human rights commission.

Many African nations are acquiring a measure of political stability unheard of just 15 years ago. The Governments of Upper Volta, Mali, Ghana, and Nigeria recently reverted from military to civilian control after democratic elections. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, patterned its new constitution after our own. In Kenya, the predictions that chaos would result after the death of Jomo Kenyatta have not been

fulfilled. Instead power was transferred smoothly from one civilian leader to another in accordance with that country's constitutional processes.

Africa's political, economic, and social evolution is far from complete. The rapid pace at which change takes place today only complicates the evolutionary process. Modern communications expose every stumble along the way to world scrutiny. And we, who must adjust rapidly to change in our own lives, may, therefore, be holding the new nations of Africa to unrealistic standards.

The development of nation states is a slow and difficult process. It took centuries, not mere decades, for the nations of modern Europe to grow from their tribal beginnings to highly developed states. Our own country grew to maturity slowly and painfully. And along the way, the developed countries of today experienced most of the travails that Africa has recently faced—colonialism, revolution, ethnic and racial conflict, civil war, economic upheaval, natural disasters.

When judged against the standard of our own progress, we must recognize that the new nations of Africa have taken substantial strides toward national maturity in a very brief period.

This does not mean that more cannot be done. Africa can learn from the mistakes we made as we developed and industrialized, particularly the shortsightedness that caused us to deplete our resources with insufficient thought for conservation or the shortsightedness that caused us to foul our air and water with little concern for pollution. Above all, Africa must resist the temptation to view issues myopically and to endow any one principle, such as noninterference, with such importance that it cancels out concern for other principles, such as respect for human and political rights.

Transition in U.S. Policy

Just as Africa has come to a transition point, so the United States has reached a transition point in its policy toward Africa. Under President Carter, Africa is no longer what I called in 1975 the "unchallenged occupant of the bottom rung of American foreign policy priorities." Today, America attaches a new importance to Africa—partly in response to Africa's changing concerns and partly in response to our own.

Our increasing economic interdependence with the black African states underscores the importance of a viable and independent Africa to American

interests. We are becoming more dependent on African resources and more aware of Africa's potential as a trading partner. Without regard to differences in economic systems, Africa is turning to us and to our traditional allies for the development assistance it so desperately needs.

I believe that Africans realize that the Communist countries to which some of them have turned for arms are not equipped to make a major contribution to African economic development. None of the nine non-African nations invited to participate in last summer's Southern African Development Conference was an Eastern European state. But we were there, along with most of the countries of Western Europe.

So development, the wave of the future in Africa, is a wave that the United States is uniquely qualified to ride. If we are willing to supply more and better development assistance to Africa, and to couple it with a commitment for additional investment and two-way trade by the private sector, Africa's increasing preoccupation with economic concerns can be a cornerstone on which to build a mutually beneficial long-term relationship with African nations.

It would be naive to imply that the involvement of the Soviet Union and some of its allies as suppliers of arms and troops to selected revolutionary movements and governments has not affected our view of Africa. So has Africa's proximity to the Middle East.

In the end, however, America's Africa policy cannot be based on the fallacy that Africa's importance to us stems from its position on East-West issues. Neither can it be based on a desire to protect the existence of resources or to acquire lucrative markets for American goods.

Instead, the United States should base its relations with Africa on our desire to promote and facilitate the same opportunity for African nations that our own country was given two centuries ago—the chance to develop themselves politically, the chance to develop themselves economically and socially, and to do so without outside interference so that they can run their own affairs and take their rightful places in the community of nations.

Even judged by traditional standards, American interests are well served by an Africa policy that respects and responds to Africa's legitimate desire to develop with international assistance, but without outside interference. If our interest is anticommunism,

a policy of assistance without outside interference offers a better chance of preventing Communist gains in Africa, because it is geared to alleviate the intolerable conditions in which communism thrives best. If our interest is economic, a policy of assistance without interference is the only way we can cultivate the African resource base and uncover potential markets without imposing an unacceptable form of economic dependence on newly independent nations.

But most important, a policy of assistance without interference will send a signal to Africa and the rest of the developing world that the United States supports dynamic, positive change in congruence with the goals of the developing countries, not simply our own.

Africa stands on the threshold of new and tremendous challenges. America stands on the threshold of a new and promising relationship with Africa. We must now make a renewed commitment to work with Africa for our mutual benefit. It will take time; it will take patience; and it will take joint efforts to bear fruit. But by working together, I am confident that we can succeed.

¹USUN press release 145. ■

Southern Rhodesia Holds Elections

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
FEB. 27, 1980¹

Today marks the beginning of a 3-day electoral period in Rhodesia. This step together with the elections February 14, means that for the first time all the people of Rhodesia will have had a genuine opportunity to choose their leaders in an open election. The process, set in motion by the Lancaster House settlement, has accomplished a great deal. All the parties involved are to be commended.

In spite of the difficulties of the transitional period, a cease-fire was established and violence reduced. For the first time in years, the leaders of all the parties were present in Rhodesia and

have been engaged in the electoral campaign over the past weeks.

The holding of this election is a remarkable achievement, indeed. As we have stated previously, we are confident that the British are determined to conduct these elections as fairly as possible.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT MAR. 2, 1980²

The British Government and the other parties to the Lancaster House agreement are to be congratulated on the successful completion of elections throughout Rhodesia. For the first time in the history of the territory, elections open to all parties have been held under an agreed, democratic constitution.

According to the interim report of the Commonwealth observer group, which recognized the difficulties under which the election was conducted, the election was "free and fair to the extent that it provided an adequate and acceptable means of determining the wishes of the people in a democratic manner." This corresponds with our own assessment that the results of the election will reflect the will of the people of Zimbabwe.

We urge the forces on all sides to exercise restraint during this historic moment. Any attempt to abort the political process would be condemned by the world community. We, therefore, urge the parties to the process in Zimbabwe, and all nations, to respect and support the electoral outcome.

We look forward to the successful implementation of independence for Zimbabwe and to working with the new government. We shall continue to assist in the return and resettlement of refugees. In keeping with our pledge at Lancaster House, we also intend to assist the people of Zimbabwe as they rebuild their nation after years of conflict.

¹ Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

² Issued to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III; also issued as USUN press release 18 of Mar. 3, 1980. ■

Refugee Coordinator Reports on Situation in Thailand

Following are two news conferences by Ambassador Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in Bangkok on January 18, 1980, and at the Department of State on January 23.

JAN. 18, 1980

As you may know, it was only 2 weeks ago that my appointment by President Carter as U.S. Refugee Coordinator and Ambassador at Large was confirmed by the Senate. My purpose in coming immediately to Thailand was to make a first-hand assessment of relief operations here, to meet with officials of the Royal Thai Government and international agencies, and to review the U.S. refugee program.

I have had very productive discussions with the Prime Minister and a wide range of Thai, U.S., and international organization officials. I have also inspected a number of the refugee camps, including Loei and Nong Khai in the north and Sa Kaeo, Khao I Dang, and the large concentrations on the border.

What I have seen during the past several days has reinforced my impressions of the magnitude of the problem and the generous scope of Thailand's humanitarian response. I have been assured by the Thai Government that Thailand will continue to do what it can to assist the unfortunate peoples from Indochina in their plight.

For our part, the United States will continue to give Thailand the strongest possible support in all respects. The President, Mrs. Carter, and Members of Congress are dedicated to this effort, and I look forward to strengthening our efforts in my position as refugee coordinator.

Throughout my visit, I have been enormously impressed by the dedication and hard work by Thai, international, and voluntary organizations personnel. Their efforts are crucial and will continue to receive strong support from the American Government and people.

Considerable progress has clearly been made on the resettlement side for Hmong, Lao, Vietnamese, and earlier Khmer refugees. I am pleased to note that the accelerated U.S. acceptance rate has measurably reduced the numbers of these refugees. I can only hope that the Governments of Vietnam and

Laos will ameliorate those practices which compel their citizens to flee.

The major problem facing Thailand and the international community is, of course, the very large numbers of Khmer now in Thailand or awaiting an uncertain fate on the border. In recent weeks, there have been significant improvements in the facilities for displaced Khmer in Sa Kaeo and Khao I Dang. Fighting among Khmer border leadership groups, however, is a disturbing development and has pushed thousands more Khmer to move to Khao I Dang. Thus that site requires rapid expansion to remain minimally adequate. I am hopeful that the situation can be stabilized and that Khmer refugees who want to can remain on the border, free from the threat of attack and sustained by the international relief effort. With all the problems they face, it is tragic that displaced Khmer are fighting each other. In the interim, we will do our best to help Thai and international authorities solve pressing problems, such as water shortages now and possible flooding in the rainy season.

With respect to the situation inside Kampuchea, we remain deeply concerned over the continuing privation of the Khmer population. Further delay in the distribution of relief supplies donated by the world community is inexcusable. Ample supplies of food and trucks are now available within Kampuchea. The failure to make any significant progress in distribution raises fundamental questions about the priorities of the Heng Samrin authorities and their Vietnamese and other supporters. Against this background, the international effort to feed Khmer civilians on the border will continue to play a vital role in sustaining the population of western Kampuchea.

In sum, a strong framework for Thai and international cooperation has been developed and substantial progress has been made in recent weeks. But the tragedy of Kampuchea and the Khmer people remains.

Q. What did the Thai Prime Minister ask your government to do for the refugees in Thailand?

A. The Prime Minister was assured of continuing U.S. support for the relief effort in Thailand, not only in terms of our contributions to the international

community but also in terms of the commitment which President Carter has made for continuing resettlement of refugees from Thailand. We assured the Prime Minister that we remain deeply committed to those objectives which President Carter has announced and that we stand ready to support this government in what must be one of the great humanitarian efforts of any nation.

Q. Is it true that you promised Prime Minister Kriangsak that the United States will increase the intake of refugees from Thailand to 10,000 per month?

A. It is true that we confirmed to the Prime Minister the commitment that was made some time ago as follows: that we will continue direct resettlement of refugees from Thailand to the United States at the rate of 7,500 per month, and in addition, we will be seeking to move another 2,500 to the refugee processing center to be opened at the end of January in the Philippines.

Q. What long-term problems do you think Thailand will face with the continued presence of Khmer people within its boundaries? Do you see another Palestinian-type situation existing in Thailand in the future?

A. I can't foretell the future; I'm sure that's not a surprise to you. But what I can do is tell you that Thai and U.S. objectives are precisely the same—to see that the Khmer refugees attain their desire to be able to return to their homeland. It is significant that the bulk of the movement of the Khmer refugees has been to the border, where they remain under conditions that are very difficult, obviously in the hope of returning to their homeland. It remains to be seen what the future will bring. The objective of most people when they are forced to leave their homeland is to return to their homeland, and I believe that is true for the Khmer people who are now on the border or in the camps close to the border. I am hopeful that that is exactly the result that we can obtain for them in the future.

Q. Will the refugees who do not want to return to their homeland be considered for resettlement in the United States at this time or in the near future?

A. We have made a very strong commitment to share with Thailand the burden of the refugee problem. That commitment has involved doubling the

resettlement of refugees from Thailand to the United States—from 7,000 to 14,000, including, of course, refugees from all of Indochina. This doubling involves roughly 7,500 from Thailand going directly to the United States and another 2,500 to the refugee processing center. The processing is now at a point where we can meet those commitments. Thousands of refugees who are qualified, in terms of the criteria used for resettlement, are now awaiting transit. The question of new arrivals in Thailand is really not one that we can confront in this next phase.

We have obligations to this government and to the refugees, who have been here awaiting resettlement for a long time, to see to it that they are treated fairly. That is to say, that we have a principle of first in, first out. Later, we will be in a position to determine whether newly arrived refugees who do not want to return home will be processed for resettlement. I'm sure that there will be some in the category that you suggest. But that is not a category that we can reach right now with as many Hmong and Lao as well as Vietnamese that the United States is accepting after long stays in the camps.

Q. Does that mean that the program is to resettle everyone from the old camps who is qualified or who wants to go before you think about turning to the new Khmer?

A. No. It means that we will do our best to balance our obligations and to meet some tests of fairness. At some point there will be people among the new arrivals who, for reasons of family unification or prior association with the U.S. Government, will have to be considered. I can't give you a categorical answer to a problem that has as many human priorities as this one. We will continue to do our best to deal with these kinds of issues in a way that is seen as fair and sensible, and I hope that we can deliver on that. Up to now I think we have.

Q. In your talks with all the people concerned with the situation on the Kampuchean border, were you able to obtain any guarantee from those who control the hundreds of thousands of Khmer in the border camps that the humanitarian aid will be carried freely for those people and free of charge for those people in the border camps and further inside western Kampuchea?

A. The question is, who is in control of these border camps or concentrations? They really are not camps in a literal sense. They are large concentrations of refugees who have gathered on the border because they are being fed through the efforts of the Thai Government, the international agencies, and the American Embassy in Bangkok. They are surviving.

The issue for us is really a simple issue: How can we get the most food to the most people? The border situation is very complicated and changes from day to day. The situation involves communal arrangements in internal organizational structures which are peculiar to the Khmer groups that are there.

I don't have any guarantees except this: The Thai Government has expressed great concern about stabilizing the situation on the border. The international agencies have made it clear that they will continue to provide the people on the border with food. Our objective will remain feeding as many people as possible, in effect flooding that zone with food so as much of it as possible gets into Kampuchea. One of the amazing things to me was to understand that a great deal of the food that is reaching the border is being taken into the Kampuchean countryside by bicycles, other conveyances, and on people's backs. This food is playing a major role in sustaining the population of western Kampuchea. With that in mind, I haven't sought guarantees because there's nobody to give them.

Q. The U.S. Government has made much of the fact that the food is not being properly distributed inside Kampuchea. What specific sources lead you or the government to believe that aid is not being properly distributed by the Heng Samrin and possibly Vietnamese authorities in Kampuchea?

A. I have spent the last two days touring some of the camps and one of the things that we did was to interview people in the camps. Some of those interviews were arranged in advance and for others I just moved through the camps and talked to people, asking them about conditions inside Kampuchea. I was seeking, of course, reciprocal arrivals to the extent possible.

I was overcome by the stories of what is going on inside the country in terms of the plight of people who are traveling under conditions of very great danger and great privation, often in ex-

traordinarily weak condition, to reach the border. So I have a personal sense that there is no effective food distribution to a large part of the Khmer population.

Secondly, we have a great deal of evidence now from the international organizations, which are exhibiting increasing concern and impatience, that the bulk of the relief supplies that have been brought into Kampuchea are still in warehouses or at the harbor. There isn't really any substantial argument about that. It is true that some supplies have been distributed, mainly Russian corn. Our impression is that that corn has not reached significant portions of the population and, more importantly, that the supplies sent into Phnom Penh and to the harbor have remained in warehouses. The international officials have confirmed that.

Q. International aid officials who have been in Kampuchea say that the Vietnamese or the authorities in Kampuchea are doing the best they can, and logistical problems are to blame. Some statements from Washington imply that there's a willful obstruction of such distribution by the authorities in Kampuchea. On what does the U.S. Government base that assertion?

A. My role in this matter has one objective—to see that the maximum number of people are fed. All I know is that the officials confirmed to me that the bulk of the relief supplies remain in the warehouses. I don't have to know much more than that. I'm not even interested in the difference between incompetence and deliberate nondistribution. All I'm interested in is the result, and the result is great suffering. I will bring every effort I can to bear on that situation.

There has now been a period of several months for the Phnom Penh authorities to invite people to take on the logistical job, if they cannot accomplish it themselves. It's perfectly clear that if they cannot accomplish it, there are many people, willing, ready, and able, to distribute it for them. There are people ready, willing, and able to carry the supplies on their backs, so it isn't even a question of gasoline. Let's not worry about fine distinctions; the fact is that the food is not being distributed. I, for one, will not join the debate about whether it's delivered or not. It's in the warehouses. That's the significant fact, especially for people who are starving.

Q. When you say you will bring every effort you possibly can, every pressure to bear to relieve this situation, what exactly do you mean?

A. I'm talking about every effort I can bring to bear. Let's see what this might be. First of all, the United States is a major contributor to the international effort. I hope to use every influence I can to see that our contributions result in food that reaches the people. If at some point I decide, and my government agrees, that people are not receiving the benefit of the contributions, then I may well suggest changes in distribution practices.

I might add that I'm not the first to suggest this. The operations director of

the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mr. Hocke, has said that he would give the authorities in Phnom Penh until January 15 to get their act together. I do not intend to be a long way behind Mr. Hocke, to the extent I have anything to do with the matter. And remember our relief operations there, as elsewhere, are not direct. They are channeled through the international agencies. I hope that we can be effective in getting food to people, not getting food to warehouses. I think there are probably other things that can be done. I think that we will use all the ingenuity and energy we can bring to bear to achieve the result that we are seeking, namely the relief of hunger.

Contributions for Khmer Relief (as of Feb. 22, 1980)

	ICRC	UNHCR	UNICEF	WFP	Donor Totals
Australia	\$ 286,300 ¹	\$ 550,781	\$ 876,200	\$ 917,000	\$ 2,630,281
Belgium		251,724			251,724
Canada	1,282,000		1,289,900		2,571,900
Cyprus		1,000			1,000
Denmark	470,000	375,940			845,940
Finland	52,600		52,600		105,200
France	1,000,000				1,000,000
Germany, West	555,600	5,177,203	1,555,500		7,288,300
Greece		5,000			5,000
Iceland	1,500		1,500		3,000
Ireland			106,900		106,900
Israel		55,000			55,000
Italy		120,482		400,000	520,482
Japan	2,272,700	10,000,000	316,500	500,000	13,089,200
Lebanon		4,644			4,644
Liechtenstein	500,000		500,000		1,000,000
Luxembourg	24,600				24,600
Malaysia		5,000			5,000
Netherlands	75,000	1,288,660	375,000	800,000	2,538,660
New Zealand	50,300		50,200		100,500
Norway	200,000	804,198	400,000	1,944,000	3,348,198
Philippines		5,000			5,000
Qatar		10,000			10,000
Singapore		5,000			5,000
Sweden	1,176,500		1,176,500	2,429,500	4,782,500
Switzerland	1,093,800	156,250	768,700	855,700	2,874,450
Taiwan	5,333,333 ²				5,333,333
U.K.				1,600,000	1,600,000
U.S.	5,999,400	15,095,000	11,492,600	30,357,600	62,944,600 ³
Totals	\$20,373,633	\$33,910,882	\$18,962,100	\$39,803,800	\$113,050,415

¹ Includes \$10,000 equivalent of a donation of 30 tons of rice.

² Represents dollar equivalent of a donation of 16,000 tons of rice.

³ The remaining \$2,680,000 of the total amount disbursed by the United States have been contributions in kind, airlift costs, and grants to various smaller voluntary agencies and organizations.

NOTE: On Feb. 21, 1980, the American National Red Cross donated \$500,000 to the ICRC; the total ANRC contribution to ICRC currently is \$1.5 million.

SOURCE: Kampuchea Working Group, Department of State.

Q. You have mentioned the bicycle brigade two or three times and the people who are willing to carry the aid—mainly the food—deep inside Kampuchea. As a result of your talks, then, has agreement been reached with the international agencies and others concerned that the effort to get food to the people on the border and to those who could carry it into Kampuchea will be stepped up considerably?

A. That is a very ambitious goal. In little more than 3 months, the international agencies and the world community have succeeded in mounting an operation which is bringing food to something like a million Khmer. That is a remarkable effort. It is remarkable in a number of ways. There is still a war going on in Kampuchea, and whether or not aid can be stepped up may not be as important as the question of whether it can be maintained, whether we can keep those shipments going to the border, whether distribution can be made to the people there in sufficient amounts so that supplies can continue to be carried inside the country.

Maybe it can be stepped up, but my sense at the moment is that the priority is to stabilize the situation on the border, to keep the shipments going, to start focusing on some other problems that have to be solved to maintain the flow of food. For instance, one of those problems is the water supply. There is no more pressing problem now in the relief effort than the question of water supply. The food is now flowing in tremendous volume, and the organizations are competent to handle it. They are succeeding. The food management and distribution problems are being solved in a major way. The problem that is not being solved is the water supply, which is getting more difficult every day, which demands major attention, and which is now being given attention by the international agencies.

Q. Late last year in New York there was an international pledging session to aid the refugees in Kampuchea. Soon after that there was some suggestion that some countries weren't delivering on those pledges. Could you give us an idea what the situation is now? Is there adequate international funding to keep this effort going for the foreseeable future?

A. This situation is complicated because of the way in which many of the pledges were made. There are about 30 pledging nations. Many of them have pledged contributions in kind. This aid

is now flowing in from all over the world. One of the major tasks that faces Sir Robert Jackson, the U.N. Secretary General's special representative for coordinating the relief effort in Thailand, will be to match the pledges with the contributions to date and to assess the need for the balance of the planning period. I would say, however, that to my knowledge the pledges are being kept. The agencies are spending more money than was planned, but the pledges are being kept. One of Sir Robert Jackson's goals will be to convene a donor conference in the near future to take a new look at the funding situation. But the response to this has been solid and responsible from the great majority of the pledging nations.

Q. You've referred several times to stabilizing the border, which, to put it at its kindest, is chaotic right now. What can be done to bring stability to the border, and what role will the United States be playing in any such effort?

A. The United States is not a direct player, as you know. The direct players consist of the Thai Government, the international organizations, and the voluntary agencies. We are represented through our Embassy, of course, in support of the Thai Government and as a major donor to the relief effort and in other ways. But ultimately the question of stability on the borders is beyond the control of the players I've mentioned. It will depend on whether the Khmer community, which is concentrated in such great numbers there, can settle the differences among the factional leaderships in a way that permits the international organizations to operate. That's not something that anyone that is operating in Thailand can do very much about. My hope will be that the Khmer leadership on the border will see the need to concert its activities and to make some sense in keeping a stable environment.

Q. Three months ago, Thai Government policy was to try to move people away from the border to camps inside Thailand where there would not be this security problem. Two weeks ago the Thai announced that they would no longer encourage people to leave the border. Given the events of the last few days, do you think it is possible to guarantee an acceptable level of security if those people remain on the border?

A. Security for the refugees? I don't think it's possible to talk about

security guarantees when you have refugees from a country in which hostilities are being conducted. The reason you have refugees is because you have insecurity. We are going to continue to have deep concerns about the issue of security for the Khmer people, who cannot be organized by anybody in Thailand. That responsibility lies elsewhere. We're going to be doing our best, through the Thai Government and through the voluntary agencies, to feed people and to keep people alive in the hope that the conditions that have caused them such suffering and that have caused them to leave their homes will somehow, someday, soon I hope, change so that they can return. That's our objective.

JAN. 23, 1980

I spent two weeks in Southeast Asia, about half of it in Thailand and the other half in Malaysia and the Philippines, essentially asking two or three questions: What have we accomplished with respect to the Kampuchean relief effort? What are the prospects for that effort in Thailand and within Kampuchea? What is happening in relation to our resettlement program in countries of first asylum throughout Southeast Asia?

I also had the opportunity to talk about funding problems with governments there and about other issues connected with this tragic, massive, and increasingly difficult situation.

Let me summarize just very quickly what I bring home with me by way of conclusions. First, famine has been checked temporarily within Kampuchea. It has been checked for the most part by the massive feeding operations which have been organized on the border by international agencies—principally the U.N. agencies, by voluntary organizations, and, I might also add, by the efforts of the American Embassy in Bangkok, which may have sounded the earliest alarm about famine in Kampuchea.

We can say that the famine has been checked in the west by the efforts of the border-feeding operation, which has penetrated into Kampuchea to an amazing distance. We have reports from both travelers within Kampuchea and from debriefings of refugees who arrived at the border that food from the border is penetrating 200–300 kilometers inside Kampuchea by the bicycle brigade and by the bull carts. That has been a major effort; it's been a successful effort.

Secondly, the famine has been temporarily checked by the fact that the recent harvest has come in, and the authorities have, in the main, apparently allowed people to keep that harvest. And I think you have to give credit to the international organizations—the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF—which are operating the relief program within Kampuchea, for affecting the psychology of the authorities in Phnom Penh—allowing distributions of Russian corn, allowing villagers and farmers to keep that recent harvest, which was a very short harvest.

Now the question: What's ahead? And that answer, I think, is quite grim. I think we are facing again the threat of a renewed famine in Kampuchea. We are very seriously concerned as to how the population can be sustained between March—when this current short harvest will be consumed entirely—and November-December, when the next main crops will be harvested.

There will be a short harvest on small irrigated acreage in the spring and in the early fall, but there is going to be a huge deficit. We are going to have a massive famine again in Kampuchea if we are not able to step up the relief effort very substantially in the next 60–90 days.

According to the international organizations, there is now some hope or improvement of distribution within Kampuchea. In particular, after persistent refusal UNICEF has recently received agreement from Hanoi to allow it to charter barges for food shipments up the Mekong. They have received approval for flights to provincial airports by chartered Laotian aircraft operating out of Phnom Penh. And the possibilities of an airlift to outlying regions and barging operations—particularly after the dry season—give us some hope. At least, they give the international organizations hope that the cejam that has been blocking distribution within Kampuchea may be thawing, if not breaking up.

The processing of refugees for the resettlement program is in good shape. The third country resettlement is working and working well. Many countries are cooperating. And the refugee processing center in Bataan, Philippines, which will be a major help in that system, is well under way and will be receiving refugees from countries of first asylum this week.

Q. Can you tell us something more about the distribution of food within Kampuchea that has been arriving at Kompong Som and at Phnom Penh? How has this food been distributed in recent weeks, or has it been distributed?

A. In the last 2–3 weeks, UNICEF officials advised that some improvements in the situation have occurred, namely the ones I've mentioned—the approvals from Hanoi for barge charters up the Mekong, the approvals for the flights of Laotian aircraft into provincial capitals out of Phnom Penh.

They also report that there is a steady improvement in the movement of supplies out of Kompong Som to Phnom Penh. We hope these supplies then get to the provinces and to the Khmer, although I want to state that under the conditions that obtain within the country, neither the international officials nor we have any way to monitor distribution. We are continuing to ask that those organizations fulfill the requirements of our law and that we get reports which verify distribution.

I want to say again that they have indicated there are improvements that they deem important. They also have emphasized to me what I've already told you—that the famine has been temporarily checked. Again in saying that, I want to make it very clear that we do not have information covering important sectors of the country—the northeast; the southwest where the Pol Pot forces hold up in the Cardamom Mountains, particularly pockets in the hills and outlying regions in the north; and in institutions where children, the sick, the aged, and marginal groups have undoubtedly been bypassed with food supplies and are still undoubtedly suffering.

So when I say the famine is temporarily checked, it's based on the reports that I've indicated but also on an important proviso that there are large areas of the country we haven't seen. We are reasonably certain that there are still large groups suffering and certain also that famine is coming unless these relief efforts can be stepped up in the months ahead.

Q. The problem of supplies piling up in warehouses in Phnom Penh—is that a political problem; is that a logistical problem; is it a problem that they just don't have enough know-how to achieve that or track it or whatever?

A. That is not a distinction one can easily make between political and logis-

Thai-Kampuchea Border Situation

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JAN. 26, 1980¹

The United States is concerned about recent Vietnamese military reconnaissance operations along the Thai-Kampuchean border, increasingly harsh Vietnamese propaganda attacking border area relief operations, and recent intelligence reports which point to possible Vietnamese military attacks on refugee concentrations along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

Vietnamese military activity in this area poses a potential threat to the security of Thailand. Any expansion of this military activity would constitute a threat to the peace, security, and stability of the entire region.

We welcome the strong expressions of concern already issued by Japan, the European Community, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada about the safety of the noncombatants on the border. Utmost care must be taken to assure that these people can return to their homes in Kampuchea.

We urge that all concerned governments continue to support efforts of international organizations, both at the border and in Kampuchea.

We also call upon the Governments of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which supports Vietnam's military activity in Kampuchea, to refrain from any action that would threaten Thailand's security and integrity or endanger the well-being and safety of the noncombatants in the refugee concentrations along the border. More broadly, we urge them to seek a peaceful solution there, entailing the end of hostilities, withdrawal of all foreign troops, and creation of a genuinely independent and representative Khmer government at peace with all its neighbors.

¹Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodge Carter III. ■

tical problems, especially when operating from outside the country.

The private voluntary organizations, U.N. agencies and the ICRC operating in Phnom Penh feel strongly that the problems are what they would call "structural;" that is, the lack of administrative competence, the lack of communications, the lack of transportation, the lack of roads, and so forth.

Other observers feel that the problems go beyond that; that if it's possible to supply 200,000 Vietnamese troops, it ought to be possible to supply food to people. And those observers would ask why it has not been possible to move some of the more than 40,000 tons that have been delivered into the country before this date.

Again, the answer has been that supplies have been moved out of Kompong Som and out of Phnom Penh, but those supplies were there before the international relief effort supplies arrived; that the Phnom Penh authorities were pursuing the principle of "first in time, first in right," and so they distributed Russian corn rather than the UNICEF and ICRC supplies. There are, in short, a lot of explanations.

Another explanation is that, in fact, the U.N. supplies delivered through ICRC and UNICEF have made a major impact on the total hoarding psychology of a government that lacked any strategic reserve for the period to come. It has been obvious for a long time that the coming months would be the worst period of all because the agricultural production system is shattered. There are no substantial prospects for recovery in agricultural production before 1981. The last crop was perhaps 10-15% of normal. And so some have argued that the supplies delivered by international agencies have constituted a kind of strategic reserve for the lean times ahead.

Whatever the facts, the supplies haven't been distributed up to now. There is now evidence that some supplies are being moved out of Kompong Som and out of Phnom Penh. We hope, and the international agencies believe, that those supplies are reaching people and that increasing amounts will move out of this blockage in the weeks ahead.

Q. From your 2-week trip, which of these different explanations do you subscribe to? I mean what is your impression as to why the delays?

A. I would find it easy to subscribe to the theory that the delays are caused by different factors at different times.

It would seem to me that there has been a clear lack of logistical competence, a clear lack of administrative structure, and a clear lack of determination to get the food to the people.

Q. How many international refugee relief workers are now in Kampuchea, and what is the status of the hundreds of trucks that have now been provided by various sides? And is the distribution going beyond the Phnom Penh area—is it now, in any sense, fanning out from Phnom Penh to the rest of the country?

A. Let me remind you that I did not go into Kampuchea; that I have sought to give you a balanced view of the situation as it was reported to me by UNICEF officials with whom we met in Bangkok, who had come from Phnom Penh, and by other officials and travelers—including refugees—who have been recently in Kampuchea. I do not speak from personal observation within the country.

There are about five or six UNICEF officials operating in Phnom Penh. They have no opportunity, with that small a complement, to monitor movements out of Phnom Penh. They are doing their best to get the goods from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh, where the basic transportation system of the country is centered.

Routes 5 and 6 around the Tonle Sap, the Great Lake, originate at that point, so there are very few officials there.

I might add a point concerning the threat of renewed famine as against the temporary improvements that we've been able to make through these relief efforts. One of the things that has not happened, and which represents a clear, political issue rather than a logistical issue, is the improvement in the medical situation. There has been no willingness to allow international medical assistance, with some very limited exceptions. That is a matter, I think, of great and increasing concern.

Q. Do they have the adequate trucks now to distribute the food, and are they allowing distribution outside of the Phnom Penh area?

A. I'm advised by the UNICEF officials that there are now 400-500 trucks within the country; however, not all of them are operational because there is a very limited training program underway for drivers. There are 50 trucks a day moving supplies from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh, which carry about 250 tons. A lot of those

trucks are not yet in service along the principal supply routes from the major harbor to the major distribution points.

There are 800 tons a week going by train, as of most recent information, from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh. That would mean, according to UNICEF, that they have improved their capacity to move goods out of Kompong Som—we're talking about relief goods now, both the joint ICRC/UNICEF program and the voluntary agencies. They think they have the capacity now for about 11,000 tons per month.

The target is 30,000 tons per month moving into the country to meet the food needs of the Kampuchean population. The Phnom Penh port itself has a substantially greater relief capacity right now—about 20,000 tons per month. If they can keep those supplies moving and we can sustain the program of moving them into the country, they will gradually develop the capacity to make the logistical connections that are necessary to reach the people.

Q. I'm perplexed by several things here. Last October, when Father Hesburgh [Theodore M. Hesburgh, chairman of a White House meeting on refugees] put together a group to make an appeal and Dick Clark [Ambassador Palmieri's predecessor] was providing him with some of the data that he was using, we were told that a large proportion of the people who were still surviving in Kampuchea were going to die within the next few months unless the relief effort could get up to that level of 30,000 tons a month.

Now you seem to be suggesting that it has not gotten up to that level, and yet you talk about a famine being temporarily checked in Kampuchea. You also talk about the inability to get to some areas to really be sure of what is happening. You talk about the inability of the five or six UNICEF people in Phnom Penh to know exactly where the food is going once they've put it in the warehouses in Phnom Penh.

Were the worst fears of last October exaggerated, or is our hope now that not too many people are dying is exaggerated? There seems to be some inconsistency here in the picture we've been given in the past and the picture you're painting today, and I don't understand it.

A. It's not hard to understand. The thing that would be hard to understand is if it would be perfectly consistent. The information is itself difficult to ob-

tain and difficult to verify. There are no statistics; there are no communications to speak of within this country.

What we do know is that as of September, we had the prospects of a virtual holocaust within Kampuchea. As of January, some 4 months later, it is possible to say that there have been, undoubtedly, thousands and thousands of deaths by malnutrition and starvation during the past year within that country. On the other hand, the relief efforts I've mentioned have come up to speed particularly in the border operation. I think we can say that that border operation may have saved a million Khmer lives in the past several months, not only by directly feeding several hundred thousand people in the border concentrations and in the Khmer holding centers but also by providing food that was taken into western Kampuchea. So both things are true. There has been great suffering; there remains great malnutrition.

I hope I have not misled you by saying the famine conditions were temporarily checked. There remains very serious malnutrition. There undoubtedly remain pockets—and they may be very substantial—of people in outlying regions who are still starving.

When I say the famine has been temporarily checked, I am giving you the characterization of experts in UNICEF and ICRC, and Sir Robert Jackson, the new U.N. coordinator, who have used those terms.

I don't think that the information was at all exaggerated that you got a few months ago. I think that I'm not exaggerating now when I tell you what I have said about the threat of a new famine, and I'm not sure I see the inconsistency. This was, in fact, one of the fastest buildups of an international relief effort, comprising not only food on the borders but water trucked in—one of the biggest water supply operations that has ever been mounted. Indeed it's been so big, it has about ruined the roads in that part of the area of Thailand.

In medicine, we now have several hundred medical people on the Thai border. This medical operation has played the major role in changing that picture. What I'm trying to say is that by checking it, we have not removed the problem.

Q. Nobody knows for sure, but there are estimates that the population of Kampuchea is only 3 million. If you are feeding 1 million on the

border and planned distribution within the country has only met one-third of its goal and, therefore, reaching another 1 million people, two-thirds of the population are being reached. Do the remaining 1 million constitute the pockets you're talking about?

A. I think you're going to have trouble making the numbers add because we have trouble making the numbers add. For one thing, as I mentioned, there have been shipments of Russian grains which have been distributed. Undoubtedly those shipments have played a role.

For another reason, there has been the recent November-December harvest which, while it won't last another month, has played an important role in checking the famine.

Another thing that goes to the question, and that is perhaps the grimmest consideration, is that those people who were strong enough to get to the border or who had friends or family who were strong enough to get to the border and get back to them have had a higher survival rate than other people within western Kampuchea.

We really don't know how many people have died there, so when I say the famine is temporarily checked, I certainly am not commenting on the mortality rate of the last few months from malnutrition within Kampuchea. I hope that's clear, that there could have been and undoubtedly was a very real human tragedy expressed in terms of lives lost. It may be that that tragedy still continues, just in terms of the permanent damage that's been done by malnutrition, to a whole generation of Khmer.

Q. About 6 weeks or 2 months ago, officials here were suggesting that some of this food might be going to the wrong people, that we had no way of knowing whether it was going to the Vietnamese Army. Do you have a better grip on that subject now? Is this still the fear of the Administration here?

A. Again, my sense would be that it would be strange if some part of it were not going in the wrong direction, because there is such a substantial effort being made to move food to the border in order to get that food moving into the country.

On the other hand, the international organizations assure us—and we have made the concern very plain to them—that they have no evidence of

deliberate diversion. On the other hand, they would say just what I have said, that in the real world, there may well be diversions. There may also be limitations to what they have the ability to inspect. I told you that they don't have any monitoring facilities. But I conclude from the information given by the international authorities that the food that is going into this relief program and, in the main, is reaching the people for whom it is intended. I want to be very clear on that, because I think that is what has checked the famine.

Q. Is there any sign of any movement by Hanoi toward allowing the controlled departure of people as seemed to have been agreed in Geneva last July?

A. There have been continuing conversations on that point. I myself met with the Vietnamese charge d'affaires in Bangkok, along with U.S. Ambassador Abramowitz. We asked again for the response that we need to continue the discussions. That response consists of the information concerning the relationship of the people on their list to either our government through past employment or to relatives in the United States. With that information, we have offered to use their list and to proceed on the basis indicated earlier, namely, to interview people at the airport in Ho Chi Minh Ville and to take them out and to make the program work. The charge listened with courtesy and interest, and we await the response of his government with interest.

Q. How long do you think it would be before these refugee camps are ever emptied, if ever possible, and do you think the flow of refugees into the United States will be speeded up?

A. The answer to the second question is that the process is being speeded up, particularly with respect to those people who have been there longest. We have, I think, made a very important improvement in the processing in Thailand. We will be taking well over 7,000 people a month out of Thailand. The whole worldwide resettlement effort now, from a processing standpoint, is in high gear. It takes time to put a management system in place, but this one is now in place; it is now working both in respect of the operation of the camps, the transit processing, and, hopefully, the processing centers where we will be working on bringing orientation programs to the refugees before they depart for third countries.

On the first question, which is the \$64 question or in this case a somewhat larger figure, the obvious answer is that we don't know when conditions in Indochina will return to a point at which people will no longer have the motivation to flee.

It is clear that that motivation is, in part, related to political repression, in part to military activity, and in part—and particularly in Kampuchea—to hunger. If you could tell me when those conditions will change, I can tell you when people will want to stay home. ■

Kampuchean Relief Disrupted

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
DEC. 6, 1979¹

Starvation still threatens millions of Cambodian lives, despite a massive international relief effort. This sad reality is due to no failure of global concern. The international community has offered the means and has the will to allay the suffering of the Cambodian people.

Growing quantities of food and medical supplies are now reaching that country, but too often the relief cannot get through to those in need; instead, the flow of aid is deliberately blocked and obstructed by the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin authorities. Their Soviet allies have not brought any discernible influence to bear to alleviate the situation, while supporting Vietnam heavily.

- Relief supplies are piling up in Phnom Penh and other points of initial delivery because local and Vietnamese authorities continually change or delay agreed arrangements for distribution.

- Taxes and tariffs are collected on the delivery of relief supplies—in effect, imposing a surcharge on human survival.

- We continue to receive reports that relief supplies are diverted or stockpiled for the use of military forces and that what distribution does take place is skewed to favor officials and supporters of the Heng Samrin regime.

- There is even interference with the attempts of the Kampuchean people to feed themselves. For example, refugees have reported the mining of rice fields to prevent a harvest.

In the face of widespread human anguish, this delay and diversion of humanitarian efforts is unconscionable.

As many as 2 million Cambodians may have died under the brutal Pol Pot regime. Now, in the wake of a Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, the long-suffering people of that country face a new wave of oppression, hunger, and disease.

To counter this mounting tragedy, we call upon responsible leaders in both Hanoi and Moscow to recognize and act upon the compelling humanitarian requirements of the Cambodian people—which they thus far have not done. We call on them to cooperate fully with the international community in opening all routes for supplies to enter Cambodia—which they thus far have not done. We call on them to take the steps necessary to speed the distribution of humanitarian aid to starving people throughout all parts of that country—which they thus far have not done. We call on them not to feed the flames of war, but use aircraft and airfields to ferry food to feed the people of Kampuchea.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 10, 1979. ■

Publications

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Secretary Visits Europe

Secretary Vance departed Washington on February 19, 1980, for visits to Bonn (February 19-20), Rome (February 20-21), Paris (February 21), and London (February 21-22); he returned to Washington on February 22. Following is the text of the news conference he and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher held in Bonn on February 20.¹

Foreign Minister Genscher. We had, yesterday and today, talks lasting for several hours. We had a substantive discussion of the world situation, we have arrived at a common analysis, and we were in agreement on the need for an overall Western concept. And I believe that the visit of the Secretary of State not only to Bonn but also to Rome, to Paris, and to London is of very great importance.

We welcome this effort undertaken by the American Administration to consult with its European allies and, as you now, there has been a very intensive process of consultations over the last few weeks. These talks will be continued when the Chancellor goes to Washington in 2 weeks.

I am convinced that the Secretary of State will leave the Federal Republic of Germany certain and convinced that the Federal Republic will meet its obligations within the framework of the Western community and that we will contribute to the objective of safeguarding the balance both internationally—worldwide—as well as here in Europe. The objective is, furthermore, to implement the resolutions adopted by the United Nations as regards Afghanistan. The objective is also that all possibilities for talks and contacts should be used and exploited so do all we can in order to avoid escalation, but rather to make a political solution of the pending problems possible, and to continue in this way the process of a realistic policy of detente.

Secretary Vance. I first want to express my deep thanks to Foreign Minister Genscher and to the Chancellor for spending many hours during my stay here in the discussion of the various topics which Minister Genscher has referred to. The discussions were extremely helpful to me.

As Foreign Minister Genscher indicated, our analysis of the situation is common. And we had a chance to dis-

cuss in depth the steps to be taken within the Western community in dealing with the difficult problems that face us.

I might say a particular word about our discussion at lunch today with Chancellor Schmidt. During those discussions we discussed in great depth substantive issues relating to not only the current situation but the long-term objectives. We did not devote our time to the tactical short-term problems; those have been covered, along with substantive matters, in my discussions with Foreign Minister Genscher and his colleagues. But it was extremely useful to have the chance to have an in-depth discussion of both the short- and the long-term substantive issues which I shall convey back to my President in preparation for the meetings which he will be having in the near future with Chancellor Schmidt.

Q. A lack of information and consultation on the part of the United States has been often deplored here in Europe. Has this matter been on your agenda, and is the U.S. Administration willing to improve in the near future the process of informing the Western allies?

Secretary Vance. The answer is yes, of course, we are willing to improve the methods of consultation. It is absolutely essential that we have the fullest consultation between ourselves and our allies and friends. We have talked about possible ways of improving the exchanges between us which I hope will prove fruitful. I believe that they will. It is crucial in times like these that we do have both a mechanism and a means for full and complete discussion at any time.

Q. Hodding Carter [State Department spokesman] told us this morning that the State Department had established two lists of countries supporting, or seeming to support, the U.S. boycott initiative on the Olympics. Twenty-five countries would make this position clear, 25 others would express private support. West Germany, Mr. Carter said, was not on either list. Were you able to gain any support during your visit here?

Secretary Vance. The question of the Olympics is a question which must be determined by each government

after full consultations among not only its government officials but also with the members of its national Olympic committee and after discussion within its domestic public. That is an issue for each country to decide for itself, and I am sure that that process will be followed in this country.

Q. [Inaudible; concerned Olympic boycott.]

Secretary Vance. We made our position very clear on this issue. We said that we would not attend the Olympics in the capital of any invading country. The Soviet Union has invaded Afghanistan; its troops remain in Afghanistan; we have suggested that the Olympics should be transferred or an alternate site found or that they be canceled. And we have said if this is not done that we will not attend.

Q. You said there was agreement on "the need for" a Western overall concept. When will you reach an agreement on the Western concept?

Foreign Minister Genscher. I

IOC Rejects U.S. Proposal on Summer Olympics

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
FEB. 12, 1980¹

We regret the decision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to conduct the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, and rejecting the proposal of the U.S. Olympic Committee to transfer, postpone, or cancel the games.

Under these circumstances neither the President, the Congress, nor the American people can support the sending of the U.S. team to Moscow this summer. The President urges the U.S. Olympic Committee to reach a prompt decision against sending its team to the games. The United States is working with a number of other like-minded governments to take similar action and to consider the practicability of conducting other international games for the teams which do not go to Moscow.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 18, 1980. ■

think I should say that we discussed essential elements of this Western overall concept and that we reached full agreement on these essential elements of such an overall concept. I think we should take very seriously what the Secretary of State said about the substance of the talks he had with the Federal Chancellor because the Chancellor gave a very detailed, thorough, and in-depth analysis of the situation—potential consequences flowing from this situation—and he also explained in detail his views as to how the present situation could be overcome.

So I think an exchange of the kind we had today which produced agreement on the assessment of individual elements is necessary as the basis for such a substantive concept, and, therefore, it is no wonder that we reached agreement on these essential elements today insofar as such agreement hadn't existed already earlier.

Secretary Vance. Let me simply add to that that I want to underscore what Herr Genscher has said. It was extremely important to have this in-depth discussion of those short-term and long-range substantive matters. And as Herr Genscher has said, there was agreement; and we are proceeding along the same track.

Q. Did you discuss the plan of the international guaranty for a neutral Afghanistan?

Secretary Vance. We have discussed the communique which was issued yesterday at the end of the [European Communities Foreign Ministers'] conference in Rome and the conclusions which were set forth in that communique. Let me say that we are in general agreement with the statements reflected in that communique.

Q. [Inaudible; concerned U.S. policy to "punish" the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan.]

Secretary Vance. What we have said on that is that as long as Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan that they must pay a cost which flows from the fact of this blatant invasion of a neighboring country. And at the same time they must realize that such action is unacceptable to the world community, as is reflected by the vote in the United Nations, which was overwhelming.

Q. Can you tell us what contribution West Germany will make to the implementation of this overall response policy?

Foreign Minister Genscher. I think it is well-known that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, within the framework of the alliance, faces its most essential task in helping to safeguard the balance here in the central district of the central area of the alliance. Another very important role of the Federal Republic is to contribute to a solution of the very difficult economic and financial problems besetting our ally Turkey. We are, furthermore, interested in making a contribution to improving relations and deepening cooperation with the gulf states and also to make a contribution to the economic development of Pakistan. These, I think, are essential contributions on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany to this overall concept.

¹Press release 41 of Feb. 21, 1980. ■

European Parliament President's Visit

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JAN. 29, 1980¹

The President met with European Parliament President Simone Veil January 29, 1980. Madame Veil, who presides over the first directly elected European Parliament, is heading a

23-member delegation to the United States.

Madame Veil discussed the evolution of the European Parliament (EP) and the enlarged prospects it enjoys for becoming a significant social and political force in Europe now that its members are elected by universal suffrage. She pointed to the recent EP resolution on Iran in support of international efforts to secure the release of American hostages in Tehran who continue to be held in defiance of all accepted norms of international law. In addition, she discussed the recent EP resolution which condemned Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and which urged EP member countries to reconsider the sending of their national teams to compete in the Moscow Olympics.

The President stressed his admiration for the strength and vigor with which the European Parliament is addressing major issues of the day, and he reiterated U.S. interest in maintaining close contacts with this evolving institution. In that connection, the President and Madame Veil agreed on the desirability of intensifying transatlantic cooperation in the fields of trade and energy, a development which would accord with the Parliament's growing interest in international affairs.

Madame Veil expressed her personal appreciation for the forcefulness of the President's State of the Union message and felt that a great number of Europeans felt as she did.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 4, 1980. ■

Madame Veil and President Carter



White House Photo by Jack Knightlinger

Security Assistance for Greece, Turkey, Relations With Cyprus

by H. Allen Holmes

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 13, 1980. Mr. Holmes is Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.¹

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our relations with the countries of the eastern Mediterranean and the Administration's security assistance proposals for Greece and Turkey for FY 1981. At the outset, I should explain that, this year, the Administration's proposal for funds for Cyprus' displaced persons will be submitted separately from the security assistance package. It, more appropriately, will be part of the budget request for refugee programs.

The basic policy goals of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean remain constant. We seek to strengthen our important bilateral relations with Greece and Turkey, to strengthen NATO's vital southern flank, and to facilitate the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Events in Iran and Afghanistan, added to the unresolved problems in the Middle East, have opened to question some earlier assumptions about Soviet behavior, thus deepening the already considerable instability in the area bordering on the eastern Mediterranean region. International tensions are increased. These developments underline the importance of fostering close, cooperative relations with Greece and Turkey and the necessity of helping them to maintain viable, pro-Western democratic systems. They lend great urgency to our efforts to assist these critically situated allies in acquiring the materiel and training needed to discharge effectively their NATO responsibilities.

In formulating our security assistance proposals, we have been guided by the statement of principles contained in section 620C(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The formal certification to this effect, required by section 20C(d) of that act, will accompany the Administration's FY 1981 legislative proposal. Detailed explanations of the certification are contained in the country program documents, and I will attempt to highlight some of the main points in this statement.

Turkey

As a result of partial elections on October 15, a new Turkish Government, led by Suleyman Demirel, took office in November. It is the first minority government in the history of the Turkish Republic, depending on parliamentary votes from parties which have no seats in the Cabinet. This government faces severe problems at home. The economy is in disarray; terrorism takes a daily toll of lives, including the brutal slaying of four Americans in December; and the harshest winter in 30 years makes all other problems even more acute. The Turkish Government is moving vigorously to combat these problems. Our support in the defense and economic fields will help it in this task, as well as serve basic U.S. interests.

The past year has seen a continuation of the steady improvement in our bilateral relationship. We have made significant progress in our defense negotiations. Secretary Vance and his Turkish colleague, Foreign Minister Erkmen, agreed in December on an intensified effort to complete these negotiations expeditiously. In talks held in Ankara in early January, Under Secretary-designate for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology [Matthew] Nimetz reached agreement on the core documents of a new relationship of defense and economic cooperation.

Initiated on January 10, these documents are the foundation agreement and supplementary agreements on defense support, defense industrial cooperation, and installations. In order to facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations and the continued functioning of U.S.-utilized facilities, Turkish authorities extended until February 22 the interim measures under which we conduct our various operations at Turkish installations. Both sides are now striving to complete the remaining parts of the agreement by February 22.

This new agreement contains no specific U.S. pledge of funding but rather a best-efforts commitment that we shall seek to help meet Turkish needs in the security and economic fields. Our FY 1981 assistance request for Turkey is in line with both the magnitude of these needs and the spirit of the recently initiated agreement. We

are mindful of strong congressional interests in these negotiations, and we are arranging to brief the relevant committees in detail on what has been accomplished to date.

On the international plane, the Turkish Government has been helpful to us with respect to the critical problems in southwest Asia. It has condemned forcefully the taking of American hostages and the violation of our Embassy in Tehran. It fully shares our grave concern over Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Within NATO, Turkey has given strong support in meeting that challenge.

Cyprus continues to affect our bilateral relationship with Turkey. The Turkish Government has frequently affirmed its desire to reach a just and lasting settlement on the island through the intercommunal talks. We hope that U.N. Secretary General Waldheim will soon succeed in bringing the two communities back to the negotiating table. We believe that Turkey will support his efforts toward that end.

On the bilateral plane, the U.S. Senate completed action last year on two consular treaties—the prisoner transfer treaty and the agreement on extradition and judicial assistance. Shortly after taking office, the new Turkish Government submitted both treaties to its Parliament for ratification. They are now in committee.

On January 24 the Turkish Government announced a sweeping program of measures which amount to a radical reorientation of the Turkish economy. It devalued the Turkish lira by 48%; ceased subsidizing most state economic enterprises, thus raising the price of many basic goods; encouraged foreign investment and private sector activity; and made the state economic enterprises subject to market forces. Independent financial experts and friendly governments have long advocated reforms of this kind and magnitude. Initial foreign reaction has been overwhelmingly positive. Success of the program will depend on a large inflow of external resources to finance essential imports in the next few months. The United States will do its part, as in 1979. We are delighted that the Federal Republic of Germany has again undertaken to put together an international consortium for this purpose. Chancellor Schmidt has appointed Finance Minister Matthöfer to lead this effort.

Our FY 1981 request for Turkey addresses these realities. We propose a total security assistance program of \$452 million, of which \$250 million is

foreign military sales (FMS) financing and \$2 million in international military education and training (IMET). We also seek \$200 million in economic support fund assistance to help Turkey with its critical balance-of-payments problems.

The \$250 million FMS financing program will have a beneficial impact on Turkey's ability to maintain equipment now in its inventory. It will also make a limited contribution to Turkey's program for reaching its NATO-approved goals of force modernization. Other allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, are also making bilateral efforts to enhance Turkish defense capabilities. Turkey has, however, a massive need for support equipment and spare parts.

IMET is an extremely valuable program. It provides needed training, and it enhances contacts and communication between Turkish and American military personnel. This dialogue is essential in light of the disruption which occurred during the embargo period. Now, both sides are relearning old habits of cooperation. As a result, we are working toward a stronger NATO in which U.S. and Turkish forces play complementary roles and make more effective use of scarce resources.

Turkey's critical economic situation makes it vital for the United States and other friendly nations to support the January 24 economic reforms. Our assistance will provide some of the resources which Turkey needs to sustain this program and, over time, to regain its economic health. Realistically, this process will take much longer than a year. Our economic support fund proposal is not dramatically large, but it builds significantly on our FY 1980 assistance. More importantly, it gives Turkey further assurance of our undiminished political support for the success of its economic stabilization program. We would plan to provide this \$200 million in economic support fund assistance on terms which reflect Turkey's stringent financial circumstances. Last year the Administration agreed with the congressional initiative to provide \$75 million of the \$198 million economic support fund as a grant.

The assistance measures which I have cited will help to strengthen a valued friend and ally. They, therefore, are intrinsically important to major U.S. and Western security interests. They will enhance the Turkish-American bilateral relationship and Turkey's ability to play a useful role in the alliance.

Greece

During the past year, our relations with Greece have deepened and matured as that increasingly developed country has more firmly established itself as an important member of the democratic West. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Karamanlis, Greece will be entering the European Communities (EC) on January 1, 1981. The treaty of accession now being ratified by member states was signed in Athens on May 28 in the presence of major European leaders, including the President of France and the Prime Ministers of Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ireland. President Carter sent a message to Prime Minister Karamanlis warmly welcoming this demonstration of Greece's economic vitality and democratic strength and congratulating him on his wisdom and leadership in bringing Greece into the EC.

The Government of Greece recently proposed the establishment of a permanent home for the Summer Olympic Games in Greece. It has offered to the

International Olympic Committee a site near ancient Olympia for this purpose. We consider this a worthwhile initiative, particularly in the present circumstances, and are prepared to support it in any way that would be helpful.

We continue to have an on-going and positive defense relationship with Greece. The facilities we utilize there operate with the full cooperation of Greek authorities. Sixth fleet ships make regular calls in Greek ports.

Greece is seeking to reintegrate its armed forces into the NATO military command structure, from which it withdrew in 1974. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. [Bernard M.] Rogers, has assumed the alliance mandate to develop military arrangements satisfactory to Greece and the alliance for this purpose. As a member of NATO, we strongly support these efforts and have urged all parties to work with General Rogers. We will continue to do so.

The security assistance program we are proposing for Greece for FY 1981 would provide \$180 million in FMS

17th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JAN. 24, 1980¹

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem, plus a copy of Secretary General Waldheim's comprehensive report to the Security Council on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period of June 1 through November 30, 1979.

Since my last report on Cyprus, dated November 21 [28], 1979, the intercommunal talks have regrettably remained recessed. Now that the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have concluded their periodic reviews of the Cyprus question, I am hopeful that all parties will again focus their primary attention on resuming the intercommunal negotiations. Secretary General Waldheim, in his December 1, 1979, report on Cyprus, undertook to pursue his efforts to reconvene the talks as early as possible in the new year. I am encouraged to note that the Secretary General's representatives on Cyprus have begun consultations with both parties in an attempt to find common ground upon which the negotiations might resume. The United States will continue to support fully the Secretary General and his staff in their efforts to achieve an early resumption of serious negotiations.

On December 14, 1979, the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution extending the mandate on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to June 15, 1980. I am pleased that the other members of the Security Council share our view that UNFICYP is essential to the maintenance of a calm atmosphere conducive to the reconvening of the intercommunal talks.

The Cyprus dispute has been on the international agenda for decades. The historical complexity of this issue indicates that perseverance, patience, and political courage are required on both sides if a just and lasting settlement is to be achieved. We are committed to the vigorous pursuit of all promising avenues that might lead to that settlement, and will continue to consult closely with all parties to the Cyprus dispute, the United Nations, our European allies, and other nations legitimately concerned with bringing peace to this troubled island.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER ■

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980).

financing and \$1.5 million IMET, for a total of \$181.5 million.

The proposed program will assist Greece in fulfilling its NATO obligations and help provide for Greece's self-defense. The program also is a continuing indication of U.S. support for a democratic Greece. It has been formulated with a view to maintaining the military balance among the countries of the region and to strengthening the southern flank of NATO at a time of particular concern. In sum, the program for Greece will be fully consistent with the principles set forth in Section 200(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and will make an important contribution to the defense posture of a key ally.

Cyprus

With respect to Cyprus, we continue to believe that the most effective way to achieve a permanent and mutually satisfactory settlement is through direct negotiations between the two parties on the island.

Secretary General Waldheim succeeded in bringing the two sides together in June, 1979, but the talks were ceased when the parties were unable to agree on an agenda. Since then, the Secretary General and his staff have worked tirelessly to find common ground on which the two sides might return to the negotiating table. The United States has consistently supported the Secretary General and will continue to do so, for we believe that his efforts carry the most promise for resumption of the intercommunal talks.

At the same time, we continue to consult closely with all parties to the dispute, our European allies, and other states which have a legitimate role to play and which share our common goal. Last fall, Secretary Vance had comprehensive discussions with Cypriot President Kyprianou in New York during the U.N. General Assembly. Cypriot Foreign Minister Rolandis has just completed a visit to Washington where he discussed the Cyprus problem with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary Christopher, and Under Secretary-designate Nimetz.

The long history of the Cyprus problem demonstrates that peaceful progress has never been easy. We believe, however, that a solution is

achievable, and we remain committed to finding a solution that will bring peace to this troubled island.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Spanish Prime Minister Meets With President Carter

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JAN. 14, 1980¹

The President met today with Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez of Spain. The two leaders had a working lunch in the Cabinet Room, with senior officials of both governments participating.

The President and the Prime Minister noted with satisfaction the close relations between their two countries and discussed a number of international issues which are of particular concern to both. These included the crises in Iran and Afghanistan, the situation in the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and U.S.-Spanish cooperation in Western security matters.

The President, in congratulating the Prime Minister for his vigorous leadership in the evolution of Spanish democracy, expressed his appreciation

and that of the entire American people for Spain's support on behalf of the international effort to secure release of American hostages held by Iran in defiance of universally accepted standards of decency and law. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the principle of the rule of law, vital to the whole world community, is at stake in this crisis. The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that they would use every effort to convince the Iranian authorities to release, unharmed, all the hostages.

The two leaders exchanged views on the Soviet armed invasion and occupancy of Afghanistan. They agreed that this Soviet action, in flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter, constitutes a most serious threat to international peace. In condemning Soviet aggression, the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the need to strengthen Western solidarity, as expressed in concrete measures, to impress upon the Soviet Union the consequences of its conduct.

During their discussion concerning other areas of interest to both governments, the President expressed admiration for the Prime Minister's insights based on Spanish contacts and historical experience in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The President welcomed the constructive suggestions which the Prime Minister made regarding these parts of the world and agreed that it would be useful to intensify U.S.-Spanish consultations on ways in which both countries could work for peace and stability there. ■

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 21, 1980.

Prime Minister Suarez and President Carter (White House photo by Karl Schumacher)



CSCE and East-West Relations

by Matthew Nimetz

Statement before the U.S. congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on January 24, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Counselor of the Department of State, Under Secretary-designate for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.¹

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Commission to exchange views on the Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE process and to report to you on our preparations for the CSCE review meeting in Madrid. We appreciate the creative role of Chairman Fassel and the members of the commission, and we value the close working relationship with your staff. We will benefit increasingly from this collaboration as our Madrid preparations intensify.

As we meet, the world has entered on a dangerous and unpredictable period. Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has called into question fundamental principles of international conduct—principles upon which East-West stability has rested since World War II and which are fundamental to the Helsinki agreement. Indeed, the first basket of the Final Act is a virtual catalogue of principles violated by the Soviet invasion:

- Principle one: sovereign equality of nations;
- Principle two: refraining from the threat or use of force;
- Principle three: inviolability of frontiers;
- Principle four: territorial integrity of states;
- Principle six: nonintervention in internal affairs;
- Principle eight: equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Afghanistan is not a party to the Helsinki agreement, but we must ask ourselves whether the Soviet Union, which feels free to violate such basic principles of conduct in Afghanistan, is not undercutting the basic norms of international conduct, embodied in the U.N. Charter, in a manner that threatens the peace and security of all regions of the world, including Europe.

Moreover, the human rights situation in the Soviet Union continues to give cause for concern. We had hoped

that the year leading up to the Madrid meeting would produce movement to resolve long-standing cases of human rights spokesmen and prisoners of conscience. There have been a few positive developments. For example, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union reached high levels last year, although the numbers of applicants for emigration and of refusals also increased. However, there are indications that the number of Jews allowed to emigrate may now be decreasing, and we will continue to monitor this situation closely in coming months.

Lately has come word of the deplorable action of Soviet authorities regarding Dr. Andrei Sakharov, whose enormous contribution to science and to the cause of human rights is celebrated around the world. The fate of this Nobel Prize winner must be a cause of deepest concern to all free men and women. It is ironic that the Soviets should choose to take this harsh and unjustifiable action on the eve of the CSCE Scientific Forum in Hamburg, which has as its fundamental goal the encouragement of scientific inquiry and cooperation.

This latest act of official repression adds to a list of recent incidents which was already depressingly long. Three important figures in the Soviet Union—a human rights activist, Tatyana Velikanova; a Russian Orthodox priest, Father Gleb Yakunin; and a Baltic nationalist, Antanas Terleckas—were arrested on the same day at the beginning of November. In December, Victor Nikipelov, a human rights activist who had been particularly concerned with Soviet psychiatric practices, was arrested.

Two Ukrainian human rights figures, Yuri Litvin and Oles Bernik, were taken into custody and quickly sentenced to substantial terms in prison and labor camps for "anti-Soviet propaganda." We are concerned for the fate of Igor Guberman, editor of an unofficial journal of the situation of Jews in the Soviet Union, who was arrested in September. It is also deeply troubling that figures in the Soviet Helsinki monitors group—men like Orlov, Shcharanski, Rudenko, Petkus, Gajauskas—remain in prison, where some of them have been for many years. In Czechoslovakia, members of Charter 77—Dienstbier, Benda, Havel, and others—have also been imprisoned.

Given this discouraging record, one

must assess why it is in our interest to persevere in CSCE. We have made this assessment and conclude that there are important ways in which CSCE continues to serve our interests and the interests of human rights.

For one, it has set a standard by which the actions of all participating states will henceforth be judged. We should not underestimate the importance of this fact. CSCE has made the human rights practices of our fellow signatories an object of legitimate concern and protest, heightening our awareness of our obligation to speak out and insuring that abuses of fundamental human rights will no longer go unremarked and unchallenged. We can hope that the steady pressure of world opinion, focused by CSCE on repressive practices, will gradually affect the actions of governments—first in marginal cases but eventually perhaps in more fundamental ways.

We should also be aware that CSCE has helped to break down, however slightly, the bloc-to-bloc configuration of European politics which for years prevented us from establishing lines of communication to many countries of Eastern Europe. The Final Act is an agreement between 35 sovereign states, without regard to political or military alignment. It has become a palpable and growing element in European politics, one which promotes discussion over confrontation and provides new opportunities for the countries of Eastern Europe to establish, albeit tentatively, their separate identities as independent nations. We are encouraged by signs that the Eastern Europeans value their CSCE relationship with us and by the progress which has been made—in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), for example—in resolving family reunification and emigration issues. By helping put our relations with these countries on a more normal basis, CSCE is perhaps a harbinger of the future Europe we all hope to build.

CSCE has other benefits. It represents a definitive recognition of the fact that the United States plays a central role in the future of Europe and provides us with a forum which includes all the European states (except Albania), the United States, and Canada, where we can meet to discuss political, economic, and humanitarian issues of common concern. In the area of security, for example, CSCE has established a means of creating a regime of confidence-building measures which has

the long-term potential for enhancing varying time of surprise attack and helping to stabilize the security situation in Europe. In the area of economic and environmental cooperation, the Treaty on Trans-boundary Air Pollution signed last November is a good example of an agreement made possible by the existence of CSCE and the Helsinki process. We hope in the future to use this process to help us find systematic solutions to issues like family reunification which are of central concern to us.

Finally, CSCE serves to remind the free nations of the West of the principles and values which bind them together and, in the end, are the source of their collective strength.

As we look forward to the Madrid meeting, we are conscious that the atmosphere of East-West relations has been gravely damaged by recent events. Nevertheless, the goals we have set for ourselves remain valid:

- To encourage substantive progress in human rights performance by Eastern countries before, during, and after the Madrid meeting;
- To insure a thorough review of implementation, especially of the humanitarian and human rights elements in the Final Act;
- To promote U.S. security and economic goals;
- To maintain a balance among the various baskets of CSCE and to insure that all subjects receive full attention and exposure.

We are, however, realistic. What is possible at Madrid will depend to a large extent on actions taken by others. To insure a useful and productive meeting at Madrid, we need action to resolve outstanding human rights cases like those of the Helsinki monitors and Charter 77 and an end to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. For our part, we will continue to insist on a thorough review of implementation, not only at Madrid but in our consultations with the signatories prior to Madrid.

In conclusion, I would like to mention briefly how we plan to continue our preparations in coming months. We plan to continue the series of bilateral CSCE consultations we have had with Eastern European countries and with the neutral and nonaligned. Members of the commission's staff will participate in these meetings as they have in past consultations. We plan an extensive series of meetings in Washington and around the country with interested groups to discuss Madrid preparations.

We hope to reach as many people as we can, and we intend to take their comments seriously. We will continue our multilateral consultations in NATO and our cooperation with the commission and its staff. Our purpose is to develop not only an effective policy but one which reflects the legitimate concerns and the long-term goals of the American people.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Italian Prime Minister Visits U.S.

Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga of Italy made an official visit to the United States January 23-26, 1980. While in Washington (January 23-25), he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the joint press statement issued on January 25.¹

At President Carter's invitation, the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, Francesco Cossiga, paid an official

visit to Washington January 24-25. The Italian Prime Minister is also visiting the United States in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community for the current 6-month term. The President offered a dinner at the White House in honor of Prime Minister Cossiga and had two meetings with him.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the exceptionally close relations between the two countries and stressed the solidarity existing between them; they also discussed a number of major international issues of common concern. These included the crises in Iran and Afghanistan, the relations between East and West, the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the continuing efforts by both the United States and Italy to strengthen the Atlantic alliance, the international economic situation, the development of the European Economic Community—of which Italy holds at the moment the presidency—and a broad range of bilateral activities designed to intensify U.S.-Italian cooperation in all fields.

The President expressed his appreciation and that of the entire American people for Italy's assistance and support in connection with the international effort to secure the release of the American hostages held by Iran in

Prime Minister Cossiga and President Carter (White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)



defiance of the universally accepted standards of international law.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the principle of civilized behavior and rule of law is at stake. They believe that the continued detention, bent on blackmail, of American diplomatic personnel puts Iran in conflict not merely with the United States but with the entire world community. The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that all the hostages must be released unharmed. To this effect, they concur in the need for all appropriate means to convince the Iranian authorities to end the illegal captivity of U.S. citizens.

The two leaders discussed the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and agreed that this unacceptable violation of the sovereignty and independence of a previously nonaligned state, of international law, and of the U.N. Charter constitutes a grave threat to the peace not only of a vital region but of the entire world. They noted the international recognition of this threat—as expressed by a very large number of countries, including all the European Community states—in the U.N. General Assembly vote overwhelmingly condemning the Soviet action in Afghanistan. The two leaders firmly reiterated their demand that all Soviet troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan. The President and the Prime Minister expressed their determination to pursue, with like-minded nations, a series of coordinated actions to make very clear to the Soviet Union that it will not be allowed to commit such aggression with impunity.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and agreed to press forward on the Camp David accords and on the search for a comprehensive settlement, recognizing the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of each country of the area and their rights to live within established and secure borders and taking into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed Atlantic security issues and expressed their satisfaction with the recent NATO decision to modernize the alliance's long-range theatre nuclear forces, in conjunction with the offer to Warsaw Pact countries to negotiate a balanced reduction of such weapons. They noted and they agreed that efforts to control and verify strategic nuclear weapons in the interest of world peace should not be abandoned.

The President and the Prime Minister also reviewed the difficulties of the present economic situation and agreed to cooperate closely in the efforts to reach common solutions to cope with them. They discussed the plans for the Venice economic summit, which Italy will host in June, with particular emphasis on pursuing effective policies on macroeconomics, energy, trade and monetary questions, as well as new initiatives for developing the North-South dialogue to which both sides attribute great importance.

In emphasizing his solidarity with the Prime Minister and with the Italian people in the fight against terrorism, the President expressed admiration for the Prime Minister's leadership and his commitment to democratic tradition. He further expressed his appreciation for the efforts made by the Italian Government to cope with the difficult economic situation, in order to achieve a greater stability and solve the most pressing problem of our time, the shortage of energy, and assure the necessary rate of economic growth.

To further the close bilateral relationship between the United States and Italy and enhance democratic ties on both sides of the Atlantic, the two

leaders agreed to intensify cooperation in a variety of fields. Concrete steps in support of such cooperation will encompass the visit of a high-level investment mission to Italy for the purpose of expanding American investment in southern Italy; increased bilateral collaboration in the fields of energy research and development; a comprehensive program in agriculture which will help make Italy more self-sufficient in meat production and enlarge U.S. feed grain exports; expanded cultural and educational exchange activity between Italy and the United States, including instructional television for the reciprocal teaching of each country's language; and the prevention of drug abuse.

The President told the Prime Minister he looked forward with particular pleasure to the visit he will be making to Rome in June and the continuation of his bilateral talks with the Italian leadership directly preceding the Venice economic summit. ■

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980, which also carries the texts of President Carter's and Prime Minister Cossiga's remarks made at the welcoming ceremony of Jan. 24 and their dinner toasts that evening.

U.S. Withdraws From Summer Olympics

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, FEB. 20, 1980¹

On January 20, the President wrote to President Kane of the U.S. Olympic Committee to urge the committee to propose to the International Olympic Committee that the 1980 summer games in Moscow be transferred, postponed, or cancelled if Soviet forces were not fully withdrawn from Afghanistan within a month.² The President also urged that if these proposals were not adopted, the U.S. Committee should not send a team to the Moscow games. This position has been overwhelmingly supported by the U.S. Congress and the American people.

On February 12, the International Olympic Committee announced it would adhere to its plans to conduct the games in Moscow. On February 14, President Kane of the U.S. Olympic Committee issued a statement saying the U.S. Olympic Committee would, of

course, accept any decision the President makes as to whether a team should be sent to Moscow.

A month has now expired, and Soviet forces have not even begun to withdraw from Afghanistan. The President has, therefore, advised the U.S. Olympic Committee that his decision remains unchanged and that we should not send a team to Moscow. The President thanked the committee for its earnest and patriotic efforts to present the case for transferring, postponing, or canceling the games and asked it to take prompt action to formalize its acceptance of his decision.

The U.S. Olympic Committee depends for its funds on the generosity of American citizens and American business. Even though no U.S. team is sent to Moscow, the committee carries on many other important and worthwhile activities to support athletic excellence in this country. The President urges all American citizens to continue their financial and moral support of the committee.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 25, 1980.

²For text of the letter, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1980, p. 50. ■

Relations With Islamic Nations

by President Carter

Statement made at the beginning of its meeting in the White House with representatives of faculties in Islamic studies from Washington, D.C., area universities on February 7, 1980.¹

The history of Islam is very long compared to that of the United States. Islam is celebrating the first year of its 5th century. As an independent nation, we have only just entered our hirth. But from the beginning, the United States has enjoyed close and valued ties with the Muslim world.

A Muslim state, Morocco, was the first to recognize our independence. Our kaleidoscopic population includes a vigorous Islamic community. Many scholars from the Muslim world pursue their studies here. Centers for Islamic and Middle Eastern studies—many of which you represent—have grown up in universities all over America.

I have been struck, personally and by my experience as President, by the human and moral values which Americans as a people share with Islam. We share, first and foremost, a deep faith in the one Supreme Being. We are all commanded by Him to faith, compassion, and justice. We have a common respect and reverence for law. Despite the strains of the modern age, we continue to place special importance on the family and the home. And we share a belief that hospitality is a virtue and that the host, whether a nation or an individual, should behave with generosity and honor toward guests.

On the basis of both values and interests, the natural relationship between Islam and the United States is one of friendship. I affirm that friendship, both as a reality and as a goal—just as I totally reject any attempt to make moral and spiritual beliefs a barrier to understanding, rather than the bridge they can and should be.

I am determined to strengthen, not weaken, the longstanding and valued bonds of friendship and cooperation between the United States and many Muslim nations. We will lend our support to any nation working for peace and justice and to resist external domination. We will continue our efforts to help resolve peaceably—and with justice—the international disputes, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, which affect the Muslim world.

It is with profound revulsion that the world now witnesses the rejection of these principles of understanding and respect on the part of the Soviet Union. Today, in a Muslim country, Russian troops are making war against a people whose dedication to independence is as fierce as their faith.

In a time of grave danger and upheaval, I want to reaffirm what I said a few weeks ago: We have the deepest respect and reverence for Islam and all who share the faith of Islam.

Of course there is indignation among Americans today over events in one Islamic country. I share that indignation. But I can assure you that this just anger will not be twisted into a false resentment against Islam or its faithful. I say that with confidence, because a respect for religious faith is so deeply ingrained in the character of the American people.

We continue to seek the closest possible political, economic, and cultural ties with the Islamic nations and with Muslims throughout the world. That has not changed, and it will not change.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 11, 1980. ■

U.N. Commission of Inquiry Established

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT.
FEB. 20, 1980¹

Secretary General Waldheim has announced the establishment of a commission of inquiry to go to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States. He has stated that the commission will speak with each of our people.

Both the United States and Iran have concurred in the establishment of the commission, as proposed by the Secretary General, in mutually acceptable, official responses to him.

In concurring, the United States has taken note of the Secretary General's statement that the commission will undertake a factfinding mission. It will not be a tribunal. The United States understands that the commission

will hear the grievances of both sides and will report to the Secretary General.

The American people are deeply aggrieved that Iran, after guaranteeing the protection of our people, has taken them hostage and held them in intolerable conditions for 108 days. The United States has no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran, but it does insist on the prompt return of the 53 Americans now illegally held in Tehran.

The United States has also made clear its position that the meeting of the commission with our people must be consistent with international law and that the hostages must, under no circumstances, be subjected to interrogation. It is vital, however, for the commission to determine that they are all present and to assess their condition.

We hope that the commission will, as the Secretary General has said, achieve an early resolution of the crisis between our two countries, which requires the release of the hostages.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 25, 1980. ■

Iran Chronology, February 1980

February 2

Iranian militants, fearing a political compromise between Iran and the U.S. to secure release of the hostages, call for mass demonstrations of solidarity.

February 3

Militants cancel march to prevent it from coinciding with the unofficial inaugural speech to be given by President-elect Bani-Sadr.

Bani-Sadr is interviewed on ABC-TV "Issues and Answers."

February 4

Khomeini formally installs Bani-Sadr as first President of the Iranian Republic.

Khomeini, for the first time, condemns Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and pledges "unconditional support" for Moslem insurgents.

February 6

U.S. delays imposing formal economic sanctions against Iran to avoid upsetting possible chances for settling the crisis.

Panama's Foreign Minister, Carlos Ozones, states that the deposed Shah could not leave Panama. Other officials say that the Shah will not be extradited.

The Revolutionary Council announces that the first round of parliamentary elec-

tions are to be held March 7 and that the new 270-member assembly will convene on April 1.

February 8

Khomeini confirms designation of Bani-Sadr as chairman of the Revolutionary Council.

Archbishop Capucci and Monsignor Nolan visit some of the hostages.

February 9

Militants claim they have a mandate from Khomeini to continue holding hostages.

February 10

A group of 49 Americans, invited by the militants and led by Norman Fouer, a professor at the University of Kansas, meets with militants for 4 hours but is not allowed to see the hostages.

February 11

On the first anniversary of Iran's Islamic revolution, Khomeini urges all oppressed peoples to rise and fight for their rights against superpowers, but also suggests possible future relations with the U.S.

Bani-Sadr announces a formula for release of hostages which calls for the U.S. to admit the "crimes" it had committed in Iran, recognize Iran's "right to obtain the extradition" of the deposed Shah, and resolve "never again to interfere" in Iran's affairs.

February 12

Ghotbzadeh suggests the organization of a commission of inquiry into the abuses of the Shah's regime would help resolve the hostage issue.

February 13

Bani-Sadr announces that Khomeini approves secret plan for release of the hostages.

President Carter approves of an international commission of inquiry into Iran's grievances.

February 11

Bani-Sadr states that hostages could be freed within 48 hours if President Carter agrees to conditions approved by Khomeini.

Secretary General Waldheim begins draft guidelines for a U.N. commission that would hear Iran's grievances and obtain release of the hostages.

February 15

In New York, a Federal judge orders all briefs to be filed in lawsuits against Iran be sealed because of the sensitive situation existing to gain release of the hostages.

Alireza Nohari, head of Iran's central bank, declares that to gain release of the hostages, the U.S. should release Iranian assets now officially frozen.

Progress in the Middle East Peace Negotiations

by Sol M. Linowitz

Address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on January 17, 1980. Ambassador Linowitz is Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations.

Today I want to speak to you candidly and with unalloyed realism about a truly critical subject: the Middle East peace negotiations—their objectives, their progress to date, and their prospects for the future.

Over the years, the world has needed no reminder that the Middle East is an area of uncertainty and instability. Yet in recent days the reminders have been multiplying. Events have conspired to underscore once again how volatile—and how vital—that region of the world is.

The unlawful detention of American hostages in Tehran, the revolutionary turmoil and instability of Iran, the naked aggression of the Soviets into

Afghanistan—all these explosive bursts of crisis dramatically absorb our attention. These events pose a threat to the independence and capability of moderate governments throughout southwest Asia and the Middle East. We are asking these governments to gether with our European allies to join us in a major effort to prevent further Soviet encroachment and to guarantee regional security.

But this strategy cannot be fully effective if it fails to address one of the main causes of instability in the region—the Arab-Israeli problem. Recent developments thus make progress toward resolution of this conflict an objective of even more crucial importance to peace and stability and to U.S. interest in this vital area. They make it even more urgent that the current negotiations between Egypt and Israel succeed and that the United States use its good offices constructively and vigorously to help them succeed. To do so is both in the highest interest of the United

February 17

The five members of the inquiry commission announced by Secretary General Waldheim are: Adib Daoudy of Syria, a political adviser to President Hafez al-Assad; Louis-Edmond Pettiti of France, a judge on the European Court of Human Rights; Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algeria's envoy to the U.N.; Andres Aguilar Mawdsley, Venezuela's former Ambassador to the U.S.; and Harry W. Jayewardene, a lawyer from Sri Lanka who is active in civil rights causes.

February 18

Bani-Sadr orally approves inquiry commission but does not give a firm commitment on the timing of the release of the hostages. He later sends a formal message to Secretary General Waldheim accepting the commission.

February 20

At Iran's request, U.N. inquiry commission delays trip from Geneva to Tehran for 3 days.

Khomeini issues statement giving his support for the militants holding the hostages and their demand for the Shah's return.

February 21

U.N. inquiry commission uses its 3-day delay in Geneva to gather information on

conditions in Iran during the deposed Shah's reign.

February 23

Commission arrives in Tehran, but Khomeini issues a statement saying that the fate of the hostages should be decided by the new parliament to be elected in March/April.

February 24

Militants endorse Khomeini's statement.

February 26

Revolutionary Council announces that some U.S. reporters, banned since mid-January, may be permitted to enter the country.

February 27

Secretary of the Revolutionary Council, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, officially forecasts that the parliament which to be elected will not be ready to discuss the hostage issue until 4 weeks after it convenes.

February 28

Visit to hostages by commission is still undecided. ■

States and in the interest of world peace.

Prospects for the Future

I am here as a negotiator, and negotiators are by nature optimists. The business of a negotiator, after all, is to try to fashion workable solutions from the most unpromising of raw materials. But I am also a realist, and it is as an optimistic realist or a realistic optimist that I want to put my basic thesis before you: It is my deep conviction that the prospects for achieving peace between the Arabs and the Israelis—a just, durable, and comprehensive peace—are better today than they have been at any time in the last 30 years.

That is a dramatic statement, and I want to suggest to you the reasons why I believe it is so.

First. For the first time in history Israel and the strongest of its Arab neighbors, Egypt, have pledged themselves to peace and have entered into a binding treaty solemnly committing themselves to that objective.

Second. That historic pledge of peace, which rightly brought the Nobel Peace Prize to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, is holding; it is working; it is bearing tangible fruits that dramatize, for all parties in the region, the benefits of peaceful negotiation.

Most importantly, both Egypt and Israel are living up to their agreements. Both nations have demonstrated their determination to adhere to their commitments. Thus Israel has turned over to Egypt on schedule not only the major portion of the Sinai but also the Alma oilfields, in spite of the immense difficulties that the loss of this oil—at today's prices—has posed for the Israeli economy. By the same token, Egypt has proceeded diligently to normalize its relations with Israel, despite the fact that these steps have led to punitive political and economic actions by a number of other Arab nations. This normalization process will be highlighted by an exchange of ambassadors less than 6 weeks from now.

In addition, this dramatic progress in their relations has been accompanied by what President Carter has described as "an extraordinary change in attitude" by Israelis and Egyptians alike. The growing respect and understanding between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin—which I have witness-

sed firsthand—reflect the steadily evolving attitudes of their two peoples.

Third. Israel and Egypt, through a framework agreement reached at Camp David, have pledged themselves to a broader peace—a comprehensive peace among all parties in the region. I have detected no wavering on the part of either leader in that commitment. Both know that progress toward that goal is essential if their dreams for their nations and peoples are to be fulfilled.

Fourth. The Camp David summit was not a one-shot achievement; rather it launched an ongoing process—and the existing momentum of that process is itself a major contribution to peace. The Camp David accords recognized that no comprehensive peace is possible unless both Israel's security concerns and the Palestinians' legitimate political requirements are satisfied. The present negotiation process is realistically designed to reconcile both sets of concerns. The process will necessarily be slow and difficult; it will be strewn with obstacles and setbacks. But the overriding fact is that the process is realistic and that it can succeed.

Fifth. The United States, at the request of both Israel and Egypt, is involved as a full partner in the negotiations. As Camp David demonstrated, the United States can contribute in a major way to the peace process—not by imposing its will—but by acting as a catalyst, by helping the parties overcome difficult issues, and by assisting the parties to maintain the momentum toward peace. The role of the United States is not to force solutions or prescribe answers. Nor do we envisage our role as that of policeman of the region. But within the framework agreed to by Israel and Egypt, the United States is committed and determined, more than ever, to work with the parties and to help them in their negotiations.

On this matter of U.S. involvement in the present peace process, I would like to interject one observation: As I look back to the decision of President Carter to take the initiative at Camp David, and as I see today the positive results that have flowed from that initiative, I am struck by the comparison between our nation's major contribution to Middle East stability and the recent actions of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and what those actions tell us about the Soviet interest in stability in that part of the world. For me,

the actions of the two great powers stand now in particularly sharp and vivid contrast—and the contrast makes me deeply proud of my country.

Objectives

I recognize, of course, that even a multitude of reasons to be hopeful is no substitute for concrete plans and specific actions. So let me briefly review with you the objectives of the peace process launched at Camp David, and where we now stand.

It was, in my judgment, the genius of the principal negotiators at Camp David to understand that other efforts to achieve comprehensive peace had failed by grasping for too much, too soon. In fact, the issues in the Middle East are so complex, the emotions so deep, and the contending parties so numerous that the problems have always defied shortcuts or one-step solutions.

The wisdom of Camp David was to recognize this fact: to recognize that the best hope for peace lay in a phased process—one in which agreements attainable at one stage become building blocks for subsequent progress on more difficult issues. And thus, by abandoning the quest for comprehensive "breakthroughs," Camp David, paradoxically, became a dramatic breakthrough; by deciding to pursue peace in relatively modest steps, the parties at Camp David took a giant step.

This does not mean that the objectives they set forth at Camp David were modest ones, far from it.

- The first goal was to establish an atmosphere of trust and confidence—an atmosphere that would not only make relations more friendly and fruitful between Israel and Egypt, but one that would also impress other parties in the region with the possibilities of peace.

- The second objective was to put in place, after the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt, a functioning self-governing process for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza. The intention here was, and is, to demonstrate, in a transitional period, that full autonomy for the Palestinians and security for Israel are compatible and to pave the way for later negotiations to determine a final status for the West Bank and Gaza.

- The third goal was, and is, the most ambitious: to build a comprehensive peace settlement in the region—the "just, durable, and comprehensive"

peace that has attracted, and eluded, so many people for so many years.

As I emphasized earlier, it is not my place as the President's personal representative, nor is it the role of the United States, to dictate how those objectives shall be pursued. But it does seem to me appropriate to observe that achieving those goals will require certain essential acts and attitudes.

To begin with, we regard it as essential that Israel's security be strictly insured, for if terrorism should flare up during the transitional period, as the fledgling self-governing authority for the Palestinians gets underway, the whole future of the peace process could be jeopardized in the conflagration.

It is my deep conviction that the prospects for achieving peace between the Arabs and the Israelis . . . are better today than they have been at any time in the past 30 years.

Second, and of equal importance, it is essential that the self-governing authority have real substance; and that it have an opportunity to build authentic democratic leadership.

Third, I think it is essential to build cooperative relationships between the self-governing authority and Israel and with Jordan if that nation will join the peace process.

And finally, I believe it important that all of us resist the temptation to make premature judgments or predictions about an eventual final settlement. Our immediate objective is to set up transitional mechanisms; let us do that, putting first things first, and dealing with today's problems today. After such transitional arrangements have been implemented, the parties will be in the best position to work together to achieve comprehensive peace.

For the fundamental point is that the present negotiations are not designed to achieve agreement on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. Rather, Israel and Egypt, with the United States as a partner, are seeking agreement on a 5-year transitional arrangement to replace the present Israeli military government and its civilian administration on the West Bank and Gaza.

Current Status

Where do these negotiations stand at present? The accords call for negotia-

tions on two aspects of such transitional arrangements: the machinery for electing a self-governing authority for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and the powers and responsibilities to be exercised by such an authority.

At present we are making efforts on both fronts. But predictably, much more has been accomplished in reaching agreement on the machinery than on the difficult second question—the powers and responsibilities to be exercised by the self-governing authority.

Let me underscore one point about this: No one has ever defined "full autonomy" in circumstances like these and that is what we are trying to do.

The talks since late May, therefore, have necessarily gone through a series of exploratory exercises. The day-in and day-out work is meticulous and arduous; but this is the very essence of negotiations. Now we are beginning to grapple with arrangements for full autonomy and a new way of life for the inhabitants of these areas.

Someone once said that there is no problem, no matter how complicated, which, when looked at in the right way, does not become more complicated. In these negotiations, we are now trying to look at immensely complicated problems in the right way. The difficulties are, as Secretary Vance once observed, like "trying to untie a knot from the inside." But as I found on my trip several weeks ago to Cairo and Jerusalem, there is a readiness on both sides to accept the fact that negotiations must result in the creation of a self-governing authority that is both credible and viable. And this, in turn, means that the transitional government must be empowered to exercise real authority over the lives of the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants.

So both parties are focusing on the powers and responsibilities which should be transmitted to the transitional authority and on how to insure that they will provide both full autonomy for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza and security for Israel. This means we must focus attention on the powers and responsibilities to be conveyed to the Palestinians and

try to find answers to such complex problems as what to do about security; about arrangements with respect to lands, including settlements; about arrangements regarding water rights; and about the status of East Jerusalem Arabs.

These are enormously difficult problems. But we must view them in the light of the progress already made, remembering that a little more than a year ago there were many who believed that peace between Egypt and Israel was also impossible.

A serious problem of concern to both Egypt and Israel is the continued refusal of the Palestinian Arabs and of most Arab nations to join in the peace process. Admittedly, the absence of the Palestinians from the peace table—as well as the absence of Jordan—is both a disappointment and an obstacle. However, it should not be considered insuperable at this time. Real progress can be made by the present participants. The most important thing is to devote our maximum energies to making concrete progress in these talks. By so doing we can show those who have not yet participated that it is in their interest to join the process.

Ultimately, for the achievement of the peace we seek, we will need the participation of other key parties. But if there is sufficient progress by the current participants, that very progress can persuade the other parties that peace is in their interest.

Next week I will be going back to the Middle East. On that trip, I plan to meet with the heads of government of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, as well as with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. I am no prophet, particularly when it comes to a region so filled with uncertainties. But I do approach the journey with the conviction that the facts as I know them and the progress thus far made justify an attitude of guarded optimism.

For I believe that if we continue our course, with the commitment and determination of the parties, we may yet find our way; and it may yet be that the Middle East, where man first dreamed his dream of peace, can show the world—even at an anguished time such as this one—how to resolve issues and conflicts that have been smoldering for centuries. And how right and fitting it would be that this region of the world, which is the cradle of civilization, should be the one which teaches man the great lesson he has not yet learned: How to beat swords into plow shares and learn war no more. ■

Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria— FY 1981 Programs

by Morris Draper

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 12, 1980. Mr. Draper is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.*¹

Last year, when we discussed programs for these three countries, I remarked that the region was experiencing a period of rapid growth, change, and evolution. In the year since then, the continuing revolution in Iran, fighting in southern Lebanon, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and shifts and alignments of forces in the region have posed new challenges to the conduct of our foreign policy.

The three countries with the programs we are addressing today—Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon—border Israel. A comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict will not be possible without the involvement of these three countries. The directions our policies will take over the period ahead will be of great interest to the United States.

These countries are geographically close but are dissimilar in character, in government, in their political forces, and in the individual relationships we have with them. Our assistance programs take into account their diversity as well as our major policy interests.

Underlying the specific objectives each country program addresses is a goal common to all three. This is to help attain mutual trust and confidence, strengthen their wishes for association with the West, to demonstrate our constancy and purposefulness in support of their independence, and to reinforce their commitments to find peace through negotiation and mediation rather than through confrontation and conflict.

The programs we have proposed for fiscal year 1981 reflect in both magnitude and focus our best judgment of how our interests can be protected and advanced at a time of greater demands on our limited financial resources. Our programs are critically important assets in our capacity to influence new trends and developments not only within these three countries but in a wider arena.

LEBANON

The program we are proposing for Lebanon this year reflects our deep belief that the United States must continue to give visible and tangible support for President [Ilyas] Sarkis' efforts to reconstruct his divided country and to develop strong national institutions. We are seeking \$20 million in foreign military sales credits, \$500,000 for military training, and \$7 million in economic support funds.

Military Assistance

New outbursts of fighting in southern Lebanon yesterday and today demonstrate graphically the need to realize President Sarkis' hope to extend his government's authority throughout the country, stage by stage. An indispensable element in this effort is the rebuilding of the Lebanese armed forces, and this has been a centerpiece of our overall strategy in Lebanon for 3 years.

In 1977, Secretary Vance announced a 3-year, \$100 million foreign military sales credit program to assist in recreating a united national army. The first tranche of \$25 million, funded in FY 1977, permitted the purchase of basic weapons and equipment to equip two defense battalions, which have become the nucleus of what is a concessionally balanced security force. Further tranches of \$42.5 million in FY 1979 and of \$32.5 million in FY 1980 will close the original program announced in 1977 and have placed, in the pipeline, the bulk of the light mechanized infantry and support equipment necessary to reestablish a four-brigade core ground force.

In addition, from 1977 to the end of 1979, well over 100 Lebanese officers received military, professional, and management training in U.S. service schools. Credits for the Lebanese Army international military education and training program amounted to \$40,000 in FY 1977, \$550,000 in FY 1979, and \$500,000 in FY 1980.

Good progress has been made. The new Lebanese Army has remained intact and effective despite periodic outbreaks of fighting. In the past year, army units have been deployed into both the southeastern suburbs of Beirut—replacing Syrian units there—and into areas of south Lebanon, where

they work with U.N. peacekeeping forces.

And, most significantly, in terms of President Sarkis' goal of achieving a genuine national consensus, the Lebanese Parliament last spring passed an armed forces reorganization law designed to reinforce the concept of concessional balance and to meet objections from Muslims that the Lebanese Army was tilted concessionally. In coming months, the Lebanese Army may be deployed in additional areas, possibly including the cities of Tyre and Nabatiyyah in the south.

The Lebanese Army now enjoys growing popular support. It is undertaking more responsibilities. Its morale is good, and its recruitment and training programs are proceeding well. U.S. assistance has helped make this possible.

Economic Assistance

President Sarkis' recovery program is a balanced mix of security and economic measures. We have been helping the Lebanese in economic and relief areas since 1975, at the height of the civil conflict. Some \$115 million in economic assistance has been provided during this period, of which approximately \$55 million has been for emergency disaster relief.

We are requesting \$7 million in economic support funds for FY 1981 which will assist small and highly visible projects for agriculture, vocational training, housing repair, social welfare, and potable water. Our geographic concentration will be in south Lebanon which has suffered greatly in the past 2 years and will be supportive of the extension of Lebanese governmental authority, as mandated by the U.N. Security Council resolution which also formed the peacekeeping force for that region.

We did not seek economic support funds for Lebanon in the past 2 years. Now that the earlier pipeline is beginning to empty, we want it to resume this next fiscal year at a modest but politically very important level and use it where relatively small contributions will have the broadest result and ease pressing needs. Our successful village resettlement activity in southern Lebanon is a good model for what we seek to achieve.

Our military and economic assistance programs for Lebanon show the Lebanese and their neighbors in the Middle East that we attach great importance to movement toward a broad

political consensus, social and economic reconstruction, and the strengthening of democratic and representative institutions. All our actions focus on achieving stability and security for the Lebanese. We support the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of Lebanon and the cohesion of its peoples.

JORDAN

We are proposing a substantial program of security and economic assistance for Jordan in FY 1981. This consists of \$50 million in foreign military sales credits and almost \$1.1 million for military training. Confirming our intention announced some 3 years ago, we have phased out grant military assistance. In the economic field, we intend to concentrate our efforts exclusively on the Maqarin Dam project, which is critical to Jordan's future economic and social health. We are seeking \$50 million in economic support funding for this purpose.

Jordanian Contributions

While substantial, the overall size of our programs reflects a continued downward trend, which was also evident last year. While Jordan's needs for outside help will remain large in scope, the country is prospering and the projects begun in past years with American assistance are making important contributions to future progress.

Jordan remains highly important to the United States. Its leadership, its stability, its continued social and economic development, and its ability to defend itself and resist outside direction have been integral elements of our broad policy interests in Jordan and in the region for decades. Our programs will build on a relationship which provides for broad U.S.-Jordanian cooperation in many fields as we pursue our own interests and as Jordan strengthens its national independence.

While both the United States and Jordan want to sustain the mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation they have developed over the years, we do not disguise our differences over the Middle East peace process. We bear in mind, however, that Jordan remains dedicated to achieving a comprehensive peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242. It will, we are sure, remain openminded and will seize opportunities which may later beckon.

King Hussein has also argued with Arab leaders that they should move from a totally negative posture regarding the Camp David process to the development of a positive and pragmatic alternative strategy. While no such reasonable alternative has yet been developed, by King Hussein or others, we believe that Hussein's basic advice warrants more interest among the region's leaders than the blind and inflexible opposition we hear elsewhere.

Security and Stability

A word about Jordan's interests in and concerns over security and stability in the broader Middle East region and southwest Asia may be useful. Jordan has been helpful over the years to its friends in the Gulf states. Over 1,800 of Jordan's best officers and noncommissioned officers are training security personnel and are providing advice in the peninsula states. More than 7,000 men from these states have passed through Jordanian training programs since 1970.

Jordan sent troops to help Oman resist outside attacks and has trained military personnel in North Yemen. Jordanian help has been responsible, discreet, and effective, and—indirectly—has thus served broader U.S. policy goals.

Our military assistance programs will contribute to the careful, phased modernization of Jordan's armed forces. Our military training programs will reinforce the orientation of Jordan's military establishment toward the West. Our economic assistance program will be an indispensable element in the construction and development of the Maqarin Dam project, designed to harness and exploit effectively the last major uncontrolled source of water in the lower Jordan River basin. In a water-scarce region, which suffered a major drought this year, it is imperative that this project be started soon.

We have examined the mix of our agreements, our disagreements, and our interests in and with Jordan. We have renewed our conviction that it is in our fundamental interest to remain credible and understanding to this important country. The basic message—that we are capable of working with our friends even when we have disagreement and that we have a long-term vision of the achievement of basic goals common to both our countries—is one that we want understood far beyond

Jordan. Only on such a basis can we strengthen our structure of cooperation which can overcome the challenge of tomorrow.

SYRIA

The program of economic assistance we are proposing for Syria reflects an appreciation of our long-term regional interests and the desirability of a mature and constructive relationship with this important Arab country. It also takes into account a situation that is different from that I have just discussed in respect to Jordan.

Economic and Military Support

We are seeking for FY 1981 economic support funding of \$5 million. This request is significantly below the levels approved in most of the fiscal years we have had a program in Syria. There are reasons for this decrease. On a technical level, it is difficult to justify the large requests for the Syrian program while substantial funds from previous fiscal years remain in the pipeline. We are continuing our joint efforts to resolve cooperatively the difficulties which have prevented the early use of these funds for the development and welfare of Syria and its people.

Members of this subcommittee may wonder why we are proposing any program at all this year when Syria has been so sharply critical of the United States and the Camp David approach to the Middle East negotiations. While we do not accept the criticisms made by Syria—or those offered by other states—we are prepared to believe that they are meant sincerely. We have made fully clear to Syria that we intend to proceed with the process on which we have embarked, believing that it is the only path that has been suggested that promises steady progress toward just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We have also made clear, at the same time, that we want Syria to keep the door ajar so that it can pass through it and rejoin the peace negotiations at a later time, and possibly under conditions that would appear more promising to Syrian political interests.

Syria is an important state, with vital strategic location, whose cooperation will be essential if lasting stability in the Arab-Israeli scene is to be achieved. Syria has influence going far beyond its borders. It has close relationships with many governments

ANZUS Council Meets

which have sprung from revolutions, including that in Tehran. Syria is a key member of the nonaligned movement.

Syria has more influence on the future destiny of Lebanon and on the direction of Palestinian policies there than any other government. The Syrian military presence in Lebanon has been a major ingredient in preserving the uneasy stability that has been established there, and Syrian behavior here—on the whole—has been prudent and cautious, thus reducing the risk of wider conflict in the area.

Cultural Agreement

Finally, we have wanted to carry out the understandings reached when we signed a cultural agreement with Syria in 1978. Our proposed program for FY 1981 will preserve our interesting and mutually beneficial people-to-people exchange efforts and U.S. training undertakings. Together with the support provided by the U.S. International Communication Agency, our proposed program will train 83 Syrian participants. Since 1975 a total of 310 Syrian professionals in the fields of agriculture, rural development, health, education, nutrition, and human resources have received training in the United States.

Shifts in attitudes and unforeseen events occur with astonishing rapidity in the Middle East. It is essential that the United States retain and exercise means of influencing trends and reinforcing cooperative relationships which encourage nations to pursue independent policies, as free as possible of negative outside influences. We also want to show our interest in Syrian citizens and in their aspirations for a better life in a more peaceful world. Our modest program for Syria is intended as a major contribution toward achievement of these policy goals and toward the reinforcement of the underlying good will which has been part of our relationship for many years.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The 29th meeting of the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States pact) Council was held in Washington, D.C., February 26-27, 1980. Following are a joint news conference held on February 27 by Secretary Vance, Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock and Minister for Defense D.J. Killen, and New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Brian Talboys and the text of the joint communique issued February 27.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, FEB. 27, 1980¹

Secretary Vance. Let me just say a few words at the outset, if I might, please. This 29th meeting of the ANZUS Council has been, in my judgment, one of the most productive in the long history of our alliance. It was, as you know, a special meeting.

Under our customary schedule, we would have met this summer in Wellington. However, the new international situation in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan lent greater urgency to our annual ANZUS consultations. We are particularly grateful to New Zealand for agreeing to a change in time and place.

We have found ourselves in close agreement on the importance of demonstrating to the Soviet Union that it cannot profit from such blatant violations of international law. We agreed that the response to this new challenge should be firm and contain a combination of political, economic, and security measures. These we discussed in detail.

As was the case last year in Canberra, we also had a very useful discussion on the situation in Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and other matters of concern to the alliance.

Again, may I thank my good friends and colleagues, Brian Talboys, Andrew Peacock, and Jim Killen for their participation in this most important meeting.

Foreign Minister Talboys. This has been a very valuable meeting of the ANZUS Council. It certainly has been, by far, the most valuable meeting that I have attended, and I want to place on the record, I'm sure, our admiration for the way in which the Secretary of State has led the discussion and has provided an opportunity in a very free and open

way to discuss the development attitudes, the development of policies that can be followed.

We in New Zealand have been part of ANZUS since its inception. We have, through the years, played our part within the limit of our capacities, and we will certainly continue to do that.

Foreign Minister Peacock. I would like to endorse what has been said. I also regard this as the most significant ANZUS Council meeting I have attended. Together with Brian, I think it's our fifth—we came in as Foreign Ministers at about the same time. They are unique meetings. They are extraordinarily valuable in the manner in which one can coordinate approaches to global and regional situations.

We happen to be meeting on this occasion at a most significant time following the invasion by the Soviet Union of Afghanistan. We've been able to indicate, through the communique, the areas covered. I think it is widely recognized that we do not see events occurring there in a simple return to the cold war. The requirements of international security today are far more complex than that, and the complexities must be discussed openly. And the sort of Council meeting we have provides a forum for just that. I was glad to participate and I speak on behalf of Jim Killen as well.

Q. On page 9 of your communique, with reference to the subject of Iran, you use the words "the hostages speedy release." It seems to be anything but speedy, and I wonder if you could define that word, what your expectations are.

Secretary Vance. It has been 100-plus days since the hostages were seized and held in Tehran. We have been, since that time, engaged in discussions through various intermediaries with the Government of Iran seeking the earliest possible release of the hostages.

We have left no stone unturned in trying to bring this about at the earliest possible moment. Unfortunately, we have not been able to do so yet. We have, however, I think, taken a step forward with the commission which has gone to Tehran. They are engaged at this point in the performance of the duties set forth under their terms of reference which have been described by the Secretary General. Their mission is

two-fold: to hear the grievances of the Iranians and also to bring about a speedy release of the hostages, and thus end the crisis.

I cannot tell you when that is going to be, but all of us in the international community will continue to do everything we can to bring that about at the earliest possible date.

Q. On pages 3 and 4 of the communique, you talk about enhancing the effectiveness of the military activities in the Indian Ocean and additional measures for military cooperation. Specifically, would either Australia or New Zealand give access to further military facilities for the United States? Would either of them be prepared to join the U.S. idea of a rapid deployment force?

Foreign Minister Peacock. We are prepared to look at any of those matters. We've held preliminary consultations with the United States and other interested countries, or particularly the United States and New Zealand, on this matter.

The military activities by the ANZUS partners in the Indian Ocean of the kind that we've discussed are distinct from the traditional activities in the Pacific and in defense of their metropolitan territories. They, therefore, represent an extension of effort to cope with Soviet pressure and threats to security affecting an area that is strategically vital because of its oil resources.

The discussions will continue about the nature of further operational planning in response to the crisis, and that is well underway. The additional measures for military cooperation, therefore, are still being explored.

Q. In other words then, would Australia, with its carrier task force which is mentioned here, be willing to take part in a standing increase in the level of forces in the Indian Ocean, together with the United States?

Foreign Minister Peacock. This is what we are discussing, and it is on the assumption that it will be on the basis of an increased role.

Q. Can you quantify that?

Defense Minister Killen. Not at the moment. A political decision has been taken to enhance the role; but to express it in mathematical form or quantify it, as you suggest, no, that is a matter for determination or advice by the military representatives who will be meeting tomorrow, and of course, that will be ongoing.

Q. There have been certain elliptical signals in the past few days—both from President Brezhnev and from President Carter—that both the United States and the Soviet Union are at least prepared to try to resolve the issue in Afghanistan. I wonder if you would try to put it in less elliptical language for us. What is the United States prepared to do? What do you perceive the Soviet Union as being ready to do?

Secretary Vance. I think that the President really made it quite clear what we are prepared to do. The President has indicated that if there is a withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the establishment of a nonaligned and neutral Afghanistan, acceptable to the Afghan people, that under those circumstances, we would be prepared to enter into others in the region in the guaranteeing of the nonalignment and neutrality of that state.

Q. Your perceptions are of what you think the Soviets are prepared to do. It's possible to interpret President Brezhnev's speech as also being something of an olive branch. Do you see it that way?

Secretary Vance. I think it is hard to interpret exactly what is being said. I think it would be fruitless for me to speculate at this point. I think it is important to know what we are prepared to do at this point and to convey that very clearly to the Soviets, as we have done by what we have stated publicly.

Q. There is a reference in the communique to the tensions along the Thai-Kampuchean border. You say that "... the Council viewed with particular concern the possibility that the hostilities could spill over into Thailand."

Could you describe for us today, in view of the fact that several weeks ago the State Department was saying that a Vietnamese attack into the refugee areas in Thailand appeared imminent, what the nature of that threat is today? Does it still appear imminent?

Secretary Vance. The concern which we have had—which is shared by many others—is that the Vietnamese troops would cross over the border and engage in conflict with those who are in the region immediately around the border where the refugee camps are located, as well as a number of refugees who are moving back and forth across the border.

Such an incursion across the border could lead to a confrontation between Thai troops and the Vietnamese troops who would be coming across the border. This would, obviously, present a very dangerous situation—one which all of us hope very much can and will be prevented.

That is the concern which we were referring to—or I was referring to—if what I have said before and what is mentioned here in the communique.

Q. Is there anything imminent about such a threat?

Secretary Vance. With the large numbers of troops that exist on the Kampuchean border, obviously, that presents a continuing danger which remains as long as they are there. You know our position. It is that the Vietnamese troops should be withdrawn from Kampuchea.

Q. Since the issuance of the Secretary General's statement on the mandate for the commission, which you pointed out had a two-fold purpose, the Iranian authorities have publicly, at least, denied that it had more than the purpose of hearing their grievances. And, secondly, since there have been statements by Iranian authorities, including the Ayatollah, suggesting that if the hostages are released—and it's just an "if"—it would not be any time before April, and now today it's suggested May.

The American people I think would like to know: Is this a misunderstanding by the United Nations and the United States of the role of the commission? Has there been any change in Iran? Or where do we stand on this?

Secretary Vance. Let me say that the understanding of the United Nations and ourselves has been clearly set forth by the Secretary General. He was asked what the mandate was after a question had been raised as to the nature of the mandate, and he confirmed it was as he had originally stated it.

Sometimes there are very difficult and delicate statements that come out of Tehran. Indeed, that happens very frequently, and it's often very difficult to tell what is being said, particularly in light of the fact that often statements are made and then retracted very quickly thereafter.

Q. In the communique you talk about the Olympics. Could both of you address the specific cities in you

ountries which might be involved in the Olympics—when, which games might be played, and whether you have the facilities to handle them?

Foreign Minister Talboys. In New Zealand there is no suggestion that there should be games in New Zealand. What is being done at the present time is that consideration is being given by a number of people to alternatives—maybe in North America, and Canada perhaps, in other parts of the world—and as soon as those sites are identified, I have no doubt that they will be announced.

Q. But you are definitely ruling out any games in Auckland or other parts of your country.

Foreign Minister Talboys. There has been no such suggestion made.

Foreign Minister Peacock. We've held preliminary consultations with the United States and with other countries about the transferring of the games from Moscow and there were further discussions.

Transfer of the Olympics to another site would, in our view, represent politically the most effective way of registering with the Soviets the intensity of international disapproval of their invasion of Afghanistan.

I would confirm with you that one of Australia, Melbourne, is one of the cities that is being considered, enough for climatic and other reasons it could be lower on the list.

Q. What activities, and is that the only city under consideration?

Foreign Minister Peacock. We held the Olympics in 1956 so there are no inner facilities available.

Q. You're saying it could be any of the activities then in any of the cities?

Foreign Minister Peacock. I'm saying nothing more than what I just said.

Q. In view of the role played by the United States and New Zealand, both in first precipitating and then condemning the African Olympic boycott of 1976, as well as the apparent dissatisfaction by African leaders with what they consider lukewarm support from the United States and in particular with your other colleagues as well on issues relating to southern Africa—particularly Rhodesia—do you feel or can you say that the United States actually has the moral authority to ask Third World coun-

tries to boycott the Olympics in 1980 when the West is outraged?

Secretary Vance. I would draw a distinction between a dispute over whether a particular team could participate and the question of whether or not it is proper for a nation to host the Olympic Games when it is involved in a naked and brutal invasion of another country. Under Olympic tradition and law itself, that is contrary to the traditions of the Olympics, and it goes back to the very beginning of the Olympics. So I think there's a clear distinction between the two.

Q. But what do you say to the Africans who don't see it that way and who felt that they—

Secretary Vance. They'll have to make their own decisions.

Q. You consulted very closely with Secretary General Waldheim before those terms of reference were issued. Why, if the Iranians were in agreement that there was some linkage between the commission and the release of the hostages, was it not spelled out in those terms of reference? And if they weren't in agreement, why did you make the concession allowing the commission to be formed when you had said previously you wouldn't do that unless there was some linkage to the release of the hostages?

Secretary Vance. I think the terms of reference and the understanding with respect to those terms of reference were clear, remain clear, and I think they have been correctly reflected by what the Secretary General has said.

Q. You earlier seemed to allow the possibility that Australia would participate in the U.S. rapid deployment forces. Could you please spell that out?

Foreign Minister Peacock. I simply said that we have the whole totality—and the Defense Minister is here so he should really answer it—but this question of operational planning and response to any crisis is well underway.

I said I think that additional measures for military cooperation are being explored. That means if you are having an examination, you would look at all the options.

Q. You say on page 4 [of the communiqué] that: "Council members reiterated the importance of preventing the . . . spread of nuclear

weapons . . ." What have you obtained from the United States by way of guarantees that if Pakistan is given a further supply of U.S. arms, it will prevent or will not be accompanied by the continued development of Pakistani nuclear weapons? What have we done to get guarantees from the new military regime in South Korea that our uranium being sold to South Korea will not be sold, continued for nuclear weapons, as distinct from the previous piece of paper signed by the previous regime? And what have we done to find out who exploded a nuclear weapon inside of South Africa, and what have we done to condemn it?

Foreign Minister Peacock. I wish we had 6 hours [laughter].

In regard to the first question, the communiqué speaks for itself. It says there that we "reiterated the importance of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and expressed concern that development and spread of the capability to acquire nuclear weapons would further harm security and international stability."

Now that statement is not made *in vacuo*. It applies globally. And you can apply it wherever you will.

In regard to your second question—which I think related to South Korea—so far as the export of uranium is concerned, you are well aware that Australia will not export uranium other than on terms of a government-to-government agreement entered into under stringent safeguards that we have laid down. Indeed, the safeguards that are written into the agreement are probably more stringent, if I may say so, than any other country in the world. And the basis is to insure that the yellow cake so sold and transferred to the country—to the purchaser—is not to be used for military purposes. So that answers the South Korean Army.

So far as South Africa is concerned—or, indeed, anybody else who explodes weapons—I've indicated clearly in Australia our opposition to nuclear testing.

Q. Can you give us any idea if there is anything more concrete than the public statements currently coming from Washington and Moscow on this whole issue of the neutralization of Afghanistan? Are talks at any preliminary stage between the United States and the Soviet Union? Are the

Common Market countries that raised this issue with you when you were in Europe a few days ago; are they doing anything?

In other words, is there something more than simply what's said publicly actually going on right now?

Secretary Vance. There are currently no talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on this issue. The matter was raised and discussed between me and the ministers of the four countries which I visited. Indeed, at the time that I was in Europe the subject was discussed in the meeting of the Nine, which was held in Rome, and they issued a statement on that.

Following the issuance of that statement, I was asked my views with respect to the statement which they had issued, and I stated that I was in general agreement with the substance of what was being said by the Nine in that statement.

Q. Do you think your Olympic committees will go along with the boycott, and do you have an assessment of how many Olympic committees will go along?

Foreign Minister Talboys. As far as New Zealand is concerned, I can tell you this: What the government has stated is that the government would welcome a change in venue.

I read a report this morning of a statement made by Mr. Lance Cross on his return from a meeting of the IOC [International Olympic Committee]. I think here in the United States, in which he said, as I recall the statement, something to the effect that if a number of other countries indicate that they would attend alternative games or not attend Moscow, then he thought it very likely that the New Zealand teams would not attend either.

Foreign Minister Peacock. Yes. So far as Australia is concerned, I think our opposition is clearly known and nothing further has developed since I left Australia, to the best of my knowledge, and that is that the Australian Government is strongly in favor of a boycott. It's indicated this to the Olympic Federation. It is in the process of consulting with that federation, and it, therefore, hopes the federation will accept its view.

Q. Could I ask you if as a result of this meeting we'll see any change in New Zealand's quite significant trading links with the Soviet Union?

Foreign Minister Talboys. When you talk of New Zealand's quite significant trading links with the Soviet Union, I think that what one needs to bear in mind is the point that has been made on many occasions—both by a Prime Minister, by myself, and by other ministers—that what New Zealand seeks is an opportunity to sell livestock products in markets around the world.

We have, as a result of policies pursued in Europe, in Japan, in the United States, had to diversify our markets—sort of seek markets in other parts of the world. Some of those markets we have found in the Soviet Union. What we've been talking about is normal or traditional trade, and it will continue.

Q. Your communique talks about a Soviet threat with the countries that produce oil. Do you detect any specific Soviet threat to those countries or to the sea lanes by which that oil is carried out of there?

Secretary Vance. The presence of tens of thousands of Soviet forces in Afghanistan presents a potential threat which is quite obvious. Those troops previously were not in that area. They now are in a position which puts them some 300 miles closer to the sea lanes and immediately adjacent to Iran which has oil fields, as you well know, so that the mere fact of their presence presents a threat that was not present before the invasion.

Q. Was there any discussion or decision on the possibility of U.S. warships using Fremantle as a navy base in the Indian Ocean?

Foreign Minister Peacock. We previously indicated that Cockburn Sound in that area is available. We're in discussion with the United States on that issue, as indicated earlier.

Defense Minister Killen. They are using it and have used it for some time. There will be units of the U.S. Navy in Cockburn Sound in connection with an exercise now in the Sandgroper in another couple of days.

Foreign Minister Peacock. It's referred to in the communique—Sandgroper.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, FEB. 27, 1980

The 29th Meeting of the ANZUS Council was held in Washington on the 26th and 27th of February, 1980. The Honorable Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State of the United States; the Right Honorable Brian Talboys, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of New Zealand; the Honorable Andrew Peacock, Foreign Minister of Australia; and the Honorable D. J. Killen, Minister of Defence of Australia, represented their respective governments.

In opening the meeting, the Secretary of State emphasized its particular importance in view of the new international situation stemming from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Australia expressed their great appreciation for New Zealand's willingness to advance the date and change the venue of the meeting.

The Council members agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a nonaligned country, was a blatant violation of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council noted that this action had been condemned by an overwhelming majority of the members of the General Assembly and by more than 50 Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting in Islamabad.

The treaty partners further agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan challenged the independence of all states. The Soviet action calls for appropriate political responses according to national interests and capacities, as well as for defence preparedness. The Council recognized that individual nations could contribute in different ways to promoting a stable international order and to strengthening the political environment against threats to national independence. It recognized that firm support by the international community for the sovereignty and independence of small countries, especially developing countries, must be accompanied by international cooperation in the economic field to which all members of the United Nations should make a fair contribution, in order to strengthen the economies of developing countries and to establish a more effective and more equitable international economic order.

The use or threat of force by the USSR against countries vital to the flow of petroleum to the East and West could, the Council agreed, endanger the independence and economic viability of many nations, both developed and developing. In the discussion of recent events in Afghanistan, emphasis was placed on the importance of strong, consistent, and enduring stand in opposition to the use of force in extending Soviet or other influence over sovereign governments. The Council members agreed on the importance of convincing the USSR that it cannot profit in the long run from such actions. They further agreed that the complete withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the restoration of

ally nonaligned, neutral government in Afghanistan responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people were necessary for the security and peace of the region.

The American Council member outlined the economic measures which the United States has taken vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. He expressed appreciation for actions already taken by the other treaty partners in their relations with the USSR. The Council members agreed on the desirability of close consultation on these matters.

In view of the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, the Council agreed that it would not be appropriate for the Summer Olympics to be held in Moscow. It considered at the Olympics should be transferred to other site or sites and noted proposals at, if necessary, alternative competitions could be arranged in the latter half of 1980 which all world-class athletes would be invited to participate. The Council agreed at there would be close and continuing consultations among the three governments on this question.

The Council also discussed the commitment and level of forces in the Indian Ocean that would be appropriate to demonstrate allied support for security of the sea and determination to deter further Viet adventurism. It agreed to explore the possibilities for enhancing the effectiveness of the treaty partners' military activities in the Indian Ocean, without prejudging the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities in the Treaty area. The Council reviewed United States plans for military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. These included enhanced maritime surveillance and anti-air and anti-submarine patrolling, increased military training and assistance to various countries in the region, and arrangements for secure access into the Indian Ocean for allied forces. The Council noted that later in the year Australia will deploy a carrier task group in the Indian Ocean led by the aircraft carrier HMAS MELBOURNE. Naval air support will be given by New Zealand as resources permit.

The Council took note of the decision to allocate greater resources to defense announced by the Prime Minister of Australia on February 19. They further noted that consultations on joint cooperation at both operational and policy levels take on a new urgency in the uncertain strategic prospects resulting from the present Southwest Asian crisis, that operational planning in response to the crisis is well under way, and that additional measures for military preparation are being explored.

Council members reiterated the importance of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and expressed concern at development and spread of the capability to acquire nuclear weapons would further harm security and international stability.

The American Council member informed his colleagues that, despite the ad-

verse political climate engendered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, effective mutual constraints on strategic nuclear weapons remain of great importance in ensuring world peace and security. For this reason, the US administration remains firmly committed to ratification of the SALT II Agreement and to the general principle of seeking effective and verifiable arms control agreements as a matter of national interest and policy. The Australian and New Zealand members welcomed a continued emphasis by the United States on arms control and disarmament measures that enhance security, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB). In this regard, the Council acknowledged that the current military and political climate is not conducive to resumption of US-Soviet talks on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

The Council members considered the tensions along the borders of Indochina resulting from the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces sustained by Soviet support. They expressed their strong concern over the danger to peace and stability arising from the present crisis and their desire to see the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

The ANZUS partners strongly endorsed efforts of Southeast Asian countries to bring about the restoration of peace and security in their region. They reaffirmed their support for the UNGA resolution, sponsored by the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which called for the Kampuchean people to be able to choose democratically their own government, without outside interference, subversion or coercion.

With regard to tensions along the Thai-Kampuchean border, the Council viewed the particular concern the possibility that the hostilities could spill over into Thailand. The Council called on Viet Nam to respect Thailand's territorial integrity and to avoid actions which would endanger the civilian Khmer concentrations along the border, or risk escalation of the fighting or confrontation with Thai military units. The Council stressed the great importance it placed on Thailand's security and territorial integrity, and noted the continued relevance of the Manila Pact.

Noting the great suffering inflicted on the Kampuchean people, the Council members strongly emphasized the necessity for continuing relief efforts within Kampuchea and along the border of Kampuchea and Thailand. They also underscored the requirement for international efforts to deal with the problems of refugees, hunger, and disease until displaced Khmer can return to their homes and they called upon the authorities in Kampuchea to cooperate with the international relief program.

The problem created for many of the countries of Southeast Asia as a result of the persisting refugee exodus from Viet Nam was reviewed by the Council. The members noted the continuing importance of the humane policies of first asylum of

countries in the region. They expressed gratification at the very large number of refugees resettled outside Southeast Asia during the past year, which has relieved pressures on first asylum countries of the region. The opening of the Bataan Refugee Processing Center (RPC) and the prospective opening of the Galang RPC were also viewed as significant additions to the ability of the region to cope with the refugee problem, as was the decision by China to take an active part in refugee resettlement. Members agreed on the need for continuing world-wide participation in refugee resettlement and support for the UNHCR [U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees] Indochina program. They called upon Viet Nam to refrain from creating internal conditions that motivate its people to attempt to escape. Recognizing that several thousand Vietnamese flee their homeland each month despite all handicaps, members reaffirmed support for the principle of responsibility of flag states for refugees rescued at sea. In those instances, where flag states did not accept this responsibility, members supported other means to assist the refugees such as through the Sea Rescue Resettlement Reserve of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

In addition to the tragic plight of Indochinese and Khmer refugees, the Council members took particular note of the many thousands now fleeing the occupation by Soviet forces of Afghanistan. The Council urged that all independent governments contribute monetarily or in kind to the international and humanitarian effort, coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to maintain the Afghan refugees until they can return safely to their homeland. The Council noted with appreciation the efforts of the Pakistan Government to receive and care for the Afghan refugees.

Welcoming the accession of Kiribati to independence since the last Council meeting, the Council reaffirmed the importance it attaches to the peaceful progress of the South Pacific.

The Council welcomed the expression of concern by South Pacific governments in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Council reaffirmed the commitment of the ANZUS partners to cooperate with the South Pacific states in support of a common interest in a secure and peaceful environment in which the South Pacific countries can most effectively pursue their national policies. It welcomed the continued development of regional cooperation among the Pacific Islands.

The Ministers took note of progress made towards self-determination in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and welcomed the increased participation of the Micronesian governments in regional organizations.

The Council noted the increased importance of its members reducing their dependence on imported fuels in the light of recent events in South West Asia. They recognized that recent dramatic increases in the price of oil will also have a disruptive

effect on the economies of both developed and developing countries and may cause serious strains in the international financial system. The respective delegations accordingly agreed that there is a serious need to pursue strong measures to reduce oil imports, bringing prices for domestic crude oil to world levels, and substantially greater efforts to use and develop alternative energy sources. They noted the degree of cooperation that had already been achieved within the International Energy Agency on these issues. It also considered the effect on the economies of the developing countries of the dramatic increases in the price of petroleum and agreed to continue to provide development assistance and to consult these countries in an effort to overcome this effect.

In reviewing the situation in Iran, the Council agreed that the seizure and holding of American personnel as hostages is a blatant violation of international law, diplomatic norms, and human rights. The Australian and New Zealand representatives reaffirmed their sympathy and support for the United States and the American hostages. The members of the Council emphasized the importance of the hostages speedy release.

In addition to the special problems arising from the crisis in Southwest Asia, Council members reviewed the conduct of the alliance since the 28th Council meeting and expressed themselves satisfied with the continued high degree of cooperation and consultation. They took note of the regular program of exchanges, exercises, and visits carried out by the armed services of the three allies and the contribution these have made to the readiness of the members to support one another in periods of military danger or natural disaster. In this regard, they were particularly gratified that a second exercise in the Sandgroper series will be carried out in the Indian Ocean off of Western Australia later this year. Satisfaction was also expressed with the success of the other exercises carried on over the past eight months in the various series established under the alliance.

The Council members concluded by agreeing that the 30th Meeting of the Council will be held in Wellington in 1981 at a date to be decided.

Australian Prime Minister's Visits

Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser of Australia visited Washington, D.C., January 30-February 1, 1979, for meetings with President Carter and other government officials. He returned again on February 7-8 to discuss with President Carter conversations he had held with European leaders. Following are a statement by White House press secretary Jody Powell on January 31 and the President's and Prime Minister's remarks to reporters on February 7.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, JAN. 31, 1980¹

The President and the Prime Minister's discussion focused primarily upon the dangerous situation that has arisen as a result of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, its potential impact on other countries in southwest Asia, and the implications that it has for independent governments everywhere, whether large or small. There will be further discus-

Prime Minister Fraser and President Carter (White House photo by Karl Schumacher)



sions at the official level as a result of the subjects covered by the two leaders.

I might say that the discussions ranged over a fairly wide area, including the Third World, obviously the Indian Ocean and southwest Asia, the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] nations, energy—those were the primary areas. I think I can say—as Prime Minister Fraser, I believe, has already indicated—that the United States and Australia have a very similar view of the gravity of the situation in southwest Asia and of the steps which need to be taken to deal with it.

The President told the Prime Minister at the beginning of the meeting that it was—this is a quote—"reassuring to have friends like you in time of trial and testing." The President also complimented the Prime Minister upon the role of Australia in helping to bring about the Lancaster House discussions which resulted in the agreements in Rhodesia.

REMARKS TO REPORTERS, FEB. 7, 1980²

President Carter

We're delighted to welcome back to the White House Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser of Australia, who came here a few days ago to consult very closely with me on matters of common interest to our two countries, but particularly the late developing events centered around the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Following his visit here, Prime Minister Fraser went to London to meet with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom—Great Britain—he went to meet with the Chancellor of Germany, and then the President of France. Following those visits, the leaders of the European countries suggested that because his meetings were so fruitful with them that he might stop by to see me again to give me a report on the consultations in Europe. I'm deeply grateful that Prime Minister Fraser has been willing to do this. His report has, indeed, been helpful.

We are grateful also to Australia because of their courageous stand as an ally of ours in condemning the invasion that threatens the peace in southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region; the fact that as a major exporter of grain, Australia immediately announced that

¹ Press release 45. ■

ney would not replace the grain being withheld by our country from the Soviet Union. And I'm also very pleased with the close military, economic, and political alliance that exists among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

There was a meeting of foreign ministers scheduled in this alliance in July. At the suggestion of Prime Minister Fraser, we have decided to move at meeting up until the last week in February so that we can expedite the common discussions among us about the situation in the Indian Ocean and the regions bordering that sea.

We have had a thorough discussion about the Olympics and what might be concerning the Olympics if the Soviets do not quickly withdraw all their forces from Afghanistan, and Prime Minister Fraser has taken the lead in this discussion and consultation well. It's with a great deal of pleasure that I welcome him back here, and I like to ask him as an honored guest to make a few comments to you.

Prime Minister Fraser

Thank you very much, Mr. President. I value very greatly, indeed, the discussions that we had a few days ago and so today. I had said at the outset of this round of discussions that I have undertaken that it's important for the development of Australia's own policy for the future to know as well as possible the mind of the President of the United States, the policies of this country, and so of principal countries in Europe.

We have no presumptuous view of the influence of 14 million Australians, but we are determined to play whatever part we can in a cause that is important to free peoples, wherever they may be. We're glad, indeed, and thankful at the United States has responded in recent days, that the President made and delivered the statement he did in the State of the Union message, which could surely give clear warnings to the Soviets about any further moves beyond Afghanistan, and the clear need at there clearly is to bring greater assurance to the world by removing forces from Afghanistan.

There are times when all of us in dependent nations have necessarily to depend on the United States for the kind of world in which we live. This is the world's greatest free power, the longest country in the world. And in times of danger, in times of invasion—as there have been, the

Soviets in Afghanistan—it is the United States that must set a lead. And the United States has done what is necessary in the preservation, as Australia believes, of world peace. And because we strongly believe that what the President has done is right, because we strongly believe that what the President has done is necessary, Australia has moved to support—in what ways we can—the actions of the United States, and we will continue to do so in a cause which is of such great importance for us all.

The United States has also taken a lead over the matter of the Olympics. And I was shown some days ago that small document that has been handed out by Soviet activists in Moscow giving their view of what the Olympics mean and how they're going to exploit it amongst their own people. The Soviets themselves have made it perfectly plain that they regard the Olympic Games being held in Moscow as a great social and political event, not at that moment speaking about a great sporting event which is what it was meant to be. And they've also made it perfectly plain, in their own writings and documents, that they would regard the rewarding of the games to Moscow as a mark of approval of Soviet foreign policy.

Now, against the background of their own statements and against the background of their invasion of Afghanistan, how can free peoples' representatives go to Moscow and, no matter what they themselves might say, allow the Soviets to say of them that their presence there is a mark of approval of Soviet foreign policy? Because that's plainly in the current circumstances what the Soviet Union would in fact be saying.

Mr. President, I welcome very much the discussions that we've been able to have; they've been extraordinarily useful to me. They have given me much, if it was needed, much greater confidence that the United States, together with allies in Europe, is determined to do what must be done to preserve all those things which the people of the United States and the people of Australia hold most dear.

U.S.-Kiribati Sign Friendship Treaty

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE,
JAN. 24, 1980¹

I transmit herewith, for advice and consent of the Senate, the Treaty of Friendship between the United States of America and the Republic of Kiribati. The primary purpose of the Treaty is to settle on terms acceptable to both governments the conflicting claims to 14 islands in Kiribati (formerly the Gilbert Islands) in the South Pacific Ocean, and to establish a regime of cooperation, particularly regarding security arrangements and fisheries. The report of the Department of State is enclosed for the information of the Senate.

The Treaty and Agreed Minute meet the practical interests of both countries and will satisfy the desire of the Kiribati people that their sovereignty over 14 of the islands in their country be unencumbered by a conflicting claim of the United States.

The Treaty will protect United States interests by assuring non-discriminatory future access to Kiribati fishing grounds which supply fish to the canneries of American Samoa. The Treaty also promotes the interest of American Samoa by encouraging joint ventures using the facilities constructed by the United States on Canton Island.¹ As well, any military use of the islands by third parties is to be a subject of consultations with the United States, and third parties may not use United States-built facilities without United States agreement.

The Treaty will further United States foreign policy and security interests in promoting peace, security and development of the region. I recommend that the Senate give early consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

JIMMY CARTER

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980. ■

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 4, 1980.

²Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 11, 1980. ■

U.S. Military Presence in the Indian Ocean Area

by David D. Newsom

Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 7, 1980. Ambassador Newsom is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.¹

It is a pleasure to provide you this brief overview of the political background to our military presence in the Indian Ocean area.

As the President said in his State of the Union message [January 21, 1980]: "Events in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized for us the critical importance for American security and prosperity of the area running from the Middle East through the Persian Gulf to South Asia. This region provides two-thirds of the world's oil exports, supplying most of the energy needs of our allies in Europe and Japan. It has been a scene of almost constant conflict between nations, and of serious internal instability within many countries. And now one of its nations has been invaded by the Soviet Union."

The United States has, for more than three decades, had a modest military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area. In recent years this has been symbolized primarily by the ships of the Middle East force presence in the Persian Gulf and naval visits throughout the Indian Ocean area.

Our need for improved communications and logistic capabilities in the area as a whole was recognized a number of years ago with the decision, in cooperation with the British, to begin constructing an austere facility on Diego Garcia in 1972, which we subsequently expanded with congressional approval to a naval support facility in 1976. The revolution in Iran and the general concern over our citizens in the area and over the security of the region generally have led us to increase that presence over the last year by regular and extended Navy task forces, including carriers. Two such task forces are currently in the Indian Ocean.

The events in Afghanistan further reinforce the need for forces upon which we can call to protect our interests and to come to the assistance of friendly countries, if we have need to do so. The tensions and uncertainties in

this region clearly call for U.S. capability and flexibility to make such deployments and to sustain them effectively.

This raises force and budgetary implications which are best addressed by the representatives of the Department of Defense but whose importance we would firmly support.

Our friends in the area are generally receptive to the presence of U.S. forces in the region as a whole. The question of the location of these forces, the establishment of bases, and the use of facilities on their territories, however, is politically sensitive. The public posture of most countries in the area is to prefer a neutral Indian Ocean without the presence of either U.S. or Soviet forces. Most nations, however, recognize the realities of the current world scene, and if Soviet forces are present in increased numbers and a more threatening posture, as they are, there is a clear desire for the presence of a U.S. capability as well.

While there is an awareness both in and outside the region of Soviet facilities in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden) and Ethiopia, these tend to get less attention politically than our own more modest installations, in part because of the very natural and necessary public discussions of our plans and requirements. Thus, however inaccurately, Diego Garcia is more of a political symbol in some countries than Aden.

Opposition to the presence of foreign forces, bases, and facilities in this area comes from a variety of sources. There is a strong influence in the Indian Ocean area of nonalignment, epitomized by the participation of virtually every nation around the Indian Ocean in the nonaligned movement.

In all countries there are images and political clichés about past colonialization and intervention which come to the fore when a Western country talks of securing facilities or establishing bases.

To some extent we tend to bring this on ourselves by speaking of intervention at times as if these lands and the resources of this area were ours. They belong to independent sovereign countries which feel that the first responsibility for their defense lies with them. They want our help and our presence but in the context of their own sovereignty.

Throughout the Arab portions of this area, there are all of the sentiments, emotions, and political tensions which grow out of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the presence of large number of Palestinian people. Inevitably cooperation of any sort with the United States risks political opposition in this context.

The events in Afghanistan have changed this picture, although the underlying reservations remain. There is a greater concern about Soviet intentions which undoubtedly makes our quest for support facilities easier. We still cannot ignore, however, the political realities which lie below the surface. Nor can we ignore the economic and social pressures and ferment which lead to political instability and to vulnerabilities in many of the countries of the region to outside pressures. Our economic and security assistance programs directed at the region are thus an indispensable component of a strategy of building stability and strengthening the ability of the countries of the region to defend themselves and insure their security against outside intervention or internal subversion.

As the committee is aware, we are discussing cooperation and facilities with several countries in the area. These requests are based on the reality that we cannot keep a permanent fleet presence in the area without access to shore facilities to aid in resupply and reconnaissance. We believe that we shall be able to obtain useful cooperative arrangements in the area.

We are aware of the interest of the committee also in the possible use of facilities in the Sinai. In our present planning for support of the Indian Ocean presence and in the absence of the completion of the arrangements for peace in the area, we have not made final conclusions about the desirability or feasibility of facilities in this region.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

South Asia—Old Problems, New Challenges

Jane Coon

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 11, 1980. Ms. Coon is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to discuss with you the complex diplomatic, political, and security situation in South Asia today. Never before has South Asia seemed more important, nor the challenges to our interests more real and direct. Old problems remain, but new developments require us to re-examine our policies in a fresh and creative fashion.

As we begin to adjust to the new situation created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is even more important than ever that the Congress and the Administration share their respective assessments and consult closely on appropriate and effective ways to pursue long-term U.S. interests in the region.

You have described some of the inherent paradoxes in the policy choices facing us in South Asia. It is precisely because there are no obvious answers that we are here today. You and your committee have an interest in the experience of many years unfolding in the region. With the extensive travel of you and many of your colleagues in Asia, you bring to these problems both the insight of direct experience and the perspective of a legislator. I hope that together we can bring to sharper focus the issues before us, recognizing that our choices will not be easy.

S. Security Interests— The Soviet Impact

I would like to begin by talking about our security interests in South Asia and how we analyze them in light of recent developments. Inevitably, the Soviet move into Afghanistan affects the manner in which we address other aspects of our policies. I would then like to move on to some of the other issues you have raised—nuclear nonproliferation, conventional arms transfers, and human rights—and relate these to the security interests which are the principal theme of my statement.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has dramatically changed the security situation in South Asia and southwest Asia. In responding to this challenge, we are proceeding along several parallel tracks.

- You are all aware of the steps we have taken in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union to make sure the Soviets pay a high cost for what they have done.

- Internationally, we have supported the strong condemnation passed by the U.N. General Assembly, and we note that the Islamic conference has taken even stronger exception to the Soviet action.

- We are working on appropriate followup actions in international forums, including support for an appropriate resolution in the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

- We are strengthening our defense capabilities in southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean.

- We have made available over \$11 million in cash and kind for the relief of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, whose plight you know better than most people.

- Finally, we are encouraging what we hope will be an effective regional response to the Soviet invasion. This includes efforts to strengthen Pakistan's ability and will to defend itself. It also involves keeping in touch with the Government of India and supporting the efforts India is making to encourage Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

U.S.-Pakistani Cooperation

The country most directly affected, of course, is Pakistan. In the period since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we have been able to work on parallel lines with the Pakistan Government in shaping an effective political response both internationally and regionally.

The 2 days of intensive discussions in Islamabad earlier this month built on our earlier talks with Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Adviser, Agha Shahi, in Washington and produced a large measure of agreement on the nature of the threat and of the security relationship we seek to build between our two nations. The personal participation of President Zia throughout the discussions in Islamabad indicates, in our view, the importance which he attaches

to the regional threat and to U.S.-Pakistani cooperation in meeting that threat.

During these talks, we again strongly reiterated our commitment to the 1959 agreement which addresses the threat of Soviet or Soviet-directed aggression against Pakistan. The President's forthright statement of vital U.S. interests in the region—in his State of the Union address—seemed to have had a salutary effect in helping to remove doubts about the strength and durability of this commitment.

We stated our willingness to ask the Congress to affirm this commitment explicitly when we seek legislation to permit resumption of assistance. The Pakistanis expressed satisfaction with this outcome and will not pursue their earlier request to turn it into a treaty.

We were unable to reach a similar degree of agreement on our proposed levels of assistance. We described our intention to propose to the Congress a package which would authorize \$100 million of economic support funds and a like amount of foreign military sales credits for each of the fiscal years 1980 and 1981. We described our efforts to encourage other traditional donors to increase their levels of assistance substantially and indicated that we viewed our contribution as part of a broad multilateral effort.

The Pakistanis asked that we defer presenting any legislation which would specify amounts of aid until we had a better assessment of Pakistan's overall economic and military needs and until we had a fuller appreciation of the increased assistance which might be forthcoming from all quarters to meet these needs. We agreed to this request, while making clear that our offer of assistance continued to stand. We also explained in some detail the degree to which this delay complicates our ability to get a supplemental appropriation for Pakistan in the current fiscal year.

In the immediate period ahead, both we and the Pakistanis intend to continue discussions with those governments to which we are looking to provide additional assistance. Our discussions in Riyadh suggest that Saudi Arabia is keenly aware of the importance of strengthening Pakistan. We will stay in close touch with the Pakistani Government as multilateral consultations proceed.

In the meantime, our military team has had detailed discussions in Pakistan in an effort to determine the scope of Pakistan's existing military deficiencies and to identify specific types of equipment which the United States might

provide to strengthen Pakistan's defensive capabilities on the western frontier. We will be in touch with other potential equipment suppliers and sources of financing in an effort to collaborate with them and the Pakistanis on an overall effective response.

We are prepared to process certain cash military sales even in the absence of agreement on our assistance levels, though obviously, Pakistan's ability to pay for much new equipment will be severely constrained under present circumstances.

We hope and trust that our economic support and that of other donors will make it easier for the Pakistan Government to take measures to encourage internal stability. We are confident that a U.S. military sales re-

lationship will help Pakistan improve its ability to defend itself against the increased threat from the northwest.

India

Our contacts with Mrs. [Indira] Gandhi's new government in India have also been significant.

As you know, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford was in New Delhi January 30-31 as the President's special emissary. We believe that his mission was successful in registering U.S. desires to maintain good relations and close consultative ties with the new Indian Government.

The President's decision to send a senior adviser of Secretary Clifford's stature obviously gratified Mrs. Gandhi

and her colleagues, and the talks he held were frank, amicable, and in our view highly beneficial.

Mr. Clifford was forthright in presenting U.S. positions on the Soviet invasion and our response to it. He made it clear to the Indians that the United States was interested in their concerns and opinions and that as the largest power in the region, they had an important role in dealing with the new situation.

He reiterated our belief that the efforts we have undertaken to help Pakistan meet the challenge on its northwest frontier should not adversely affect either our relations with India or Indo-Pakistan ties.

He expressed our hope that India and Pakistan could evolve a regional approach to the fundamentally changed situation which the whole region now faces, and stated that what we do to strengthen Pakistan's security should not impede such an approach. He welcomed the decision of the Indians and Pakistanis to hold high-level talks, which took place a few days later.

We came away from the Clifford talks convinced that while the Indians are dubious about our military supply relationship with Pakistan, they are quite concerned by the Soviet invasion. They share our desire that the Soviets pull out of Afghanistan. They find developments in Afghanistan a matter of concern both for their own sake and also because, in the Indian view, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan could lead to big-power confrontation in the South Asian region.

We hope that continuing a frank dialogue with India can lessen the danger that our differences in approach could adversely influence Indo-U.S. relations. Our offer to be more receptive to Indian interest in purchases of U.S. military equipment to meet their legitimate security requirements reflects the importance we attach to India's role and to Indo-U.S. relations under present circumstances.

Against this background, we will also pursue our other interests in the region which include nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, narcotics, and the discouragement of regional arms races. I believe that our security objectives and these other interests can be mutually supportive and that we must seek to achieve all of our goals.

Nuclear Proliferation

The problem of nuclear proliferation causes us intense concern. If and when we reach an understanding with the Pakistan Government about a U.S. aid

Assistance for Afghan Refugees

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, JAN. 31, 1980¹

President Carter announced on January 31, 1980, that the United States is making a new pledge of \$5.3 million for immediate assistance to the growing number of Afghan refugees fleeing into Pakistan because of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. This latest U.S. contribution consists of \$5 million in emergency refugee funds for the Afghan relief program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and \$300,000 in grant aid for voluntary agency efforts.

The \$5 million contribution to the UNHCR will include an immediate cash contribution of \$3 million, plus the shipment of \$2 million more in relief supplies. As a first step the United States is shipping more than 40,000 heavy blankets to Pakistan. The cost, including airfreight, is more than \$500,000.

This new U.S. pledge is in response to the worldwide appeal issued by the UNHCR for a total of \$55 million (\$25 million in food and \$30 million in cash) to help care for a projected refugee population of 500,000 over the next year—a number which may well increase as more Afghan people flee their occupied land.

The United States has already made an initial contribution to the UNHCR, through the U.N. World Food Program, of more than 17,000 metric tons of food commodities, largely wheat, valued at \$6.1 million. In addition, the United States will allocate

a minimum of \$10 million from the pending supplemental appropriation for PL 480 (Food for Peace), on which the President hopes the Congress will shortly complete action.

Together, these will provide more than \$16 million for more than 50,000 tons of food, including wheat, vegetable oil, and dried milk. With today's new pledge, the U.S. contribution will total more than \$21 million, nearly 40% of the U.N. appeal.

We are considering still other humanitarian steps we can take to help UNHCR and the Government of Pakistan care for these unfortunate Afghan people who have been forced to flee their homes and now suffer from cold and hunger because of the brutal Soviet invasion and occupation of their homeland. More help is needed, and we call on all other humanitarian-minded countries to join this effort.

The President's Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Victor H. Palmieri, also announced today that he is sending his deputy, Frank E. Loy, and two staff members of a factfinding mission to Pakistan for a firsthand look at relief operations. Dr. Marie Griffin of the Center for Disease Control will accompany them to survey the medical needs of the refugees. Loy and his delegation will report their findings to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance on their return in 2 weeks.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 4, 1980. ■

Security Council Vote on Israeli Settlements

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 465¹

The Security Council,

Taking note of the reports of the Commission of the Security Council established by Resolution 446 (1979) to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, contained in documents S/13450 and Corr. 1 and S/13679,

Taking note also of letters from the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/13801) and the Permanent Representative of Morocco, Chairman of the Islamic Group (S/13802),

Strongly deploring the refusal by Israel to cooperate with the Commission and regretting its formal rejection of Resolutions 446 (1979) and 452 (1979),

Affirming once more that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

Deploing the decision of the Government of Israel to officially support Israeli settlement in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967,

Deeply concerned over the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing this settlement policy in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and its consequences on the local Arab and Palestinian population,

Taking into account the need to consider measures for the impartial protection of private and public land and property, and water resources,

Bearing in mind the special status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the holy places in the city,

Drawing attention to the grave consequences which the settlement policy is bound to have on any attempt to reach a

encouraged by Pakistan's recent ban on opium production in the settled and merged areas of the Northwest Frontier Province and by the apparent reduction in this year's crop. Realistically, this problem is likely to be with us for some time, however, and we will continue to work closely with the Pakistan Government on enforcement and other aspects of narcotics control.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Recalling pertinent Security Council resolutions, specifically Resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, as well as the consensus statement made by the President of the Security Council on 11 November 1976,

Having invited Mr. Fahd Qawasmeh, Mayor of Al-Khalil (Hebron), in the occupied territory, to supply it with information pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional procedure,

1. *Commends* the work done by the Commission in preparing the report contained in document S/13679;

2. *Accepts* the conclusions and recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report of the Commission;

3. *Calls upon* all Parties, particularly the Government of Israel, to cooperate with the Commission;

4. *Strongly deplors* the decision of Israel to prohibit the free travel of Mayor Fahd Qawasmeh in order to appear before the Security Council, and requests Israel to permit his free travel to the United Nations Headquarters for that purpose;

5. *Determines* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

6. *Strongly deplors* the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and calls upon the Government and people of Israel to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

7. *Calls upon* all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories;

8. *Requests* the Commission to continue to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, to investigate the reported serious depletion of natural resources, with a view to ensuring the protection of those important natural resources of the territories under occupation, and to keep under close scrutiny the implementation of the present resolution;

relationship, we expect to propose to the Congress legislation which would suspend the strictures of our nonproliferation legislation—the Symington and Glenn amendments—because of the imperatives of our security interests.

We have made it clear to the Pakistan Government that this does not represent any lessening of concern on our part. We have plainly told them our view that a nuclear explosion in the present unsettled international environment in South Asia would be even more dangerous and unwise than before. We have stated what we consider to be a fact—that a Pakistani nuclear test would drastically alter our relationship and put at serious risk our further cooperation.

We intend to continue to pursue this matter with the Pakistan Government since we believe that concerns for Pakistani security and regional stability must be separated from the question of nuclear restraint within the region.

Both the nuclear question and our prospective military supply relationship are intimately bound up with our desire to avoid sparking an arms race, especially one between developing countries which need to spend their scarce resources on pressing development problems. Our military supply policy toward Pakistan will emphasize improving Pakistan's ability to defend its western frontier with Afghanistan and will not be directed against India.

Human Rights

Our interest in human rights, too, is closely bound up with our support for the region. We are convinced that equitable economic development which encompasses all regions of Pakistan and the creation of representative political institutions can make an important contribution to the stability of the country. Our recently released human rights report has highlighted some of the practices we are concerned about. We have made our views known to the Pakistan Government and hope that we will be able to establish an aid relationship which will help Pakistan to move in this direction.

Narcotics

In closing, let me say a brief word about narcotics. We are deeply concerned about the influx of narcotic substances from southwest Asia into the European and U.S. markets. We are

9. Requests the Commission to report to the Security Council before 1 September 1980, and decides to convene at the earliest possible date thereafter in order to consider the report and the full implementation of the present resolution.

**AMBASSADOR McHENRY,
MAR. 1, 1980²**

As always, the Middle East is subject to many trends and influences, some of them contradictory in nature. In the view of the United States, one of the positive trends in the area is the current series of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement which resulted from the historic breakthrough at Camp David a year and a half ago. A Peace Treaty has been signed, and large areas of occupied Arab territory have been evacuated by Israel. The parties have taken concrete steps in the cause of peace, even in the face of issues which touch their most vital national interests and on which there are, particularly in Israel, sharp but honest differences of view.

As significant as these developments are, we recognize that there can be no comprehensive peace in the Middle East until the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects is resolved. The ongoing negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza are admittedly difficult and even if successful will constitute only a first step. But progress is being made, and for the first time in 30 years, the core issues are being addressed seriously and with determination.

Everyone recognizes that the problem of Israeli settlements is one of the issues that must be dealt with. The position of the United States on the question of settlements is clear and is consistent. In particular, the United States has had the occasion to state its views both publicly and privately concerning the situation in Hebron.

We regard settlements in the occupied territories as illegal under international law, and we consider them to be an obstacle to the successful outcome to the current negotiations which are aimed at a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East.

We have supported the resolution before us. We have done so despite our reservations with regard to certain of the provisions of the resolution, which we consider to be recommendatory in character. We believe that the report of the settlements commission is generally fair-minded and objective, but we have a question concerning the commission's recommendation in paragraph 54 of its

report as to the best means to deal with the settlements in the occupied territories. I should also add that we do not read the reference in operative paragraph 5 of the resolution to changes in the institutional structure of the occupied territories as in any way prejudicing the outcome of the autonomy negotiations.

The basic framework for all our efforts, including the Camp David accords, is Resolution 242 which calls for negotiations to resolve the many and difficult aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such negotiations are currently underway.

One of the issues which the negotiators will have to address is the matter of existing settlements. There are a number of factors of a practical character that make impractical the call in operative paragraph 6 of the resolution for the dismantling of existing settlements. Some projects are not so easily dismantled; moreover, whatever the future status of the occupied territories, there will be a need for housing, and there will be a need for related infrastructure for the inhabitants.

My delegation is pleased that the Council has spoken unanimously on this important issue. At the same time, we believe we must all recognize that the solution to the problem lies ultimately in a negotiating process. For our part, we are committed to the negotiations in which we are currently engaged as a full partner, and we are determined that they shall bring a comprehensive peace closer to reality. In the final analysis, all of us here will be judged by the contribution which we make to this objective.

**DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAR. 3, 1980³**

There were some questions raised over the weekend about our vote in the Security Council on Saturday. I want, therefore, to make the following points. There is no change in our basic policy on settlements or on Jerusalem. Our policy has been consistently stated over a number of months and remains unchanged. Our support for Israeli security and well-being also remains firm and unwavering.

This is a fundamental element in American foreign policy. We remain totally committed to the success of the negotiations under the Camp David frameworks. We believe they will provide the proper context for dealing with

issues such as the Israeli settlements in occupied territory.

As we said yesterday and as Ambassador McHenry made clear in the Security Council, the United States is opposed to the inclusion of the phrase "dismantling of existing settlements" in the Security Council resolution which was passed on Saturday.

The issue of existing settlements in occupied territory will be dealt with in the negotiations now underway. We do not consider the call in this forum—i.e. in the Security Council—in that resolution for dismantling them to be either proper or practical.

As we have said, we believe all the outstanding issues should be dealt with through negotiation, and we are fully committed to the success of the current negotiations.

Finally, to repeat again what we have said before, we have made clear our opposition to any effort to change or amend U.N. Resolution 242 in any way.

**PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
MAR. 3, 1980⁴**

I want to make it clear that the vote the United States in the Security Council of the United Nations does not represent a change in our position regarding the Israeli settlements in the occupied areas nor regarding the status of Jerusalem.

While our opposition to the establishment of the Israeli settlements is longstanding and well-known, we make strenuous efforts to eliminate the language with reference to the dismantling of settlements in the resolution. This call for dismantling was neither proper nor practical. We believe that the future disposition of existing settlement must be determined during the current autonomy negotiations.

As to Jerusalem, we strongly believe that Jerusalem should be undivided with free access to the holy place for all faiths and that its status should be determined in the negotiations for comprehensive peace settlement.

The U.S. vote in the United Nations was approved with the understanding that all references to Jerusalem would be deleted. The failure to communicate this clearly resulted in a vote in favor of the resolution rather than abstention.

I want to reiterate in the most unequivocal of terms that in the autonomy negotiations and in other fora, the United States will neither support nor

cept any position that might jeopardize Israel's vital security interests. Our commitment to Israel's security and well-being remains unqualified and irrevocable.

¹Adopted unanimously on Mar. 1, 1980.
²USUN press release 16 of Mar. 1, 1980.
³Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.
⁴Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 10, 1980. ■

U.S. to Rejoin ILO

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
 FEB. 13, 1980¹

Two years ago I directed that the United States withdraw from membership in the International Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, because it had strayed too far from its fundamental principles and purposes. In particular, the withdrawal was an expression of my growing concern over a number of trends that weakened the ability of the ILO to carry out its basic mission. These trends included the erosion of the independence of employer and worker delegates attending ILO conferences, the relative immunity of certain countries from criticism for violating workers' human rights, the growing disregard within the ILO of the principles of the due process, and the introduction of extraneous political issues into ILO debates.

At the time of our withdrawal, I stated that we remained ready to return to the ILO whenever that organization demonstrated respect for its proper principles and procedures. It is my hope that other countries would now be able to realize that the ILO and other U.N. agencies can only be effective if they are not used for political propaganda purposes.

Since then, a majority of ILO members—governments, workers, and employers—have successfully joined together to return the ILO to its original purposes. Through their efforts, steps have been taken to strengthen the independence of employer and worker delegates, undertake investigations of human rights violations in a number of countries, including the Soviet Union, reinforce the principle of the due process, and generally reduce the level of politicization in the ILO.

I have decided, therefore, that the United States should now rejoin the ILO and work with other members to insure that the true potential of this organization is realized. This decision has the support of American trade union and employer organizations—the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce.

As a member of the ILO, and with the support of other countries, the United States will seek to insure that the ILO continues to serve the interests of the world's working men and women by promoting more and better jobs while protecting their human rights and dignity.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 18, 1980. ■

Background on U.S. Reentry into ILO

Foreign Relations Outline¹

The International Labor Organization (ILO), created in 1919 as part of the League of Nations, was established to set international labor standards, improve working conditions, create employment, and promote human rights. In 1946 it became the first U.N. specialized agency.

Unique among international organizations, it operates on a tripartite principle. Representatives of workers, employers, and government all participate on an equal basis. It is now composed of 141 member states.

U.S. Withdrawal

In November 1977, the United States withdrew from membership in the ILO for several reasons, including the erosion of the tripartite principle, the ILO's selective concern for human rights, its growing disregard for due process, and the increasing politicization of the organization. At that time, President Carter said that: "The United States remains ready to return whenever the ILO is again true to its proper principles and procedures."

Decision to Rejoin

Following the withdrawal, the President established a Cabinet-level committee to monitor developments and

advise him on ILO matters. Reflecting the ILO's tripartite structure, AFL-CIO, U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. Government representatives all had an equal voice on the committee. In early February 1980, the committee recommended unanimously to the President that the United States rejoin the ILO. The President accepted this recommendation, and the United States rejoined the organization on February 18.

Progress at the ILO

Although the ILO has not fully resolved all the issues that led to U.S. withdrawal, it has made significant progress on each.

Tripartism. The ILO has passed several resolutions strengthening its tripartite decisionmaking system. For example, a new ILO general conference secret ballot procedure, vigorously resisted by the U.S.S.R., permits employer and worker delegates to vote their consciences on sensitive issues without fear of government recrimination.

Human Rights. The ILO is applying its human rights machinery to Eastern Europe. In November 1978, the ILO governing body censured Czechoslovakia for illegally firing dissidents from their jobs, and it is currently examining worker complaints against the U.S.S.R. and Poland for violating trade union rights.

Due Process. In 1978 the general conference defeated an Arab resolution seeking to extend a 1974 resolution that condemned Israel without any investigation of the facts. A new mechanism to eliminate resolutions representing such violations of due process was negotiated by Western and Third World governments.

Politicization. ILO meetings have been far less politicized, and there has been a major turnaround on Middle East issues. When Arab representatives walked out during the speech of the Egyptian Labor Minister in the 1979 conference, only Communist delegates joined the walkout. The ILO also sent two missions to investigate working conditions of Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories. The mission reports were well balanced and accepted by both Arabs and Israelis at the 1978 and 1979 general conferences. As a result, no political resolutions were offered on this subject.

Effect of U.S. Withdrawal

U.S. withdrawal from the ILO apparently contributed to the progress that has been achieved. Western countries played a more active role in pressing for reforms. A majority of ILO members successfully resisted efforts to subvert due process and constitutional procedures. Equally important, the U.S.S.R. generally was unable to capitalize on the U.S. absence.

Benefits of Membership

Although withdrawal may have promoted reforms, continuing to remain outside the ILO would not have yielded additional benefits to the United States. Those ILO members which worked to achieve the gains that were made would have felt disillusioned if the United States had failed to return. Moreover, while the Western group has become more cohesive and effective, there remains a clear need for the kind of presence that only we can provide. This is especially true on human rights issues. By rejoining now, we can resume our seat on the governing body before the June 1980 annual conference. Specifically, membership in the ILO offers the United States:

- The opportunity to participate in and influence the formation of international labor standards, which directly affect labor codes in developing countries;
- The opportunity to participate in and influence voluntary agreements such as codes of conduct for multinational enterprises, the ILO version of which is regarded by U.S. labor and business as the most constructive yet developed;
- A framework in which the U.S. labor movement and business community can be in contact with their counterpart organizations throughout the world;
- Influence over ILO execution of U.N. Development Program projects, totaling about \$40 million in 1980;
- An important forum in which the United States can carry on discussions with the Third World;
- Participation in the U.N. system's most effective mechanism for promoting the human rights of workers; and
- Participation in the ILO's studies of development, which pioneered the basic human needs approach to development and directly influenced World Bank and Agency for International Development programs.

Membership Costs

Our contribution to the ILO will be about \$25 million in 1980. Administrative support costs of U.S. participation could amount to an additional \$500,000.

¹ Taken from the Department of State publication in the GIST series, released Feb. 1980. This outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. ■

U.S. Policy on Apartheid

by William Dunfee

Statement in the U.N. General Assembly on November 8, 1979. Mr. Dunfee is U.S. Alternate Representative to the 34th U.N. General Assembly.¹

My Government shares the total and inalterable opposition of this body to the institutionalized system of racism called apartheid. We are committed to affirmative policies which promote genuine social and political change in South Africa. We believe that economic forces are particularly important in an effort to effect the kinds of changes in South Africa we all desire. In the last several days, other speakers have introduced reports of a possible nuclear event into this debate. Because these comments are based on information which originated with my government, I shall address this issue briefly.

As the members of this Assembly are aware, my government has had an indication of the possibility of a low-yield nuclear explosion in the area of the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, although we do not have corroborating evidence. It is important to understand that we cannot confirm that a nuclear explosion took place nor, obviously, can we say at this time who was responsible. We are continuing to investigate this matter. Earlier in this session, a distinguished delegate called upon the Assembly to address this issue, not in panic, but with facts. We could not agree more.

My government has made clear that a fundamental objective of our national policy is to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have joined others in expressing concern that South

Africa's nuclear facilities could be used to develop a nuclear explosives capability. The U.S. Nonproliferation Act of 1978 provides, as a minimum condition for the licensing of nuclear exports to any country after March 1980, that it have all its nuclear activities under international safeguards. As a practical matter, however, the United States ceased exports of nuclear materials or equipment to South Africa 4 years ago.

My government calls on South Africa and all other countries which are not parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty, to adhere to that treaty and to act promptly to place all their peaceful nuclear activities under international safeguards.

U.S. Approach

In recent years the U.S. Government has taken a number of actions to underscore our opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa. Following the death of Steve Biko, the United States supported a mandatory arms embargo in the Security Council. In addition, the United States has unilaterally imposed a ban on all exports of whatever nature to the South Africa military and police.

On October 4, 1979, speaking before ambassadors and ministers comprising the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in New York, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance reaffirmed that unless a system of government evolve there in which all South Africans can participate equitably, our relations with South Africa would inevitably deteriorate.

The United States opposes the racially motivated bannings and detentions in South Africa. We oppose the pass laws and other such forms of social discrimination. We oppose the policy of separate development under which black South Africans are systematically being denied citizenship in their own country and instead are being documented as nationals of so-called independent homelands. We oppose the current lack of equal opportunity for a races regarding employment, job promotion, and education. We oppose the lack of opportunity for full political participation by all the citizens of South Africa, regardless of race or color.

We do note, however, that there have been some signs of a more flexible attitude on the part of white South Africans over the last year and that the present South African Government has taken steps to eliminate some aspects of discrimination in the economic area. These have included steps to eliminat

most categories of legal job reservations, recognize trade union rights for blacks, and lift some restrictions on the operations of black businesses.

Unfortunately, most of these steps have been hedged with qualifications that could seriously dilute their impact. It is too soon to say that they have, in fact, led to real, specific changes, and to reiterate our position that any changes that leave the basic framework of apartheid intact are by definition inadequate. Apartheid is also based on practices as well as laws—practices frequently sanctioned by the South African Government.

Economic Focus

The presence of U.S. corporations in South Africa has become an important ethical issue in the United States and the focus of the more general debate on U.S. policy toward South Africa. Our degree of economic involvement represents potential leverage for social and ethical change. Since 1973, we have urged U.S. firms operating in South Africa to institute, maintain, and extend enlightened employment practices toward their black employees, including improvements in wages, working conditions, fringe benefits, and opportunities for advancement, as well as dealing with legitimate representatives of black workers, including black unions.

Students on many U.S. campuses have focused their efforts on college and university investments in U.S. corporations doing business with South Africa. Many institutions have been under pressure to divest themselves of stock of companies doing business there, or in, South Africa, and about a dozen have done so. At this time, many college and university boards are urging corporations in which they own stock to work for social change in South Africa. For now, we believe the latter initiative is a valid means to confront the apartheid system realistically, but we are monitoring closely the progress of such initiatives. If their effects prove neither significant nor rapid enough to satisfy our commitment to end apartheid, we will consider other ways to bring about change.

The "Sullivan Principles"

One of the more successful of the initiatives to bring international pressure to bear on South Africa has been that undertaken in the United States by the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan. His action is launching a set of principles for fair

employment practices by U.S. companies doing business in South Africa and in subsequently established reporting and monitoring procedures has set the pace for corporate conduct and procedures in South Africa.

There are now 135 U.S. companies which have signed the "Sullivan principles." These companies represent 75% of the work forces on the payrolls of U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa. The Sullivan initiative springs from the private corporate world. It brings together U.S. companies voluntarily to pursue a common objective based, realistically, on their growing awareness that an investment in an apartheid environment is not in their interest.

Following the lead of the Sullivan principles, 13 similar codes of conduct have emerged from other nations with corporations doing business with South Africa. Also, this year, 10 of the largest South African corporations, employing more than one-half million black workers in mining and other labor intensive areas, have agreed to implement the principles.

The third report on the progress of U.S. companies doing business in South Africa in implementing the Sullivan principles was issued October 18. While the report indicated that the principles had become an important force for social change in South Africa, it is clear that the companies should not be satisfied with the current progress and need to push their effort significantly further.

Commitment to Combat Apartheid

There are many groups in the United States today calling for stronger measures to combat apartheid in South Africa—in the private sector, in churches, on university campuses, and in Congress. And indeed, my government's objective remains fundamental, not peripheral or token change. In this context we recognize, as do their sponsors, that the existing principles and procedures concerning corporate conduct in South Africa need to be applied so as to insure their relevance to this objective.

They should address additional significant problems of labor and social conditions in South Africa, including, for example, migratory labor, minimum wage, and influx control. They should examine the continuing role of banks

and lending institutions. This would require effective monitoring systems for activities of all foreign firms. In this regard, it is important that fair employment principles and procedures be supported by all those who trade with and invest in South Africa.

While we believe that corporate principles for fair employment practices in South Africa can have a cumulative effect on South African labor policies and practices, we also recognize that they can affect the structure of the basic apartheid system itself only in combination with an unrelenting commitment from the world community that apartheid must end. And apartheid will end only when the people and the South African Government, motivated both from within and without, accept the inevitability of change. In the final analysis, it is those persons in influential positions in South Africa, particularly those who now dominate its economic life, who must catalyze and promote the fundamental changes for which the majority of the population yearns—and to which my government remains firmly committed.

¹USUN press release 115. ■

U.S. Contributions to the UNHCR

by Esther Coopersmith

Statement in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly on November 14 and in the ad hoc Committee for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to the 1980 Programme of the UNHCR on November 16, 1979. Ms. Coopersmith is U.S. Representative to the 34th U.N. General Assembly.

NOV. 14, 1979¹

Ever since the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1951, it has had to deal with the humanitarian problem of displaced peoples throughout the world. During and immediately following the Second World War, we witnessed the flood of refugees from war-torn Europe. The High Commissioner then faced the challenge of finding asylum for these tens of thousands of homeless people. It would be nice to say that the problem has been solved. But, as we meet here today, we find that once again the world confronts a refugee problem of monumental proportion.

We have all pondered the staggering figures on refugees, but numbers alone do not reveal the extent of human suffering which these people are experiencing. Our eyes have been focused on the human tragedy in Indochina. First, there were the boat people from Vietnam, and at this very moment, it is the famine-stricken people of Kampuchea who are fleeing across the border into Thailand.

We have all been deeply moved and saddened by the human suffering that engulfs these people. Finding the means to help them poses a difficult task for the High Commissioner and the international community.

Having heard the report of the High Commissioner, I know I speak the sentiments of all countries in acknowledging his heroic response and the extraordinary work of his colleagues. We know he wants to do more, and we know that more has to be done.

May I take this opportunity to express my government's appreciation and gratitude to the Government and people of Thailand for their compassionate and generous response to the

refugees who have streamed across their border seeking not only sanctuary but the most basic needs of staying alive.

U.S. Support to Kampuchea

Reflecting the personal concern of our President and the American people, Mrs. Rosalyn Carter visited the areas in Thailand where thousands of Kampuchean refugees are seeking shelter in overcrowded, unsanitary, and humiliating conditions. She found this experience to be emotionally wrenching, and one which she will never forget. We had hoped Mrs. Carter could have come to New York to address Committee III, but unfortunately circumstances did not allow her to do so. She has met with High Commissioner [Poul] Hartling and discussed her observations with Secretary General Waldheim. She will continue to give support and encouragement to the voluntary groups in our country which have already demonstrated their profound concern and which have been involved in this crisis since its very beginning.

My government has already authorized the High Commissioner to make immediate use of \$4 million for Kampuchean refugees from our contribution to the UNHCR. We will immediately transport mobile equipment to provide water to refugee holding camps as well as send communication equipment in order to improve the coordination between the refugee camps and the support agencies in Bangkok. Moreover, the President has directed the Peace Corps to accelerate its support of the UNHCR programs.

African Refugees

While we acknowledge the tragic circumstances of the people of Kampuchea and the continuing plight of those fleeing Vietnam and Laos, we must not—we cannot—allow these tragedies to divert our attention from Africa where most of the world's refugees are now concentrated. Approximately 4 million people have been uprooted in that continent, and the High Commissioner in his report, as well as by his attendance at the Arusha conference last May, has made it clear that his office gives the highest priority to the African refugee problems. We must support the High Commissioner in this

commitment. The United States will certainly do so. The United States has set for itself a goal of providing one-third of the costs of the High Commissioner's general program requirement in Africa as an expression of its concern.

International Contributions

The UNHCR's role is essential to the well-being of the millions of refugees throughout the world. That role need to be enhanced and additional resource made available in order for the High Commissioner to meet this immense problem which affects us all. We must do more than merely provide substantial camps in which refugees are bare able to eke out an existence. For over the long term, refugees must be helped to regain productive and self-sufficient lives as quickly as possible.

An undue burden of coping with problems caused by the influx of refugees has fallen to developing countries and it is these countries which will require additional resources if the refugee programs of the High Commissioner are to succeed. But the High Commissioner cannot accomplish a task of such magnitude alone. Therefore, we call upon the specialized agencies of the United Nations to give high priority to assisting those developing countries with large numbers of refugees.

My government believes that the work of the High Commissioner is the responsibility of all nations. As Ambassador [Deputy Permanent Representative, Per] Aasen of Norway noted yesterday only 87 countries have contributed to the general program for 1978. We do hope all countries will contribute and get involved with the work of the High Commissioner.

Conclusion

This is a most critical period for the UNHCR. The tasks before it are unprecedented, and its response must transcend traditional approaches to the problem. History shall look to these days and those immediately ahead to judge the wisdom, the imagination, at the innovation we apply to the refugee crises of today.

For our part, let me state clearly that my government—and in fact all the American people—will continue to respond to this humanitarian problem. Our commitment, which we hope is shared by all present in this room, is

and in the preamble of the U.N. Charter—"... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person. . . ."

OV. 16, 1979¹

S. Pledge

On behalf of the U.S. Government, I am pleased to announce our intention to pledge \$48,350,000 as an initial contribution to the UNHCR 1980 general program. A pledge letter in that amount will be forwarded to you pending final action on our 1980 appropriation which is now pending in Congress.

We plan to provide the \$48,350,000 pledge for the following purposes:

- \$30 million, to the ongoing UNHCR program for the care and maintenance of Indochinese refugees the first 9 months of 1980;
- \$16.9 million as a contribution toward the UNHCR's general program for African refugees; and
- \$1,450,000 toward UNHCR's general program requirements in other areas.

With regard to UNHCR's special operations, we are pleased to announce an increase of the U.S. contribution to the High Commissioner's program of support for Khmer refugees in Thailand to a total of \$15 million. With this pledge, U.S. commitments in support of the High Commissioner's program needs for the care and maintenance of refugees in countries of first asylum total \$63,350,000.

We have the capability to increase support of UNHCR programs in 1980 as further needs and special programs are identified. The United States plans to contribute up to one-third of the High Commissioner's general program needs in Africa, 30% of the program in Southeast Asia, and an appropriate share in meeting other UNHCR program needs, taking into account, as in the past, the level of support by other member governments. We are encouraged by the response other governments have made this year to some of the most urgent program needs and are confident that they will continue to assist us in providing strong support to the overall program in 1980.

Special Programs

I would like to mention two special programs which the UNHCR has in process. The first concern is refugee pro-

cessing centers in Indonesia and the Philippines. Both these governments, to their great credit, have now reached agreement with the High Commissioner to construct processing centers to which refugees, now in countries of first asylum, can go after they have been accepted for resettlement and while they await movement to their destinations. We plan to support 30% of the cost of these centers and have already provided adequate funds for initiation of construction.

The second program I would like to mention is the idea, still in its developmental stage, of a fund to promote durable solutions for refugees. The October meeting of the UNHCR's executive committee named a working group to develop this concept further. We do not see this fund as a large new development bank but as a focus for devising and planning—in collaboration with development banks and specialized agencies—projects which will be useful to governments and people who are taking the important and humanitarian step of absorbing or, in some cases, reabsorbing refugees into their societies and economies. We sincerely hope such a concept can be developed and, if it is, will support it fully so that the fund will have a capability of not only devising appropriate projects but assisting the movement and reception of refugees going to new locations.

These two new programs can, in our view, give the UNHCR substantially added capabilities in providing protection, care, and resettlement of the growing numbers of refugees. We are prepared to give strong support for these programs and the overall activities of the UNHCR.

¹USUN Press release 120.

²USUN Press release 123 of Nov. 19, 1979. ■

Secretariat Formed for Women's Conference

The U.S. Department of State, expressing its commitment to the U.N. Decade for Women, established the U.S. Secretariat for the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women, 1980 on November 26, 1979. Earlier in the year, the Department inaugurated U.S. preparatory efforts for the world conference with a day-long meeting on September 12 attended by more than 800 American women. The early establishment of the U.S. Secretariat, a full 7 months before the world conference, will enable in-depth U.S. preparation for the middecade reappraisal.

The U.S. Secretariat will direct and coordinate U.S. preparations for the world conference which will be held in Copenhagen, Denmark, July 14–30, 1980. The conference has two major purposes.

First, conferees will assess worldwide progress toward achieving the goals outlined in the resolutions adopted at the 1975 International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City, including the World Plan of Action.

Second, participants will formulate specific action-oriented programs for regional development in the second half of the U.N. Decade for Women, 1980–1985.

The conference will focus on three subthemes of education, health, and employment, as well as other substantive topics including the effects of apartheid on women and the special plight of women as refugees.

The U.S. Secretariat will work in conjunction with various government agencies and departments in the preparation of U.S. position papers. The Secretariat, through extensive public outreach, will seek to obtain opinions and suggestions from American women on all aspects of the Copenhagen conference.

Vivian Lowery Derryck is the director of the U.S. Secretariat. Maureen Whalen is the deputy director.

Correspondence for the Secretariat may be addressed to: U.S. Secretariat for the World Conference on the UN Decade for Women, 1980, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Press release 9 of Jan. 15, 1980. ■

New and Renewable Energy Sources—1981 Conference

by Harry M. Montgomery, Jr.

Statement in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the U.N. General Assembly on November 21, 1979. Mr. Montgomery is the U.S. Representative on that committee.¹

The global energy problem affects all of us. Effective and cooperative actions by all nations—producer and consumer, developed and developing—are required to insure a smooth and orderly transition from primary reliance on oil and gas to increased use of other forms of energy to meet the world's needs. The accelerated development and implementation of new and renewable forms of energy can make an important contribution to this process.

The U.S. Government attaches great significance to the Conference on New and Renewable Energy that will be held in 1981. Secretary of State Vance emphasized, at both the 33d and 34th sessions of the U.N. General Assembly, our strong support for this conference. The Senate, in its resolution of April 10, 1979, reaffirmed the high priority my country accords to this meeting. We welcome the proposal that it should be held in Nairobi. This is especially fitting, given the particular importance to developing countries of the issues to be dealt with by the conference.

The United States is already expanding its programs to develop these new energy technologies with a view both to our needs and to those of developing countries.

Energy Programs

Our Department of Energy (DOE) already has a substantial program to develop and apply various new and renewable technologies. For our fiscal year 1980, its budget includes almost \$800 million in direct funding. Now, responding to President Carter's program to assure our nation's energy needs, the Congress is considering a much enlarged program for development of alternate sources of energy—notably synthetic fuels and solar energy—which will make available tested technologies benefiting the world community.

Our Agency for International Development (AID), which provides bilat-

eral assistance to developing countries, has established programs which will provide:

- Training and support for national energy institutions;
- Analysis of developing countries' energy needs, uses, and resources; and
- Support for experimental programs and projects to determine the applicability of selected new and renewable energy technologies.

Also, the DOE manages a program of comprehensive energy assessments in collaboration with developing countries and is involved in other cooperative energy activities in 11 developing countries.

Conference Objectives

Multilateral efforts also will be required to meet these global needs. We believe the U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Energy can accomplish a number of valuable objectives.

- First of all, it will demonstrate, concretely, the mutual interest of the developed and developing countries in cooperating in the development of new sources and improved methods of using energy.

- In recognition of the seriousness of the global energy situation and the need to conserve conventional fuels, the conference will highlight the urgency of bringing alternatives to oil and natural gas into use as rapidly as possible.

- The conference can review the state-of-the-art of various technologies, produce an inventory of research in progress and planning, highlight areas in which further research is needed, evaluate the demonstration projects, and assess the economic viability of available technologies.

- It can commit all developed and developing countries to making alternative energy development a priority field of cooperation and investment, with special attention to meeting the needs of developing countries in the context of accelerating their overall development.

- The conference can seek to agree on a realistic goal for the global use of new and renewable sources by the year 2000 and evaluate the role that such sources can play in rural, industrial, and other applications.

• Finally, it could draw up a plan of action for intensified and coordinated efforts at the national, regional, and international levels.

Conference Preparations

A successful conference requires prompt and effective preparations. We must move with despatch to insure that the conference takes place in August 1981—as proposed in the draft resolution—only 20 months from now. Its subject matter is too important to permit the date to slip. And if the conference is to be successful, it will require major efforts in the intervening period by the Secretariat, by the various agencies of the U.N. system, and by member states.

We are pleased that the first meetings of the technical panels are underway, with much credit due to the intensive work of the Center on Natural Resources, Energy, and Transportation. We agree with others that the ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council Committee on Natural Resources] should be designated as the conference preparatory committee. To perform this role, it would, of course, have to be open to universal membership.

Many U.N. agencies and other multilateral organizations are currently engaged in relevant energy activities. We agree with the distinguished Secretary General [Mohamed Habib Gherat] of the conference that greater coordination will serve the interest of all. The energy conference coordinating committee and task force, created by the Director General [Kenneth Dadzie], at steps in the right direction. In addition strengthened interagency machinery, including further analysis by the Committee for Program Coordination of the Energy Programs of the U.N. system would be useful.

We regret that the conference budget submission for 1980-81 has not been prepared in time for careful review before this debate. We will review this document carefully.

We have much work ahead to produce the type of conference that will meet the expectations of all of us and thus contribute to solving the global energy problem. The United States will participate actively and constructively in the conference and in its preparations. We will do our part to make it a success.

¹USUN press release 127. ■

Y 1981 Foreign Assistance Program

John A. Bushnell

*Statement before the Subcommittee Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 1980. Mr. Bushnell is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.*¹

The past year has been one of substantial change in Latin America. We welcome most of the changes. We challenged ourselves to adjust our assistance programs, both economic and security, to the changes in the area.

Some changes have been traumatic—caused great suffering, as in Argentina and the process even now going on in El Salvador. Others have been less drastic although not less painful, as in the return to democracy in Ecuador, the evolution of democracy in the Dominican Republic and St. Lucia through peaceful change rather than revolution, and the steady movement of Peru toward free and open elections. The Andean Pact gained new momentum and moved toward warmer relations with us. Significant improvements in human rights were made in many countries. The island states in the Caribbean continued to cut their colonies and are beginning to stand on their own feet—a few of them not too long.

The rise in oil prices has been beneficial to several hemisphere countries; to most, particularly the smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean, it has been a severe blow. Some of these changes require new perspectives and a U.S. response suited to the new reality.

MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

As you are aware, the absolute amount of military and bilateral development assistance for Latin America as a whole declined over the decade of the 1970s. A major thrust of our economic assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean is now multilateral. And we have moved away from close relationships with countries where the military and the reins of power and have made progress toward a return to democratic government.

Some of the dimensions of our changed role are less immediately evident. First, bilateral and multilateral

assistance are not perfect substitutes one for the other. Secondly, the declines in our assistance have come about for several reasons, among them budgetary constraints, competing demands for limited resources, and a change in worldwide assistance policy to concentrate on the poorest countries.

These changes do not, however, signal any diminution in the importance of our relationship with Latin America. We have over 330 million neighbors south of our border, many of whom are desperately poor. The combined economies of the entire region produced some \$460 billion in gross national product in 1978. In the same year, we produced over \$2 trillion worth. It is easy to see why the countries of Latin America expect us to provide significant help in their development, either through direct assistance or by special consideration in trade matters. For them, the test of our interest is our willingness to help with their most pressing problems—economic development and security.

U.S. Interests

Our own interests in the countries of Latin America are strong. They are our closest neighbors. They are also important trading partners and friends which share many of our views about peace and stability in the world. They voted unanimously in the OAS (Organization of American States) to condemn the taking of hostages in Iran, and 25 countries in the region voted for the resolution condemning Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Increasingly, we need the cooperation of our southern neighbors to solve some of our own problems—such as drugs, illegal migration, and access to energy and raw materials.

Finally, we have reason for concern because their economies are not yet robust enough to provide a decent livelihood—and sometimes even sustenance—to all their people. A number of countries are in a crucial state of political change. We have a large stake in this change process. If these transitions preserve democracy, national independence, and pluralism—principles we believe are necessary for the development of a political system truly responsive to the needs of the people—the outcome will be governments that we can work with smoothly

and effectively on the whole range of mutual problems.

Given the magnitude and importance of our interests in the region, the programs we are proposing are modest. Our total request for development assistance, security assistance, and PL 480 programs totals \$450 million. This is but a fraction of our worldwide total of nearly \$8 billion. Our development assistance in 1981 would be equal to only one-half of 1% of the combined output of the receiving countries. More than half of our proposed program for Latin America and the Caribbean—\$275 million, of which only \$111 million is in the form of grants—is for development assistance through AID (Agency for International Development). Security assistance totals \$91 million: \$63 million for military sales credits and training—less than 2% of our worldwide military programs—and \$28 million for economic support, compared with \$2 billion for other areas.

Latin America is an area with countries at various levels of development. Let me differentiate this economic geography. The countries which receive our development assistance through AID have less than 20% of the region's population. They produce only 11% of its output. In South America, the four countries with which we have development assistance programs make up only 14% of the population of the continent and produce barely 7% of continental gross national product.

The point to underline here is that the largest countries with the largest populations and the largest economies—Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and to a lesser degree Chile and Colombia—look to the international financial institutions for development assistance and to the private sector for the bulk of their financing needs. It is only through the international financial institutions and our private sector that we help in their special development needs. There are still enormous undeveloped areas in these countries with large numbers of very poor and even hungry people. But the immense financing needs of these countries must be satisfied in the private financial markets. A single syndicated loan in Colombia—for \$600 million, or Brazil, for \$1.5 billion—exceeds international financial institutions' lending in that country by many times and dwarfs our entire assistance program for the hemisphere.

These relatively more developed countries play an ever growing role in the affairs of the region and in world affairs. Moreover, the AID reflows—principal and interest—from these countries where we no longer have assistance programs will amount to \$130 million in FY 1981. This is more than enough to pay the \$111 million in grant assistance we intend to provide to their smaller neighbors. Furthermore, a large share of their imports come from the United States, and we are an immensely important market for them. They look to us to be responsive to their needs in keeping our markets accessible to their goods and thus permit a reasonable rate of growth for their economies. For every dollar they earn in our market, they spend a dollar here. Thus, growing trade increases efficiency and well-being in both countries.

Let me turn now to the areas and countries where we still do have programs.

South America

The economies of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru—plus Paraguay and Colombia where our economic aid is small—are beginning to gain some economic strength which enables them to utilize to varying degrees the private financial markets. Their long-term outlook is generally positive; we expect their economic policies will enhance their development and strengthen their economies while addressing the very real problems they still face. The development assistance programs we have worked out with them are carefully crafted to reach and benefit the poor and to assist in institution building. The security assistance programs we are asking you to approve for these important South American countries are largely symbolic, but they will strengthen existing bonds of friendship. It would be seriously misleading to suggest that such small programs will enable us to exercise significant influence on the direction or nature of Latin American military expenditures or military planning.

Some disbursements continue from earlier programs in countries where we have withdrawn our development and military assistance, either by request or because of problems with the current governments. There are, for example, still \$7.8 million in AID loans to be disbursed in Colombia and \$4.5 million for Chile, although no new loans have been signed since 1976. But these older programs are coming to an end; they do not reflect our current priorities.

In sum, the focus of our commit-

ment in South America today is to reach the poor and build institutions through training, planning assistance, and expert advice and to remain in touch with their military establishments. These purposes are narrow and the size of our programs small compared to each country's output, as is appropriate under the changed circumstances in South America.

Central America and the Caribbean

The situations we face today are radically different. President Carter stated to the Congress last November in his request for a major supplemental appropriation that:

Many of our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean are in crises marked by economic problems, terrorism, and popular frustration. The resolution of these problems in ways that will preserve the independence and security of these countries, while expanding democracy and supporting human rights, is very much in the interest of the United States.

The perception of deepening crisis and the assessment that we have a major interest in helping is, if anything, stronger today than it was 3 months ago. The Administration is giving urgent attention to Central America and the Caribbean and is seeking to use all the resources at our disposal to the maximum. But it is clear that the problems of the area are long term and that resources that might have been adequate in other circumstances are inadequate today.

In the Caribbean, the 12 small island states—of which nine have become independent since 1960—face enormous problems with very limited resources. Their economies cannot provide adequate growth and improve the livelihoods of their people under the impact of oil price rises and other external shocks. Our development assistance, while only 1% of their combined GNPs, can have a noticeable impact in a few important sectors. In addition, the rapid reduction in the British role in the Caribbean requires us to open the door to cooperative security relationships with them. Our security assistance proposals, principally for military training, are modest. But they can have a significant impact in providing security for development. To do otherwise is to leave the field to Cuba, which is aggressively expanding its influence with its smaller Caribbean neighbors.

We place considerable emphasis on regional programs in the Caribbean because we believe regional cooperation is the best and quickest way to deal with

their problems. We are concerned that in the absence of efficient regional institutions, the sense of futility of the poor and unemployed spawned by economic stagnation could turn into a breeding ground for radicalism. We must be prompt to respond to the need to grow and develop into healthy, independent, and pluralistic societies.

In Central America, even more fundamental changes are taking place. Economic distortions—the foremost of which has been an exaggerated concentration of wealth and political power too few hands—have bred inequities that have festered over a long period. Adverse international economic conditions now severely aggravate these endemic tensions. We are concerned that without resolution of the severest of the economic problems, the processes change could in some cases produce traumas and slip into anarchy.

The assistance we plan to reprogram for Central America in 1980, though we seek in the supplemental, and the appropriations we seek for 1981 are in part a response to a lessening of repression. But increased assistance is needed to forestall the possibility that over the longer term events will lead governments unrepresentative of the broad majority of the population and controlled by well-trained and disciplined groups unashamedly hostile to the United States. Whether in the end these groups are of the right or the left will matter little to the peoples whose aspirations they would frustrate.

With regard to security assistance it is important that we act now to improve the capability of moderate governments to defend themselves and sustain evolutionary and peaceful progress. Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras will receive the largest increases in FMS [foreign military sales] credits and IMET [international military education and training]—albeit not large absolute terms.

HUMAN RIGHTS

As you know, there are several important countries where we have reduced or stopped completely our support because of their performance in human rights. But the tide has turned.

Last year was one of substantial progress on both personal and political rights in Latin America. There was a marked overall decline in cases of violations of the integrity of the person, even in countries where abuses have been most serious. Fewer disappearances occurred in Argentina. Cases of

longed arbitrary detention were won in Chile. The Uruguayan armed forces adopted apparently effective internal measures to stop the use of torture. Cuba released about 3,900 political prisoners.

The institutionalization of human rights in the inter-American system continued apace with the establishment of the Human Rights Court and a landmark visit to Argentina by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. These improvements were given by a series of changes within Latin America itself although influenced by U.S. policies.

The regionwide trend from military to civilian governments enhanced respect for human rights. In 1979 Ecuador and Bolivia installed civilian governments; Peru elected an assembly which adopted a new Constitution; Brazil maintained a steady course of democratization; and the freely elected government in the Dominican Republic consolidated its position.

Indigenous human rights organizations grew in strength and boldness, challenging government policies in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Nicaragua.

Acrimonious OAS debates on human rights gave way to general agreement on principles and institutions. The ninth General Assembly of the OAS approved resolutions urging reforms in Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile and emphasized the need to deal with the problem of disappearances. The Inter-American Human Rights Court came into being under the San Jose Pact, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission enhanced its role.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Let me now address more specifically the proposed development assistance program for Latin America. The Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator will discuss the program with you in greater detail in a few days.

The broad strategy is, of course, to maintain the momentum for continued economic development. We seek to maintain economic growth while reaping the benefits of growth more equitably. U.S. bilateral economic and technical cooperation in Latin America is not currently designed primarily as a source transfer program. Our primary roles are to transfer ideas and technical knowledge to build indigenous capacity—primarily through creating and strengthening institutions and to deal with newer global problems.

In accordance with congressional directives, we concentrate our program on addressing the basic human needs of the poorest sectors in the recipient countries. Often this means rural health and agriculture programs. But we also face the growing global problems which increasingly impact on us all—environmental pollution, energy development and conservation, and population growth. These are a necessary complement to a basic human needs strategy.

Turning to our specific requests, the total development and economic support assistance of \$303 million requested for the region is modest. The poorest countries—Haiti, Honduras, Bolivia, Guyana, and El Salvador, with per capita incomes of less than \$625—would receive \$80 million, including \$32 million of our grant assistance. Where we have programs in the so-called middle-income Latin countries, our focus is on the poorest people in these countries. As you are well aware, the poor bear the burden that lagging growth and economic stagnation produce. Even in the best of times, the economies of these countries are not yet robust enough to employ fully their human resources.

Assistance to Nicaragua will remain large in FY 1981, but a significant shift is planned in the type of assistance. For FY 1980, in our supplemental request, we have asked for \$75 million of quick disbursing economic support funds. Fast disbursing support funds are needed quickly to help overcome the crises resulting from exhausted foreign exchange resources, damaged or destroyed inventories, late or lost agricultural plantings, and lack of credit. Development assistance levels for FY 1980 are minimal; for until the immediate problems are resolved, few new development projects can be put in place.

We are continuing with several development projects for which funds were committed in FY 1978 and earlier years. By FY 1981 we expect the worst of the economic crises will be over, and it will be time to begin new development assistance projects. Thus, Nicaragua again becomes a major recipient of AID development assistance in FY 1981. However, there will still be short-term problems in the balance of payments which will require help. Our economic support fund request for \$25 million is intended to address both the balance-of-payments problem and the needs of the private sector for credit. By FY 1982, we expect to be able to re-

turn to a normal program of development assistance without economic support funding.

To complement official aid efforts and help meet the challenge we face in Latin America and the Caribbean, we are working with a number of voluntary organizations, such as the American Institute for Free Labor Development. This organization can respond quickly and flexibly to new situations. The labor movements it reinforces are generally a key element of pluralistic democracy and an important political as well as economic force. We want to help and encourage them to do more and have requested \$8 million for FY 1981. Because of constraints and inflexibilities inherent in any government-to-government program, there is much that private organizations can do that the United States cannot.

Respect for human rights is central to our policy in Latin America. Our proposed increased assistance levels in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru are linked to their present progress on human rights. A modest increase in our level of assistance would acknowledge the demonstrated support and respect for human rights in these countries where we have made clear our strong support of the return to the democratic process. Moreover, the fledgling democratic governments need our support to help relieve the strong pressures for social development which the return to democracy promises, but which the economies of these countries are unable to support adequately.

We have tried to maintain the momentum of assistance to regional programs. We are convinced that regional and subregional cooperation and interdependence can be the key to accelerating development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Regional cooperation not only can achieve economies of scale but helps tear away the sometimes fierce suspicions and fear which isolation can cultivate.

The Latins themselves are coming to realize the benefits that can accrue from working in tandem rather than competitively or defensively. We have urged the development of institutions which foster these linkages, and we are pleased to see the growing strength of the concept of regional cooperation on a wide variety of issues.

We hope to have \$34 million for the Caribbean regional program. Nowhere is the building of regional institutions and cooperation more important than in the ministates of the Caribbean. Our program for Central America at \$3.7

million and the Andean region—only slightly less—are very modest indeed but, nevertheless, are important as an incentive to the development of regional projects.

Let me conclude my comments on economic assistance by noting how important it is for us to have a means to respond quickly to unexpected political changes, such as in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The contingency economic support fund which the President has requested is just such an instrument which embodies primarily through its disbursement characteristics the flexibility we need to meet situations of rapid change. The size of the worldwide fund is small considering that it will probably have to be spread among several countries. But such funding can be made invaluable as visible demonstration of our support in countries where the changing situation is such that quick and effective economic support from the United States is critical to achieving outcomes in our national interests.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Our request for FMS and IMET of \$63.7 million is the largest we have sought for Latin America in 3 years. Although that represents a 65% increase over the amount originally requested for Latin America in the 1980 budget, it is close to the average of the programs Congress approved for 1977 and 1978. It is still substantially below the Latin American programs of earlier years. Moreover, since most of the program is for FMS credits, which require appropriations for only 10% of the total amount, the actual request for appropriations is small—only \$14.6 million.

This increased request does not reflect a general increase in assistance to the region. On the contrary, the programs we are asking that you approve for important South American countries are shrinking to levels that are largely symbolic. In 1979, 1980, and 1981 we will offer FMS loans of between \$3 and \$6 million to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, and between \$10 and \$12 million to Colombia. Such loans to Peru, for example, represent less than one-half of 1% of its total military budget.

A squadron of 18 F-5E fighters—the aircraft we have made available to major Latin American countries in lieu of our more advanced planes—costs approximately \$75 million, exclusive of spare parts and training. A squadron of Mirages or Soviet SU-22s costs substantially more, but credit from the

U.S.S.R. or France is often available with concessional interest rates and repayment periods.

Obviously, a U.S. loan of \$4 million, offered not on concessional terms but at 11.4% interest, with 5-8 years to repay, neither provides major assistance to friendly governments nor offers any alternative to major purchases from suppliers who offer concessional credit.

Our FMS sales, both cash and credit, to all Latin America have declined from a high of \$212 million in 1974 to \$81 million in 1978 and \$33.2 million in 1979. FMS sales to South America, excluding the two countries where sales are prohibited by law, dropped from \$120 million in 1974 to \$30 million in 1979. That represents less than 3% of total South American arms purchases from outside the area.

There are, of course, a number of reasons for this decline. In a few cases, we have denied the sale of major weapons systems in accordance with our policies on conventional arms restraint. We have also deliberately curtailed our sales to some countries where major human rights violations have occurred. In particular, we have avoided a close military relationship with countries where the military has overthrown civilian regimes and is making little or no progress toward a return to democratic government. Pursuant to that policy, we terminated all military and most economic assistance to Bolivia last year when a military officer overthrew the elected President of that country.

Fortunately, that intervention was quickly terminated by the people and the armed forces of Bolivia themselves, and we were able to resume assistance. Where military governments have made firm plans for elections and have prepared to return their countries to civilian control, where human rights situations have shown decided improvement, we have sought to respond by modest increases in our security assistance.

I began by noting that the Administration is seeking increased security assistance in FY 1981 in Latin America. Given the essential stability of our South American programs, it will be evident to you that most of the increase is being sought for Central America and the Caribbean. In his message to the Congress last November on the supplemental request, President Carter said that we would be reprogramming \$5 to \$10 million in FMS credits and IMET funds for the Caribbean and similar amounts for such programs in Central America.

We are considering reallocating about \$14 million in FMS credits and \$500,000 in IMET to the Central American and Caribbean countries, within the worldwide levels which we hope will be approved by the conference committee on the FY 1980 appropriation bill. As you know, those levels are austere. FMS credits for the rest of Latin America in 1980 are being cut to \$9.5 million below the President's request in order to fund, in part, the necessary increases in the Caribbean and Central America. IMET funds for the rest of Latin America are being cut by more than 20%.

It is time now to establish these new programs in the regular annual budget process, responding to the new and critical circumstances in our southern neighbors. Permit me to touch briefly on each of the countries where we are proposing new or substantially increased security assistance in 1980 and 1981.

The Caribbean

Our largest program in the Caribbean has traditionally been in the Dominican Republic. In the past, however, it has averaged only a half million dollars a year in FMS credits and a similar amount in IMET. Yet the Dominican Republic has the fifth largest population and the fifth largest military for among all Latin American FMS recipients. Its population and armed force are almost the same size as those of Bolivia, which is receiving \$4 to \$6 million a year in FMS credits. Moreover, now has a lengthening record of free elections, civilian government, and respect for human rights. Its military equipment suffered extensive damage from hurricanes last year. We are considering \$3.8 million in FMS credits in FY 1980 and are requesting \$3 million in 1981.

We began a small IMET program in Barbados in 1979, continued it in 1980, and propose a modest \$84,000 in 1981. Training has so far been limited to the members of Barbados' new coast guard, but the government is interested in expanding training to the Barbados regiment. In response to a request from Barbados, President Carter determined the country to be FM eligible last June, and we are preparing to offer a \$1 million credit in FY 1980 purchase a small patrol plane and other equipment for the coast guard.

We are requesting authority for \$5 million FMS program in 1981 to finance the purchase of communication and navigational equipment for the

ist guard and perhaps transport and repair equipment for the Barbados regiment. These expenditures will strengthen the security not of Barbados but of the entire eastern Caribbean area.

We are initiating very small—000—IMET programs in FY 1980 in three other eastern Caribbean territories—St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica—and we propose to continue to do so at approximately the same level in 1981. All three countries have discontinued cooperation with Barbados and with other in coastal and maritime patrols, and our training would be in this area.

We also propose to offer IMET of up to \$25,000 each to Guyana and Suriname. Their defense relationship, until recently, began largely with the United Kingdom. We believe it is important to open the door to a cooperative relationship with the United Kingdom in military training. We do not see it as the primary alternative to the United Kingdom to be Cuba.

Central America

As part, the assistance we are reprogramming for Central America in 1980 and the appropriations we seek for 1981 reflect improvements in the Central American human rights situation. We continued assistance to Nicaragua in 1980. The bitter and bloody civil war in that country has since ended; a government with evident wide popular support has been established; and the human rights situation, although still bleak, has improved greatly.

A small amount of IMET funding, \$100,000, was used by the new government in FY 1979, and small FMS cash advances have been made. We are considering \$3 million in FMS credits and up to \$250,000 in IMET for Nicaragua in 1980.

El Salvador. Assistance was terminated at the request of the military government in 1977 because of its concern over our human rights reports. The overthrow of that government by a civilian-military junta which was clearly more representative, committed to democratic government, and determined to improve respect for human rights was followed by urgent requests for nonlethal equipment for the armed forces and training in its use.

The junta has now been reconstituted with the participation of the Christian Democrats. That government has not yet completed its evaluation of security assistance requirements. In order to be in position to respond

rapidly to possible requests, we have tentatively allocated \$4.5 million in FMS credits and \$350,000 in IMET for El Salvador in 1980.

Honduras. Preparations continue for national elections in April, and there is every indication that there, as in Peru, the military junta will peacefully turn over power to an elected civilian president. In response to the Honduran Government's growing concerns over its ability to defend its territory against covert penetration and agitation, we are considering \$3 million in FMS credits and about \$350,000 in IMET in 1980.

In FY 1981, we are seeking \$5 million in credits, \$500,000 in training for each of these three countries, and a similar amount to assist Panama in preparing itself to participate in the joint defense of the canal. The emphasis in all four countries will be on nonlethal equipment. Transportation and communications are the priority needs: jeeps, heavy-duty support vehicles, radios, helicopters, aircraft engines and spare parts, transport aircraft, and coastal patrol boats.

International Military and Education Training Program

In discussing individual countries, I have referred several times to the international military education and training program. In dollars it appears to be a small program. However, in my opinion, it is our most important security assistance program in Latin America. As our role as a supplier of military hardware has declined, the program has become our most significant channel of contact with the military in many countries. For many Latin American military, these courses provide the only exposure they will ever receive to American strategic concepts and American values. It is our only instrument to encourage the development of professional military officers, proud of their technical military skills and conscious of their nation's external security requirements. Without strong professional training, too many become politically oriented officers, seeing their role as governing, instead of defending, their countries.

It is sometimes implied that an end to U.S. training and contact with Latin American military officers would somehow reduce the number of military governments in Latin America. That proposition seems to me highly questionable. Latin American officers are going to be trained, many of them in other countries, whether we offer

training or not. Those officers trained by our military, in our schools, are given a strong professional orientation and are exposed to our concept of the proper role of the military. I hope that as you examine the budget requests, you will give particular consideration to the value of these inexpensive but valuable training programs.

There is one issue related to IMET that I would like to bring to the committee's attention. We are, of course, always interested in encouraging aid recipients to move from grant aid to self-financed purchases of needed training. Several Latin American countries are now reaching a stage where they can afford to purchase some or even all their military training.

We would like them to continue to seek their external training requirements from the United States, to maintain the close relationship among the hemisphere's military forces which contributes to our mutual security. But the Latin American countries are well aware of the fact—and have repeatedly drawn our attention to it—that training in U.S. military schools purchased through FMS cash sales is extremely expensive. It is noticeably more expensive than the same training provided through the grant IMET program.

For example, to put an army officer through the command and general staff course at the School of the Americas in Panama costs a country \$3,318 when that sum is charged against his country's IMET allocation. If Venezuela or any of the other eligible Latin American countries should seek to pay cash for that same course, they would be charged \$38,598—11 times as much. The jet engine mechanic's course at the Panama schools costs only \$199 under the IMET program; if purchased under FMS, it would cost \$2,940.

Of course, one reason why the charge for IMET courses conducted in Panama is less than that for the same courses conducted in the United States or under FMS is that the fixed costs of the Panama schools are a separate line item, not charged to individual countries. But the schools are not filled to capacity. With no addition to fixed costs, additional personnel could be trained under FMS cash if the charges were set at a more reasonable level. I invite your attention to this problem because it would be desirable to make U.S. military training more competitive and more attractive to countries that pay for it with their own funds.

I might add that this comparison of costs which I have just made also illustrates the immense importance and

value of our U.S. military schools in Panama. We would have to appropriate substantially larger amounts of IMET if all of our Latin American training programs had to be conducted in the United States. The Panama Canal treaties provide for the continued operation of the School of the Americas until 1984. We will need to plan carefully, and to consult closely with you, about their future after that time.

In sum, the programs we are proposing in both economic and security assistance are modest. They are designed to respond with limited resources to the changing situation in Latin America. They will contribute significantly to improving the lot of the poor. They are useful instruments in support of U.S. policy objectives. In Central America our programs are of potentially great importance given the tremendous changes taking place there. I hope you will be able to support these lean program proposals fully.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977 at the 9th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.¹
Notification of approval: Japan, Jan. 28, 1980.

Collisions

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.

Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, Nov. 13, 1979.

Accessions deposited: China, Jan. 7, 1980; Peru, Jan. 9, 1980; Samoa, Oct. 23, 1979; Thailand, Aug. 6, 1979; Uruguay, Aug. 15, 1979.

Consular

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Ratification deposited: Norway, Feb. 13, 1980.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Ratification deposited: Norway, Feb. 13, 1980.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised, with two protocols annexed thereto. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Dec. 7, 1979.

Customs

Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978.²
Accession deposited: Romania, Feb. 14, 1980.

Defense

Memorandum of understanding for the cooperative support of the 76/62 OTO Melara Compact Gun (OMCG), with annexes. Open for signature Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1978; for the U.S. July 17, 1979.

Signatures: Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, U.S.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 12, 1980.

Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force for the U.S. Nov. 30, 1977.

Accession deposited: Dominica, Jan. 29, 1980.

Fisheries

Convention on future multilateral cooperation in the northwest Atlantic fisheries. Done at Ottawa Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.²

Acceptance deposited: Japan, Jan. 4, 1980.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966, relating to amendments to the convention. Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975.¹
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, Jan. 10, 1980.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Dominica, Dec. 18, 1979.

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965. Done at London Nov. 19, 1973.¹

Acceptances deposited: Brazil, July 6, 1978; Argentina, Jan. 29, 1980.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Dominica, Feb. 21, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976.²
Accession deposited: Morocco, Feb. 11, 1980.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Ratification deposited: Barbados, Feb. 2, 1980.

Succession deposited: St. Lucia, Dec. 28, 1979.

Pollution

Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979. Enters into force on the 90th day after the date of deposit of the 24th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or succession.

Signatures: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., Yugoslavia, Nov. 13, 1979; Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Denmark, European Economic Community, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Liechtenstein, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Nov. 14, 1979.

Property—Industrial—Classification

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised. Done Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979.²

Ratification deposited: France, Jan. 18, 1980.⁴

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Yemen (Sana), Jan. 18, 1980.

Safety at Sea

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at

1974. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.¹
ification deposited: U.K., Nov. 5, 1979.

vention on international liability for
 damage caused by space objects. Done at
 Washington, London, and Moscow Mar. 29,
 1972. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972; for
 U.S. Oct. 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.
ussions deposited: Syria, Feb. 6, 1980;
 Chad and Tobago, Feb. 8, 1980.

ar
 international sugar agreement, 1977, with
 annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. En-
 tered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978;
 definitively Jan. 2, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 6, 1980.
ification deposited: Brazil, Feb. 5,

communications
 international telecommunication conven-
 tion with annexes and protocols. Done at
 Geneva-Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. En-
 tered into force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S.
 Jan. 7, 1976. TIAS 8572.
ification deposited: Benin, Nov. 13,

ial revision of the radio regulations
 (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the
 nautical mobile (R) service, with annexes
 and final protocol. Done at Geneva
 Jan. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1,
 1979, except for the frequency allotment
 for the aeronautical mobile (R) service
 which shall come into force on Feb. 1,
 1980.
Approval deposited: Hungary, Nov. 15,

orism
 international convention against the taking
 of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 19,
 1978.
atures: Canada, Feb. 18, 1980; Liberia,
 Mar. 30, 1980; Panama, Jan. 24, 1980.

nage Measurement
 international convention on tonnage meas-
 urement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done
 at London June 23, 1969.¹
Proclamation deposited: Korea, Jan. 18,

Protocol for the accession of Colombia to
 the General Agreement on Tariffs and
 Trade (TIAS 1700). Done at Geneva Nov.
 28, 1979. Enters into force on the 30th day
 following the day upon which it shall have
 been signed by Colombia.

DO
 constitution of the U.N. Industrial De-
 velopment Organization, with annexes.
 Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.¹
atures: Afghanistan, Feb. 13, 1980;
 Bangladesh, Jan. 2, 1980; Bolivia, Burundi,
 Jan. 25, 1980; Gabon, Jan. 8, 1980; Hon-
 g Kong, Feb. 5, 1980; Liberia, Jan. 30, 1980;
 Mali, Feb. 12, 1980; Syria, Feb. 1, 1980.

Approval deposited: China, Feb. 14, 1980.
ifications deposited: Philippines, Jan. 7,
 1980; Yugoslavia, Feb. 8, 1980.

Wheat
 Protocol modifying and further expanding
 the wheat trade convention (part of the in-
 ternational wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS
 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979.
 Entered into force June 23, 1979, with re-
 spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979,
 with respect to other provisions.
ification deposited: Austria, Feb. 27,
 1980.

BILATERAL

China
 Agreement on trade relations. Signed at
 Beijing July 7, 1979.
Entered into force: Feb. 1, 1980.

Dominican Republic
 Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
 modities, relating to the agreement of
 Sept. 28, 1977 (TIAS 8944), with memoran-
 dum of understanding. Signed at Santo
 Domingo Jan. 3, 1980. Entered into force
 Jan. 3, 1980.

Finland
 Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June
 11, 1976.
Instruments of ratification exchanged:
 Feb. 11, 1980.
Enters into force: May 11, 1980.

Federal Republic of Germany
 Administrative agreement relating to addi-
 tion of an educational program under para-
 graph 4, article 71, of the Supplementary
 Agreement of Aug. 3, 1959 (TIAS 5351).
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 Nov. 23 and Dec. 28, 1979. Entered into
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 Aug. 8, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8936,
 9291, 9611), relating to trade in cotton,
 wool, and manmade fiber textiles and tex-
 tile products. Effected by exchange of let-
 ters at Hong Kong Jan. 28 and Feb. 6,
 1980. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1980; ef-
 fective Jan. 1, 1980.

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 fected by exchange of letters at Jakarta
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 15, 1979.

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 8, 1977 (TIAS 8824). Signed at Kingston
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 1980.

Japan
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 notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978.

Instruments of ratification exchanged:
 Feb. 25, 1980.
Entered into force: Mar. 26, 1980.

Korea
 Agreement amending the agreement for
 sales of agricultural commodities of June 7,
 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at
 Seoul Jan. 25, 1980. Entered into force Jan.
 25, 1980.

Mexico
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 Signed at Mexico May 4, 1978. Entered into
 force Jan. 25, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 6, 1980.

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 and Water Commission amending and ex-
 tending minute 240, as amended and ex-
 tended (TIAS 8712, 9290), relating to
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 and textile products. Effected by exchange
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 20, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1979.

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 ral disasters. Signed at Mexico Jan. 15,
 1980. Entered into force provisionally, Jan.
 15, 1980; definitively, when each party
 shall inform the other by way of diplomatic
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 legal requirements in its country for entry
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 by the second party.

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 ter, as amended by exchange of notes at
 Mexico Mar. 28, 1972. Effected by ex-
 change of notes at Washington May 3, 1968.
 TIAS 6481, 7308.
Terminated: Jan. 15, 1980.

Agreements amending the agreement of
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 Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico
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 into force Jan. 23, 1980.

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 modities, relating to the agreement of Apr.
 26, 1978 (TIAS 9604), with memorandum of
 understanding. Signed at Lima Feb. 14,
 1980. Entered into force Feb. 14, 1980.

Turkey
Agreement concerning assistance to Turkey in stabilizing its economy. Signed at Ankara Jan. 28, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 28, 1980.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the U.S.

³ With declaration.

⁴ Applicable to the territory of the French Republic, including Overseas Departments and Territories. ■

February 1980

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page 47.

February 4

French Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, is attacked by demonstrators.

February 7

U.S. further reduces its personnel at the Embassy in Libya and continues suspension of normal Embassy operations as a security precaution following mob attack on the French mission.

February 9

Ambassador McHenry begins 2-week visit to the Middle East and North Africa.

February 12

State Department announces that if Israel establishes a settlement in the city of Hebron, it could have a damaging effect on the peace process and cause serious consequences for the autonomy negotiations.

February 13

President Carter holds news conference. During the conference he calls for a February 20 deadline for Soviets to withdraw troops from Afghanistan or the U.S. will not participate in the Summer Olympics.

February 14

U.N. Human Rights Commission adopts a resolution condemning Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The resolution was approved by a vote of 27 to 8, with 6 abstentions.

U.S. Olympic Committee accepts President Carter's decision that a U.S. team not participate in the Moscow Olympics.

February 15

Spanish King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia on a private visit to the U.S. make a courtesy call on President Carter.

February 17

Canada holds parliamentary elections.

February 18

Former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau wins in Canada's elections.

Israeli Embassy officially opens in Cairo.

U.S. formally resumes membership in the International Labor Organization.

February 19

Secretary Vance departs for Bonn for meetings with Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany and other European allies Feb. 19-22 on coordinating policies in response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Kenyan President Daniel T. arap Moi visits the U.S. Feb. 19-22.

February 20

State Department announces the following countries supporting the Moscow Olympics boycott: Great Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Bermuda, Chile, Haiti, Australia, Fiji, Japan, New Guinea, New Zealand, Malaysia, China, Djibouti, Kenya, Liberia, Sudan, Zaire, Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Paraguay, Papua New Guinea, and Israel.

February 21

Egypt officially opens embassy in Tel Aviv.

February 22

Cambodian Prince Sihanouk arrives in Washington for private talks with U.S. officials.

February 26

Israel and Egypt formally exchange ambassadors.

Twenty-ninth ANZUS Council meeting is held in Washington Feb. 26-27.

February 27

Leftist guerrillas invade Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota, Colombia seizing 45 diplomats, including U.S. Ambassador Diego C. Asencio.

Rhodesia begins second phase of parliamentary elections. ■

Department of State

February 4-29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*26	2/4	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, Nov. 30, 1979 and Jan. 17, 1980.
*27	2/4	U.S., Mexico amend textile agreement, Sept. 11 and Nov. 20, 1979.
*28	2/4	Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Feb. 29.

*29	2/6	Fifth annual U.S.-Central American Conference Trade and Investment New Orleans, Feb. 27-29.
30	2/4	Vance: statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Feb. 27-29.
*31	2/5	Vance: statement on "Egypt Today" symposium.
32	2/5	Vance: statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
*33	2/7	U.S. Organization for the International Telecommunications and Telephone Consultative Committee (CICIT), study group A, Feb. 28.
*34	2/7	Vance: statement before Senate Appropriations Committee, Feb. 7.
*35	2/8	Ronald I. Spiers is appointed Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (biographic data).
36	2/11	Vance: statement before the International Olympic Committee, Lake Placid, Feb. 9.
*37	2/11	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on fire protection, Feb. 25.
*38	2/11	SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watch-keeping, Feb. 27.
*39	2/19	Itinerary of Kenyan President Daniel T. arap Moi's visit to the U.S. Feb. 19-22.
*40	2/21	Vance: statement following meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Ruffini, Rome, Feb. 20.
41	2/21	Vance, Genscher: news conference, Bonn, Feb. 20.
*42	2/21	SCC, SOLAS, working group on bulk chemicals, Mar. 13.
*43	2/25	U.S., Finland air transport agreement.
*44	2/25	U.S., Hong Kong amend textile agreement, Jan. 28 and Feb. 6.
45	2/27	Vance, Peacock, Talbot news conference following ANZUS Council meeting.
*46	2/29	U.S.-Canada consultative on U.S. fuel conversion proposals.
*47	2/29	Assistant Secretary Derian to travel to South Asia and Hong Kong, Mar. 2-28.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN.

†To be printed in a later issue. ■

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*Department
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bulletin

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May 1980

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Peace Palace at the Hague, Netherlands,
headquarters of the
International Court of Justice.

(Photo courtesy of the United Nations)

The **DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN**, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The **BULLETIN**'s contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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JUN 3 1980

DEPOSITORY



Seated from right to left: Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the Department of State; Stephen M. Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State; Thomas J. Dunnigan, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague; David Small, Assistant Legal Adviser and Ted L. Stein, Attorney-Adviser (both of the Department of State); and Hugh V. Simon, Jr., Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague. (International Court of Justice photo.)

For text of Mr. Owen's oral argument see page 36.

U.S. Actions Against Iran

Following are President Carter's announcement, Executive orders, a memorandum for the Secretary of the State, and a message to the Congress of April 7, 1980, and a Department of State press release of April 8.

PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, APRIL 7, 1980

Since Iranian terrorists imprisoned American Embassy personnel in Tehran in November, these 50 men and women and their safety, their health, and their future have been our central concern. We've made every effort to obtain their release on honorable, peaceful, and humanitarian terms, but the Iranians refused to release them or even to improve the inhumane conditions under which these Americans are being held captive.

The events of the last few days have added a new and significant dimension to this matter. The militants controlling the Embassy have stated they are willing to turn the hostages over to the Government of Iran, but the government has refused to take custody of the American hostages. This lays bare the full responsibility of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council for the continued and outrageous holding of the innocent hostages. The Iranian Government can no longer escape full responsibility by hiding behind the militants at the Embassy. It must be made clear that failure to release the hostages will involve increasingly heavy costs to Iran to its interests.

I have today ordered the following:

First, the United States of America is breaking diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran. The Secretary of State has informed the Government of Iran that its Embassy and consulates in the United States are to be closed immediately. All Iranian diplomatic and consular officials have been declared *persona non grata* and must leave this country by midnight tomorrow.

Second, the Secretary of the Treasury will put into effect official sanctions prohibiting exports from the United States to Iran, in accordance with the sanctions approved by 10 members of the Security Council on January 13th,

in the resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Although shipment of food and medicine were not included in the U.N. Security Council vote, it is expected that exports even of these items to Iran will be minimal or nonexistent.

Third, the Secretary of Treasury will make a formal inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government, which were frozen by my previous order, and also will make a census or an inventory of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran. This accounting of claims will aid in designing a program against Iran for the hostages, for the hostages' families, and other U.S. claimants. We are now preparing legislation, which will be introduced in the Congress, to facilitate processing and paying of these claims.

Fourth, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General will invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens for future entry into the United States, effective today. We will not reissue visas, nor will we issue new visas, except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest of our own country requires. This directive will be interpreted very strictly.

In order to minimize injury to the hostages, the United States has acted at all times with exceptional patience and restraint in this crisis. We have supported Secretary General Waldheim's activities under the U.N. Security Council mandate to work for a peaceful solution. We will continue to consult with our allies and other friendly governments on the steps we are now taking and on additional measures which may be required.

I am committed to resolving this crisis. I am committed to the safe return of the American hostages and to the preservation of our national honor. The hostages and their families, indeed, all of us in America, have lived with the reality and the anguish of their captivity for 5 months. The steps I have ordered today are those that are necessary now. Other action may become necessary if these steps do not produce the prompt release of the hostages.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS, APRIL 7, 1980

Amendment of Delegation of Authority With Respect to Entry of Certain Aliens Into the United States

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1185), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1-101. Amendment.

Section 1-101 of Executive Order 12172 of November 26, 1979, is amended by deleting "holding nonimmigrant visas."

1-102. Effective Date.

This order is effective immediately.

JIMMY CARTER

Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Iran

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), in order to take steps additional to those set forth in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979, to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States referred to in that Order, and in furtherance of the objectives of United Nations Security Council Resolution 461 (1979) adopted on December 31, 1979, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1-101. The following are prohibited effective immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order:

(a) The sale, supply or other transfer, by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any items, commodities or products, except food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering, from the United States, or from any foreign country, whether or not originating in the United States, either to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity in Iran, any other person or body in Iran or any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in Iran.

(b) The shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway or other land transport of United States registration or owned by or under charter to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across the

United States of any of the items, commodities and products covered by paragraph (a) of this section which are consigned to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity or any person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran.

(c) The shipment from the United States of any of the items, products and commodities covered by paragraph (a) of this section on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran.

(d) The following acts, when committed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with any transaction involving Iran, an Iranian governmental entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran or an Iranian governmental entity, or any person in Iran:

(i) Making available any new credits or loans;

(ii) Making available any new deposit facilities or allowing substantial increases in non-dollar deposits which exist as of the date of this Order;

(iii) Allowing more favorable terms of payment than are customarily used in international commercial transactions; or

(iv) Failing to act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are not made in a timely manner;

(e) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any service contract in support of an industrial project in Iran, except any such contract entered into prior to the date of this Order or concerned with medical care.

(f) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any transaction which evades or avoids, or has the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this section.

1-102. The prohibitions in section 1-101 above shall not apply to transactions by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States which is a non-banking association, corporation, or other organization organized and doing business under the laws of any foreign country.

1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated, and authorized to exercise, all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*) to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal government.

1-104. The Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure that actions taken pursuant to this Order and Executive Order No. 12170 are accounted for as required by Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641).

1-105. This Order is effective immediately. In accord with Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641) and Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), it shall be immediately transmitted to the Congress and published in the *Federal Register*.

JIMMY CARTER

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, APRIL 7, 1980

In connection with my decision today to close Iranian diplomatic facilities in the United States, I am directing that the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service provide any assistance necessary to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General in order to make my decision effective, including control of movement of persons and property into and out of Iranian diplomatic facilities in the District of Columbia.

JIMMY CARTER

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, APRIL 7, 1980

Pursuant to Section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703, I hereby report to the Congress that I have today exercised the authority granted by this Act to take certain trade, financial and other measures against Iran and its nationals.

1. On November 14, 1979, I took the step of blocking certain property or interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran. At that time the United States Embassy in Tehran was occupied and American personnel were being held hostage there in flagrant violation of international law. In addition, Iran had threatened suddenly to withdraw its assets from United States banks, to refuse to accept payment in dollars for oil, and to repudiate obligations owed to the United States and to United States nationals. Iran's actions attacked the foundations of the international legal order as well as the stability of the world economy and the international monetary system.

2. The extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, which I determined existed on November 14, continues today. The United States has used every diplomatic and legal means available to it to end this extraordinary threat, but without avail. Iran has ignored or rebuffed a decision by the International Court of Justice, resolutions by the Security Council of the United Nations and efforts by the Secretary General of the United Nations and others to resolve the underlying problems.

3. In light of the above, it is necessary for me to order the following to be prohibited:

(a) The sale, supply or other transfer, by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any items, commodities or products, except food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering, from the United States or from any foreign country, whether or not originating in the United States, either to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity in Iran, any other person or body in Iran,

or any other person or body for the purpose of any enterprise carried on in Iran.

(b) The shipment by vessel, aircraft, way or other land transport of United States registration or owned by or under charter any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or the carriage (whether or in bond) by land transport facilities across United States of any of the items, commodities and products covered by subparagraph (a) of this paragraph which are consigned to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity or any person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran.

(c) The shipment from the United States of any of the items, products and commodities covered by subparagraph (a) of this paragraph on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran.

(d) The following acts, when committed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with any transaction involving Iran, an Iranian governmental entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran or an Iranian governmental entity, or any person in Iran:

(i) Making available any new credits or loans;

(ii) Making available any new deposit facilities or allowing substantial increases in non-dollar deposits which exist as of the date of this Order;

(iii) Allowing more favorable terms of payment than are customarily used in international commercial transactions; or

(iv) Failing to act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are not made in a timely manner;

(e) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any service contract in support of an industrial project in Iran, except any such contract entered into prior to the date of the Order or concerned with medical care.

(f) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any transaction which evades or avoids, or has the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth above.

Attached is a copy of this Executive Order which I am transmitting pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1641(b).

4. The prohibitions in paragraph 3(a) shall not apply to transactions by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States which is a non-banking association, corporation, or other organization organized and doing business under the laws of any foreign country.

5. The above measures are being taken in furtherance of the objectives of Resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on December 31, 1979, and would have been specifically mandated by the Security Council on January 13, 1980, but for a veto by the Soviet Union.

6. This action is taken with respect to Iran and its nationals for the reasons described in this report.

JIMMY CARTER

PARTMENT PRESS
RELEASE 8,
J. 8, 1980

U.S. Course in a Changing World

Revocation for Iranian Officials

ive immediately, all visas according
matic or official status to Iranians in
United States, other than those on
business, are revoked.

The decision has been made pursuant
e authority conferred on the Secre-
of State by Section 221(i) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. It applies
Iranian officials and employees, includ-
those accredited to the United States,
their immediate families, attendants,
servants. It does not apply to Ira-
accredited to or employed by the
United Nations or other international or-
ganizations in the United States.

This action is taken in connection
the termination of relations between
United States and Iran. The termina-
of relations is necessary because of
continuing failure of the Government
to put an end to the unlawful deten-
tion of U.S. citizens in Tehran, Iran.

Texts of White House items from
e House press releases. ■

*Address and excerpts from
question-and-answer session before the
American Society of Newspaper
Editors at the Washington Hilton Hotel
in Washington, D.C., on April 10,
1980.*¹

As you may know, for the last 2 days I've
been meeting with President Sadat of
Egypt. I've been very eager to get him
out of the country before he decides to
enter the late Presidential primaries.
[Laughter] I think I'd rather run against
anyone in this country than he. Let me
say at the beginning that our meetings
these last 2 days have been very signifi-
cant. President Sadat's historic visit to
Jerusalem initiated the process of
peacekeeping which finally culminated in
the Camp David accords. And through
his efforts and those of Prime Minister
Begin, with whom I will meet next week,
we have already achieved one resulting
miracle: a Treaty of Peace Between
Egypt and Israel.

Its terms are being honored meticu-
lously by both sides. Now we are engaged
in negotiating to insure peace and secu-
rity for Israel and its neighbors and for
full autonomy for the inhabitants of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. We come to
these current talks, in which we are al-
ready participating, encouraged that the
full agreements carried out at Camp
David, with a solemn commitment from
all three nations, will also be fully hon-
ored, as has the treaty between Egypt
and Israel.

President Sadat and I talked of many
issues. I was not surprised to find him
sharing my own thoughts and my own
concerns and my own ideas about the
course of international events. I would
like to discuss with you today some of the
most urgent imperatives of American
foreign policy with special emphasis in
one particular area of the world. It's im-
portant that we take a hard, clear look
together not at some simple world, either
of universal goodwill or of universal hos-
tility, but the complex, changing, and
sometimes dangerous world that really
exists.

It's not one world but many. It's no
longer a world that is structured and con-
trolled by competition among colonial
powers. It's a more complicated world,
where national, religious, and ethnic as-
sertions are fragmenting old boundaries

and old alignments. It's a world of con-
flicting ideologies, of unequal wealth, and
of uneven resources. It's a world in which
the capacity for destructive violence is at
once alarmingly dispersed to every single
small terrorist band and awesomely con-
centrated in the nuclear arsenals of the
superpowers. It's in just such a changing
world—uncertain, suspicious, shifting,
searching for balance—that we pursue
peace and security, not only for ourselves
in this great nation but for every human
being on Earth.

We have so much youthful vitality
that we sometimes forget that we are a
mature nation in the best sense. We've
been a democratic republic now for two
centuries, and we are the strongest na-
tion on Earth. But we live among chal-
lenges which are, every day, a test of our
maturity and our will and the skill of the
American people to deal with rapidly
changing and unpredictable times.

In many languages and out of many
unfamiliar cultures other peoples con-
stantly ask America for a response to
myriad—and often conflicting—concerns.
Nations ask us for leadership, but at the
same time they demand their own in-
dependence of action. They ask us for aid,
but they reject any interference. They
ask for understanding, yet they often de-
cline to understand us in return. Some
ask for protection but are wary of the ob-
ligations of alliance. Others ask for firm-
ness and certainty, but at the same time
they demand flexibility required by the
pace of change and the subtlety of events.
The world asks, with impatience, for all
these things at once. They ask for them
today, not tomorrow.

Iran

Nowhere do we face the challenges I've
just described more directly than we do
in Iran. No single situation so aggravates
the American people, so tests our matur-
ity, so tries our patience, so challenges
our unity, as does the continued captivity
of American hostages in the Tehran Em-
bassy. No other single event seems so
clearly to mirror the disorder of our times.
This disregard for diplomatic propri-
ety and for international law is a special
threat to the small nation, the weak na-
tion, the nation without economic or mili-
tary or political power or influence. And

it also comprises a part of the competing pressures on a great and a powerful nation like ours.

This crisis calls on us to act with courage, and also with wisdom, that will both produce results and preserve life. I'm deeply proud of the steady strength that has been demonstrated in America in dealing with the irresponsible Iranian authorities who've been unwilling to act or unable to carry out their frequent, solemn commitments. The leaders of the Iranian Government lack the cohesion and resolve to bring order to their own chaotic land or to decide on a basis for ending this illegal detention of hostages which has created international crisis.

For long months, ours has been a restraint of strength, despite outrageous provocation. I do not regret that restraint, which was designed to protect American lives and to explore with Iranian Government officials and with U.N. officials and with mediators working with us a way to resolve this crisis peacefully. But it has become necessary, because Iran would not act in accordance with international law and with their own interests, for us to act again. The steps I've taken this week, to end diplomatic relations and to impose sanctions, are firm and substantive, and we hope that they will be persuasive.

America will continue the careful and considered exercise of its power. We will pursue every and, I repeat, every legal use of that power to bring our people home free and safe. But the hard, sad reality is that a small number of zealots engaged in a power struggle within Iran are using the innocent American hostages for their own advancement, with serious adverse consequences to all Iranian people.

In the interests of the people of Iran and of their possible future as a unified and peaceful nation living in freedom, it is imperative that the Iranian Government resolve this crisis. Every day that the crisis continues, Iran is further isolated from the rest of the world. Every day that the American Embassy remains a prison pushes Iran further into lawlessness, down and down the spiral of disorder.

With a return of rationality, international lawlessness need not be Iran's fate. Bankruptcy, political as well as moral, need not be Iran's future.

If interference from outside is a threat, the threat does not come from the United States.

The challenge in that area of the world—as in some others—comes from

the intersection of two historic trends. One is the rising demand for development and for self-determination which is felt, and deeply felt, throughout what we call the Third World. The United States responds with sympathy to that demand. The other trend is Soviet expansionism, which we are determined to oppose.

In 1946, the United States stood firm against Soviet occupation of northern Iran, against Soviet-sponsored subversion in Greece, against Soviet demands on Turkey. Historically, American strength has been used to help the countries of the Persian Gulf area to protect their stability and to retain their own sovereignty.

The reality of the world today is that Moscow exploits unrest—not to address the discontent that underlies that unrest, not to overcome the inequalities that give rise to unrest, but to expand its own dominion and to satisfy its imperial objectives.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has revealed for the world the hypocrisy of its courtship of the Third World. It has shown that it will not be deterred by principle or decency or by international law or by world public opinion or by the opposition of freedom-loving and patriotic Afghans. And it has made this known in a region which is at once politically volatile and economically crucial.

The subjugation of Afghanistan represents the first direct intrusion of Soviet Armed Forces beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact nations since the Second World War. The explosiveness of this region, its great natural wealth and the Soviet willingness to use the armed forces which have been developed during the Kremlin's enormous military buildup during the last 15 years are what combine to make the invasion of Afghanistan so unsettling to the future of international peace.

In southwest Asia, unstable and uncontrollable forces are at work. The Soviets have, with their invasion, disturbed these forces of historic, religious, economic, and ethnic conflict that are beyond the control of the Soviets and that could lead to much more serious direct confrontation with other nations which have vital interests in this region.

Nor can the world turn away from the harsh truth that the occupation of Afghanistan is marked by appalling inhumanity. We must not forget, and our allies and other nations must not forget, that

today, at this moment, every day, the Soviet Union is violating human standards of decency and violating human rights in the grossest kind of way. Hundreds of Afghan freedom fighters are dying every week, some in brutal mass executions. Entire villages are being wiped out. More than 800,000 people have fled the country. Terror tactics, including the use of chemical weapons, the trademark of the ruthless attempt to crush Muslim resistance and to install Soviet form of peace—a peace of brutal armed suppression.

Earlier this year, 103 other members of the United Nations joined us in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and demanding the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces. Soviet leaders have never been informed of this U.N. action. This unprecedented condemnation was significant but, because the principle at stake, because of the nation's importance to Western security, because of the savagery of the Soviet assault which continues until now, and because of the Soviet Union's use of its troops directly in such a conflict, it's imperative that we continue to meet the challenge of the invasion with calm and unshakable resolution.

The measures that I've ordered designed to enhance peace. They include the embargo on further grain sales, tightened controls on high technology trade, limitations of fishing in U.S. waters, strengthening of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, intensification of our development of rapid deployment forces and our capacity to deploy them and to use them, and our offer to assist states in the region to maintain their security. These are necessary steps of course which we must and we will persist.

We cannot know with certainty the motivations of the Soviet move into Afghanistan—whether Afghanistan is the purpose or the prelude. Regardless of motives, there can be no doubt that the Soviet invasion poses an increased threat to the independence of nations in the region and to the world's access to vital resources and to vital sea lanes.

But our interest in peace and stability in the region goes far beyond economics. We cannot wish away the fact that conflict and tension in the region could endanger the broader peace. As the invasion of Afghanistan does indeed foreshadow a pattern of Soviet behavior for the coming years, American must accept the truth that we are in a challenging and very difficult times.

ever more interdependent world, to me that aggression need be met only if it occurs at one's own doorstep is to t new adventures and to risk new very serious miscalculations. Our e is clear. By responding firmly, we do to halt aggression where it takes and to deter it elsewhere. Let me underline for you this most point in our policy: America and eans are not motivated by relent- ostsity, by a desire for indiscrimi- n confrontation or a return to the cold But for America simply to accept t occupation and domination of Af- nistan as an accomplished fact would cynical signal to the world that could encourage further aggression, fur- tension, and further danger to world . It's America's responsibility to r and register in concrete terms our emination of the Soviet invasion for ng as that invasion continues.

Olympic Games

extremely important that we not, in ay, condone Soviet aggression. We recall the experience of 1936, the of the Berlin Olympic Games. They used to inflate the prestige of an ous dictator, Adolf Hitler, to show any's totalitarian strength to the l in the sports arena as it was being to cow the world on the banks of the e.

The parallel with the site and timing e 1980 Olympics is striking. Let me our attention to one compelling simi- y between the Nazi view of the 1936 pics as a propaganda victory and the al Soviet view of the 1980 Summer es. I'd like to read to you a passage e this year's edition of the "Handbook arty Militants" issued in Moscow for et Party activists, and I quote:

The ideological struggle between East and e is directly involved in the selection of e where the Olympic Games take place. e decision to award the honor of holding the p Games to the capital of the world's Socialist state is convincing testimony of eneral recognition of the historic im- nance and correctness of the foreign policy e of our country and of the enormous ser- of the Soviet Union in the struggle for e.

Let me repeat a part of that:

The decision to award the honor of holding p Games to the capital of the world's Socialist state is convincing testimony of eneral recognition of the historic im- nance and correctness of the foreign policy e of our country, and of the enormous

services of the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace.

A few weeks ago I met with Ameri- can athletes in the White House. I ex- plained the Soviet stake in the Olympics, and the moral and political reasons why the United States will not send a team to the Moscow games. I understand the sac- rifice that has been asked from these men and women for the sake of the security of their country and their world. The Soviet leaders certainly understand it. But for our not sending a team to Moscow, this is far more than a symbolic gesture. It's a direct repudiation—in the phrase of their own propaganda handbook—of the "cor- rectness" of their foreign policy.

Under Olympic principles, and this is very important, athletes represent their nations. Athletes who are not part of a national team cannot compete in the Olympics. The United States does not wish to be represented in a host country that is invading and subjugating another

the restoration of a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan, with a government that would be responsive to the needs and the wishes of the people of that country.

Although the Soviets have talked about the withdrawal of their troops, they have actually shown no interest in such proposals. There are no signs at this time of a Soviet withdrawal. As a matter of fact, within this last week, we have proof that the Soviets are moving additional troop units across the border into Afghanistan. We must be prepared to hold our course and to impose the costs of aggression for as long as this is necessary.

We thus face what could be a pro- tracted time of strain in East-West re- lations. To enhance stability as much as possible in this predictable and difficult period, we will continue to maintain a stable military balance, both through our own steady defense modernization, and through negotiated arms limits that are equitable and verifiable. This objective —a stable balance—is advanced by the

With a return of rationality, international lawlessness need not be Iran's fate. Bankruptcy, political as well as moral, need not be Iran's future.

nation in direct violation of human de- cency and international law. If legal ac- tions are necessary to enforce the deci- sion not to send a team to Moscow, then I will take those legal actions.

All of these decisions do require sac- rifice, and I've acted to assure that the burdens of those sacrifices are shared as equally as possible among all Americans. The American people have demonstrated that they are willing to bear their share of the burden, but it is also vital that the burden of sacrifice be shared among our allies and among other nations.

East-West Relations

Neither we nor our allies want to destroy the framework of East-West relations that has yielded concrete benefits to so many people. But, ultimately, if we continue to seek the benefit of detente while ignoring the necessity for deterrence, we would lose the advantages of both.

It is essential that our intentions be absolutely clear. The measures we've taken against the Soviet Union since the invasion will remain in effect until there is total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Then, and only then, we would be prepared to join with Afghanis- tan and its neighbors in a guarantee of the true neutrality and noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. We support

SALT II Treaty. In a period of height- ened tensions, it is all the more im- portant that we have reliable constraints on the competition in strategic nuclear weapons. SALT is an integral part of our national security policy. I remain com- mitted to the ratification of this treaty, and the United States intends to abide by its obligations under international law and to take no action inconsistent with its intent or purpose, so long as the Soviets act with similar restraint.

The U.S. Approach

The course we pursue, therefore, in this turbulent world is steady, firm, and fair:

It's the course of a strong, stable na- tion practicing mature restraint but in- sisting on justice—the policy we pursue in Iran.

It's the course of a resolute nation, hopeful of good relations but determined to deter aggression—the course we pursue in dealing with the Soviet Union.

It's the course of the peacemaker—the same role to which the United States is committed in the Middle East and, in- deed, throughout the world.

It's the course of an understanding nation, sensitive to the tides of change and to the rights and the needs of all people—America's rightful approach, proper approach, to the revolutionary

climate in which a new world is now coming to life.

Our mission is to promote order, not to enforce our will; our mission is to protect our citizens and our national honor; not to harm nor to dishonor others; to compel restraint, not to provoke confrontation; to support the weak, not to dominate them; to assure that the foundations of our new world are laid upon a stable superpower balance, not built on sand.

This is a worthy mission for a great nation, for a caring people, and for loyal friends. It is the historical mission of the United States of America, and the United States of America will fulfill this mission.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION

Q. I have two questions on your speech. You referred to frequent solemn commitments made by the Iranian Government officials. What were these commitments and who made them? And on Soviet expansion, is there any connection, or have you found any connection between the Iranian militants that are holding the hostages and the Soviets, and have you given any diplomatic recognition to this by way of communications with the Soviets?

A. The commitments were made directly to us and through intermediaries that several things would happen: First, that frequent and adequate visits could be made to the American hostages to determine their physical and their psychological well-being, to assure that they were getting adequate medical care, and were living under conditions that were humane.

We also had firm commitments, including a report to us from the highest Iranian officials in the government, that through a unanimous vote within the Revolutionary Council, as approved by the students and approved by Khomeini, that the hostages would be transferred from control of the terrorist students to the government itself. These kinds of commitments were made from time to time, and invariably before the commitments were carried out, they were either aborted or those responsible for carrying them out, through timidity, failed to keep their commitments.

I cannot say that we have proof that the terrorists who hold the hostages in the compound are controlled by the Soviet Union. The Tudeh Party in Iran is relatively small in number. In recent

months it has been highly supportive of Khomeini and the mullahs and those who are close to him, possibly as a political ploy to seek some better treatment from the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Soviets, in recent weeks, have had a very strong and constant radio propaganda effort going into Iran expressing their approval of the actions taken by the militants in the compound. We complained to the Soviet Union

Our course is clear. By responding firmly, we intend to halt aggression where it takes place and to deter it elsewhere.

strongly and repeatedly and, for awhile, that propaganda effort was assuaged. In recent days, however, it has built up again.

Q. Continuing on the issue of the hostages, you said in your speech just now that you will use every legal power that you have to free the hostages, and the other day in your formal statement, you said that other actions may be necessary if the hostages are not promptly freed. Two questions: What kind of legal power are you thinking about using and, two, what do you mean by "prompt"? What is the timetable, if you will, for the actions that you might take, particularly in the light of the very violent threats that are now being made by the militants?

A. I think it would be ill-advised for me, as President, having the ultimate authority and responsibility for the nation's actions, to spell out in any sort of detail an exact time schedule or exactly what options are available to us.

Under international law, however, since we are an aggrieved nation caused by not only the action of terrorists but also having the terrorist actions condoned by and even supported by the government, the breadth of the rights that we have to take action to redress this grievance is quite extensive.

Q. On the subject of, for instance, allied support—we are getting reports that you—conflicting reports as to whether or not they are going to support us or not. What kind of specific commitments are you getting from them to either withdraw their envoys or to apply similar sanctions as you have applied?

A. Through my own personal mes-

sages, either with cables or on the telephone, I have relayed my urging to the allies to give us their full support. The support has been, on occasion, effective. On other occasions, we have been disappointed.

Recently, since the effort that has been made to have the hostages transferred or released has been ineffective we have increased our effort to get the allies to act on their own initiative to the release of the hostages.

I talked to some of the European leaders very recently. Yesterday and today, the foreign ministers of many nations met in Lisbon. They have decided to to the Iranian officials to demand that hostages be released immediately and insist upon a time schedule for the release of the American hostages. Options that are available to them if such action is forthcoming would have to be chosen by those autonomous and independent nations and their leaders.

We have suggested such things as the imposition of the sanctions as voted by the U.N. Security Council, blocked legally by the veto of the Soviet Union and also the withdrawal of their diplomatic personnel from Iran or possibly breaking of relations with Iran. I can tell you what those allies and other friends of ours might actually do, but are putting as much proper effort as possible to induce the allies to act strong and in a concerted way, hopefully to break the present deadlock and to resolve the crisis.

Q. I have a couple of political questions. Why did you let Secretary Vance take the fall for the U.N. resolution vote on the Israeli settlements? Shouldn't you have fired him or taken responsibility yourself as Eisenhower did with the U2 and Kennedy did with the Bay of Pigs?

A. Cy and I considered that there was enough blame or culpability to go around, and we both took a maximum amount, politically speaking. And as said to news people, personally, I'm responsible for anything that goes on in Iran. It would obviously have been better in retrospect for me to study very carefully the text of the U.N. resolution for which I approved a positive vote.

My understanding was that there were no references in the text at all to Jerusalem and that we would clearly make sure that the world understood

and not favor demanding publicly the settling of the existing settlements. The two items had been discussed before and Begin at Camp David, and I understood our position. And I felt and felt then, that for us to be loyal on the record as favoring those parts of the resolution are in contention to the further peace prospects we are now pursuing. But it was a matter of Cy Vance being responsible for what happened at the State Department. I'm responsible for everything that happens in the government, including the error that was

Q. On another point, you've been accused of manipulating foreign affairs for political advantage. There was a White House celebration of the Camp David accord 2 days before the New York primary, when in fact the actual anniversary date was the day after the New York primary. There was a 7:18 press conference to announce the breakthrough on the hostages the day after the Wisconsin primary, and the next day that fell through. Your pollster, Pat Cullen, said that the press conference had a big impact on the Wisconsin primary. Your press secretary, Jody Powell, said it was not. Which one is right, and do you say to your critics this?

A. I think Jody is right. And I think the results of the New York primary showed that holding of a reception at the White House on a Sunday afternoon to commemorate the anniversary of the Camp David Treaty did not materially affect the outcome of the voters' decisions in New

York. Anyone who said that I have condoned recent events in foreign policy to re-election obviously doesn't understand the political process. If I could control international events to help me in re-election, I would have made several changes in what has actually occurred.

Q. You spoke rather eloquently a little while ago about Soviet expansion. President Reagan suggested earlier this year that others have charged rather fully that there would never have been an Iran, never have been an Afghanistan, and the kind of Soviet expansionism that we're talking about currently, if world leaders had not really confidence in American leadership. American resolution during your administration. They cite, for example, the situation in Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen,

and flip-flops on such things as the Soviet troops in Cuba and the U.N. vote on Palestine. What's your response to this kind of fundamental criticism?

A. I think the people in the Kremlin would agree completely with what Mr. Reagan has said. That the invasion of Afghanistan was not the fault of, nor the responsibility of, President Brezhnev and the Politburo but was the responsibility of the President of the United States. That's obviously a ridiculous claim that could only damage our nation's prestige coming from a responsible person and help the Soviets in their claim that they had adequate provocation from this country to take this unwarranted action. And I'm sure the same response would come from the terrorists who hold our hostages captive in the American Embassy in Tehran. I think they would agree with candidate Reagan that this was really not their responsibility or their fault, but the United States is somehow culpable for this abhorrent and inhumane action.

So, I do not agree at all with the premise which predicated those statements, but I'm sure that our enemies or our abusers in the Kremlin or in the compound among the terrorists would agree completely.

Q. I'm not exactly sure that their intention was to say that you are in collaboration with the Kremlin here; I think the argument is—

A. I don't maintain that they claim that I was in collaboration. But what I say is that that line of argument that an invasion of a sovereign country with 100,000 troops or the taking over of a compound with innocent American hostages is somehow the fault of the United States or its President is completely fallacious and does not help our country and does not help us resolve those issues that are so important for us to resolve.

Q. No, but the basic line of argument is somewhat different. They're saying that if we have a long history of inaction, inability, to deal effectively with our commitments around the world, that that then leads and misleads other world leaders, particularly in the Soviet Union, to believe that they can take actions with impunity without expecting to get any kind of retaliation from the United States. I think that's the basic argument and it traces back to this charge that there is this sense among a lot of world leaders of a weak leadership in the White House, in the United States during this particular critical period around the world. Now

that contributes to these miscalculations by other national leaders.

A. Your interpretation of what they might have meant when they said this or that is interesting to me but I find it still lacking in conviction.

The record is that our nation has always stood firm and resolved against aggression. The Soviets have used their surrogates to go into nations with troops, ostensibly at the invitation of the host government. This occurred in Angola, as you well know, with Cuban troops. I think in 1975-76. I have occurred before and since then, when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia, when they invaded Hungary, when they took over East Germany, took over Poland. I don't believe that anybody could say that was because the United States was weak or vacillating.

We have made steady progress, in my judgment, in expanding the beneficial impact of our nation throughout the world. The Communist government philosophy, and what occurs within those nations, is not attractive enough to gain adherents without the use of violence or force. It's not an accident that East Germany has a wall built around it. It's not designed to keep people out of East Germany; it's designed to keep people in East Germany. And had the Soviets been successful in selling to one of their neighbors in Afghanistan the attractiveness of a totalitarian government under communism, similar to what exists in Moscow, then they would not have had to put 100,000 troops into an innocent country to subjugate those people and to force them to accept a puppet government.

This week we have seen in Cuba a bankrupt nation, kept alive economically, by the skin of their teeth, only with the infusion of \$3 or \$4 million a day from the Soviet Union. When they temporarily opened the gates to the Embassy of Peru, 10,000 Cubans filled that Embassy to escape political persecution and economic deprivation in Cuba. So for anyone to claim that it's actions of the United States, or a failure of democracy or the failure of a President that has caused these kinds of forceful actions, in the absence of convincing ideological truths that have changed the shape of the world, that's a completely fallacious example.

Our resolve is steady. NATO is strong. We've got many new friendships. Our country is now building up for the first time our military forces, after a long, steady decline. We have very good interrelationships with our allies. Our efforts toward peace are very sound and

progressive and successful. I have no apology at all to make for our country, or for the administration which I head.

Q. Somewhat along this same line: You spoke today of how we are responding firmly—by responding firmly we intend to halt aggression where it takes place and to deter it elsewhere. I think one of the things that troubles a lot of people is that—speaking specifically now of our reaction to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, aside from our not going to the Olympics, which has a moral force, but which will not stop the games, and aside from our not selling grain to the Soviets, who do seem able to obtain it elsewhere—in dealing with a country which does not appear to be swayed by moral considerations in international affairs, what else can we do to halt aggression? Is there anything else that we can do, beyond the moral force of whatever policies we espouse?

A. As President I have available to me the resources of the strongest nation on Earth, economically, politically, and militarily. The judgment that I have to make when we're faced with a challenge or with a responsibility is to decide which of those powers or forces that exist substantially at my command to be executed. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, I decided to exercise the economic and political authority of this country and not to go to war and to exercise what military resources we have.

Politically, we went to the United Nations, along with other countries, and in an absolutely unprecedented fashion, an overwhelming portion of the nations of the world, including some nations that are subservient to the Soviet Union or dependent upon the Soviet Union, voted to condemn the Soviets and to call for the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan. Thirty-four Muslim nations, not all of whom are our friends at all, some very closely aligned with the Soviet Union, voted unanimously to condemn the Soviets and demanded that the Soviets withdraw.

I made a speech to the joint session of the Congress, the State of the Union speech, and spelled out the commitments that we would make to maintain steadily, even if we have to stand alone, the economic constraints, our absence from participation in the Olympics, and so forth. We are inducing—I think we'll have substantial success—other nations to join us in these restraints. We go further than other nations, but we are the leader of

the world. We're not as vulnerable as some others are to economic or political pressure put on them by the Soviet Union because of proximity and because of our innate strength. So I think it's necessary for us to go a little further than the other countries.

I don't believe there's any doubt in my mind or in most people's minds that a very clear signal has been sent to the Soviet Union: Your action in Afghanistan is condemned; it will not be accepted; the status quo will not be revived that existed prior to Afghanistan; and further aggression by you will result in the possible exercise of additional authority and power by the United States and other countries above and beyond economic and political actions.

¹Text from White House press release. ■

News Conference of April 17 (Excerpts)

Since last November, 53 Americans have been held captive in Tehran, contrary to every principle of international law and human decency. The United States began to implement a series of nonviolent but punitive steps designed to bring about the release of our hostages.

In January we received information and signals from the Iranian authorities that they were prepared to enter into serious discussions to bring about the release of the hostages. At that time the United States decided to defer additional sanctions, and then these discussions resulted in commitments from the top authorities in Iran including a transfer of the hostages to government control to be followed by their release.

These commitments were not fulfilled. Earlier this month, April the 7th, I announced a series of economic and political actions designed to impose additional burdens on Iran because their government was now directly involved in continuing this act of international terrorism. This process is moving forward. We've imposed economic sanctions, and we have broken diplomatic relations with Iran. Recently, a number of other nations have recalled their ambassadors, and

these countries are now considering actions that they may be prepared to take in the near future.

Even while these deliberations continue, officials in Iran talk about not solving the hostage issue until July or even later. We are beyond the time for gestures. We want our people to be free. Accordingly, I am today ordering additional set of actions.

First, I am prohibiting all financial transfers by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to any person or entity in Iran except those directed to the gathering of news and financial remittances. As of today, any such action will become a criminal act.

Second, all imports from Iran to United States will be barred.

Third, I intend to exercise my statutory authority to protect American citizens abroad by prohibiting travel to and by prohibiting any transactions between Americans and foreign personnel relating to such travel or the presence of Americans in Iran.

Again, this authority will not be used to interfere with the right of the press to gather news. However, it is responsibility and my obligation, given the situation in Iran, to call on American journalists and news-gathering organizations to minimize, as severely as possible, their presence and their activities in Iran.

Fourth, I am ordering that all military equipment previously purchased by the Government of Iran, which I have previously impounded, be made available for use by the U.S. military forces of sale to other countries.

And finally, I will ask Congressional authority to pay reparations to the hostages and to their families of the more than \$8 billion in frozen Iranian assets in the United States. The assets will be available to satisfy consumer and other commercial claims of American firms against Iranian Government entities and to reimburse claims of the United States for the heavy military other costs we have incurred because of Iran's illegal actions.

If a constructive Iranian response is not forthcoming soon, the United States should and will proceed with other measures. We will legally forbid shipment of food and medicine, and the U.N. Charter, as you know, stipulates interruption

communications as a legitimate sanction. I am prepared to initiate negotiations with the member nations of ELSAT to bar Iran's use of international communications facilities. The measures which I am announcing are still nonbelligerent in nature. They are a continuation of our effort to resolve this crisis by peaceful means. The authorities in Iran should recognize, however, that the availability of such measures, like the patience of the American people, is running out. I am compelled to repeat what I have said on previous occasions: Other actions are available to the United States and may be necessary if the Government of Iran refuses to fulfill its solemn international responsibility. The American hostages must be freed.

Q. What have you accomplished these sanctions so far, and have you set a deadline before summer for a belligerent stand? And also, did you have any reason to believe that the allies are going to back up our actions, or are they fair weather friends?

A. From the very beginning of the crisis in Iran brought about by the seizure of our hostages, I have had two things in mind from which we have never deviated: First of all, to protect the interests of our country and its principles and standards and secondly, and along with it on an equal basis, to protect the lives of our hostages and to work as best I could under the most difficult possible circumstances to secure the release of our hostages safely and to freedom. We have had three options available—economic, political, and military. So far we have only exercised the economic and political measures—in the [International] Court of Justice, in the United Nations, in our own economic actions which are now inflicting punishment on Iran's economy, and in the marshaling of support among other countries. I can't predict to you exactly what the nations will do. In recent days, I have communicated with almost all of the nations' leaders, asking them to support peaceful action, economic and political. I am joining with us in convincing Iran that they are becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of the civilized world, and are increasingly vulnerable to dissension and contention within, and to danger from without, particularly the Soviet Union to the north of Iran. Recently, our allies and friends have

withdrawn their ambassadors to decide what they should do in the future. I understand from some of the leaders that next week they will have another meeting to decide what further steps to take now that Bani-Sadr, the President of Iran, and others have refused to take action to release the hostages after our allies had demanded directly that Iran take this action.

If this additional set of sanctions that I've described to you today and the concerted action of our allies is not successful, then the only next step available, that I can see, would be some sort of military action which is the prerogative and the right of the United States under these circumstances.

Q. Why didn't you embargo food right now as some of us had been led to believe you had already decided to do?

A. We have considered extending the embargo to food and drugs, which is obviously an item that we could include. We, first of all, are complying with the U.N. Security Council definition of sanctions and we are encouraging now our allies to take similar action.

Secondly, because of decisions made by us, the attitude of the American people, the attitude of shippers of food and drugs, this trade is practically nonexistent. As I pointed out to you today, unless there is immediate action on the part of Iran, these items and the interruption of communications are still available to us for a decision by me.

Q. There's been some ambiguity, perhaps partly deliberate, about the circumstances and timing of military measures, if they are to be taken, against Iran. One element of that ambiguity was a remark you made in an interview with the European television last week that suggested that if our allies support us sufficiently in taking sanctions, then it might be less necessary for you to take unilateral military measures.

A. My question is, to what extent does the timing of military measures depend on what our allies do and to what extent does it depend simply on the Iranian response?

A. It depends on three factors. One is the effectiveness of the accumulation of economic and political sanctions that we have taken against Iran. Secondly, it depends upon the effectiveness of the sanctions to be imposed upon Iran by other nations in the world, including some of

our key allies. And thirdly and most importantly, of course, it depends upon the response of Iran to these actions and the condemnation of the rest of the world.

I do not feel it appropriate for me to set a specific time schedule for the imposition of further actions which may include military action, but it's an option available to me.

I think our key allied leaders understand the timeframe under which we are acting and making our plans and, their decisions next week, I think, will be colored, perhaps, by the messages that I have exchanged with them, both by cable and by direct telephone conversations, which continue.

Q. There have been reports that you have designated Hamilton Jordan as your special envoy on Iran to negotiate on the hostages and that generally, he has become one of your top foreign policy advisers. Could you explain to us some of these new functions of his and his qualifications for them and also confirm a report that on one or more of his secret missions he wore a wig and other disguises?

A. I've never known about any disguises or wigs. Hamilton is not one of my major foreign policy advisers. He does not claim to be an expert on foreign policy. Hamilton is very valuable to me in the proper interrelation of foreign policy decisions with domestic decisions. He does attend most of our high-level discussions on both domestic matters and foreign policy matters.

Almost every member of the White House staff who is involved directly or indirectly in international affairs and also those in the State Department and perhaps even those in the Justice Department have been involved at various times in the attempt that we have made to convince the Iranian Government and their officials to release the hostages. This does include Hamilton, but he's not designated exclusively at all to play this role.

Q. You mentioned that there's a statement from Iranian officials that they may not consider the hostage question until July. Without talking about a deadline, is that acceptable? Could it go on that long?

A. I would think that would be an excessive time for us to wait.

Q. Despite the compelling objective of obtaining the release of the hostages, what is the possibility that a future military action by the United

States, even including a blockade, might be too high a price to pay in terms of the damage to the allied oil supplies, and the further risk of war?

A. That's a balance that I will have to assess and on which make the ultimate decision. I have not discussed specific military steps with our allies that I might take. I think they are familiar through news reports and through just common-sense analysis of those available to us that the interruption of commerce with Iran is a kind of step that would be available. We announced in November, I think November the 20th, that this was one of those steps that we would reserve for ourselves to take in the future. I think we used the phrase, "interruption of commerce with Iran." It would be severe in its consequences for Iran and much less severe for any particular customer of Iran.

Because of sanctions against Iran and because of the fragmented nature of their own economic system and because of their inability to buy adequate spare parts and continue their exploratory operations of the production of oil, their shipments of oil in the international markets have dropped precipitously. So a total interruption of Iranian oil shipments to other countries would not be a devastating blow to those countries. It would certainly be an inconvenience; it would certainly be serious. And we have been trying to avoid that kind of action, and we are still attempting to avoid that kind of action. But I cannot preclude that option for the future if it becomes necessary.

Q. Some of your critics, especially those who work for Senator Kennedy, have suggested that your announcements and actions on Iran—many of them seem timed to influence the presidential primaries. They cite the announcement the morning of the Wisconsin primary and, I'm sure, will point out that today's announcements and this press conference come just a few days before the Pennsylvania primary. What's your response to that?

A. I would like for you to look at the calendar since the first of January and find a time that wasn't immediately before or immediately after a primary. As you know, we have 35 primaries this year in a period of about 5 months, which is an average of 7 primaries per month. And I have never designed the announcement of an action to try to color or modify the actions of voters in a primary. These occurrences are too serious for our nation. And

the particular instance to which you refer in Wisconsin was a time when we had negotiated for many weeks in anticipation of such an announcement that the hostages would be transferred to control of the government and subsequently released.

That decision came through official action by the Iranian Government, the Revolutionary Council. President Bani-Sadr made the announcement himself early in the morning our time, about noontime Iranian time. It was a completely appropriate time for it to be announced. But I do not make, and have not made, and will not make decisions nor announcements concerning the lives and safety of our hostages simply to derive some political benefit from them.

Q. It seems a lot of people've never seen don't find your effectiveness too great these days. We find this in the polls and elsewhere, and at least it's not as high as they'd like, as good as they'd like. My question is this: Is the job today of being President too big, too complex for a President, any President? Are there too many factors outside of your control to be effective?

A. The job is a big one; there's no doubt about that. Under any normal circumstances, being President is not an easy task. The greatness and strength of our country, the support of the American people, the derivation through democratic processes of authority and responsibility, and the ability to act is a reassuring thing to me and all my predecessors who've served in this office and lived in this house.

This year, almost in a unique way, we've had additional responsibilities. I think it's been 25 or 30 years, for instance, since an incumbent Democratic president had to run a political campaign while he was still in office. I don't deplore that. The right of my opponents to run is theirs. But that's an additional complicating factor. It was obviously an additional burden for our entire nation, not just for me, to have American hostages captured in Iran and to have the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan, which was a departure from 25 years of policy on their part not to use their own military forces to cross the borders into a previously undominated country.

The combination of these three factors, in addition to very high interest rates and inflation rates, brought about primarily by worldwide escalation in oil

prices, has made this an extremely difficult job even compared to normal times. I don't deplore it. I'm not trying to avoid the responsibilities, and I believe that the action of the American people so far in the electoral process has not been complete endorsement of what I have done or of what I have accomplished. I think the results so far compared to what was anticipated 6 months ago in spite of these unpredictable kinds of crises that have afflicted our nation have been very gratifying to me and an indication that the American people are fairly well satisfied. We've got problems, yes. But I am not despairing, and I am not fearful; I don't think the American people should be either.

Q. Do the sanctions that you've announced today bar the families of hostages and other humanitarian-minded Americans from traveling, assuming, of course, that the terrorists will allow them into the Embassy?

A. Yes, it would unless they had received a specific permit either from the State Department or the Attorney General.

Q. You have just recently encouraged foreign auto makers to invest plants in this country presumably to hold more jobs here. But in recent the auto workers are complaining they've lost a significant number of jobs. And they are suggesting putting restrictions on foreign imports, at least as a short-term remedy, and they're planning to be here and lobby for that. wonder how you feel about restricting imports?

A. I'd like to respond to your question without it being characterized as criticism of anyone. I remember the 1 few months that I was President sitting in the Cabinet room, over just across the Oval Office, talking to the leaders of the American automobile manufacturing firms—all of the leaders there, all the firms represented, encouraging them to comply with the impending legislation in the Congress to require the production of small and efficient automobiles for the American market.

Their unanimous reply was that was an inappropriate thing for them to do, that the market was not there for small and efficient automobiles. Subsequent events, which could not be completely predictable, have shown that American people are now demanding

er to conserve energy, the small and efficient automobiles, precisely the kind of car that we were encouraging them to use 3 years ago or more.

At this moment every single small, efficient automobile that can be produced in American manufacturers has a ready market. Because they are now in a transition period from the large gas-guzzling automobiles to the manufacture of the small and efficient cars, there is a very difficult time for employment and American production because the market's not there for the big, heavy, inefficient automobiles.

So to replace the number of cars that Americans could be producing that are small and efficient that are not being produced, foreign imports are coming in at a very high level. There are several things we could do—prevent those foreign cars from coming in, deprive the American consumer from buying them, which would drive up the price of domestically produced small cars enormously or would hurt in Americans having to buy the more expensive and inefficient gas guzzlers which we do not want.

I think that would be ill-advised, so we are trying to carry over, as best we can during this transition phase, minimal damage to the American automobile market, as I described in my statement, encouraging the American manufacturers to shift toward the small and efficient cars as rapidly as possible, and as an additional thing, encouraging Volkswagen and other foreign manufacturers to come to the United States to employ American automobile workers—highly trained to produce the foreign-designed cars during that period.

Later, I have no doubt that the American manufacturers who are highly competent and who make superb vehicles rapidly shift to the small and efficient cars. When they do, I think the foreign markets, even those manufactured here, will have a much more competitive market.

But I cannot freeze now imports of small foreign cars that American consumers want just to protect an industry that is now transferring its attention to small cars to be manufactured here.

Q. I would like to get back to the subject of Iran if we might. There have been published reports that the Soviet Union has already taken some steps to counter the effects of a boycott or a blockade, should you decide to take that route as the days go on, the reports of truckloads of various food supplies

and other commodities are already coming across the Soviet border into Iran. Do you have any independent confirmation of this; and don't you think if it is true this would undermine any future type of a naval blockade?

A. The fact is that I guess historically there has been a fairly substantial level of trade between the Soviet Union and Iran. Before the recent revolution there were plans afoot for substantial increased shipments of natural gas from Iran into the Soviet Union in exchange for the barter of goods and perhaps hard cash.

The rail lines and the road system which interconnects Iran and the Soviet Union are quite limited in their capacity. They may be used now at capacity. I don't really know the specifics about that. But I think that the quantity of goods that would be interrupted by a possible blockade, which I'm not predicting now specifically will take place, could not possibly be filled or replaced by the limited transportation routes by land, either from Turkey or Iraq or the Soviet Union, certainly not from Afghanistan at this time.

Q. I was wondering, is it your belief the American people will continue indefinitely to provide the main defense of Western Europe when there's a story in the papers this morning that showed pluralities in both West German and Britain now oppose backing the United States in a future dispute with the Soviet Union?

A. The United States has never provided the majority or the overwhelming portion of troops or fighting equipment in Europe for the defense of Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact. The number of troops that America has in all in the European theater is about 300,000. We and our NATO allies combined have, I think, more than 2 million. I don't remember the exact figure.

We have always provided the strategic nuclear umbrella for the protection of Europe, and we've had direct control, as you know, over most of the tactical nuclear weapons. I saw results of a poll today from Germany that showed that over 80% of the people in West Germany, Federal Republic of Germany, favor a boycott of the Moscow Olympics by the Federal Republic of Germany.

I think the NATO alliance is as strong now as it has been in any time in my memory, since the war. Under very difficult economic circumstances, the major nations in the alliance have committed themselves to a real growth in de-

fense expenditures. Under heavy pressure, propaganda efforts by the Warsaw Pact nations, the allies voted last December to go ahead with a modernization of theater nuclear forces—a very difficult decision. And my own personal relationship with the leaders in those countries, both the heads of state and military and diplomatic, show a very strong commitment to the alliance and a very strong support for us.

I have sometimes been disappointed at the rapidity of action and the substance of the action taken by some of our allies in the Iranian and the Afghanistan question. But we look at things from a different perspective. We are much more invulnerable than they are to any sort of conventional attack. Germany, for instance, is a divided country—17 million Germans live under Communist rule in East Germany, and Berlin is especially exposed.

Most European countries have a much higher dependence on foreign trade than do we. But I think within the bounds of the limitations and difference of perspective, although I have sometimes been disappointed, I think they have performed adequately. And I believe recently, the last few days and I believe next week, we will see a strong rush of support to join us in the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, which will be a heavy propaganda and psychological blow to the Soviet Union in condemnation of their invasion, and I believe their support for us in Iran will prove that the premise of your question that we don't have their support and cooperation is inaccurate.

Q. In the last 10 days you've talked with the leaders of Israel and Egypt at length about their negotiations on Palestinian autonomy. And you've said, today in fact, that the problems look less formidable now. Can you tell us where the give is and where you see the hope that these two parties might reach agreement by May 26th or any other time in the near future?

A. I am not able and have never been able to speak for Egypt or to speak for Israel. The negotiation is basically between those two countries. We have faced much more formidable obstacles in the past than we presently face, both prior to the Camp David accords and also prior

to the Mideast peace treaty conclusion.

Now we are carrying out the Camp David agreement. When I discuss these matters with President Sadat or Prime Minister Begin, they have never deviated one iota from the exact language and the exact provisions of the Camp David accords. It's looked on almost as a sacred document.

There are differences of interpretation about what is actually meant by "a refugee" or what is actually meant by "full autonomy" and so forth. But we're now in the process of negotiating how much authority and power and influence and responsibility to give to the self-governing authority, how exactly it will be composed—those are the two basic questions—and how that self-governing authority is to be chosen. And once that's decided, Israel is completely ready to withdraw their military government, the civilian administration, to withdraw their own forces and to redeploy them in specified security locations and to let those new duties and responsibilities be assumed by the Palestinian Arabs who live in the West Bank/Gaza. That will be a major step forward, and if we can accomplish that then the details of exactly how to administer water rights and exactly how to administer land and how to administer other specific elements of security like controlling terrorism, which are now the difficult issues being negotiated, I think will be resolved without delay.

Text from White House press release. ■

News Conference of March 14 (Excerpts)

Q. Is Israel keeping faith with the Camp David accords and the autonomy talks when, by government policy, it continues to confiscate the land of Palestinians?

A. There is nothing specifically in the Camp David accords concerning the settlements themselves. There is an agreement in the treaty between Israel and Egypt about settlements that have been established in the Sinai region, which is Egyptian territory. I might say concerning that, that our policy is set by me, as President. There has been no change in our policy. That policy is guided by U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, the basis of all of our negotiations; by every word in the Camp David accords, signed by me on behalf of our nation; and by Begin and Sadat on behalf of Israel and Egypt. We intend to carry out that agreement.

Right now we are indulged in some very difficult but very important discussions and negotiations to establish full autonomy on the West Bank, Gaza area. I believe that these discussions can be successful. It's crucial to our own nation's security that they be successful, that we have peace in the Middle East; and it's, I think, crucial to the whole region that these discussions be successful.

I might add one other point. It's not easy. We've had tedious negotiations at Camp David. We had tedious negotiations almost exactly a year ago, when we finally concluded and signed the Mideast peace treaty. Our principles are well known by Prime Minister Begin and by President Sadat, and I stay constantly in touch with them and our negotiators to make sure that we are successful.

I believe that we will have peace in the Middle East, with a secure Israel behind recognized borders, with the Palestinian question being resolved in all its aspects, and with peace between Israel and its neighbors.

Q. You say the policy is set by you.

A. Yes.

Q. And this is a question about the recent mixup on the U.N. resolution. My question really goes to proc-

ess. The resolution was not the resolution that you wanted. Are you the only one who can determine that it is not the resolution you want? Does your staff not know when it's not a resolution that you want, or is it possible that some of your foreign policy advisers are trying to make policy for you?

A. I don't think anybody in my Administration doubts that I'm the one who sets the policy. The U.N. resolution, as it was passed, was not in accordance with the policy that I have established. It was not in accordance with the agreements that I had made with Prime Minister Begin, well understood by President Sadat.

We had agreed among us that we did not approve, as an American Government, of the settlements on the West Bank and Gaza area—that that were an obstacle to peace. But we had agreed that during the time of negotiations, we would not call for dismantling of existing settlements. That was to be resolved as an issue the ongoing negotiations.

Also, President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and I agreed on a paragraph in the Camp David accords concerning Jerusalem. It called for—and we still believe that there should be—an undivided Jerusalem but the those who look upon those places in Jerusalem as holy places should have unimpeded access to them for worship.

This resolution in the United Nations violated those two very important and basic principles. Those issues have not yet been resolved. There is not in this resolution at the United Nations that established the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza area. That will be established after a 5-year interval period, during which full autonomy is enjoyed by the residents of the area. So, the resolution was in violation of policy.

I might say that I have absolute confidence in Secretary Vance. I have seen him days and days and weeks negotiating to achieve the security of Israel and the peace of Israel. It was a honest breakdown in communication between me and the United Nations. I'm responsible for anything that goes wrong in this government, and I'm also responsible, on occasion, for things that go right. Secretary Vance is responsible for the State Department. But to say exactly how the commun-

s broke down is very difficult to do. But I made it known as quickly as I could that this resolution did not cover the policy and disavowed our support for it.

Q. Given the fact this is an election year, do you still intend to push ahead with Senate ratification of SALT II? If so, when will you ask the Senate to ratify SALT II? The second action deals with the Trident submarine. When that begins sea trials in June, I think under the SALT II agreement you will need to begin decommissioning Polaris submarines to stay within the limits of the SALT II agreement. Will you begin decommissioning Polaris submarines when Trident begins its sea trials, or will you wait for technical violation of the SALT II agreement?

A. The agreement which we presently have with the Soviet Union, which I intend to honor as long as they cooperate, is to comply with all the terms of the interim SALT agreement, which is known as SALT I.

SALT II has been signed by me and President Brezhnev. I consider it binding on our two countries. It has not been ratified. We will observe very closely to make sure that the Soviets comply with this agreement. I will not ask the Senate to ratify SALT II until I have a chance to consult very closely with the congressional leadership on the Senate side, particularly Majority Leader Byrd and others who work with both Democrats and Republicans. Because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is obvious that we did not see successful in ratifying the SALT II Treaty at this time. It is still the calendar. It will not be brought until after that consultation takes place. I will also continue to consult with congressional leadership as far as compliance with SALT II is concerned.

But my present intention, within the bounds of reciprocal action on the Soviet Union and consultations with the State and, to some degree, the House leadership, I intend to comply with the provisions of SALT II.

Q. I'm a bit confused by that last answer. You both said that you rejected the treaty that you signed as binding on this country and that you would consult on compliance with it. Does the question then come down to whether or not the United States, in the absence of ratification, would ob-

serve the provisions of SALT II and the notion that it's in its own best interests and, I suppose, inviting Soviet comparable action. Is that what you're saying to us?

A. Ordinarily, when a treaty is signed between the heads of two nations, the presumption is that the treaty will be honored on both sides absent some further development. One further development that would cause me to renounce the treaty would be after consulting with the Members of the Senate to determine an interest of our nation that might cause such a rejection; in which case I would notify the Soviet Union that the terms of the treaty were no longer binding.

So, there will be two provisos in the continued honoring of the SALT II Treaty. One is that the Soviets reciprocate completely, as verified by us, and, secondly, that the consultations that I will continue with the Senate leadership confirm me in my commitment that it's in the best interests of our country to do so.

Q. Can you give us some new word on the hostage situation in Iran? Is the Administration content to just wait until the parliament is elected, or do you have any plan to resolve this? Do you plan to bring any more pressures on Iran?

A. We are not content for the innocent American hostages to be held by terrorists for one single day. This is an abhorrent act in direct violation not only of international law but the very Islamic principles which these militants profess to espouse and to support. We have done everything we possibly could in the last 4 months to honor the principles of our nation, to protect the interests of our nation, to try to preserve in every way the health and the lives of those hostages, and to work for their freedom.

I don't know when they'll be released. We have constant negotiations and attempts to provide continuing communication with the leaders of Iran. I believe that when there's a stable government in Iran, which may possibly occur after the elections—the vote, as you know, began today. But our past few days have been characterized by bitter disappointments, because, in effect, commitments that had been made by the newly elected President and administration of Iran were not honored, because prior to these parliamentary

elections, they obviously do not have the authority to speak and carry out their own commitment. Whether they'll have that authority after the elections are completed I don't know. I certainly hope so.

Q. Why did we let in over 9,000 Iranians to come here and be citizens of this country after they took our hostages? Was that an accident or what happened?

A. No, it's not an accident. There's a difference between a great and a free and compassionate democratic nation on the one hand, and other countries from which refugees flee, looking for freedom, looking for the right to worship as they please, trying to escape possible persecution. We have screened the immigrants very closely, and in every instance, they have been determined to have a real, genuine, legal interest, and reason for coming to our country.

It would not be advisable for us, it would not be humane for us, it would not even be decent for us, in my opinion, when we have an intense confrontation—an extremely emotional confrontation—with a revolutionary country like Iran to refuse to accept refugees who are trying to escape circumstances there and coming to our nation for a haven. This was a decision made by me, it's in accordance with the American law, and I believe it's in the best interests of our own country to do so.

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 17, 1980. ■

U.S. Call for an Olympic Boycott

Address before the U.S. Olympic Committee House of Delegates in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on April 12, 1980.¹

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the honorary President of the U.S. Olympic Committee—the President of the United States. And I am delighted to be in the lovely community of Colorado Springs, the home of the U.S. Olympic Committee.

I speak to you as leaders dedicated to amateur sport and as citizens dedicated to America's best interests. I know that everyone in this room loves our country. And I want to express the nation's gratitude for your efforts at Lake Placid to persuade the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to move or postpone the Moscow games. I thank your leaders as well for stating that the committee would be guided by the President's decision on the best interests of the nation.

As we meet today, the lesson of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan still waits to be drawn. History holds its breath; for what is at stake is no less than the future security of the civilized world. If one nation can be subjugated by Soviet aggression, is any sovereign nation truly safe from that fate? If 100,000 Russian troops, and the barbaric use of lethal gas, and the specter of nightly assassinations—if these fail to alarm us, what will? If the Soviet lunge toward the most strategic oil-rich spot on Earth fails to unite us, what will? And if we and our allies and friends fail to use every single peaceful means available to preserve the peace, what hope is there that peace will long be preserved?

While history holds its breath, America has moved decisively. To show the Soviet Union that it cannot invade another nation and still conduct business as usual with the United States, our country has embargoed 17 million tons of grain, tightened controls on high technology trade, limited Soviet fishing in our waters, raised our defense budget to upgrade all aspects of our forces, strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, intensified development of our rapid deployment forces, and offered to help other sovereign states in the region to maintain their security.

On April 12, 1980, by a vote of 1,604 to 797, the U.S. Olympic Committee agreed not to send a U.S. team to the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow.

In the U.N. General Assembly, the United States joined more than 100 other nations in an unprecedented majority calling for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But the President, the Congress, and the American people understand that a world which travels to the Moscow games devalues its condemnation and offers its complicity to Soviet propaganda.

I am convinced that the American people do not want their athletes cast as pawns in that tawdry propaganda charade. And I urge you to respect that undeniable consensus. Your decision today is not a question of denying our Olympic team the honor they deserve; for the American people, as you know, deeply respect the sacrifice we are asking our athletes to make. It is no longer a question of whether participation in the

the President and Congress have made clear that the Olympic boycott is a genuine element of America's response to the invasion of Afghanistan. It is an unambiguous statement of our national resolve. It is a keystone in our call to our allies for solidarity.

We must not—and cannot—break that link between America's power to check aggression and America's call for an Olympic boycott. Your vote is a test of our will, our confidence, our values, and our power to keep the peace through peaceful means. It is not a partisan issue—for both political parties resoundingly supported the President's action in Congress. It is not a parochial issue; for the American people overwhelmingly agree that we must not go to Moscow.

And it is not just a national issue—for citizens and governments throughout the world share our judgment. From his exile in Gorky, Andrei Sakharov—the voice of the father of human rights and the father of the Russian H-bomb—calls for America, saying that “a united position on the Moscow Olympic Games must obviously be a basic part” of the world's r

... if we and our allies fail to use every single peaceful means available to preserve the peace, what hope is there that peace will long be preserved?

Moscow Olympics confers legitimacy on Soviet aggression. When the Communist Party prints a million handbooks to tell its top activists that the Summer Games mean world respect for Soviet foreign policy, surely that issue is behind us.

Nor is it a question of drawing a line between sports and politics. That line the Soviets long ago erased. When billions of rubles are diverted to the games from Soviet domestic needs; when Moscow and other Olympic cities are purged of dissidents who might speak out; when Soviet children who might meet Western people and ideas on the streets are packed off to internal exile; when Soviet emissaries roam the globe offering athletes expense-paid trips to Moscow; when Soviet sports officials distort the number of teams committed to participating—surely the issue of Soviet politics in Soviet sports is also behind us.

Above all, the decision you will make today is not a choice between a sports issue and a national security issue; for

sponse. This morning, as many as 50 nations—leading political and sports powers—await your signal to join us.

Athletes and sports organizations and national bodies around the world await your lead to mobilize their commitment. They do so for good reason. Today virtually every industrial nation on Earth is dangerously dependent on Persian Gulf oil. How could we convince the Soviets not to threaten the gulf, if a blow was dealt to our deterrent? How could our government send a message to Moscow, if tomorrow's *Pravda* brags that our policies have been repudiated?

It is fitting that the same ancient tradition that gave us the Olympics also gave us democracy; for your decision here is truly a referendum on freedom.

the Olympic Games

thus it is also a referendum on the character and fundamental nature of the athletes here, and the athletes represent, may have been born of a generation after the Berlin Olympics, but as their advisers and trustees, they bear the responsibility of linking that history to their duty. For the story of Hitler is more than an unspeakable tragedy, more than a study in tyranny. It is a chronicle of the free world's failure—of opportunities not seized, aggression not opposed, appeasement not abandoned.

By the fall of 1935, the Nazis had passed the notorious Nuremberg laws regarding the Jews to nonpersons and were using their military muscle. For a hope of a permanent, American opinion was polarized—and editorials and amateur athletic unions across the country urged a boycott of the Berlin Olympics. An American member of the International Olympic Committee, Ernest Jahncke, made the case most eloquently when he wrote the statement of the IOC.

Our committee permits the games to be held . . . Germany . . . there will be nothing to distinguish [the Olympic idea] from the ideal . . . It will take . . . years to re-establish the prestige of the games and the confidence of the peoples of the world. Sport is its beauty and its nobility and because it has already become in Nazi Germany an ugly, ignoble affair.

The call for a boycott was rejected. And the reasons for rejection are bone-deep—even across all these decades. They drag sports into the arena of politics, they were told. It will destroy the Olympic movement, they were told. It will penalize our American athletes, they were told. Solutions to political problems are not the responsibility of sporting events, they were told. Let us take our stand and blacks to Berlin and beat the Nazis, they were told. If America refuses to go, we will be the only ones left out in the cold, they were told.

Such reasons prevailed. Only weeks before American attendance was assured, German troops took the Rhineland; and Hitler invaded Germany for the games. His actions cast uncannily foreshadows. He expelled foreign journalists, who knew the truth about persecution. He ordered his vicious propaganda concealed from foreign visitors. And he too looked for legitimacy. As Joseph Goebbels boasted on the eve of the Olympics, "We expected the games to turn into a check and create a friendly world at-

titude toward Nazi political, economic, and racial aims."

It worked. Not even Jesse Owens' magnificent personal triumph diminished Hitler's international propaganda success—a coup he linked directly to his master race doctrine. We revere Jesse in death as in life; for he was an exemplary American, an inspiration to millions everywhere, and a personal friend loved by many of you here today. But neither Jesse's achievements in Berlin nor any words spoken at the games prevented the Reich from exploiting the Olympics toward their own brutal ends. Listen to Nazi War Minister Albert Speer's report on the Fuhrer's mood as the happy spectators left Berlin: "Hitler was exulting over the harmonious atmosphere that prevailed. . . . International animosity toward Nazi Germany was plainly a thing of the past, he thought." Before long, the Nazi war machine scarred the face of Europe, and soon the night closed in.

The Need for Sacrifice

We are far from that time—but not from that script. Like you, I understand the ideals of sport—for sportsmanship is synonymous with fair play. Like you, I am in awe of the Olympic tradition—stretching over centuries, reaching out across cultures.

And like every American, I know the exhilaration of Olympic victory. Few moments in my life match the electricity I felt at Lake Placid. And few human experiences can compare to the years of sacrifice, pain, and yearning that you and our athletes have invested in this summer. But I also know, as you know, that some goals surpass even personal achievement. To any young athletes who feel singled out for suffering, I say, it is war above all that singles out our young for suffering. And it is war that our peaceful resolve can prevent.

Everyone across the board is being asked to sacrifice. We need only ask the farmers of the midlands if they have sacrificed. Or ask the workers in our export industries if they have sacrificed. Or ask the computer companies whose products have been embargoed. Or ask the businesses whose years of planning have come undone. Or ask the young sailors in the Indian Ocean task force. Or ask the American families whose taxes support our defense budget. Or ask the Afghan

athlete who faces the Soviets not on a field in Moscow but as a resistance fighter in Kabul.

A heavy burden lies on your shoulders. We recognize the enormous price we are asking our athletes to pay. We recognize the tremendous sacrifice we are asking of sports officials. But on behalf of the President of the United States, I assure you that our nation will do everything within its power to insure the success of the Los Angeles games; to help the Olympic Committee restore its finances; to provide even greater assistance to the development of amateur sport; and, above all, to recognize the true heroism of our athletes who do not go to Moscow.

I believe all Americans will thank you—both for the contribution you make to our national security and to the further integrity you confer on amateur sport; for I believe that the Olympic movement will be forever strengthened by your courage. You will have restored to the modern Olympics the ancient "truce of the gods." No nation may serve as the Olympic host while invading and subjugating another: That was the rule for the Greek city-states, and that must be the rule again today.

Forty-five years ago, when an American official took his stand against Berlin, he said this:

Place your great talents and influence in the service of the spirit of fair play and chivalry—instead of the service of brutality, force, and power. . . . Take your rightful place in the history of the Olympics. . . . The Olympic idea [has been rescued] from the remote past. You have the opportunity to rescue it from the immediate present—and to safeguard it for posterity.

His words reach out to us across the decades. History rarely offers us a second chance. If we fail to seize this one, history itself may fail us.

¹Text from White House press release. ■

U.S. Foreign Policy: Our Broader Strategy

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 27, 1980.¹

I welcome the opportunity to join with you in looking beyond immediate events to America's overall posture and purposes in the world.

For the past 4 months, our primary concern has been drawn to an area of immediate crisis—southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Terrorism in Iran and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan have required concentrated attention. But even as we address these current challenges, we must constantly place our response to specific events within our broader strategy. Our present actions must not only meet immediate crises; they must advance our long-term interests as well.

Over the past several years I have met with the committee many times on specific elements of our foreign policy. These hearings offer an opportunity to consider America's wide-ranging interests, how they relate to each other, and our overall course.

I hope these hearings can also serve another purpose: to help crystallize broad agreement on the general course that best suits America's interests and needs in the coming decade.

I do not suggest that a full consensus behind a detailed foreign policy is now likely. In a world of extraordinary and growing complexity, a world in which our interests are diverse, we cannot escape choices which in their nature are the stuff of controversy.

But I do believe that despite differences on decisions that we have made and that we and others will make during the 1980s, our nation can now shape a new foreign policy consensus about our goals in the world and the essential strands of our strategy to pursue them.

This consensus can be built around agreement on two central points.

- First, the United States must maintain a military balance of power. Our defense forces must remain unsurpassed. Our strategic deterrent must be unquestionable. Our conventional forces must be strong enough and flexible enough to

meet the full range of military threats we may face. As a global power, we must maintain the global military balance. Our strength is important to our own safety, to a strong foreign policy free from coercion, to the confidence of allies and friends, and to the future of reciprocal arms control and other negotiations. Our strength also buttresses regional balances that could be upset by the direct or indirect use of Soviet power.

- The second central point is this: that our military strength, while an essential condition for an effective foreign policy, is not in itself a sufficient condition. We must nurture and draw upon our other strengths as well—our alliances and other international ties, our economic resources, our ability to deal with diversity, and our ideals. By drawing fully on these strengths, we can help shape world events now in ways that reduce the likelihood of using military force later. A global American foreign policy can succeed only if it has both these dimensions.

Some have argued that a strong response to Soviet military growth and aggression is overreaction. But to disregard the growth of Soviet military programs and budgets or to explain away aggression as a defensive maneuver is to take refuge in illusion.

It is just as illusory, and just as dangerous, to believe that there can be a fortress America or that the world will follow our lead solely because of our military strength. America's future depends not only on our growing military power; it also requires the continued pursuit of energy security and arms control, of human rights and economic development abroad.

As we look to the 1980s, our first obligation is to see the world clearly. We confront a serious and sustained Soviet challenge, which is both military and political. Their military buildup continues unabated. The Soviet Union has shown a greater willingness to employ that power directly and through others. In that sense, Afghanistan is a manifestation of a larger problem, evident also in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.

The world economic order is undergoing dramatic change. An energy crisis has rocked its foundations. Economic interdependence has become a daily reality

for the citizens of every nation. At the same time, the assertion of national independence has reshaped the political geography of the planet. There is a profusion of different systems and allegiances; a diffusion of political and military power. Within nations, we see an accelerating rise in individual expectations.

These challenges require a full American engagement in the world—a resolve to defend our vital interests with force necessary and to address potential conflicts of conflict before they erupt. These hearings can help illuminate how best to meet and serve the wide range of interests we have in a world grown increasingly complex.

In my remarks today, I will discuss eight central American interests for coming years. Each is broad in its own terms. But I do not believe that any of these interests can be narrowed, much less disregarded, without doing damage to the others.

- Our most basic interest, and I believe it is, is the physical security of our nation—the safety of our people. This requires strong defense forces and strong alliances.

- It also requires that we and our allies firmly and carefully manage a sensitive area of concern: East-West relations.

- A third interest—controlling the growth and spread of nuclear and other weapons—enhances our collective security and international stability.

- Fourth, we must confront the global energy crisis and strengthen the international economy; for doing so is vital to our well-being as a people and as a nation.

- A fifth interest, peace in troubled areas of the world, reduces potential threats of wider war and removes opportunities for our rivals to extend their fluency.

- Our diplomacy in troubled regions and our ability to pursue our global economic goals are strengthened by pursuing a sixth interest: broadening our ties with other nations—with China, for example, and throughout the Third World.

- The advancement of human rights is more than an ideal. It, too, is an interest. Peaceful gains for freedom are a

ds toward stability abroad and greater
rity for America.

- And finally, we cannot disregard
interest in addressing environmental
other longer term global trends that
imperil our future.

Pursuit of each of these interests
es shape the kind of world we want to
Each is important—as a part of this
der conception and because failure in
area can lead to failure in another.
Can we say that our security is more
atened by the growth of Soviet mili-
power or by the strains we can fore-
n the international economy? By the
pect of nuclear weapons in the hands
ditional nations or by the prospect of
oil and political turmoil in many re-
s of the world?

The hard fact is that we must face
of these and other challenges simulta-
neously. Clearly, our interests do collide
rticular circumstances. There will be
scaping the difficult task of weighing
interests against each other, moving
forward whenever possible.

Our course in the world must be de-
d by a mix of interests, sensibly bal-
nd, meeting always the central im-
eptive of national security for our
ntry and our people. No simple slogan
ngle priority can answer in advance
ilemmas of the coming decade.

Nor can we define our security
ests in ways that exclude any region.
o so could leave beyond the lines of
interest nations of genuine im-
ance to our well-being or tempt
rs to believe that we were ceding to
n new spheres of influence.

Certainly, we will always have re-
al priorities. As I shall discuss in
e detail, by history, strategic location,
shared values, our allies in Europe
the Far East are central to our plan-
g, as is our hemisphere.

We have also, in recent years, re-
ded to new dangers in a region of
aving strategic importance—southwest
a and the Persian Gulf. Because of its
ent urgency and its relevance to our
rall foreign policy, let me begin there.

Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf

My first concern is the continued, illegal
ention of Americans in Tehran. Rarely
e our determination and our judgment
n so severely tested as in our efforts
ree them. We will not rest until all of
people are free. As long as their cruel
ment continues, this matter will re-

main at the forefront of our national
agenda.

We have pursued a policy of firmness
and restraint. This is the most practical
course consistent with our national honor
and the safety of the hostages. Interna-
tional condemnation of Iran and the eco-
nomic measures which have raised the
costs to Iran of their illegal actions are
bringing home to Iranians the fact that
the holding of the hostages is harmful to
their interests and to the success of their
revolution. But divisions within Iran have
prevented progress.

We continue to work toward a peace-
ful resolution of the crisis. The United
States agreed to the U.N. commission of
inquiry to hear Iran's grievances and to
work for a resolution of the hostage
crisis. We regret that the commission was
unable to carry out its full mandate in
Tehran. But we continue to support its

*We will not rest until all of our
people are free.*

mission. We are prepared to see its work
go forward as soon as positive conditions
exist.

We are reviewing again our options
in the event tangible progress is not now
made.

There is only one question at issue
here: the illegal detention of our diplo-
matic personnel and American citizens in
contravention of international law and
practice. We accept Iran's revolution as a
fact; we do not question the right of the
Iranian people to determine their own fu-
ture; we do not reject Iran's desire to
bring its grievances to the attention of
the world. But Iran must first live up to
its fundamental responsibilities for the
safety, well-being, and release of the hos-
tages.

Several broader conditions in the
area also converge to demand our atten-
tion.

- One is our direct interest in the
Persian Gulf region. Roughly one-quarter
of the oil we import comes from this area
of the world. For our allies, the propor-
tion is higher—two-thirds in the case of
Western Europe, three-fourths for Japan.
Loss of this oil would create havoc not
only in the world economy but for the se-
curity of our alliances.

Our stake in the region, however, in-
volves more than oil. Peace and stability

in the area are critical to the future of our
friends there and affect the broader
peace. Our strength and skill in support-
ing their independence will demonstrate
to them and to others the constancy of
our purpose in the world.

- Another condition is the potential
for turmoil and instability, caused by ten-
sions between and within nations.

- A third condition is the geographic
accessibility of this critical region to the
Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan increases and dramatizes the
potential threat to the security of nations
there and to the world's free access to
natural resources and shipping routes.

That is the fact, whatever we may
speculate about Soviet aims; for inten-
tions cannot be known with certainty.
Even if they could, intentions can change.
Our response must be based upon Soviet
capabilities and Soviet behavior. To re-
spond firmly to these realities now is not
to be apocalyptic; it is simply to be pru-
dent.

Thus we are moving to deal with a
new security situation. We have in-
creased our own naval presence there and
we are working with others on access to
additional air and naval facilities in the
region. We are consulting with others on
steps to reinforce the deterrence to any
future Soviet aggression.

These steps serve an explicit and
unmistakable purpose. As President Car-
ter has said: "An attempt by any outside
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interests of the United States of
America, and such an assault will be re-
pelled by any means necessary, including
military force."

We are also acting to impose a seri-
ous and sustained price for the aggression
that is being committed against Afghanis-
tan. The steps we have taken—on grain,
on technology, on the Olympics, and in
other areas—have two purposes.

First, by responding firmly to ag-
gression, we seek to deter it elsewhere.
To pursue business as usual in the face of
aggression is to tempt new adventures or
risk miscalculation.

Detente cannot be divorced from de-
terrence. To oppose aggression now is to
promote peace in the future—to foster
the conditions for progress in East-West
relations. To assume that we can obtain
the benefits of detente while ignoring the
need for deterrence would be short-
sighted and dangerous. To assume that
detente is divisible, that aggression need
be met only when it directly threatens

one's own region, could encourage aggression elsewhere.

Deterrence requires sacrifice. The United States is willing to bear its share. It is vital that the burden of sacrifice be shared among all our allies—for the sake of peace, for the sake of our alliances, and for the sake of the public support which makes those alliances strong.

The Soviet invasion is not only a challenge to our interests but to those of our allies as well. While there should be a division of labor, it must be an equitable one.

We do not seek nor are we asking our allies to dismantle the framework of East-West relations. We do ask that they take measures designed to deter the Soviets from new adventures that could produce new crises. It is important that we and our allies stand together in our condemnation of aggression.

This firm stand also serves a second purpose: the withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

Western pressures do not stand alone. The Soviet actions have been swiftly and strongly condemned by the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world. The Soviets are facing a staunch, broadly based Afghan resistance. These factors all combine to impose a continuing cost on the Soviets for their aggression.

We also support efforts to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan, with a government that would be responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. With the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops, we would join with Afghanistan's neighbors in a guarantee of true neutrality and of noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Let me be clear that so long as Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan, the sanctions we have undertaken in response to the Soviet invasion will remain in force. We see no sign of Soviet withdrawal. The evidence is of a continuing buildup.

Let me be equally clear, however, that our intention is to remove the sanctions when Soviet troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan. This would include the tighter criteria we announced last week governing exceptions from controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union. However, the changes we have proposed in the list of items to be controlled would, if adopted by the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy (COCOM), remain in place; such changes were being considered even be-

fore the invasion of Afghanistan, as necessary to promote Western security interests and to reflect the state of Soviet technology.

Nor will we alter our firm position opposing participation at the Moscow Olympics. The February deadline has passed.

Our response to the immediate situation is part of our long-term strategy in the region, as we work with others toward a cooperative security framework. Our purpose is not to dominate any nation; our purpose is to help the nations of the region preserve their independence and build their strength so that they can resist domination by others.

We advance this objective in several ways.

- We are persisting in our efforts for peace in that broad region. A comprehensive settlement between Israel and its neighbors remains a paramount American goal. It would strengthen the security of Israel, to which we remain unshakably committed. It would enhance the security of Israel's neighbors and the stability of the region as a whole.

- In South Asia, mutual suspicions between India and Pakistan harm the security of both and heighten the regional danger. We will continue to support their efforts to resolve the issues dividing them. We seek good relations with both. Our assistance to either one is not directed at the other.

- We are working with the nations of the region to foster their economic progress and political stability. The conditions inviting internal disorder cannot be remedied by military force. They can be met as governments move to meet the expectations of their people in their own ways and within their own traditions.

- We are strengthening the basis for security cooperation in the region—through military assistance, through access to facilities, and through our increased presence. We have reaffirmed in these new circumstances our commitment to the 1959 agreement of cooperation with Pakistan. The nature of our economic and security assistance will depend both on Pakistan's assessment of its needs and our own resource capabilities.

- Finally, we seek to improve our relations with nations throughout the area, wherever there is a basis of shared interests. Our diplomacy is grounded in support for the independence of others and respect for their traditions and concerns.

I have concentrated on our approach in this one area because of its immediate

importance and because it illustrates a more general proposition: Globally, as well as in this region, our posture must be to maintain our own and allied military strength while pursuing an active, affirmative diplomacy. Both serve the full range of our interests.

U.S. Security

Our most fundamental interest is to maintain our security through an assured balance of military power. For more than 15 years there has been a steady growth in Soviet military programs and budget. They have doubled their defense effort over the past two decades. There is no sign of abatement in this trend.

During most of that same period our own efforts, in real terms, decreased. We have reversed this downward trend. If it were to continue, the current overbalance in military forces would be dangerously altered.

The increases in defense spending that this Administration has proposed require sacrifice at a time of economic difficulty. They are sacrifices we must make now for the sake of our future security. As we proceed, we should not underestimate our existing strength. We want no dangerous miscalculations of our power or our will.

Simple U.S.-Soviet force comparisons, for example, ignore the principle of collective security that are the core of our defense strategy. On the whole, our alliance makes a significantly greater military contribution than Soviet allies. Combined NATO strength rests upon an economic foundation more than twice the size of that of the Warsaw Pact. And our alliances also have a fundamental cohesion that is far less certain on the Warsaw Pact side.

A fair measurement of the balance must also account for the fact that the Soviets have fully one-fourth of their ground and tactical air forces deployed along their border with China.

More broadly, our purpose in the world is in basic harmony with the deep determination of nations around the world to defend their sovereignty. A purpose in conflict with nationalism—a quest to dominate and control others—presets far more difficulties and dangers, as the Soviets are learning from the nationalists in Afghanistan.

Most important, we are moving in orderly fashion to anticipate and remedy the potential gaps in our defenses—strategic, theater nuclear, and con-

ional. Our real defense programs are being. Reinstatement of draft registration will advance our capacity for sharp increases in military personnel should a time crisis require it.

To portray an America standing immobile in the face of growing danger may be dishonorable, but it also is patently false.

Our security begins with the balance of strategic forces. The Soviet nuclear arsenal constitutes the one credible, direct threat to the continental United States. It effectively deters that danger we must have a capability for certain and appropriate retaliation to any level of attack. We must also maintain forces which are more perceived to be, essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union, to avoid the possible military or political consequences that an imbalance might bring.

These requirements—flexible defense and essential equivalence—are met by our programs to modernize and improve the three elements of our national strategic force: the MX mobile missile, the Trident submarine and missile programs, and the unlaunched cruise missiles for our nuclear bombers.

Our security is also based upon collective defense. The security of our allies is synonymous with our own.

The Soviet Union, with its Warsaw Pact allies, has increased its capability to mount a heavy attack, with little warning in Europe. To counter that danger, President Carter in 1977 recommended to Congress a Long-Term Defense Program to move allied capabilities in each of 10 critical areas ranging from air defense to maritime posture. The program was completed in 1978. It is being implemented.

Last December in response to Soviet nuclear modernization, the NATO Ministers agreed to a plan for modernizing our theater nuclear forces while we negotiate equal negotiated limits on both sides. These force improvements reflect a common perception in NATO of the growing threat to Europe—and a common determination to respond. I will not pretend there is unanimity in the alliance on international issues. But NATO is based on its central role, and the alliance is making progress to guarantee that its capabilities will be sufficient to meet its obligations.

We have security interests in Asia similar to those in Europe. We are committed to maintaining our strength in Asia. Our close association and alliance with Japan reflect strong economic ties

and shared security interests. Our defense cooperation is expanding. Japan's self-defense forces are undergoing steady improvement. We have urged Japanese leaders to expand these programs, within the limits set by the Japanese constitution.

We attach great importance to our alliances with our ANZUS [security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States] partners—Australia and New Zealand. We stand firmly behind our other security commitments in the region.

In response to the confirmed sharp buildup in North Korea, we are maintaining our strength in that area. At the same time, the strength of our South Korean ally is growing. Next year, for example, South Korean defense spending is expected to reach nearly 6% of its gross national product, compared to roughly 4% in the early 1970s.

Conclusion of a revised base agreement with the Philippines has been an

... if we shortchange our programs of security assistance now, we will be shortchanging our own future safety.

important, positive development for the sustained defense of the region.

Our forces in East Asia not only reinforce our security commitments there; because of their mobility they help protect interests that we and our Asian allies share outside the immediate region, such as those in the Persian Gulf.

Our European and Asian alliances have long encompassed our major defense priorities. They do not, however, define the perimeters of our security interests. We must also be prepared to reinforce the capacity for resistance to aggression in areas beyond our alliances. Let me take a few moments to address this important question.

With an inescapable stake in the health of the international economy, we cannot idly watch vital resources fall under the control of an outside force. Our interests require that we be able and willing to help others resist challenges to their sovereignty and to counter, in particular, a growing Soviet ability to project its power.

Our ability to project our power is

unsurpassed. But improvements must be made. Enhancing the mobility of our rapid deployment forces will be an important step forward. Plans for maritime prepositioning ships and a new large cargo aircraft will further strengthen our ability to respond quickly when crises occur.

The confidence of our friends and our political influence in the world depend, in part, upon our military strength and our will to use it if necessary. We must be seen as fully reliable. Our strength must be perceived as fully sufficient to meet realistic threats.

Certainly there are limits to what we can and should do. We would undermine the confidence of our friends and allies through bellicose pronouncements or a posture that implied an interest in dominating other sovereign states. The use of American military force is not a desirable American policy response to the purely internal politics of other nations. As the President said in his State of the Union address, "... our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being."

No easy formula can determine in advance when we should use military force beyond our alliance areas. The proper response in each case must be a function of the importance and immediacy of the American and allied interests at risk; the source and character of the threat; the potential involvement of friends and allies within and beyond the region affected; the prospects for success and the potential costs of our involvement; and other factors.

Our system rightly gives responsibility to both the President and the Congress for committing our military forces to combat. To sustain such a commitment requires a firm public base.

Obviously, direct military involvement is not our preference. The best answer to outside pressure is indigenous strength. Sensible programs of security assistance and arms supply can help our friends build their own capacity to resist. A policy which concentrated solely on our own military strength and failed to provide for legitimate security needs of our friends would be worse than shortsighted. It would be dangerous; for such a policy would increase the danger of conflicts and international confrontations that might be avoided if local security balances are preserved.

Let me emphasize that if we shortchange our programs of security assistance now, we will be shortchanging our own future safety. Such programs are not

gifts to other nations; they are investments which serve our security interests as well as theirs.

East-West Relations

As we fulfill the needs of defense and deterrence, our second interest is in fashioning a relationship with the Soviet Union in which our fundamental competition is bounded by restraint. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their adventurism in Africa and Asia have done real damage to this relationship and to the immediate prospects for a more peaceful world.

We are prepared to impose costs on aggression for as long as necessary. We will promote America's interests and values in all of our dealings. But we seek no cold war, no indiscriminate confrontation. It is not in our interest, even during a period of heightened tensions, to dismantle the framework of East-West relations constructed over more than a generation. Even if we could discount the direct implications of an unbounded competition for our own interests—and we cannot—our relations with our allies and our credibility throughout the world would still call for a diligent, good faith American effort to sustain a framework for peace.

Thus, even as we have responded to Soviet aggression, we have also held to our formal obligations. We are denying specific benefits to the Soviet Union, but we have not abrogated formal agreements. Progress has been suspended, but when Soviet behavior allows, the door to a more stable and mutually beneficial relationship—a competition bounded by restraint and a regard for each other's interests—will be open.

Meanwhile, we should avoid framing our discussions of East-West relations in ways that suggest a false choice between extremes: between some utopian state of perfect detente on the one hand or, on the other, a condition of implacable hostility. In fact, realism and safety require that we conduct relations in the continuum between those two poles. At times there will be greater progress in areas of mutual interest. At others, as now, the adversarial elements in our relations will be prominent. There will always be elements of both.

In seeking to deter further aggression and pressing for an end to the invasion of Afghanistan, we are working to create the conditions that will enable us to return to building a more stable relationship.

Arms Control

A third and related area of emphasis is arms control. Our interests have been well served by the arms control agreements to which the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. In 1963 we halted poisonous nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. The SALT I Interim Agreement froze the number of offensive strategic missiles when the Soviets were building up in that area and we were not. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty headed off a potentially costly and destabilizing arms race in these defensive weapons. In the same fashion, the SALT II Treaty would serve this country's paramount security interests.

We must all think through very carefully the consequences of a no-SALT world. What would that world look like?

- Without SALT, there would be no agreed limit on the number of strategic

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systems the Soviets could build. They could easily reach a total of 3,000 delivery systems over the next 5 years, more than 700 beyond what the treaty allows.

- Without SALT, there would be no limits on the number of separate warheads each missile can carry. Each of the Soviet Union's heaviest missiles—the SS-18s—could theoretically deliver 20 or even 30 nuclear warheads, instead of the 10 the treaty allows. On those 308 SS-18s alone, the Soviets could mount as many additional warheads as their entire strategic force holds today.

- Without SALT, our own defense planning would be seriously complicated. For example, the MX program would be more difficult to design and build and less certain to achieve its purpose.

- Without the treaty, our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces—and thus evaluate Soviet capabilities—could be impaired, since there would be no constraints on the deliberate concealment of those forces.

- Without the treaty, the likely increase in Soviet strategic capabilities would compel further defense expenditures that could compound our already difficult budget choices.

The security advantages of SALT I have been reinforced by recent events. At a time of increased tensions between the superpowers, effective mutual constraints on strategic arms become all the more important.

For these compelling reasons of security, we should move ahead with ratification at the earliest feasible time. In the interim, it is most important that both sides continue to observe the mutual constraints of SALT I and SALT II. Our strategic programs are consistent with those agreements. We will, of course, continue to review our strategic arms requirements with the Congress, and we will keep a close watch on Soviet action to see that they are exercising a similar degree of restraint.

For the same reasons, we will continue whenever feasible to pursue balanced and verifiable arms control agreements at other levels—in the mutual balanced force reduction talks, on anti-satellite warfare, on banning nuclear weapons tests, on chemical warfare, and in other areas. The theater nuclear force negotiating offer remains on the table. And we have called upon the Soviet Union to pursue it with us.

None of these efforts is undertaken as a favor to others; each one serves the national security interests of the United States, as well as others.

Our willingness to seek restraint in strategic weapons reinforces other critical arms control efforts. In particular, we must be concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons. The technology is lost its mystery. Six countries have already carried out nuclear explosions. At least dozen more could produce a weapon within a few years of deciding to do so. The risks in this progression are self-evident. Regional nuclear arms races have become a real danger. The presence of nuclear arms in volatile areas multiplies the chance that they will be used.

Thus we continue to press for the widest adherence to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. We are urging other to take necessary steps to bring the treaty of Tlatelolco into full force. And vigorously support the improvement of application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In 1977 President Carter also initiated the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, to involve both producing and consuming nations in a joint search for ways to realize the benefits of nuclear power while limiting the risks that nuclear weapons will be developed. This was not a negotiation that resolved

Differences; it was a technical study illuminated problems and possible solutions.

It has provided a better understanding of the economics, technology, and risks associated with the nuclear fuel cycle, and it produced consensus on a number of middle-range goals. These include the possible value of an international regime to manage excess plutonium, stronger fuel supply assurances for consumers under effective nonproliferation controls, and conversion of research reactors from use of highly enriched uranium fuels. Differences remain in many areas, but the essential task has been advanced by this common effort.

More countries will approach the nuclear weapons threshold in the decade ahead, some with uncertain intentions in regions of tension and conflict. The time remaining to reduce the appeal of nuclear weapons and to develop safer ways to address legitimate energy needs is slipping away. Our nonproliferation efforts are more vital now than ever before.

Energy Crisis and the World Economy

Fourth, it is plainly in our interest to act to forestall a future energy disaster. Quite simply, that is what we could do. We now import some 40% of the petroleum we use. This year alone, the cost for these imports will come to some \$8 billion. That energy dependence fuels our inflation. It strains the dollar. It turns our balance of payments. It increases our vulnerability.

As much as anything else we do in the coming decade, our effort to gain control of our energy future—to conserve, to expand our own production, and to develop new and renewable fuels—will determine not only the quality of our lives at home but the strength of our position in the world.

We must also recognize the profound consequences of the global energy crisis for other consuming nations whose economic health affects our own. Our allies are even more dependent than we on the production and pricing decisions of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and on political events in oil-producing nations.

The point is vividly illustrated by the plight of Turkey, which now spends 70-80% of all its export earnings to pay for oil imports. Because of a shortage of oil, it is only able to keep its industry functioning at something less than 50% of capacity. It would be hard to exaggerate the strains that the energy crisis places

on many nations such as this democratic and strategically placed ally.

The developing countries are even more burdened by the rising price of oil, the inflation it helps to fuel, and the debts it brings. This year, developing countries will spend on oil and debt servicing alone three times what they will receive in outside economic assistance from all the industrial democracies and the OPEC countries.

The United States has a direct stake in the economic vitality of developing countries. They are increasingly important as partners in trade—both as markets and sources of supply. And the political effect of their economic stagnation can have serious consequences for us—with major social disruptions, a reversal of progress toward democratic rule and human rights, and new openings for violence and radicalism.

In short, our economy and ultimately our security depend upon whether we can gain control over our own energy future, and whether the world economy can manage the hard transition ahead. We

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have made some progress in the past few years. While our economy was growing last year, our oil consumption declined. The elements of a national energy policy are taking shape.

Continued progress at home will give impetus to our international efforts—working with other consumers for more stringent conservation and developing new energy resources through World Bank financing and our bilateral assistance.

As we grapple with the energy problem, it is important that we not lose sight of our broader economic interests or jeopardize the real progress that has been made in the past few years to open and strengthen the international economy.

Despite the persistence of protectionist impulses in times of economic difficulty, the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations was able to agree upon significant reductions in barriers to trade—a result which both improves our access to foreign markets and helps to curb inflation at home. Current economic strains must not erode this major achievement.

The global economic structure is

being strengthened in other ways—through negotiation of commodity agreements, progress on the common fund, and more funding for the multilateral development banks.

The International Monetary Fund, in particular, has a key role in helping countries through this time of adjustment and also in recycling OPEC's enormous surpluses. To fulfill these vital missions, the increase in IMF quotas scheduled for later this year is essential. We also have a stake in assuring the necessary capital for the World Bank, the International Development Association, and the regional development banks.

Let there be no mistake. The years ahead will be trying ones for the international economy. The trend in oil prices is alarming. The OPEC countries will continue to run massive surpluses—estimated at over \$100 billion for 1980—which means corresponding deficits for other nations. The developing countries will be hardest hit—and faced with the painful choice between stunted growth and deeper debt.

The steps we have taken only buy us more time. We must use that time to make fundamental adjustments in our energy consumption and production patterns. Our older industries must be streamlined and retooled to meet the inevitable challenge of a more open and competitive world economy. More investment must be earmarked for new product lines and advanced technology. For that is necessary to restore the balance in international commerce—and to assure future prosperity for the American people.

Regional Peace

A fifth element in our global strategy is to help achieve peaceful resolutions of disputes in troubled regions of the world. The task is an imposing one, and it is not without costs. It is always difficult to work for accommodations which cannot fully satisfy the demands of any side, because they must be accepted by all sides. We must be prepared for frustration.

But working for peace is directly relevant to our interests in collective secu-

ity and the freedom of other nations from outside domination. Regional conflicts pose the danger of wider confrontations. Disputes between our allies—as in the case of Greece and Turkey—weakens the common defense. And as a magnet draws iron, Third World conflict seems to draw the interest of the Soviets, the Cubans, or others prepared to exploit disorder.

We can take satisfaction that real progress in the pursuit of peace has been made.

The 1979 Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt is an historic achievement. We have no more urgent diplomatic priority than the effort to complete and broaden that peace so that Israel, the neighboring Arab states, and the Palestinian people will be able to live securely and with dignity.

Our immediate attention must be on the autonomy negotiations. Ambassador Linowitz (Personal Representative of the President to the Middle East Peace Negotiations) has worked hard and ably to focus and accelerate the talks, which have now begun to center on the substantive issues that lie at the very heart of the negotiations—issues like security, water, and land. We have no illusion about the complexity and sensitivity of the problems that remain. But in this evolutionary process we have overcome seemingly intractable obstacles before.

The President has invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to Washington for talks in April. They know that the Camp David process provides the best opportunity in 30 years to bring the security of peace to the Middle East. We cannot let it slip away.

There has also been an historic breakthrough in southern Africa. The nation of Zimbabwe will soon become a reality, through the realism of the parties, the skill of British diplomacy, the commitment of other African states, and because of the constructive role played by the United States. The steadfastness of the Congress in resisting attempts to lift sanctions prematurely played a significant part in assuring that bargaining and balloting, not bullets, are shaping Rhodesia's future.

I want to be sure the importance of this event is understood. We have a wide range of interests in Africa—security interests, economic interests, an interest in political cooperation on all global issues. In my judgment no policy could have served those interests better than our stalwart support for the principle of majority rule, with minority rights, in

Rhodesia. And nothing could have weakened us more there than to waver in this crucial effort.

Peace and stability are at risk in other parts of the world—in the eastern Mediterranean, in Southeast Asia, in northwest Africa, in our own hemisphere. All of those cases have some bearing upon American interests. At the same time there are, of course, practical limits on what we—or any one nation—can do.

The nature of our involvement will vary—from support for the efforts of others, to mediation ourselves, to helping maintain a balance of forces if that is required to induce the parties to settle. But in each case we are determined to employ the influence we have to develop workable alternatives to war.

We advance regional peace in another tangible way, by striving to limit the destructiveness of war when it cannot be prevented. Since 1977 the United States has taken the lead in working toward negotiated limits on conventional arms transfers. While we remain convinced that such agreements can contribute to a safer world, we do not at this time foresee progress.

In the absence of agreed international restraint, we do not plan to reduce further the ceiling on our own arms transfers. But the other elements of our arms transfer policy continue to serve our interests. Arms transfers must be based on assessments of U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. The policy has a dual effect:

- To facilitate those arms transfers that clearly promote the security of the United States and our allies and friends, and
- To restrain transfers that are in excess of legitimate defense needs, that could promote regional arms races or increase instability, or that otherwise do not advance U.S. interests.

In short, our purpose in supplying arms is security, not profit.

Positive Bilateral Relations

Sixth, we have an interest in building positive bilateral relations with all countries, wherever there is a basis of shared concerns. Scores of new countries—and new centers of power—have emerged since the end of the Second World War. The international landscape—and thus the nature of diplomacy—has been altered fundamentally. Questions of direct

importance to us are determined not in a few capitals but among 155. Our access to resources and to defense facilities cannot simply be declared; it must be agreed. We seek positive relations around the world not because we have a compulsion to be liked but because our interests and the well-being of our people are at stake.

This interest in a broad network of relationships is reflected in our international approach.

- This Administration has worked especially hard to strengthen our core partnerships with our traditional allies. There appear to be new strains among us they flow principally from the fact that we are facing up to hard, new challenges together.

- We often have an interest in working with nations whose ideologies are different from ours. In a diverse world our exact scale of values will be replicated rarely if at all. It would make no sense to limit our influence by refusing to pursue specific areas of shared interest with other nations because of broader disagreement.

This is why we oppose, in principle, country-by-country limitations on our aid and trade programs. Obviously we will not have such relationships when there is no basis for cooperation—as is the case in Cuba and Vietnam. But our diplomacy is undercut when such restrictions are cast in law.

The establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China illustrates the value of an open approach. It is, in its own terms, an accomplishment of historic importance—an achievement of economic as well as diplomatic meaning, global as well as regional significance. Normalization is not an end in itself. It is the beginning of continuing efforts to improve our relations with Beijing. Similarly, we are working toward improved relations with the nations of Eastern Europe.

- The pursuit of our interests also requires that we stress an inclusive form of diplomacy, in which all who have a stake also have a role and are encouraged to accept a share of the responsibility for hard decisions. Our diplomacy on Namibia and Zimbabwe is a case in point. Such multilateral efforts are time-consuming and complex. But building coalitions is a process that Americans, with our own pluralistic traditions, well understand. Abroad, no less than at home, on many issues it is the only way to achieve workable results.

Our interest does not require that

be like us or always side with us. We seek their willingness to find areas of mutual interest or balanced compromise in our interests may clash. A quest for unanimity is not realistic, nor is it required. The Soviets may demand ideological purity; we can serve our interests in a world of diversity.

In this context, let me dispute the suggestion that in our dealings with the Third World we have to choose between two approaches: competing with Soviet nations in the Third World by seeing developing nations primarily through a Cold War prism or dealing with the Third World primarily in terms of Third World problems. These are sometimes presented as exclusive options.

But the choices presented—between an interest in Third World concerns and a determination to counter Soviet inroads—are false. In fact, the two are twin strands in a single strategy, for the best strategy for competing with the Soviets is to address the practical interests of Third World countries themselves—not their security concerns but their needs for economic and political justice as well as peace.

It would be misleading, of course, to gloss over our real differences with developing countries on a wide range of issues. But we can bargain most effectively, for mutual benefit, when they are confident that we share the goals of equitable economic growth and political independence.

Certainly there have been painful disappointments and setbacks. But because we have supported those goals, our relations with most of the nations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia are better than they have been for many years.

Human Rights

One seventh way in which we advance our interests in the world—indeed our national security—is through support for human rights. When the two concepts—human rights and national security—are uttered in the same breath, it is to express an unavoidable conflict, a fundamental tension between the pursuit of the good and the pursuit of the practical.

I strongly reject the idea that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the pursuit of human rights and the pursuit of self-interest. By this, I do not mean to say that there can never be a conflict between human rights concerns and security concerns. We cannot escape hard decisions that must be made in

such cases. We must constantly weigh how best to encourage the advancement of human rights while maintaining our ability to conduct essential business with governments—even unpopular ones—in countries where we have important security interests.

But the fact remains that over the longer term, our pursuit of human rights is not only generally compatible with our national security, it contributes to that security.

We know from our own national experience that the drive for human freedom has tremendous force and vitality. It is universal. It is resilient. And, ultimately, it is irrepressible. Just in the past several years, we have seen that drive for a fuller voice in economic and political life gain new expression in Portugal and Spain and Greece; in Nigeria and Ghana and Upper Volta; in Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic; and elsewhere. These countries make a compelling case for the proposition that the tide in the world is running toward human rights and that it is in our interest to support it.

The United States cannot claim credit for these developments. But we can find proof in them that our policy of furthering human rights is not only consistent with American ideals; it is consistent with the aspirations of others.

Our support for those aspirations enables us to regain the political high ground in competition for world influence. It stands in vivid contrast to the practices of the Soviet Union abroad, as Afghanistan demonstrates, and at home, as the internal exile of Andrei Sakharov again makes clear. In short, our willingness to press for human rights progress gives credibility to our commitment to freedom. And it is that commitment which has always been one of America's most enduring strengths in the world.

Our support for human rights serves our interests in another way. As President Carter put it in his State of the Union address,

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring.

As the President suggested, divergent views cannot be long repressed without sowing the seeds of violent convulsion. And once the ties are broken between a government and its people, outside intervention cannot secure its

long-term survival. Thus it is profoundly in our national interest to support constructive change before such ties erode and the alternatives of radicalism or repression drive out moderate solutions.

How each society manages change is a matter for it to decide. We cannot and should not write social contracts for others. But we can help others promote—in their own ways—peaceful and orderly reform.

We do that by clearly expressing our opposition to official torture, arbitrary arrest, and other abuses of individual liberties. Whatever short-term quiet they may provide, they engender long-term bitterness.

We do it by reinforcing efforts to open economic and political institutions to broader national participation, so that they are better able to accommodate conflicting views and interests.

And we do it by focusing development assistance on helping governments meet the basic human needs of their people. In doing our part to meet the greatest moral challenge of our times—the plight of hundreds of millions of human beings who lack adequate food or health care—we are also addressing the root causes of instability. We must recognize, in the demand of these people for their basic human rights, that stability can only come through peaceful progress, not through a desperate effort to preserve the status quo.

Nowhere do we see more clearly the race between radical and peaceful change than in Central America today. And nowhere is our commitment to peaceful change more clearly tested. In Nicaragua our challenge is to join with others in the region to help the Nicaraguan people and government succeed in building a stable, healthy, democratic society out of the debris of dictatorship and civil war. We cannot guarantee that democracy will take hold there. But if we turn our backs on Nicaragua, we can help guarantee that democracy will fail.

Failure to appropriate needed American aid has jeopardized our interests. It has weakened the position of the private sector, which would receive the majority of our assistance. It has made it more difficult for the Nicaraguan Government to pursue a development strategy that includes important roles for both the public and private sectors. And it has played into the hands of the Cubans. Those who are most concerned about the potential for radical revolution in Latin America

and growing Cuban influence in the region should be the strongest supporters of our efforts to help Nicaragua build a better future.

Our essential challenge in El Salvador is similar. In October reformist military officers overthrew a military dictator in order to forestall the outbreak of a violent and bloody civil war. The Revolutionary Junta of Government, which includes the Christian Democratic Party, is committed to peaceful, sweeping change. An impressive agrarian reform has already turned more than 224,000 hectares of land over to the rural poor. The ultimate success of the program will depend heavily on our ability to provide technical and economic assistance.

The dangers of the situation are clear in the tragic and despicable assassination of Archbishop Romero. If reform fails, El Salvador will become a battleground between the radical left and the radical right. A moderate solution is still possible. It is in our interest. We will pursue this interest by helping the Government of El Salvador pursue progress.

In short, we pursue our human rights objectives not only because they are right but because we have a stake in the stability that comes when people can express their hopes and find their futures freely. Our ideals and our interests coincide.

Environmental Concerns

Eighth and finally, we cannot define our interests so narrowly as to exclude from our immediate attention a series of other global trends that darken the horizon. We face a world population that could double in the next generation, overwhelming our global resources; already, for example, the world's tropical forests are disappearing at a rate of 50 acres a minute. The worldwide flood of refugees displaced from their homes—some 7-8 million people today—is growing. The enormous international traffic in narcotics costs our society nearly \$50 billion each year and destroys thousands of lives. The mounting wave of international terrorism strikes at the very heart of civilized order.

Imagine for a moment how different our world could be for our children if we do not address these problems now on an urgent basis. To relegate these matters permanently to the back burner of our

foreign policy is to invite even more serious consequences for us in the future.

- Thus we have increased our bilateral aid commitment in family planning. The United States is the world's leading donor in this area.

- We have focused greater attention and greater resources on efforts to deal with such potentially harmful environmental trends as the shrinking global base of tropical forests and farmland and the creeping spread of deserts.

- The United States has taken a leading role in relief and resettlement of refugees, particularly in Southeast Asia where the need has been most acute. Humanitarian considerations alone would compel our generous response. Our political and strategic interests reinforce that requirement; for massive refugee flows

We face a world population that could double in the next generation, overwhelming our global resources

heighten tensions in regions already unsettled by political and military conflict. We must help friendly governments which are risking severe internal strains as they shoulder a growing refugee burden.

- Wherever possible, we have strengthened our bilateral cooperation with governments striving to halt the production of narcotics within their borders.

The steps that we take now to address such global issues can prevent our being engulfed by them later. But let me make a fundamental point here: On these—and on many of the other challenges I have discussed this morning—there can be no exclusively American solutions. There can only be international answers, or there will be no answers at all.

The blight of terrorism is an especially urgent case in point. No nation can defeat it alone. We have been working actively through the United Nations and other multilateral institutions to build an international consensus on the criminality of terrorist tactics. International conventions—on aircraft sabotage, hijacking, the protection of diplomats, and against the taking of hostages—play a crucial part. We need wider support for the principles that governments should not give in to terrorist blackmail and that both

those who commit and those who support terrorism have to be punished. Every feasible step—unilateral and multilateral—must be employed.

In this and many other areas, the truth is that we cannot assure our future security without a framework for global cooperation on issues that affect many nations and many peoples. That is why we have welcomed and supported the growing strength of regional association such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity and the Association of South East Asia Nations.

And that is why we need to support and continue to help strengthen, the United Nations and its affiliated institutions. It is a center of global politics. The collective expression of world opinion embodied in recent U.N. votes on Afghanistan and Iran demonstrates that our interests can be advanced there. In the Middle East and elsewhere, its peacekeeping operations reduce tensions. On refugees; on the fight against hunger, illiteracy, and disease; on strengthening international resistance to terrorism; and on other issues of importance to us, the United Nations is making a concrete contribution.

Certainly, there are limits to what international organizations can accomplish. But to dismiss them as irrelevant or inconsequential would be folly. The simple fact is that we need them and they need our support. The institutions of international cooperation and international law are essential to the practical advance of our interests in the world.

Conclusion

I know that no one is more acutely aware of the breadth and complexity of our challenges than the members of this committee. We face a broad agenda. It requires constant, hard choices among compelling yet competing interests. In a dangerous world, it requires a willingness to defend our vital interests with force when necessary and a diplomacy of active and constructive engagement to reduce the dangers we may confront. It requires sacrifice in resources for our defense and help for other nations, in reduced consumption of energy, and efforts to control inflation. It will test our wisdom and our persistence.

We will be badly served if we fail to understand a world of rapid change and shy away from its complexity. The flat truth is that complex problems can sel-

Deputy Secretary Christopher Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was interviewed on ABC's "Issues and Answers" on April 13, 1980, by Bob Clark and Barrie Dunsmore of ABC News.

Q. There are reports today that President Carter has asked this country's major allies to break off diplomatic relations with Iran next month if the hostages haven't been released by then. Is this true?

A. Let me put that in context for you. As you know, the President, last Monday, the 7th of April, took a series of serious steps with respect to Iran. We really entered a new phase where we're going to be very determined and very deliberate.

We've asked our allies to join us in taking severe economic sanctions against Iran. The allies asked their ambassadors in Tehran to meet with President Bani-Sadr to let him know the seriousness of the matter. And now those ambassadors are returning to their capitals. We hope and expect that the allies will be acting with respect to those matters of economic sanctions within the next few days. Perhaps they'll act jointly on the 21st of April at the time of the foreign ministers' meeting of the European Community.

Now if that doesn't work, if there's no progress, if the hostages are not released, the President has asked the allies to seriously consider further diplomatic steps. He's expressed the hope that they will join us in taking the kind of diplomatic steps that we took last week.

Now as far as that date, I don't want to confirm any specific date or even a particular month, but I will say the timeframe is not a long one. The President said yesterday it's not a matter of months, and it's not more than a matter of several weeks.

Q. You say the President has asked the allies to take the—if further economic sanctions don't work—to take the sort of diplomatic sanctions that we took last week, and that was a total breakoff of diplomatic relations with Iran. So the President has asked our allies to do that. Is that correct?

A. Yes, he asked them to do that if there was no progress and if the hostages had not been released after these other

sanctions had had an opportunity to be effective.

Q. Ever since the President made his announcement various spokesmen for the government have hinted about the possibility of using the military option if these things don't work out. But it's been nothing more than hints, and as a matter of fact, the other day Jody Powell [White House press secretary] seemed to be backing away a little bit from that. How realistic is a military option?

A. Let me talk to you about the options that remain. The President took a number of very serious steps last Monday. As you know, he broke diplomatic relations. He took the steps with respect to visas. He put into effect severe economic sanctions. He called for a census of the claims against Iran. Now those steps deserve some time to work. We also deserve to give our allies an opportunity to join us.

But if those things are not effective, then the President will obviously have to consider the other options that are open to him. He has some nonmilitary options that are left. They are somewhat difficult to implement, but they are serious steps and he'll have to consider those. Out beyond those there are military options. The President has always reserved the right to take options that would be permissible under international law of a military character if nothing else worked.

I think that's where we are now. The President has taken severe steps. We hope that they will be effective. If they're not effective, then there are other options, both nonmilitary and military in character, that the President will consider.

Q. It seems, however, that the Administration is quite happy to let the news media speculate on what the other options, the military options might be. My question is that when the students or the militants are threatening to kill the hostages if even the slightest military action is taken, how realistic does that option become?

A. I think the President is determined that we will succeed in our goals with respect to the hostages. We've always had twin goals and that is to secure their safe release and at the same time not do anything to impair the credibility and honor of the United States, not give

to be resolved by simple solutions.

Some have said that we are trying to do too much. I say that we cannot afford to do less, in our own national interest.

Some say that in trying to do too much, we have accomplished too little. I say that in strengthening our military posture, in reemphasizing and strengthening NATO, in negotiating the SALT II Treaty, in normalizing relations with China, in helping achieve peace between Israel and Egypt and a framework for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, in advancing peace in Zimbabwe, in the Panama Canal treaties, in the successful multilateral trade negotiations and other improvements in the international economic system, in closer ties to developing nations, and in promoting human rights—in all these areas, I say we are on the right road, even if it is a long and difficult one.

Some say that in seeking peaceful change toward human justice in every area of the world, we encourage radicalism. I say that the world is changing, that human beings everywhere will demand a better life. The United States must offer its own vision of a better future, or the future will belong to others.

Some have said that the executive and legislative branches cannot collaborate effectively on foreign policy. I say that the record over the past few years has been a good one.

Some say that America is in a period of decline. I am convinced they are wrong.

There is no question that the years to come present a somber prospect. Strict challenge in Afghanistan and beyond, energy crisis, revolutionary explosions when expectations run ahead of progress—such current events are all too likely to be harbingers of the trends of the coming decade. This is the reality we confront.

But it is also a reality that our strengths—military, economic, and political—give us an unmatched capacity for world leadership. We can succeed if we combine power with determination, persistence, and patience. We can make progress if we promote the full range of our interests and use the full range of our strengths.

¹ Press release 68. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

in to terrorism. We continue to pursue those goals and will keep all of our options before us. We're not going to telegraph our decisions. I understand it's natural for there to be speculation about them, but the President is moving deliberately. But we are on a new course of determination and deliberation in order to increase the pressure.

Q. But the student militants holding the hostages said this weekend that they have put explosives in the walls of the U.S. Embassy and will, in their words, "blow the hostages sky high" if we take any slightest military action. How do you deal with threats like that whether they're credible or not, and at the same time even talk about military action?

A. We have to weigh them very carefully. There are so many statements coming out of Iran that one can't credit any particular statement. We have heard that statement before. Nevertheless, we will have to do what we think is in the best interests of the hostages and in the best interests of our country. We will try to weigh as well as we can the many statements that come out of Tehran, but at the same time I think we can't give credibility to any one claim, any one charge, any one pressure point from their side.

Q. And another statement that has come out of Iran this weekend comes from President Bani-Sadr who said yesterday that he will invite an international organization to visit the hostages to check on their health and monitor visits to them. Would you see this as a hopeful development?

A. That statement apparently came in connection with his meeting with the ambassadors from the European Community. Frankly, from their standpoint, that was a very disappointing meeting. He did not promise that the hostages would be released. He did not give any indication that he had a plan for that. What he did say is that perhaps an international organization such as the Red Cross could visit.

Now naturally we would welcome such a visit. We always have said that anyone who could see the hostages, who could determine their condition, some reliable outside observer to do that would be desirable. But that's not the real solution. The real solution is to get them released. We have heard so many indications that they would let international

agencies in to inspect them or to see them that frankly we've become somewhat skeptical. We'll be glad if it happens, but that isn't the end of the line. The end of the line is to get them released.

Q. And in that meeting you speak of, President Bani-Sadr also said he rejected a demand by representatives of our allies that the hostages be released by a specified date. Is that a setback at this stage to our continued and escalating efforts to involve our allies in this process?

A. No, I would think it would be helpful in that regard because those ambassadors will go back and report to their capitals that Bani-Sadr is not under the present circumstances prepared to do anything. And I think that will encourage the allies. It certainly ought to encourage them to take the kind of economic sanctions we're asking them to take.

Q. Let's talk about the allies for a moment. This week the President expressed disappointment with what the allies had done to that point. What makes you think that you're going to get the kind of cooperation in terms of economic sanctions that we want? It was easy enough for us to do it, after all, because it didn't really cost us anything, but it would cost countries like Germany and Italy a great deal to do that.

A. It wasn't cost free here. As a matter of fact, we've asked for sacrifices from Americans all across the board both in respect to Iran and Afghanistan. And, fortunately, the American people have been united, and they've been terrific on this subject.

Now the allies during the months of January, February, and March—while there was a real negotiating track, while there was a possibility of achieving something either through the United Nations or through other negotiating efforts—had suggested that we not press for the sanctions. But I think they realize that that phase has come to an end. And I hope that they will understand the seriousness of the matter now. We're looking for action from them at this point, not words.

Q. Do you hope—I mean do you really think you're going to get it, and what would be the timeframe again?

A. I would hope, as I said earlier, that when their ambassadors come back and give this report that that will give them a realistic picture of what's happening in Iran. And then they're going to

meet in the European Community, I understand, on the 21st of April. And it may hope that they will take action at the time to impose the sanctions as if the U.N. resolution had not been vetoed by the Soviet Union, that is that they will ban all shipments to Iran except for food and medicine.

Q. Are we threatening our allies even implicitly by suggesting that, if they don't go along, we'll have to blockade the Persian Gulf and they'll have to cut off trade anyway?

A. The statement of a reality sometimes communicates itself as a threat. I think the fact is that if we are not effective with the sanctions that are in place now and if the allies don't join us and if the subsequent nonmilitary actions that we might take—if none of those things works, then we'll have to consider other options, and those may be less attractive than the options that are open to us now.

Q. Is there somewhere down the road another type of threat, that is the threat that has been talked about from time to time over the past 6 months of putting more realistic pressure on the allies perhaps in the form of letting them know that we will have to reduce our support to NATO unless they give us more help in this crisis in the Persian Gulf area?

A. I'd like to respond to that by saying that our alliance is really the bedrock of our security. Our allies are important to us, and we're important to them. So don't think we're talking about the security relationship here. We're talking about what good allies and good friends do for each other when there is trouble.

Now this is not just trouble for America. This is trouble for the world as a whole. They happen to be our hostages but the principle involved is a principle of international law. It's a principle of international human rights. And so I think that allies will want to join us in resolving the problem.

Q. But we are approaching the 6-month mark now in the holding of the hostages and we've gotten precious little help from the allies. Doesn't the moment come where we have to get tougher, and the question is being asked increasingly editorially across the country who really needs allies who don't stand with us at critical moments?

A. We need our allies. One hundred and sixty-two days have gone on. I think

are aware of that. I think they're aware that we're in a new phase of this from their standpoint as well as from our standpoint. And I'm hopeful that they see the situation in terms that will cause them to take some action within the next 3 weeks.

Q. Do you feel that the U.S. Olympic Committee's decision yesterday will tend to bring around some of the allies on the subject of boycotting the Olympics?

A. Yes, I think that was a most welcome decision. I think the Olympic Committee deserves our congratulations. The U.S. President said it was a referendum on freedom, and the referendum came out right.

I think it's a very good bet that our allies will join us, our principal ones, in boycotting the Olympics. I think we'll see this happening over the course of the next month. And I think the whole process is greatly strengthened by what happened in Colorado yesterday.

My own feeling is that the Olympics, if they do ever take place, will only be a shadow of what was expected before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Q. You sound very hopeful that our allies will join us. Can you be a little more specific? Are you talking about all of our major allies in Europe: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, all of these?

A. Each one is a somewhat separate case, and each of them has different relationships with their Olympic committees. But I think I'll just stand on the point that I believe that at the end of a month from now, or at least before May 25th, we'll find most of our major allies—our principal allies—joining us in boycotting the Olympic Games.

Q. One of the anomalies of this past week has been the feud between Iraq and Iran heating up once again. How seriously do we consider that particular problem? Could it be a factor in the hostages' future?

A. We know about that mainly by what we read in the newspapers. As you know, we don't have diplomatic relations with Iran now, but we have not had diplomatic relations with Iraq for some time. We're not involved in any way in the controversy between the two of them. It's a longstanding controversy. It has roots in ethnic problems, religious problems,

boundary problems between them. But we're out of that picture.

Now as far as the relationship to the hostage situation, that's a very hard calculus to make, but I would have to say that on balance that anything that increases instability in the area tends to add an additional threat to the hostages. But it's nothing that we can do anything about at the present time. It's only something that we're watching from the sidelines, not involved.

Q. We're not involved at the moment, but I think one of Iraq's concerns is that the Soviet Union would attempt to exploit the situation in Iran, and despite the fact that the Iraqis, as you know, have been receiving aid from Russia for a long time, they evidently are very concerned about that possibility. Is the United States concerned, and what would our response be if Iraq were threatened by the Russians?

A. Our response would be a serious one if any of the countries in the Middle East were invaded by the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union were to invade Iran or to invade Iraq, we would have a reaction somewhat similar to the invasion of Afghanistan.

That's exactly the kind of a problem that we foresaw when we said that the invasion of Afghanistan was a major international matter, a violation of international law, and something that the international community had to respond to with strength and determination.

Q. What do you see at the moment as the role of the Soviet Union? Are the Russians indeed supporting Iran as they appear to be in this conflict with Iraq, or could there be something else beneath the surface that might revive their old alliance with Iraq?

A. Right now I see the Soviet Union having their hands full in Afghanistan. Just before coming up here, I read an analysis of the comparability between the difficulties the Soviet Union is having in Afghanistan and those that we had in Vietnam. They're obviously not a completely parallel situation, but let me say that the Soviet Union is having a great deal of difficulty in Afghanistan. Their generals are asking for more troops. They're having a great difficulty using the Afghan Army. They're pouring in additional troops. It's now well over 100,000, probably over 110,000.

So I would say that's the main pre-

occupation of the Soviets at the present time. It's very hard to read their intentions with respect to Iraq.

Q. You say the Soviets are having a great deal of trouble in Afghanistan. Is this good or bad in the long run? Does it reduce the danger that they might eventually try to drive on to the Persian Gulf because their hands are so full now in Afghanistan or what is danger?

A. I think the combination of the international pressure on them because of the action they've taken and the difficulty they're having will tend to deter them in the future. Our whole policy with respect to that invasion has been first to make them pay a heavy cost for that and, second, to deter them from taking comparable action in the future.

I think they are being shown that when they try to go in and take over an independent country, shoot up its mosques, and execute a number of its people, that they can't easily subjugate that kind of a country. The Afghan people are a brave and determined people and they're giving the Soviets a great deal of difficulty. If I were sitting in the Soviet Union, I would not regard that as the kind of event that would encourage me to repeat it.

Q. It's been announced that Secretary Vance will meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna next month. What would be the purpose of that meeting? Is there any hope to improve U.S.-Soviet relations as long as the Afghan affair goes on?

A. I'd have to quarrel with your premise. That was certainly not announced from here. There have been no specific arrangements for such a meeting in Vienna.

That being said, let me say that I think it's important for us to keep the lines of communication open to the Soviet Union. We've been meeting here with their diplomatic officials. Secretary Vance met, as you know, with Ambassador Dobrynin the other evening. We do not want to go back to the cold war situation with the Soviet Union and at the right moment we want to continue whatever contacts we can with that might be of a useful nature. But I don't know whether such a meeting will take place in Vienna.

Q. What is our response to recent Soviet suggestions on arms control? Are

we interested in arms control with the Russians at all at this point?

A. Yes, I think we intend to try to keep the fabric of East-West relations in order, and one of the ways we can do that is to pursue arms control negotiations with them. They're in our interest. They're perhaps in our mutual interests. So we've been meeting with them on a number of arms control matters, the mutual and balanced force reductions, the negotiations in central Europe. Other negotiations go forward.

We continued to talk to them about the SALT Treaty and to indicate to them our desire not to prevent its subsequent ratification when the right time comes. So I would say that arms control, the prospect of arms control, is one of the avenues for possible improvement of our relations with the Soviet Union if and when the situation stabilizes.

Q. Prime Minister Begin of Israel is arriving in Washington this week close on the heels of President Sadat of Egypt who met with President Carter this past week and delivered some very strong expressions of concern here about Israeli settlements on the West Bank.

The question is hanging at the moment as to whether or not Mr. Carter plans to deliver a tough message to Mr. Begin that "it is a time to bring an end to your government's settlement policy or we're going to have to get tough in some way." Would you expect that the President will indeed deliver such a message?

A. We look forward to Prime Minister Begin's visit just as we did to President Sadat's. We had a good session with President Sadat—constructive—and made progress. I think we'll have the same kind of a session with Prime Minister Begin.

As you know, the autonomy talks have gone on for some time. Ambassador Linowitz (Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations) has indicated that progress has been made, but the two meetings with the heads of state give an opportunity to give a new impetus to the autonomy negotiations. I think the President will be exploring with Prime Minister Begin ways in which those autonomy talks can be speeded up looking toward some very substantial progress by the year-end deadline of May 26th.

Q. It's now been well over a year and a half since the Camp David summit. There's been a great deal of tongue-clucking by the Administration about both the settlements on the West Bank and the lack of progress on Palestinian autonomy, but nothing happens.

We do have the capability of getting very tough with Israel through the threat of cutting off economic and military aid for instance. Why are the President and this Administration so reluctant to apply real pressure on Israel?

A. You say nothing has happened, and I just have to disagree with you on that. Egypt and Israel have diplomatic relations. Traffic goes back and forth between the countries. They've exchanged ambassadors. That's a very historic step. So a great deal has happened.

In addition to that, I would remind you—I believe it's correct to say—that all elements of the Camp David agreement have been abided by up to the present time, some of them even in advance of the deadlines. So we're not dissatisfied with the progress under the Camp David agreement. And I think the President will be talking with Prime Minister Begin in the same frame of mind as he did with President Sadat: How can we keep this progress going? We together have taken these important steps. We've made this progress. Now let's keep moving down the line.

Q. Do you really mean to say that you are not dissatisfied with the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements on the West Bank?

A. Our view on that is well known. Yes, we think the settlements are an obstacle to progress in this area. We've told the Israelis that not only for months but for a long time, but I think that particular aspect does not prevent our making progress on the autonomy talks. Indeed, that is one of the issues that will have to be discussed, and progress made on it as well, in connection with the autonomy talks.

Q. A general question on U.S. foreign policy: In a political year, virtually everything the President does at least is open to the possibility that he's doing it for political reasons. To what extent has the campaign infringed upon foreign policy over the last few months?

A. I haven't seen any indication that it has. Indeed, perhaps the opposite is more true. I think foreign policy has infringed on the campaign. Sitting here in the State Department we ask for and get a great deal of the President's time. He occupies himself on foreign policy naturally a great deal of his time, especially the midst of crises such as the Iran crisis and the Afghanistan crisis. So the President has been prevented from campaigning, and he's been having to rivet his attention on these matters of foreign policy. So I would say the effect has been more the other way.

Q. It is noted that he has made a couple of important announcements vis-a-vis Iran on primary days, and his famous news conference on the morning of the Wisconsin primary escaped no one's attention. It's certainly sometimes—the impression is certain there that there is a connection between the two.

A. I was there that morning and the reason he made that statement that morning was because Bani-Sadr had made a speech in Iran that day that required a response. We had waited for that speech. We had waited for an indication that progress might be made, and the President responded in due course in good order. But the triggering event there was not the Wisconsin primary but the speech made by Bani-Sadr.

Q. When Senator Kennedy accused the President on the campaign trail he has repeatedly, of betraying Israel now doesn't that impinge on the conduct of foreign policy? Doesn't that show the President in in getting tougher with Israel for instance?

A. The President is absolutely committed to the security of Israel. He is committed to making the process work. He has not betrayed Israel. Indeed, our support for Israel is one of the main elements of American foreign policy. So it just inaccurate to charge the President with that. ■

Visit of Kenyan President Moi

President Daniel T. arap Moi of Kenya made a state visit to the United States February 19-22, 1980. While in Washington, he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the text of the White House statement issued on February 20.¹

President Carter met this morning for four and 15 minutes in the Cabinet Room with President Daniel arap Moi of the Republic of Kenya. President Moi is in Washington on a 4-day state visit at the invitation of President Carter. In addition to their meeting this morning, the two leaders will meet again tonight at a state dinner in the White House.

The two Presidents reviewed the close relations which exist between the United States and the Republic of Kenya. They discussed developments in East Africa and the importance of regional cooperation and understanding in that area. They also reviewed developments in southern Africa and agreed upon the importance of free elections and a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The two Presidents discussed the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and agreed on concerted action in not participating in the Olympic Games in Moscow. They also discussed a range of issues concerning regional stability in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean basins, including the measures required to ensure mutual security in that region.

The two Presidents also discussed specific problems in the Middle East, during which President Carter expressed his gratitude for Kenya's support and President Moi's personal interest in efforts to secure the release of our diplomats being held hostage in Iran.

Bilateral issues were also reviewed, including U.S. assistance programs in Kenya.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 25, 1980, which also contains President Carter's and President Moi's exchange of remarks at the arrival ceremony on Feb. 20 and their dinner toasts that evening. ■



President Moi and President Carter (White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

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CORRECTION

In the April 1980 issue, the first sentence of the last paragraph on page 6 should read: "The United States has often taken the lead and is a major participant in both emergency and long-range Sahelian programs."

Human Rights Conditions in Non-Communist Asia

Statements by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke and Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia M. Derian before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 6, 1980.¹

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you to speak about our human rights policies in Asia.

Let me begin by reaffirming that human rights is an integral element in U.S. foreign policy in East Asia. In our relations with any specific country, there must, by necessity, be a number of objectives—national security concerns, economic and commercial ties, cultural relations, broad foreign policy goals, and, of course, human rights. Over the past 3 years in East Asia, we have made significant progress on the human rights front without damaging or subordinating our other objectives.

As Vice President Mondale said in May of 1978, the refugee problem is the number one human rights issue in East Asia today. During the past 5 years, the Communist regimes of Indochina—Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea—have dislocated hundreds of thousands of people in those countries; the number may be in the millions.

In Kampuchea the Pol Pot regime began the destruction and forced migration of the Khmer population. This has been perpetuated and compounded by the Vietnamese invasion and subjugation of Kampuchea. Nearly half a million Khmer refugees are now in Thailand and on the Thai border. Massive numbers of Khmer have been killed or starved. The food denial policy of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime is perhaps the most egregious example of continuing human rights violations in Kampuchea.

In 1978 Hanoi began sending its ethnic minorities and "undesirables" out to sea in boats, leaving them to

wash up on the shores of neighboring countries. Finally, the largest Laotian city is now in Thailand at the refugee camp of Nong Khai, and it increases every day as new refugees arrive from Laos.

The initial burden of this refugee migration has fallen on Hong Kong and the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and most especially on Thailand. They have responded with compassion, providing shelter and first asylum, until the refugees can be systematically resettled. The United States has made a major effort to ease the refugee burden on ASEAN, working with the United Nations and international voluntary organizations to feed, shelter, and resettle the refugees. Thus the issue of human rights has been the key to our response to the continuing tragedy in Indochina. I believe we all have a duty to try to keep the world's attention focused on this situation.

At the same time, we are also seeing significant progress in human rights conditions in the non-Communist countries of East Asia. Our own attention to the human rights cause has contributed to this progress, without jeopardizing our other very important objectives in our relations with these countries. In fact, U.S. relations with the countries of non-Communist Asia have improved across the board in recent years.

Let me cite a few examples. In Korea the assassination of President Park last October sent a profound shock through the Republic of Korea. The period of adjustment and transition is now underway, and the present interim Government in Seoul is dedicated to the goal of a more broadly based political system. Work is underway to write and adapt a new constitution to enable national elections for a President this year.

With regard to the Philippines, where we have manifold, complex, and close relations, there have been a number of recent improvements in the human rights situation. The government has responded positively to domestic criticism of military abuses in

the areas of active insurgency. One week ago there were elections for governors, mayors, and thousands of less officials, for the first time since 1971.

In Indonesia the government completed on schedule its 3-year program to release approximately 30,000 prisoners detained in the wake of the 1965 coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party. This resolves a major focus of international concern. The United States, international organizations, and Indonesia are cooperating to ease the situation in East Timor. While problems remain, I believe your visit there, Chairman Wolff [Lester L. Wolff of New York], showed that on this front, progress is being made.

I do not mean by these comments to underestimate the problems that surface in Asia. Asia encompasses a cultural, linguistic, political, and economic diversity unsurpassed in any other region of the world. Some governments face external military threats or internal armed insurrections and have consequently suspended constitutional guarantees of freedom or instituted martial law. Others enjoy a shaky political stability which tends to expose perceptions of sedition and seditious activity. In a great many Asian countries governments must cope with aspirations of ethnic and cultural groups which threaten the stability of the social order.

I recognize that the next decade will be a difficult one for all of the countries of Asia, and particularly for the cause of freedom in that part of the world. On balance, however, I believe that America's championing of freedom in Asia has already contributed to an improvement in the basic human condition in this part of the world and that we shall continue to see further progress in the future.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN

I welcome the opportunity to participate in this joint hearing of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee and the Subcommittee on International Organizations.

The letter of invitation from the subcommittees asked me to evaluate

human rights conditions in non-communist Asia; review the process by which the State Department's human rights reports on the countries in this area are prepared; assess the effect of policy in promoting changes in human rights conditions in the countries in question; comment on whether sacrifice moral and diplomatic influence by continuing assistance to human rights-violating countries; and, finally, evaluate on the possibility of the non-communist countries of Asia joining together to address their human rights problems.

Before addressing these questions, I would like to mention briefly three important human rights issues in Communist Asia. First, Vietnam's internal policies, particularly toward ethnic Chinese, have generated a large refugee exodus, leading uncountable numbers to drown at sea. Second, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia have aggravated the danger of mass famine. Third, while the People's Republic of China has engaged in some relaxation of strict internal controls, the removal of Democracy Wall to a less accessible location is disappointing.

I would like to turn now to the question of human rights conditions in non-Communist East Asia. As you know, last week the Department of State submitted to the Congress lengthy and comprehensive reports on human rights conditions in 154 countries, including those of non-Communist East Asia. Therefore, my prepared remarks this morning will simply highlight the most important concerns in each.

Burma

The interim government under President U Nu released most political prisoners and has abrogated emergency measure 9, which severely restricted individual rights. However, martial law provisions, announced immediately after President Park's death, have imposed significant limits on the exercise of political and civil rights. A small number of dissidents have been arrested and sentenced to prison for organizing peaceful demonstrations. President Choi has stated his commitment to a more liberalized political system, and amendment of the constitution is underway in the National Assembly which has resumed operation with the participation by the opposition party.

Philippines

Since 1972 President Marcos has exercised unrestrained executive authority under martial law. Political and civil rights are greatly restricted. Rights are more restricted in rural provinces, particularly where there are active insurgencies. Reports of the incidence of military abuses of civilians in outlying areas have significantly increased during 1979. The government tried and dismissed some military personnel for abuses and held hearings in several locations on the problem. The government admits to holding 579 persons as public order violators—persons accused of subversion, sedition, and rebellion. Most of these persons can be considered as political prisoners and are held in the Manila area. The clergy, which became more critical of Marcos in 1979, alleges that additional numbers are held in the provinces. Local elections, the first since 1971, were recently held.

Indonesia

Detainees from the 1965 coup attempt were either released before December 31, 1979, or, in 23 cases, are being brought to trial. Although no reliable figures are available, it appears that many thousands of East Timorese have died of hunger and in warfare since 1975, and this subject has been a matter of international concern. This year East Timor has been opened up to relief efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Catholic Relief Service and to diplomatic and journalistic visits. A congressional delegation visited the island last month.

Other Indonesian human rights issues include the broad powers of detention held by security authorities, the lack of bail and habeas corpus in existing legal codes, and the need to replace the anti-subversion law and the old Dutch penal code. The government has introduced legislation in Parliament, a draft law on criminal procedures, which is designed to replace the series of colonial laws which now provide the primary guidance for the legal system.

Taiwan

For the past quarter century, Taiwan officials have considered the country still in a civil war situation. Some positive trends have been overshadowed by government actions taken after opposi-

tion demonstrations in Kaohsiung last December 10. Taiwan authorities began a general crackdown on the leadership of *Formosa* magazine which had organized the demonstration. About 24 people were arrested and charged with the capital crime of "sedition" and will reportedly be tried by military tribunals. Among those arrested were the prominent Taiwanese legislator (Wong Shin Shay) and several members of the Presbyterian Church. Another 37 are still in custody, and it appears that they will be tried in civil courts, presumably on lesser charges. Three opposition magazines were also closed.

Thailand

Parliamentary government was reestablished with national elections in March, the martial law order permitting detention without trial was repealed, and prisoners were released. The government has retained some restrictions on media content and an internal security law with arbitrary detention provisions. Both measures are seldom used. Although Thailand initially took steps to forcibly repatriate Khmer refugees, they have reversed this policy and work closely with foreign and international organizations to provide assistance to refugees.

Malaysia

During 1979 the government invoked the Internal Security Act to arrest participants in a strike by union members against the national airline on the grounds that this constituted interference with an essential service. This action provoked strong reactions within Malaysia and abroad, and all detainees were subsequently released.

An insurgent threat and the possibility of communal conflict are cited to justify legislation which makes it legal to arrest and detain, without trial, persons suspected of activities that threaten general "civic order."

Singapore

On January 31, Amnesty International issued a report accusing the Singapore Government of systematically stifling political dissent by continuing to detain people without trial and mistreating prisoners. Political power in Singapore is concentrated in one ruling party, the People's Action Party. It dominates the Parliament, having won all seats in the past three elections with approximately

70% of the vote. In Singapore discussion of certain ethnically sensitive topics is prohibited.

The press is circumspect in its treatment of the government, due, at least in part, to the need for annual renewal of publishing licenses. The government enjoys broad popular support, and its record in economic and social matters is excellent. The Amnesty report contends, however, that significant advances in the social and economic areas have been accompanied by rigorous internal political repression.

Japan

Japan is a parliamentary democracy in which democratic institutions are well-established. Human rights are guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution and secured by a just and efficient legal system. Freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly are guaranteed by law and respected. In 1979 Japan completed ratification of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Burma

Burma has an authoritarian system of government under president Ne Win. Freedom of expression is limited. Public criticism of the leadership is not tolerated nor is political assembly nor organizing outside of government-sponsored mass and party organizations. The exact number of political prisoners is uncertain but believed by observers to be between 150 and 250.

Human Rights Reports and Policies

I would like next to address the other questions posed in your letter of invitation. Several concern the process by which the human rights reports are written. Last year, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and two of the deputies serving in my office testified before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations. The process remains essentially the same today. It is also fully described in the introduction to the 1979 report submitted last week.

In answering the question as to whether U.S. pressure brings about changes in human rights policies, I realize I am up against the perennial

bottom line. Does the policy make a difference?

There is no doubt that the human rights issue has come to the center of world attention over the past several years. There has been a geometric increase in world consciousness, and significant improvements in human rights conditions have occurred in every region of the world over the past 3 years. When improvements are made, we prefer to regard them as the results of decisions made by the governments and peoples involved. But I am confident that the policy has contributed to an environment in which such changes are much more likely.

Military Assistance to Violators

Let me now address the issue of whether the United States sacrifices its moral and diplomatic influence by continuing military assistance to severe violators of human rights. Human rights remain a very high priority in foreign policy decisionmaking. There are also security interests which may require, on occasion, the provision of U.S. assistance to a serious human rights violator. In such cases, we have undertaken in clear, direct, and persistent ways to emphasize our concerns about human rights conditions no matter how important the security relationship. The U.S. Government uses all other means at its disposal, including private diplomatic interchange, symbolic public acts, careful review of economic aid programs, and prohibition of the export of police equipment.

Regional Institutions

I turn last to the final question in your letter to Secretary Vance. "Is it possible for non-Communist countries to join together to address their own human rights problems?" You have raised a profound and important question. I hope it will be one we can explore further.

The year 1979 saw considerable progress in the building of regional and international institutions for the protection of basic human rights. These institutions can do the most to advance and to secure human freedoms. You are familiar with the Organization of African Unity's call for the establishment of a permanent pan-African body for the protection of human rights.

In our own hemisphere, the American Convention on Human Rights recently came into force. An Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been established and is meeting in Costa Rica. In Western Europe, the Council of Europe's Human Rights Commission and Court of Human Rights continue to be active.

Unfortunately, such activity as yet has no analogue in non-Communist or Communist Asia. Clearly it is not for outsiders to prescribe the precise form regional human rights cooperation might take, but one could imagine the ASEAN states investigating the possibility of establishing a human rights organization in the framework of that association. There is also the possibility of nonmember states being prepared to associate themselves in this particular activity.

Whatever form institutions finally take, it is vital that those interested in and committed to human rights in the region join together and discuss what kinds of institutions they can fashion. Creating a regional human rights consciousness, a necessary prelude to any institution, will be a long and difficult task. There will be formidable obstacles along the way—some put there by some of the governments affected—but I believe the goal is attainable.

It is my hope that most governments eventually will accept what President Carter pointed out in the State of the Union address to the Congress January 23. He said: "... where peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring."

There is no more important task for non-Communist East Asia than to forge a regional commitment to internationally recognized human rights and to craft regional machinery which can insure that these rights are protected and enhanced for the peoples of the region. The United States is ready to do what it can to promote such a regional effort. In the final analysis, the task only can be accomplished by the peoples concerned.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

German Chancellor Visits U.S.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany made an official visit to the United States March 4, 1980. While in Washington, D.C. (March 4-6), he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the text of the joint press statement issued on March 5.¹

President Carter and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt, held a lengthy conversation in Washington, March 5, during the Chancellor's official visit to Washington, March 4-6. The Chancellor, who last met with the President in June 1979, was in Washington at the President's invitation.

The conversation between the President and the Chancellor covered a wide range of political, security, and economic issues of mutual interest for the two countries. Their meeting followed an intensive period of high-level consultations between the two governments, including visits to Washington and Bonn by the respective Foreign Ministers and several exchanges between the President and the Chancellor. The President and the Chancellor agreed on the necessity of continuing these close consultations in order to assure full coordination of the policies followed by the two countries on major international issues. They also agreed that intensified bilateral and multilateral consultations between all of the Western allies were essential, particularly in light of the current international situation.

The Chancellor expressed his high respect and admiration for the President's exceptional statesmanship in the crisis caused by the illegal and horrendous holding of the hostages in Iran and for the courage and patience shown by the American people.

In their review of the international situation, the President and the Chancellor agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had created a serious threat to international peace and security. They confirmed their determination, together with their allies, to take measures necessary in the circumstances to guarantee their security and defend international stability as also stated in the joint Franco-German declaration of February 5, 1980.

They reiterated their governments' condemnation of the Soviet invasion



Chancellor Schmidt and President Carter (White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

and called upon the Soviet Union immediately to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. They noted with satisfaction that their assessments of the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were quite close, and they agreed upon the measures which each country should take in response to the Soviet action, including the need for urgent assistance to Turkey and Pakistan. The President noted with satisfaction the decision of the Federal government to coordinate Western assistance to Turkey in 1980. The President and the Chancellor expressed the determination of their governments to make major contributions to the common effort of assisting Turkey and Pakistan. In this connection, the Chancellor proposed a debt rescheduling for Pakistan.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the independence of the countries of the Third World is an essential element of world peace and stability. They underlined the necessity not only to recognize the independence and self-reliance of the Third World countries but also to assist those coun-

tries economically and politically on the basis of equal partnership.

The President and the Chancellor discussed the importance of increased efforts to strengthen NATO defenses. They reaffirmed their strong support for the NATO Long-Term Defense Program and for the NATO aim of 3% annual real growth in defense spending. The President noted the strong efforts of the Federal Republic in the defense field in recent years and welcomed the Chancellor's statement that the Federal Republic would achieve 3% real growth in its 1980 defense budget as it has in the past. The President reviewed U.S. defense programs which have been made much more urgent in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Chancellor agreed that it was essential for America's allies to share equitably in collective defense efforts to meet the needs of the common defense.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has also had a seriously detrimental effect on the economic relations of the West with the U.S.S.R. They agreed on the importance of taking, in coordination with their allies, the necessary measures. They also

agreed that in shaping economic relations with the Soviet Union care must be taken not to strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s armament efforts and military potential.

The President expressed his support for the proposal announced February 19 by the Foreign Ministers of the European Community aimed at reestablishing a neutral, nonaligned, and independent Afghanistan, on the basis of total and prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that participation in the Olympic Games would be inappropriate as long as Soviet occupation in Afghanistan continues. The President stated that the United States would not participate in the Olympic Games in Moscow. The Chancellor emphasized that it is up to the Soviet Union to create the conditions that athletes from all countries will be able to participate in the Olympic Games and that at present such conditions do not exist.

The President and the Chancellor reiterated their countries' commitment to the reduction of tension throughout the world. They agreed that in the current period of heightened tensions it is desirable to maintain the framework of East-West relations that has been built over two decades.

The President and the Chancellor stressed their continuing support for the arms control negotiations. The Chancellor welcomed the President's recent statement that he planned to seek ratification of the SALT II Treaty by the U.S. Senate as soon as this was practicable. The President and the Chancellor agreed that the NATO allies should continue to press ahead with their December 20, 1979, initiative in the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduction] talks in Vienna, their long-range theater nuclear force (LRTNF) deployment decision of last December 12 as well as their offer for negotiations in the framework of SALT III aiming at limitations on U.S. and Soviet LRTNF on the basis of equality. They expressed regret that the Soviet Union had responded negatively to the U.S. proposal, based on the December 12 decision within the alliance, on arms control negotiations involving long-range theater nuclear forces. They reaffirmed the determination of the alliance to keep this offer on the table. They expressed their concern that the continuing Soviet LRTNF arms buildup increases the existing imbalance.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that at the upcoming followup meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which will take place in Madrid this fall, the allies should conduct a thorough review of the implementation of all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act and consider proposals aimed at furthering the objectives of the Final Act. In this respect, they reaffirmed the position taken by the Foreign Ministers of the alliance on December 14, 1979.

Having in mind the need to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, the President and the Chancellor discussed the latest developments in that region, in particular the autonomy negotiations currently underway between Egypt and Israel within the Camp David framework. They agreed on the urgent need for progress in these negotiations.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the current international economic situation, with particular emphasis on the energy problem and financial questions arising from the recent sharp increases in oil prices. They agreed that the program adopted by the seven-nation economic summit in Tokyo last June remained valid and that its objectives should be pursued. They stressed the need for further urgent efforts aimed at expanding alternate sources of energy, in particular coal, nuclear, renewable resources as well as coal gasification and liquefaction, and reducing energy consumption by all means possible. They pledged to cooperate with other nations in taking new medium- and long-term actions to these ends in the International Energy Agency and at the Venice economic summit.

They expressed particular concern over the worsening economic conditions of the developing countries resulting in large measure from the continued increase in energy prices and expressed the readiness of their governments, together with other countries, including the OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Countries], to seek ways to help oil-importing developing countries produce more energy. They agreed that in the present circumstances healthy growth by these countries is essential to a prosperous world economy and that both the OPEC countries and the industrial countries should help.

The two heads of government exchanged views about the actions they are taking to overcome inflation and

achieve sound and sustained growth. The President described the Administration's program of fiscal restraint, efforts to reduce energy consumption and to increase energy supplies, and steps to curtail present rates of inflation. The Chancellor expressed confidence in the prospects of success of these actions and described the current stance of monetary and fiscal development and energy policy in the Federal Republic of Germany. The President and the Chancellor stressed the importance of resisting protectionist measures that would impede trade, retard growth, and add to inflation.

The two heads of government agreed that the key to success in the economic field is to be found in holding to present economic policies over a sustained period. They shared the view that if these policies are continued and strengthened, the main industrial countries can restore noninflationary growth from which all will benefit.

The President and the Chancellor saw in this visit further proof of their fundamental commitment to the North Atlantic alliance and of the close friendship and partnership between their countries. They were agreed that it is not only the common security interests that link the two countries together but also their common principles and values, their democratic way of life, and their belief in the inalienable rights of man.

¹ Lists omitted here of those F.R.G. officials in the Chancellor's party and the U.S. officials with whom he met. Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 10, 1980, which also included the President's and Chancellor's remarks reporters on Mar. 5 and their dinner toast that evening. ■

Transactions Prohibited for Olympic Games

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
MAR. 28, 1980¹

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the continuing interference by the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of that country constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. An overwhelming majority of the U.N. General Assembly, including countries of varying political and religious persuasions, economic strength, and geographical circumstance, have joined in a condemnation of the Soviet Union's aggression.

In response to the Soviet action, the President has taken certain national defense measures. He has also imposed a number of restraints on normal economic, cultural, and political exchanges with the Soviet Union. These have included an embargo on grain and other agricultural products, an embargo on phosphate shipments, and the application of more rigorous restrictions on the export of high technology and other strategic commodities.

With respect to the Moscow Summer Olympics, the President has announced that neither he nor the American people would support the participation in the Olympics by the U.S. Olympic Team, and he has urged U.S. businesses not to participate in or contribute to the holding of the summer games in Moscow.

The President is now taking additional steps to make clear the U.S. Government's firm opposition to participation in the Moscow summer games. He has today directed the Secretary of Commerce to take the following actions:

1. To deny all pending validated license applications for goods and technology to be used in support of or in connection with the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow;

2. To revoke all outstanding export

licenses for Olympic-related exports that have not already been shipped;

3. To impose validated license controls on all exports not now requiring validated licenses to be used in support of or in association with the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. No such licenses shall be granted;

4. To prohibit other transactions and payments associated with all Olympic-related exports. Among other transactions, the order will bar NBC from making any further payments or exports under its contracts relating to the U.S. television rights for the Olympic Games. (NBC has previously announced that it would not exercise these rights if no U.S. team took part in the games.)

¹ Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 31, 1980). ■

GPO Sales

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25% discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

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Agreement with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. TIAS 9266. 6 pp. 75¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9266.)

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Re-equipment of the Institute

Shipping—Jurisdiction Over Vessels in United States Deepwater Ports. Agreement with Norway. TIAS 9275. 4 pp. 75¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9275.)

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U.S. Presses Case in World Court on American Hostages in Iran

On March 18, 19, and 20, 1980, the International Court of Justice met to hear oral arguments on the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran brought by the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At this phase, the United States made its final arguments on the jurisdiction of the Court and the merits of the case. On December 15, 1979, the Court had granted the U.S. request for interim measures of protection, reserving further proceedings for a later date.

Representing the United States in this case were Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, as Agent; Stephen M. Schuchel, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, as Deputy Agent and Counsel; Thomas J. Dunniagan, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague, as Deputy Agent; and David Small, Assistant Legal Adviser, Ted L. Stein, Attorney-Adviser (both of the Department of State), and Hugh V. Simon, Jr., Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague, as Advisers.

The following is taken from the U.S. oral argument made to the Court by Mr. Owen.

MAR. 18, 1980

Once again I have the honor to appear before the Court as Agent of the Government of the United States of America in the case concerning *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran*. As we commence the present hearing, I should like to emphasize the extraordinary importance of the case which we will be presenting to the Court.

I start from the premise that the paramount purpose of the United Nations, as recited in the opening words of the first article of the U.N. Charter, is to maintain international peace and security. Similarly, the maintenance of peaceful relations among states is the essential function of this Court and of those principles of international law under which nations conduct their diplomatic relations. To the extent that a state uses force to assault the mechanisms of peaceful diplomacy, it

strikes at the jugular of the entire system by which the world seeks to maintain the peace.

These principles have been so uniformly recognized that for literally centuries no state has used force against the diplomatic envoys and embassies of another. Occasionally, rebellious political groups or individuals have assaulted embassies and diplomats, but governments have not. For centuries international wars have come and gone, but by universal agreement embassies and their diplomatic staffs have been regarded as inviolable from official interference through the use of force.

That great tradition of recognizing and honoring the inviolability of embassies and diplomats has now been shattered for the first time in modern history. On 4 November 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and more than 60 of its personnel, were forcefully seized with the cooperation and endorsement of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moreover, this shattering attack upon the mechanisms of peaceful relations among nations was not a temporary aberration for which apology and reparation were quickly made; the captivity of 53 American

diplomatic agents and staff has continued under the official auspices of the Iranian Government for 4½ months. It seems hard to believe, but the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran occurred more than one-third of a year ago, and 53 of my countrymen are still held in precarious captivity as I stand before the Court today.

During these hearings, as the Court listens to the argument of the Government of the United States, I would respectfully request that the Court continuously bear in mind the implications of the Iranian conduct in terms of the cause of world peace and the cause of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Consider, if you will, what would happen to the fabric of international relations if this Court and the world community were to exhibit any degree of tolerance for what the Iranian Government has done and continues to do. Such tolerance would promote repetition, and repetition would lead, tragically, to the unraveling of orderly international relations. It is for this reason that I submit, very seriously, that in this case the Court has a compelling responsibility to condemn, in the most severe terms, the

THE LEGAL ADVISER

Roberts B. Owen was born in Boston and grew up in Cambridge, Mass. He attended the Phillips Exeter Academy in Exeter, N.H. He entered the Naval officer training program in 1943, was commissioned in 1945, and served on a troop transport in the North Atlantic in 1945-46.

After his discharge from the Navy, Mr. Owen attended Harvard and graduated with honors in 1948. He then attended Harvard Law School and graduated with honors in 1951. In 1951-52 he was a Fulbright scholar at Queens' College in Cambridge, England, and received a diploma in Comparative Legal Studies.

From 1952 until 1979, Mr. Owen practiced law in Washington, D.C., with the law firm of Covington & Burling. He specialized in trial and appellate practice covering a wide variety of subject matters with some emphasis upon antitrust litigation and *pro bono* litigation on behalf of citizens groups.

Mr. Owen was sworn in as the Legal



Adviser to the Department of State on October 4, 1979. ■

Visit of Egyptian President Sadat

President Anwar al-Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt made an official visit to Washington, D.C., April 8, 1980, to meet with President Carter and other government officials. Following are an exchange of dinner toasts at the White House on April 8 and a White House statement issued on April 9.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, APRIL 8, 1980¹

President Carter

First of all, let me welcome everyone here. In our great country we have a lot to be thankful for. I won't take my entire time to describe the blessings that we have in the United States but one of the blessings that we have tonight is to have two very close friends to come and visit us, along with their family and their official family from Egypt. Sometimes when people walk into a home, there is an instant feeling of warmth and friendship and common purpose and a degree of love. And that is the way we feel when the Sadats come to visit us at the White House.

That is not the only thing I am thankful for. Every day, when the clock progresses through its long and arduous route, I am thankful that one is not running against me in the United States. [Laughter, Applause] How would you like to run against Anwar Sadat for President of the United States? [Laughter] I would guess that he is possibly the most popular man not only in our country but in other parts of the world, because he has demonstrated in his own life in a unique and exemplary way statesmanship, understanding of others in a strong and passionate and self-confident manner and the epitome of political courage.

When he decided in his fashion to make an historic trip to Jerusalem, it transformed the attitude of the world. There was a shock that went through society in almost every nation on Earth that one person could change instantly a discouraging and debilitating deadlock which had lasted four wars in 30 years.

It is hard to think back now on these troubled times because so much has changed in the last 30 months—a

time when Israel was hated and despised by almost all Arab governments, when no Arab leader had the temerity to even meet with or talk to or recognize diplomatically or acknowledge the right of Israel to exist, and President Sadat decided to change all that. And he was received with gratitude and friendship and with courage by Prime Minister Begin and the people of Israel.

A lot has happened since then, and the response has been extraordinary—an unprecedented achievement of an accord, an agreement, a mutual commitment between Israel and Egypt after 13 days of intense negotiations at Camp David when the limit of, I would say, human commitment and tenacity and perseverance and patience was tested, and we came out with a signed document that laid the groundwork for the future.²

I have reread this document lately, and it is filled not only with achievement but with promise. It would be inconceivable that we would let this promise slip from our grasp and end the hopes and the confidence and the aspirations of two troubled peoples and, in-

deed, the entire world with failure. It is inconceivable.

It is important for us to remember that peace between Israel and Egypt is not a threat to others. It is a possibility for the realization of the hopes of the Palestinians and the hopes of all Israel's neighbors and, indeed, all the nations of the Arab world to live in peace and to slowly but inevitably remove hatred from their hearts and to seek for common understanding. It is not easy. No one claims that it is easy. It hasn't been easy so far, but it is important.

The two countries have set May 26th as a goal date for the consummation of the expectations at Camp David, and I think we should not forget the promise that still exists in a live and vital way of success.

I just summarized on a piece of paper the elements—the basic elements—of the Camp David accords. It is a brief document. And I would hope that all of you might get a copy of it and just read it over because it is, indeed, extraordinary. It specifies that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 will be a basis for future negotiations in the relationships between Israel and all its neighbors. It expresses a firm commitment to the respect for the territory and the independence and



President Sadat and President Carter (White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

the integrity and the sovereignty of all nations and the right for them to live in peace behind recognized and secure borders.

It specifies that the relationship that has now developed between Israel and Egypt should not be confined to those two nations, but the same kind of thrust should extend to the relationship between Israel and all its neighbors. It is a foundation for future success with nations that so far have not chosen to take advantage of this wonderful opportunity.

This document specifies the organization of a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza derived through free elections held by the people who live in those two troubled areas. And with the establishment of a self-governing authority, Israel has agreed to withdraw the military government and the civilian administration associated with it and then to withdraw all its troops from the occupied territories and then the remainder of those troops to be located in specified security locations.

The people of those two territories are granted autonomy and, as Prime Minister Begin said many times in the presence of President Sadat and me, not just autonomy, full autonomy—full autonomy, he said many, many times.

It is important for us to know that the agreement calls for a strong local police force and for that local police force to be interrelated with law enforcement officials in Jordan and in Egypt and in other surrounding countries.

It is important for us to remember that security arrangements should be agreed upon; that there should be a recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; that the Palestinians have a right to participate in the determination of their own future; and that the Palestinian question should be resolved in all its aspects; and that the nations involved—that is Egypt, Israel, and others—should provide for the resolution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

You can see how far-reaching this document is, and Prime Minister Begin, President Sadat, and I are pledged to carry out all these agreements on our word of honor and on the honor of the nations that we represent. It is a solemn commitment which cannot be lightly ignored or violated.

The world now may be skeptical about the prospects of success. But the world is not nearly so skeptical now as it was before Camp David or before the

Peace Treaty was signed between Israel and Egypt. We have overcome difficulties in the past, and the United States plays a full role in assuring that the negotiations now underway will be successful.

A week from now, Prime Minister Begin will be here, and he has the same commitment to the success of this effort as is shared between President Sadat and myself. We cannot afford to fail because of these two nations committed to peace and led by courageous men who are determined not to fail.

Tonight I would like to propose a toast to the people of Egypt, a proud and ancient nation, which has provided leadership for the world through many generations and for its great leader, President Anwar Sadat, his lovely wife, and all the human characteristics that are so fine and noble, which they represent, and I would like to propose a toast to peace.

President Sadat

My dear friend, President Carter, Mrs. Carter, dear friends: Thank you for your kind words and genuine hospitality. As you well know, it is always a pleasure for us to visit your great country and work with you for the noble cause of peace and friendship among nations. The historic steps we have taken together on the road to peace constitute the most positive contribution to that cause.

We are determined to pursue our mission until a comprehensive settlement is achieved. This was our pledge when we started together, and it remains our firm commitment. If a comprehensive settlement was a necessity at the time we began our endeavor, it is an absolute must today.

The talks we had today confirmed my confidence in your unwavering commitment to justice and morality. You have demonstrated once again your sensitivity to other people suffering a denial of rights. You have proven your determination to stand firm by your commitments.

You set a shining example for genuine concern and unselfish concern for peace and stability in every corner of the world. You fully realize the interdependence and community of interests between all nations. Today, as ever, you shouldered your responsibility with vision and courage.

In the weeks and months ahead, we shall continue to work together for the consolidation of peace. We shall spare no effort in our concerted drive to effect a genuine change in the West Bank

and Gaza. A real transfer of authority must take place, and a new era of reconciliation should begin. This would be in the interest of all nations, not the Palestinian people alone. No one benefits from the continuation of occupation and the perpetuation of conflict. No one profits from the escalation of tension and the deepening of suspicion and distrust among those who live in the same region. Everyone stands to gain from just and lasting peace in the cradle of civilization.

I am happy to say that we are quite satisfied with the development of our cooperation in various fields. This is greatly appreciated by every Egyptian. We are determined to intensify the creative exchange between our people for the good of all nations. Such a healthy and sound relationship based on mutual respect and trust can promote higher degree of universal understanding and cooperation. It sets a model for human interaction and solidarity with those who believe in the oneness of the destiny of man. Let us pledge to continue this march and reinforce our friendship in every possible way.

Dear friends, permit me to ask you to rise in a tribute to our great friend President Jimmy Carter and Mrs. Carter, to all of you present tonight, to every American who lent us his support and understanding and to the ever-growing friendship between our nations. God bless you all.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 9, 1980³

President Sadat and President Carter have completed 2 days of extensive talks in which they reviewed carefully, and in depth a wide range of issues, including the Middle East, southwest Asia, Africa, and the remaining issue in the current autonomy negotiations.

The talks were held in the spirit of the close relationship which President Sadat and President Carter have developed along with Prime Minister Begin in working together to bring peace to the Middle East. Both leaders reaffirmed their conviction that the Camp David agreement and the subsequent Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel have produced the first tangible steps, after decades of conflict, toward achieving real peace in that troubled area of the world. President Carter praised the scrupulous implementation of the Peace Treaty, at times even ahead of schedule, noting that both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have proved to the

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin

Prime Minister Menachem Begin of the State of Israel made an official visit to Washington, D.C., April 14-17, 1980, to meet with President Carter and other government officials. Following an exchange of dinner toasts at the White House on April 15 and a White House statement issued on April 17.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, APR. 15, 1980¹

President Carter

I would like, first of all, to welcome all of you to the White House. We are extremely delighted to have our guests from Israel come here to see us again, particularly Prime Minister Begin and his lovely wife.

Mr. Prime Minister, as you may know, this is an election year in the United States. I don't know if the word has gotten to Israel yet. [Laughter] But I have noticed that when Prime Minister Begin and I agree, we both prosper, not only in public acclaim but also politically. When we don't quite agree, neither one of us benefits substantially. [Laughter] Lately, for instance, my own policies have caused him some trouble, as you may have noticed a month or so ago, on the West Bank of Jordan, and I might say that our agreement also caused me some trouble on the east bank of the Hudson River. [Laughter, Applause]

When Prime Minister Begin comes to the White House, it's an experience not only of a personal pleasure but also of the realization of the making of history. There are a few people in this world who, because of personal courage and integrity and deep commitment and sensitivity to others and tenacity, are

able to change the course of human events. And obviously, our visitor tonight, Prime Minister Begin, is one of those men.

This is an historic house, and the friendship that binds our two countries together and the tremendous achievements of this great statesman, I think, make a good confluence of both pleasure and history.

Monday will be the 32d birthday of the nation of Israel. I can't be in Israel; I wish I could. I am sending, Mr. Prime Minister, my mother to represent me on that delightful occasion.

As you know, 2 years ago we were together on the South Lawn of the White House to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel.

On that occasion, I thought that it would be good for our nation to commemorate with the large group of American Jewish citizens and all of us—the 220 million of us—the terrible historic lesson that we learned from the Holocaust. Since then, the committee has been to Israel and to some of the devastating locations in Europe to assess how our own nation might commemorate this historic and blighting event in the passage of human life and through human history.

We have now appointed the Holocaust commission to establish a proper memorial in our country, an outgrowth directly of the 30th anniversary event on the South Lawn of our White House.

I think it is obvious that when Prime Minister Begin was elected Prime Minister, and obviously for the 25 or 30 years prior to that, many people said it is impossible to bring peace to Israel, and particularly between it and its most powerful Arab

neighbors. Prime Minister Begin proved those people to be wrong.

It has been less than 2½ years—it is hard to believe—since the historic meeting between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat in Jerusalem, an act that literally shook the world and inspired all human beings to believe that peace was indeed possible, even among the most historic and bitter of enemies.

It was less than a year following that when Prime Minister Begin met with President Sadat at Camp David and came forward with an agreement—the Camp David accords—that was announced here in the White House one Sunday afternoon.

This agreement is now the basis for our current search for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. It is founded on the principles espoused in U.N. Resolution 242. It calls for an honoring of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity and the political independence not only of Israel but of all nations in the Middle East.

It is committed to the proposition that each nation there, with a special emphasis on Israel, has a right to live in peace behind recognized and secure borders. This accord, or agreement, signed with our word of honor and with our nation's honor, calls for the establishment of a self-governing authority among the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza area. It calls for Israel, after the establishment or inauguration of this self-governing authority, to withdraw its military government, the civilian administration. And then it calls for withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces and a redeployment of them to specified security locations.

It calls for a strong police force among the people who live on the West Bank and the Gaza area, with proper liaison to be established with the adjacent police forces in Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.

It calls for a preeminent recognition of the need for all of us to guarantee the security of Israel and its neighbors. It calls for the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. It calls for Palestinians' right to participate in the determination of their own future. It calls for us to resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects. And it calls on us to resolve the refugee problem.

This combination, which was carefully hammered out between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat at Camp David, is still the binding document under which we are presently engaged in further pursuit of peace. It is

world their dedication to sparing their people the agony of war.

In their discussions, the two Presidents asserted again their joint determination to pursue to successful conclusion within the Camp David framework the current autonomy negotiations as another step toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. They focused on ways to accelerate the peace process and to resolve the remaining issues in the negotiations.

President Carter plans to pursue these discussions in an equally thor-

ough examination next week with Prime Minister Begin.

The two Presidents reaffirmed that the objective of the parties is to do everything possible to reach agreement by the May 26 goal set out in the agreement which President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin sent President Carter at the time they signed their Peace Treaty.

¹Text from White House press release.

²For text of the Camp David accords, see BULLETIN of October 1978, p. 7.

³List of participants in the discussions omitted here (text from White House press release). ■

almost impossible again to believe that 13 months ago Israel and Egypt were in a state of war, a state that had continued over a period of 30 years. And last year, at this same place—the White House of the United States of America—that Peace Treaty was signed.

It has been observed meticulously. And I might add my voice to President Sadat's in saying that Israel has honored the difficult terms of this treaty with truthfulness and with honor; and I might add, with generosity. Its terms were very strict, but those terms have been met not grudgingly at the last minute but ahead of time and with an extra expression of a common commitment to peace.

Israel has already withdrawn from more than two-thirds of the Sinai and, in a time when oil is particularly precious, has relinquished oil wells that were on acknowledged Egyptian territory but were developed by, discovered by Israel. We have guaranteed Israel to meet its needs for oil in the future if its supply should be interrupted, and, of course, our country will carry out this commitment meticulously as well.

Now there is full diplomatic relations—recognition of each other. An exchange of ambassadors, open borders, tourism is building day-by-day between these two ancient enemies who are now friends.

This is an exciting time, and we have made a lot of progress. Now we are moving to the next step—how to carry out those detailed, complicated, very carefully negotiated agreements at Camp David; how to define the self-governing authority; how to set up the procedure for the elections. They are difficult issues. We acknowledge them to be so.

Last week President Sadat was here with me. We discussed those difficult issues. Today, with Prime Minister Begin, we have discussed them as well. As we walked toward Prime Minister Begin's car at noon today, we both acknowledged—I started to say admitted—we both acknowledged that we have had even more difficult times in the past, but when he and I and President Sadat have set our minds to overcoming an obstacle or answering a difficult question, so far—and I knock on wood—we have never failed.

It would be a tragedy, having come this far, to fail. As I said earlier, Prime Minister Begin represents those characteristics that can insure success, and those characteristics are shared by his heroic partner in this effort, President Sadat—courage, sensitivity,



Prime Minister Begin, President Carter, and Secretary Vance (background) (White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

tenacity. And I think that this will bode well for the world in the future.

I might say in closing that our nation also has a special relationship with Israel—a relationship built on mutual respect and admiration; a shared past and a shared future; a realization that one of the most vital aspects of the security of the United States of America is a strong, free, independent, peaceful, and secure Israel. We have made commitments in the past to Israel that are vital to them. We have committed ourselves never to negotiate with nor recognize the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] until after the PLO has acknowledged U.N. Resolution 242 as a basis for peace and also recognized Israel's right to exist.

We have expressed ourselves strongly and forcefully and consistently as being opposed to the establishment of any independent Palestinian state in the West Bank area, and we believe very strongly, and I am sure Prime Minister Begin shares this belief, that Jerusalem should be undivided and that all should have access to the worship places there.

I might close by saying that we believe that together we can continue to achieve a just and a lasting peace for all in the Middle East, and, a little more than a year ago when we signed the historic Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Prime Minister Begin said, and I would like to quote his words in closing: "Peace unto you—*shalom, salaam* forever."

I would like to ask all of you to rise and join me in a toast. To the brave and free people of Israel in one of the world's great nations and to a courageous and enlightened, farsighted, and successful leader of those free people Prime Minister Begin and his lovely wife.

Prime Minister Begin

The President just said that when we agree, we both prosper. Therefore, I would like to say immediately that I agree with the President that Jerusalem should remain undivided. [Laughter, Applause]

This is a unique week in our life, started with Remembrance Day of the greatest tragedy that ever took place in the annals of mankind since God created man and man let loose the Devil. And it will end with the great victory a persecuted ancient people achieved through the sacrifices of its best men during the rule of our independence in the land of our forefathers.

We use the word "Holocaust." What does it mean? Nothing more than a word, but that word will not be healed for generations—many generations to come. We lost 1½ million of our children. We lost our sages, our professors, our doctors, our rabbis, our brains, our hearts, our beloved ones. Such is the wound in our hearts. And there it will be to the last day of our lives.

But there is the command to live

the divine command to overcome, to continue, to struggle for a just cause until it wins the day and, therefore, after the tragedy, we struggled, we gave sacrifices, and, with God's help, we won the day, and a country of our own and means to defend our people.

During this memorable week, I look around and see the world in turmoil and liberty in danger. In Iran, the lost reactionary revolution that ever happened in the history of mankind took place. Customs and laws which were sacrosanct for ages, not only in time of peace but even during war, are being trampled under foot with incomprehensible dark fanaticism and absolutely intolerable blind hatred.

There are the hostages there—for the last 5 months. Perhaps I can say that no other nation in the world understands the American people these days better than our nation does. Nobody can understand as we do what it means to see our sons and citizens kept hostage, threatened with their lives, getting ultimatums which we cannot fulfill, to look upon the families who spend sleepless nights and restless days thinking of their dear ones, longing for them—loving wives and mothers.

We feel deeply for the President, who is so preoccupied with this human and humanitarian question, and for all the American people. As I spent a certain period of my life in Russia not, as the previous Soviet Ambassador in our country before they severed diplomatic relations with us told me, "not in too good conditions." [Laughter]

Some people ask me: "In your opinion, you know the Russians, what would they have done?" I gave an unequivocal answer. "The very same day they would have marched on Tehran, and they wouldn't have given a damn to the hostages." They would have conquered Tehran. The Khomeini army is a mob. It is no match for any army, not for the Soviet Army. But this is the difference: The American people try every avenue, accept patience and pain just to make sure that the hostages come back home alive and well.

We have had such experiences—how many, how many. Our children were taken hostages not only our men. And just 10 days before I came to this great country, five of our children were taken hostage and threatened with death, and one boy 2½ years old—I saw the little coffin that I will never forget—got killed.

Four other children—1 year, 2 years old, babies—were saved by our soldiers. In the spirit of self-sacrifice which our army has got in itself, with

their blood, 11 boys—11 soldiers—were wounded, several of them severely. One of them got killed. Four children were saved, although wounded; wounded children, hostages.

This is the first reason why we are so grateful to the President that he found time to invite President Sadat and me and my colleagues and to deal with our problems of the Middle East and the bilateral relations we have, although his mind is with the hostages and their families, as the minds of all the American people are. At such a juncture, to find time for such talks is a measure of devotion and of moral greatness.

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in one of the most dangerous and serious moves after the Second World War. Some people compare it with the invasion into Czechoslovakia in August 1968. It is not a true comparison. It is a fact that Czechoslovakia went through a horrible tragedy. The Czechs and the Slovaks started to breathe some freedom under the man, who is already forgotten, Dubcek, and that beginning of liberty was crushed by the tanks of the Warsaw Pact countries.

But still, Czechoslovakia was in the Soviet orbit, and then the famous, or infamous, Brezhnev doctrine was created which even Yugoslavia and Romania—two Communist countries—did not recognize—no country in the world ever recognized. Afghanistan never was in the orbit. It is a neighbor of the Soviet Union, of the so-called Socialist countries. It was invaded. It is an ancient people, a fighting people. They do fight the huge Soviet Army of more than 100,000 soldiers; they resist as any proud people should an invader.

But to the world, there is a grave danger every day. Through Baluchistan, the Soviet Army can reach the Indian Ocean in no time, and there is no real force to stop them there.

Iran may become a Communist country anytime. We know the tactics. There is the Tudeh Party, the most servile to Moscow except the French Communist party—well organized, the only really organized group in Tehran. And they, the Communists, support Khomeini with his fanaticism because, since the days of Lenin, the Communists have developed a theory which is called a revolutionary situation. It means strikes, disorders, fights on the street, demonstrations, and in this atmosphere, they used to say, power lies on the street. Bow and take it. Then

they take it. And with the long border between Iran and the Soviet Union—1,500 miles—who can stop it if such a thing happens? And it may happen anytime, any day.

Therefore, we live in a dangerous period. But there is one solace: Free nations can, if they wish to, stand together.

The great people of the United States have many allies throughout the world, but I would say, looking out of experience into this world, that there are two categories of American allies. The first are allies, and the second are reluctant allies. May I tell you that Israel belongs to the first category.

We are a small nation, but may I have the *chutzpah* to say—[laughter]—a courageous nation. No, no, no—not me, the nation is courageous. It is conceived in courage and born in fight and reborn in resistance to tyranny, to oppression. And we are your ally in good and in bad days, we stand by you and stand with you, and we shall always be together and defend liberty so that tyranny never wins its night.

Under these circumstances, may I ask the following question: Should Israel be weakened or should it be strengthened? I know your attitude toward the so-called Palestinian state ruled by the PLO. That organization is bent on the destruction of Israel. It will not destroy Israel. How can it? It never will. But it is bent on it. It wrote about this destruction brazenly. It never changed it, not one word.

But even a corridor leading to such a Palestinian state would be a mortal danger to us. No peace. Peace is lost and bloodshed, more even than in Lebanon, much more. And, therefore, we must be very careful, very careful.

There are some who say, especially in Europe, that now, after the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan—and as there is oil in the Earth beneath the surface of the sheikdoms, which only the free West could have taken out because otherwise it would still be beneath the surface.

Some people say that now we must find favor with the Islamic world—with the Arab world—even at the expense of Israel. They say so cynically. This is called expediency and with our experience of our generation in the 1930s in Europe, we do know now that expediency is not a realistic policy. To the contrary; it takes revenge on those who sacrifice ideals for the sake of expediency. At Israel's expense, at the expense of our security, of the lives of our children, I believe that the United

States will never, under no circumstances, adopt such a policy, and as we are your ally, the United States is our ally and we will always stand together.

Israel shouldn't be weakened. Israel fulfilled a very serious role—I say so without boasting—with every government it had, under all governments in the Middle East, to stop Soviet expansionism indirectly and directly. I remember when there was a threat of Syrian invasion into Jordan with Soviet help. We were asked—it is now disclosed in two books written by two Americans—to bring about the putting to an end of that danger, and we put it to an end. And there is another example which I prefer not to mention tonight.

We really fulfilled the role and we can do so in the future. May I also say with humble pride, the army of Israel is not the worst in the world. So Israel should be strengthened for Israel's sake, it deserves—we suffered so much, we lost so many—but also for the sake of the free world should be strengthened, mustn't be weakened under any circumstances. This, the reason why we did so much for peace.

Yes, last year and a month ago we signed the Peace Treaty. Now I think I will ask a rhetorical question. Nobody is going to answer it, but I will put it and I, myself, will reply to it. Who is the architect of the Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel? And the answer is the President of the United States, Mr. Jimmy Carter. [Applause]

It was the turning point in the annals of the Middle East. Let us imagine the state of war for 31 years—five wars, five meetings on the battlefield. The Secretary of State, who is here, will remember how moving it was that moving scene which we shall never forget when wounded soldiers of Egypt and Israel met at El Arish together with the President of Egypt and me and the Secretary.

And the invalids who bodily suffered in the wars embraced each other, shook hands, and said to each other, as the President of Egypt and I said to each other: "No more war. We shall never again raise arms against each other." Could there be more beautiful words than those simple words? "No more war. We shall not raise arms against each other."

We also gave proof to the oldest of philosophical teasers: that every war is avoidable. What is absolutely inevitable is peace. Peace must come. We gave sacrifice for it. The President already mentioned it, therefore, I will not

repeat—that oil well, that our oil fields, with the help of an American company, but with the toil of our men—how much toil did we invest in it? Now we get the oil, that quantity, but how much do we have to pay for it? You better don't ask. [Laughter] And every month the prices go up. But you should also remember this: Out of that money we all pay, and every several months, more and more, there goes a million dollars per day for a terrorist organization with a Nazi philosophy called PLO. And all of us share in that million unwillingly, but in fact.

And for 9 months, the whole burden of fulfillment of the Peace Treaty commitment was on our shoulders. We did it. We fulfilled it—to the date, to the day, to the dot. Now, there is a mutual commitment of normalization of relations. Again, both sides do it honorably.

Now there is the question. May I, Mr. President, quote you and, through this quotation requite myself. There is the question of the full autonomy for the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, in my language, the proper language—[laughter]—and the Gaza district. And we want to keep what we promised, what we wrote, and what we signed—full autonomy for our neighbors. We will deliver them in peace and in human dignity and in justice and in liberty. We don't want to oppress them. We don't want to oppress anybody.

You should know that in the Bible, scores of times it is written love a stranger, don't do any wrong to a stranger because you were strangers in Egypt—not in Egypt of President Sadat, another Egypt, much older one.

But this is written in the Bible. We don't want to do any wrong to anybody. We never want to do any wrong. We just came to the land of our forefathers. And therefore, we want to grant to give them, to assure them this full autonomy. We shall do so. There are difficulties with that negotiation. My dear friend, Dr. Burg, the Minister of Interior, who is here, is the head of the negotiating team—all of you know him now as a wonderful man, mighty sense of humor which we need very badly sometimes, sage—and they achieve much, not enough yet.

We now face difficulties, yes. But we shall solve them. We want to have it solved by the 26th of May, as we promised each other, as a goal not as a deadline. We believe in lifelines, not in deadlines. So, we shall do our best.

Before I came here, there were rumors in the American press and also in the Israeli press that pressure is going to be exerted on me and my colleagues. And God knows what is going to happen in the Cabinet Room when we meet. As we already met, and we talked for hours on end, I can attest that nothing happened in the Cabinet Room, and no pressure was exerted and no confrontation took place. And the Cabinet Room, as it became a familiar place to me, was the same Cabinet Room in which all of us felt friendship for each other, understanding for each other, and together we looked for solutions and for formulations and all the brains worked and on both sides sat some brainy people who did their best and who will do so in the future.

So there is hope that we may meet the date. If we don't, the sky is not on our heads, we shall continue negotiating until we reach the agreement which is necessary. We want it with all our hearts, and we shall honor it as we do honor the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and all its commitments. The people of Israel will next week celebrate, as the President said, the day of independence when glory came back to our ancient people, when we got our Parliament, our government, our army—all the attributes of sovereignty in the land of our forefathers.

From generation to generation, this day will be always a great holiday in our hearts, amongst our people. But during the holiday, we shall also always remember our friends—remember you Mr. President, and all of you dear friends, leaders, and representatives of the great American people. We shall stand together, and together we shall labor for liberty so that it will win the day and triumph in the world.

I raise my glass to the great American people, which is the guarantee to the success of liberty throughout the world, the President of the United States, my dear friend, who contributed so much to peace in the Middle East between Egypt, Israel and in the future between other states and Israel. I say to all of you, as it is our tradition *L'chaim*.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 17, 1980²

Prime Minister Begin and President Carter have completed 2 days of extensive talks following the talks with President Sadat last week on the remaining issues in the autonomy negoti-

tions and on global security and the situation in the Middle East. These talks were held in the traditional spirit of friendship and close cooperation which characterizes relations between the United States and Israel.

President Carter reaffirmed the longstanding American commitment to the security and well-being of Israel and to the achievement of a just and lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors. Prime Minister Begin reiterated Israel's warm friendship for the United States and its strong support for the firm role of the United States in helping to preserve the security and independence of the states of the Middle East.

The President and Prime Minister consider that these talks have been helpful in advancing the autonomy negotiations. They reaffirm their dedication to the Camp David agreement of September 17, 1978, their satisfaction over the smooth implementation of the Treaty of Peace Between Israel and Egypt of March 26, 1979, and their determination to pursue to successful conclusion within the Camp David framework the current autonomy negotiations as another step toward a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. They reiterate their view that lasting peace can be achieved in the Middle East only through a comprehensive settlement.

Prime Minister Begin reaffirmed the objective set out in his and President Sadat's letter to President Carter of March 26, 1979, to do everything possible to reach agreement by May 26, 1980, the 1-year goal they set for themselves in that letter. President Carter affirmed the determination of the United States to do everything it appropriately can to assist Israel and Egypt to achieve that goal. To this end, has been agreed, following consultations with the Government of Egypt, at the negotiating delegations of Egypt, Israel, and the United States will meet for accelerated negotiations in the Middle East beginning before the end of April in Herzliya.

Prime Minister Begin and President Carter affirmed the determination of their two countries to continue to work closely together in every sphere and in particular in the joint effort they have undertaken together with President Sadat to bring a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace to the Middle East.

Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty Marks First Anniversary

The following remarks were made at a White House reception on March 23, 1980, by President Carter, commemorating the first anniversary of the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel.¹

President Carter

A year ago, many of you joined us here at the White House for a thrilling moment: the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. We stood in the bright spring sunshine, filled with a hope of a new beginning for a nation which I love here and for two nations in a region which had long been at war.

We knew the difficulties ahead, yet we were exhilarated by the prospects for peace. We watched the leaders of two great peoples who had long been enemies embrace each other and embark on a new and a promising relationship—two men of courage, President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin. They astonished the world. They had silenced for awhile the voices of cynicism and hatred and despair. They had done the impossible. They had achieved peace.

That day culminated a year and a half of patient and often very difficult negotiations following President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. I remember the moment at Camp David—it was a Sunday afternoon—when we suddenly knew that peace was possible. And I remember the moment in Cairo, following my visit to Jerusalem, when we were able to proclaim to the world that a treaty between these two great nations was at last within our reach, and then the ceremony here, bringing to an end 30 years of war.

Prime Minister Begin spoke to all of us that day: "Peace unto you," he said. "*Shalom, salaam forever.*" Many things have happened since that day almost exactly a year ago, things which once seemed even beyond dreaming. The borders have been opened. Ambassadors have been exchanged between the two countries, based on full diplomatic recognition. Ordinary citizens have become sightseers in a neighboring land from which they had long been completely excluded. It's no longer harder to travel between Tel Aviv and

Cairo than it is between Tel Aviv or Cairo and New York. Israelis and Egyptians in all walks of life have clasped each other's hands on the streets of Jerusalem and in Cairo, Alexandria, and Tel Aviv, in friendship.

Israel has returned a large part of the Sinai to Egypt, and Egypt has accelerated the normalization process even faster than we had envisioned a year ago. The doubters had history on their side, for these things had never happened before. Yet the practical dreamers also had history on their side as well, for now it has been proven that we need not repeat old patterns of hatred and death, of suffering and distrust.

Benjamin Franklin, who negotiated the treaty with England following the American Revolution, said that he had never seen a peace made, however advantageous, that was not censured as inadequate. No treaty can possibly embody every aim of any particular party to a treaty. What a treaty can do, through negotiation and compromise, is to protect the vital interests of each of the parties involved. That's what was done here 12 months ago.

We all know that our work is incomplete until the peace can be extended to include all who have been involved in the conflict of the past in the Middle East. We must prove to all people in the Middle East that this peace between Egypt and Israel is not a threat to others but a precious opportunity.

When I stood before the Knesset at a moment when it seemed that the peace treaty prospects had reached an impasse, Prime Minister Begin reminded us that this must be a peace not of months and years but forever. We've come to the first year. We must now look at the world as it is and find ways to continue living in peace with one another.

This treaty between Egypt and Israel is only one step on the way to a comprehensive peace throughout this troubled region. At Camp David, President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and I agreed on a second step, which is now underway—negotiations to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. That concept offers a first real hope for keeping our common pledge—a pledge made by all three of us—to resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects while fully

¹ Text from White House press release.

² List of participants in the discussions cited here (text from White House press release). ■

protecting the security and the future of Israel.

The autonomy talks will lead to a transitional arrangement. Further negotiations will be required after 3 years or so to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. Egypt, Israel, and the United States are now committed to the success of this course that we set for ourselves at Camp David, a course based on these accords and on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. As we all three pledged at Camp David, through these current negotiations Israel can gain increased security, and the Palestinians can participate in the determination of their own future and achieve a solution which recognizes their legitimate rights.

For the past 10 months our negotiators have done the patient work of defining these difficult issues. As we meet today, Ambassador Sol Linowitz [personal representative of the President for the Middle East peace negotiations] is in Israel, and he will soon be going to Egypt to help move the talks forward. And next month I will be meeting here with President Sadat and with Prime Minister Begin. It's time for us to review the progress that we've made so far and to discuss the way to move forward even faster. These two summit meetings are not meant to replace the negotiators who have worked so hard and have come so far but to help them to expedite their vital work. I look forward to seeing these two men once again. They are my friends.

In the 13 days at Camp David and the meetings I've had with them before and since, I've come to know them well. Both the men have deep religious convictions. Both are men whose personal sense of the history of their own nations has shaped their lives since early childhood. It should never be forgotten that after a generation of unsuccessful efforts engaging the talents of a legion of fine statesmen, it took courage and vision to create this first major step toward peace. It will also require courage and vision—perhaps even more—and a commitment to fulfill not only the letter but the spirit of the Camp David accords and to realize our dreams of a permanent peace.

The period between now and the completion of the talks will certainly not be easy as we work to resolve some of the most complex and emotional issues in the entire world. Both Egypt and Israel will now be facing difficult decisions in making an effort to answer difficult questions, and they will need patience and understanding—theirs

and also ours. Yet in the resolution of these questions lies a great promise for achieving the comprehensive peace which is coveted by Egypt, Israel, the United States, and all people of good will everywhere.

The United States will continue to work patiently and constructively with both Egypt and Israel as a full partner in the negotiations. These negotiations presently ongoing are the road to peace. They can succeed. They must succeed.

Let me make one thing clear. Domestic politics cannot be allowed to create timidity or to propose obstacles or delay or to subvert the spirit of Camp David, or to imply a lack of commitment to reach our common goal. This is time when we must continue that political vision that made possible the treaty which we celebrate today. As Prime Minister Begin said here last year: "... now is the time for all of us to show civil courage in order to proclaim to our peoples and to others: No more war, no more bloodshed, no more bereavement."

At Camp David, we invited others to adhere to the framework of peace and to join in the negotiations. The negotiations must be based on a commonly accepted foundation. As these talks move forward, let me reaffirm two points. We will not negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, nor will we recognize the PLO unless it accepts Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognizes Israel's right to exist. And we oppose the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

The United States, as all of you know, has a warm and a unique relationship of friendship with Israel that is morally right. It is compatible with our deepest religious convictions, and it is right in terms of America's own strategic interests. We are committed to Israel's security, prosperity, and future as a land that has so much to offer to the world. A strong Israel and a strong Egypt serve our own security interests.

We are committed to Israel's right to live in peace with all its neighbors, within secure and recognized borders, free from terrorism. We are committed to a Jerusalem that will forever remain undivided, with free access to all faiths to the holy places. Nothing will deflect us from these fundamental principles and commitments which I've just outlined.

As you all know, also, the United States has broadened and has deepened its valuable friendship with Egypt, the largest and the most powerful and the

most influential Arab nation on Earth. President Sadat, with his heroism, has brought about profound changes not only in the rest of the world but in Egypt's own internal life. And he has made Egypt a leader among nations in the pursuit of peace. We support Egypt's security and its well-being, and we will work with Egypt to insure a more prosperous and a peaceful life for the Egyptian people.

As President Sadat said at this house a year ago: "Let there be no more wars or bloodshed between Arabs and Israelis. Let there be no more suffering or denial of rights. Let there be no more despair or loss of faith. Let no mother lament the loss of her child. Let no young man waste his life on a conflict from which no one benefits. Let us work together until the day comes when they beat their swords into plow shares and their spears into pruning-hooks."

Isaiah, in chapter 42 in the Bible, says of a great servant of God, "A bruised reed he will not break; a dimly burning wick he will not quench . . . I have given you, as a covenant to the people, a light to the nations to open the eyes that are blind."

Today, as the earth is reborn in springtime after a long winter, we lift high that dimly burning wick of peace before the nations of the world. In its light all can see that, amid the disappointment and the dangers, mankind can still prevail against its own evils, against its own past, against all the efforts that would separate us one from another and make us enemies. We must not be mean nor stingy nor lacking in courage. We must not betray the trust of those whose faith is in us.

Down through the centuries the children of Abraham have spoken daily of their longing for peace in their greetings. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are children of Abraham, and they are men of peace. I ask your prayers that full peace may yet be ours. I pray that the dimly burning wick which we have lit may yet ignite a blazing flame of peace that will light the world.

I and President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin join in with you in our fervent prayer: Peace, *shalom*, *salaam*.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 31, 1980, which also includes the remarks on this occasion by Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, and Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to the United States. ■

course of conduct which has been pursued by Iran and thus to create the maximum deterrent against its repetition by any country in any part of the world.

Order of Presentation

I would like now to explain the order in which we propose to present our case to the Court. At the outset I propose to review the factual events which have occurred during the 4½ months that the American hostages have been held in captivity in Tehran. At the hearing which the Court held on December 10, I described a number of the relevant events, but in the ensuing 3 months there have emerged a number of additional facts which are plainly relevant to our case on the merits, and I would be glad of an opportunity to present them to the Court.

Thereafter, we would appreciate it if the Court would hear from my colleague, Mr. Stephen Schwebel, who appears as Counsel in the case. Mr. Schwebel will develop our argument to the effect that the current dispute between the United States and Iran falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the Court and that there is no valid reason why the Court should not proceed to adjudicate the claims currently being presented by the United States.

Following Mr. Schwebel's presentation, I would appreciate it if the Court would allow me to resume the argument and to develop, in additional detail, the specific substantive claims advanced by the United States against Iran. I would propose to include within that discussion a point which, in my view, deserves particular attention—namely, that although the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was originally seized by a mob of people who did not purport to be agents of the Government of Iran, in fact, the mob received almost immediate support and endorsement from the government and have since been operating with the authorization of the chief of state of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, as I shall explain in more detail, the Government of Iran is internationally responsible for all of the conduct upon which the U.S. claims in this case are based.

In the course of describing those claims I shall also observe that, although the Government of Iran has suggested that it has grievances of various kinds against the United States, none of those grievances has been presented to this Court, and none

can be treated as having any relevance whatever to these proceedings. No such alleged grievance can be allowed to interfere with or detract from the pending claims of the United States.

Finally, I shall develop our contentions as to the relief which we seek in this litigation. In essence, we seek a series of declarations which will conclusively establish to all within the international community that the Government of Iran has committed gross violations of its international obligations to the United States and that it is bound to put an end to the present unlawful situation.

We also seek a declaration to the effect that Iran's unlawful conduct has given rise to an obligation to make reparations to the United States. As indicated in our Memorial [January 15, 1980], the determination of the amount of damage that is due to the United States must necessarily be postponed until Iran's ongoing unlawful conduct has been brought to an end, but it is, nevertheless, important that the Court now affirm that the United States is entitled to reparation in an amount to be subsequently determined.

Sources of Information

As a preliminary matter, I should make one comment about the factual sources upon which we have had to rely in formulating our claims. Since the U.S. nationals who would normally be supplying the relevant information to the U.S. Government are now in captivity, all normal sources of information have been completely unavailable to us throughout the crisis, and to a very large extent we have had to rely on press reports of actions taken and statements made by the Government of Iran. Under some circumstances, of course, isolated press reports may be of questionable reliability, but the events that have occurred in Tehran over the last 4½ months have been so dramatic that they have been covered by a multitude of reporters whose reports are substantially unanimous as to the essential facts, giving a clear indication of substantial reliability. In any event, as to many of the events in the story, the press reports are all that we have—not through any fault of the U.S. Government but as a direct result of the unlawful conduct of the Government of Iran.

The fact that the Respondent in this case is responsible for depriving us of direct proof of our allegations, I respectfully submit, entitles the United

States here to rely upon the principle laid down by the Court in the *Corfu Channel* case. There the Court took note of the predicament of a state which had been made the victim of a breach of international law and which for that reason was unable to obtain direct proof of its claims. The Court stated as follows:

Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions. It must be regarded as of special weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single conclusion. [*I.C.J. Reports 1949*, p. 18]

It is our submission, of course, that the inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence upon which the United States is entitled to rely here overwhelmingly demonstrate multiple and flagrant violations of international law by the Government of Iran.

I should note also that many of the facts to which I will give special emphasis during my argument are referred to in our Memorial with appropriate citations to the source materials. When I refer to a fact which could not be included within our Memorial, I shall be relying upon the Supplemental Documents which the Court has given us permission to submit. We have supplied the Registrar with a typewritten version of our presentation which contains appropriate citations to sources and which also contains headings to which we shall not refer during our oral rendition.

Political Structure in Iran

Turning to the facts, I propose to start with one brief comment on the political structure which has existed within Iran throughout the relevant period. As the Court is aware, the Islamic revolution in Iran began in late 1978. The former Shah left the country, and the reins of power thereupon came into the hands of the Ayatollah Khomeini. With great rapidity, the Ayatollah established himself as the *de facto* chief of state, and he has been, without any question, the supreme political authority in Iran ever since that time.

Throughout the period with which this case is concerned, the Ayatollah Khomeini has been in direct control of the Iranian Armed Forces; he has received foreign envoys, accepted resignations of prime ministers and other

officials, delegated authority to the Revolutionary Council, and, in general, exercised ultimate control over all important governmental decisions. To date the Ayatollah and his immediate colleagues have admittedly been operating as an interim government, but under the Constitution which was formally adopted in December 1979, the Ayatollah will continue to be the supreme authority in the political structure of Iran. Indeed, although Mr. Bani-Sadr has now been elected President, Principles 5, 107, and 110 of the Iranian Constitution expressly place the ultimate power to govern in the hands of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who is identified by name in the Constitution, and that constitutional arrangement will obviously continue in force even after the installation of a new legislature in April or May.

It should be emphasized additionally that the Ayatollah's role is not titular; as demonstrated by additional facts which I shall describe in a moment, the Ayatollah Khomeini enjoys ultimate power of decision over the entire governmental apparatus and over the so-called militant students who have been holding the American hostages in captivity for so long. Against that political background I should like now to turn to the autumn of 1979, when the story of this case begins.

Attack on the Embassy and the Iranian Government's Responsibility

Before describing what happened on 4 November 1979, the date of the actual seizure of the American Embassy, I should like to refer to two significant events which occurred before and after 4 November. The two dates involved are 1 November 1979 and 1 January 1980. The two dates have something in common: On each an Iranian mob threatened to attack a foreign embassy, and on each the Government of Iran took effective action and protected the embassy in question.

Let me begin with 1 November 1979. Four days previously the Ayatollah Khomeini had delivered an inflammatory speech saying, in effect, that all of the problems of Iran stemmed from America, and, in the next few days, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran heard rumors that a mass demonstration in the vicinity of the Embassy was planned for 1 November. On the morning of 1 November, the people in the Embassy took stock of the security situation and concluded that there were a sufficient

number of Iranian police in the area to deal with the planned demonstration, and, in that conclusion, they were correct. At one point during the day, there were as many as 5,000 demonstrators marching back and forth in front of the Embassy, but the Chief of Police was present with adequate forces, and the government kept the entire situation under complete control. We think it is indisputable that on 1 November the Government of Iran recognized its duty to provide complete protection for the Embassy and all those within its walls, and on that day the government fulfilled its duty in a completely satisfactory way.

Exactly the same phenomenon occurred 2 months later, although a different embassy was involved. On 1 January 1980, a large mob physically attacked the Soviet [Tehran] Embassy in Tehran, [of the Soviet Union,] but, again, the security forces of the Iranian Government were on hand to prevent its seizure. Regrettably, those forces were unable to prevent the defilement of a Soviet flag, but the news films of the attack of 1 January, as well as the films of a second attack on the Soviet Embassy on 3 January, graphically portrayed the security forces of the Government of Iran protecting the Embassy premises. As I shall indicate in a moment, the events of 1 November and 1 and 3 January stand out in dramatic contrast with the events which began to unfold on 4 November 1979.

At this point in these proceedings the Court is certainly familiar with the story in general terms. It has been told in the Application which we filed on behalf of the United States [November 29, 1979], it was amplified in our Request for Interim Measures of Protection [November 29, 1979] and in the oral argument which we presented to the Court on 10 December, and it has been laid out in considerable detail in the Memorial which we submitted on 15 January. Nevertheless, I would like to touch briefly on some of the more important facts which have particular significance in the context of these proceedings on the merits.

First of all, the evidence makes clear that the Government of Iran, including the Ayatollah Khomeini, either knew or should have known in advance that the U.S. Embassy was going to be attacked by an organized group of people who claim to be university students. In the preceding days the Ayatollah had made a number of

speeches calling for anti-American demonstrations, and the students have since publicly proclaimed that when they attacked the Embassy they were acting in response to the Ayatollah's call to "intensify their attacks against America."

Moreover, the students have recently revealed that prior to the attack they consulted with a man named Mos Kho'ini, an official of the Iranian Government's broadcasting organization. They wanted to know whether the proposed attack would be consistent with the policy of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and he confirmed that it would. Moreover, Mr. Kho'ini then contacted Mr. Ghotbzadeh—then in charge of Iranian broadcasting and now the Foreign Minister of Iran—to urge him to support the attack when it occurred, and, as we know, that support was given. All of these facts are set forth in our Supplemental Documents Nos. 18 and 111. In addition, the son of the Ayatollah Khomeini has stated that before the attack, he was in touch with the attackers, although he has said that he did not know an attack would actually be made.

On 1 November, as I mentioned earlier, the police authorities were fully aware that in that period there was a very real danger that the current demonstrations in the Embassy area might lead to an attack, and the police had demonstrated through their actions on November that they had the ability to deal with and thwart any such attack they wished to do so. The simple fact that on 4 November, when an attack actually occurred, they evidently made deliberate choice *not* to do their duty.

On 4 November there was a demonstration of approximately 3,000 people in front of the American Embassy. The size of the crowd was not unmanageable; it was substantially smaller than the crowds of 5,000 and more than the Iranian security forces had previously demonstrated their ability to control. But, 4 November they evidently decided to stay out of the way. The relatively small group which carried out the assault on the American Embassy was hardly a formidable military force, and, yet, according to eyewitnesses, the Iranian security personnel stationed in the area simply "faded" from the scene. Since that was exactly the opposite of the conduct which they had displayed during the much larger demonstration 3 days before, it is hard to believe that their mysterious withdrawal resulted

on anything other than a deliberate tactical decision by their superiors.

Now, this last conclusion is supported by the dramatic events which followed. As soon as the attack began, possible officials in the Embassy began to make repeated calls for help to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and all such calls were ignored. Responsible Iranian officials were certainly aware of the need for help. It happens that the American Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Bruce Laingen, was at the Foreign Ministry at the time of the attack, and he made repeated, urgent, and personal appeals to the Iranian Foreign Minister seeking government assistance. Although ample security forces were available, absolutely nothing was done to prevent the attack from going forward and proceeding.

Moreover, the deliberateness of the decision to allow, and indeed encourage, the attack is made clear by yet another significant event. It appears that, as a result of the repeated American requests for assistance, specific orders were actually given to an official security force known as the "Revolutionary Guards." According to a subsequent official statement, as reflected in page 85 of our Memorial, the Revolutionary Guards were actually ordered to proceed to the Embassy immediately, but, instead of being ordered to terminate the attack which was then going on or to clear the Embassy grounds of intruders, they apparently were ordered to protect the attackers. According to the statement to which I have just referred, the students who attacked the Revolutionary Guards thanked the Revolutionary Guards for their support in taking possession of the Embassy.

All this makes it apparent that when the Embassy was seized and the hostages taken, whether or not the Government of Iran had a role in actually planning the attack, the government was itself an active participant in the venture. The *de facto* chief who incited the attack, the police authorities did nothing to prevent it, the Foreign Minister did not respond to calls for help, and the Revolutionary Guards provided protection for the Embassy attackers. As we will emphasize in later portions of our argument, it is difficult to imagine a course of conduct which more flagrantly violates uniformly recognized norms of international law.

The complicity of the Iranian Government in the operation has been

shown again and again by that government's own subsequent conduct. Starting on the very day of the attack and continuing in the days and weeks that followed, a whole series of Iranian Government officials—from the Ayatollah Khomeini down through the governmental structure—have treated the invading militants as national heroes. On 4 November the Ayatollah telephoned the students to approve of their capture of the American diplomats, the Foreign Minister "endorsed" that action, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards pledged continuing support by his forces, the public prosecutor joined in, and—perhaps strangest of all—the *judiciary* expressly endorsed these plain violations of the law.

In connection with these official endorsements of the actions taken by the militant students, I suppose that it might conceivably be suggested that the Government of Iran felt powerless to prevent such violations of law and, therefore, should not be criticized too harshly for participating in and condoning this course of conduct. As a matter of law, of course, no such defense could be accepted, and it is also refuted by the *facts*. Indeed, refutation is to be found in an event which took place just 2 days after the seizure of the American Embassy.

On 6 November an Iranian mob seized the Consulate of Iraq in retaliation for an Iraqi seizure of an Iranian Consulate, but, within a matter of hours, the Ayatollah Khomeini had issued an order directing that the Iraqi Consulate be surrendered by the mob, and they obeyed by 5:00 p.m. These facts, which reemphasize the practical control exercised throughout this period by the Ayatollah Khomeini, are set forth at pages 203 and 204 of our Memorial. From 4 November down to the present day the Ayatollah has simply not chosen to exercise his power to free the hostages and clear the Embassy.

U.S. Reactions to the Seizure

Protests by the United States began to be heard by the Government of Iran from the moment of the inception of the attack. As I have mentioned earlier, the beginning of the attack prompted immediate calls for help from the senior U.S. official in Tehran, Mr. Laingen, who vigorously protested the government's failure to prevent the attack and demanded that the Government of

Iran fulfill its duty to protect the Embassy and its personnel.

Moreover, as soon as it became apparent that the seizure of the Embassy and the American diplomats was more than temporary, the President of the United States summoned a former U.S. Attorney General, Mr. Ramsey Clark, to Washington and commissioned him a special emissary to travel to Iran and seek the release of the hostages. Mr. Clark's principal responsibility was to negotiate with the authorities in Tehran, and he set off for Iran on 7 November, stopping in Istanbul to change planes.

That was as far as he got. By the time Mr. Clark reached Istanbul, the Government of Iran, through the Ayatollah Khomeini and others, had stated very clearly that the hostages would not be released until the United States had fulfilled certain political demands, including particularly the extradition of the former Shah, who was then undergoing treatment for cancer in a New York hospital. On 7 November, when Mr. Clark had reached Istanbul, the Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed that discussions between the United States and Iran could not even begin until the Shah had been turned over to the Iranian authorities. Demonstrating his power in the official hierarchy in Iran, the Ayatollah forbade any official of the Government of Iran or of the Revolutionary Council to meet with Mr. Clark or any other U.S. envoy.

I need hardly remind the Court that under the U.N. Charter, all states, including Iran, have an obligation to seek to resolve disputes by peaceful means, including of course negotiation, and yet on 7 November, as reflected at page 204 of our Memorial, the Ayatollah decreed that there could be absolutely no negotiations with any American envoy until after the Shah had been extradited. Iran had, in effect, declared its intention to pursue its goal by coercion, the seizure of hostages, instead of by negotiation. According to a statement issued on 20 November by the Ayatollah's son, there were other elements within the Government of Iran who favored discussions with President Carter's special envoy, but that view was flatly rejected by the Ayatollah and he, after all, was and is the ultimate authority in Iran.

This is not to say that there were no conversations between Mr. Clark and the authorities of Tehran. As a matter of fact, while Mr. Clark was in

Istanbul he had a series of telephone conversations with senior members of the Iranian governmental structure, including the Ayatollah Beheshti, who was then Secretary of the Revolutionary Council; Mr. Ghotbzadeh, then Minister for National Guidance; and Mr. Bani-Sadr, the supervisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time. During these conversations Mr. Clark made it very clear that the United States regarded the seizure of the hostages and the Embassy as totally illegal and unjustifiable. Although Mr. Clark never had an opportunity to carry out the essential function that he was supposed to perform—namely to open negotiations with the Government of Iran—nevertheless, he managed to lodge unequivocal protests which made clear—if, indeed, any clarification was needed—that an enormously important dispute had arisen between the two states.

Such protests were repeatedly voiced as the United States pursued its efforts to resolve the dispute. On 9 November, just 5 days after the hostages had been seized, Ambassador Donald McHenry, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, presented to the U.N. Security Council the letter which is set out at page 133 of our Memorial. In that letter the United States asserted that the action taken by the Government of Iran against our Embassy and diplomatic personnel struck at the "fundamental norms by which states maintain communication, and violate the very basis for the maintenance of international peace and security and of comity between states." The United States requested the Security Council to consider what might be done to secure the release of the hostages, and over the next several weeks the Security Council and the General Assembly responded with a series of statements and resolutions calling upon Iran to release the hostages without delay. These statements are set forth in our Memorial at pages 134, 135, 140, and 27–28. I will have more to say about the actions of the United Nations at a later point, but I should simply note here in passing that from an early point in the crisis, the conduct of the Government of Iran was vigorously protested both by the United States and by the United Nations.

During the time it was making these public protests with respect to Iran's illegal conduct, the United States was also employing diplomatic channels for the same purpose. During the first

few days following the Embassy takeover, the United States asked other governments which maintained embassies in Tehran to make demarches on the Iranian Foreign Ministry calling upon Iran to release the American hostages. Indeed, other countries have pursued that goal so vigorously that on 30 November, as indicated at page 132 of our Memorial, the Ayatollah Khomeini confessed that "probably not a day passes" without such messages from third countries being received by the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

Iran's Use of the Hostages for Political Coercion

Thus far in my argument I have emphasized four basic facts: first, that the Government of Iran very clearly was aware that it had an obligation to protect the American Embassy and its diplomatic personnel from the mob; second, that it had the capability of doing so; third, that the Government of Iran made an apparently deliberate political decision that the Embassy and its personnel should be seized and implemented that decision not only by failing to provide protective security forces but by sending in the Revolutionary Guards to insure that the invaders would succeed in their mission; and fourth, that the United States reacted promptly, peacefully, and constructively to those events.

At this point, then, I would like to turn to another aspect that I have touched upon but not yet emphasized; namely, that the Government of Iran, once it had accomplished the capture of the American hostages, decided to use those hostages as a political instrument for coercing the United States into taking specific political actions desired by the Iranian authorities.

As the Court is aware, various different kinds of political action have been demanded by the Iranians during the crisis, but at the beginning of the dispute the single most basic demand was that the United States send the former Shah back to Iran for prosecution. As early as 7 November the Ayatollah and the students began to demand the extradition of the Shah, and the same demand was echoed at every level of the Iranian Government. On 7 November, for example, in discussing the question whether Mr. Clark would be received by the Iranian Government, the Ayatollah Khomeini

declared that the return of the Shah was a precondition not only for release of the hostages but for the mere opening of discussions with the United States. As stated 2 days later on the Tehran radio, the Ayatollah was absolutely firm in the position that until the deposed Shah had been extradited, there could be no negotiations with an American envoys. The declaration to that effect is set forth at page 206 of our Memorial.

The efforts of the Iranian Government to coerce the U.S. Government reached an initial crescendo on 17 November: At that time the Ayatollah Khomeini had decided that certain female and black hostages then held captive in the American Embassy should be released, and on 17 November the Ayatollah issued an official decree to that effect which was broadcast over the Tehran radio, as indicated at page 95 of our Memorial. In the decree it was stated explicitly that once the specified hostages had been released the remaining American hostages would be held under arrest until the American Government had returned the Shah to Iran for trial and he had returned all of the wealth that he had allegedly plundered.

I submit that the Iranian decree of 17 November, as set forth at page 95 of our Memorial, is a unique document in the history of modern international relations and quite appalling in its implications. In that official pronouncement the government not only confirmed its role in bringing about and endorsing the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages, it also confirmed that the Iranian Government itself was holding diplomatic personnel captive in an attempt to bring about desired political action. As I shall subsequently explain when I address the merits of our claims, it is the position of the United States that the conduct of the Iranian Government, as exemplified in the decree of 17 November, in a very real sense constituted compound or multiplied violation of international law: The Government of Iran violated the law when it failed to protect the Embassy and the American diplomatic personnel; it compounded that violation when it supported and endorsed the capture; and it compounded the violation again when it began to use the hostages as an instrument of coercion or blackmail. As I stand here today, this brutal strategy a negation of the rule of law, has not attained its stated objective; on the other hand, for international peace it has raised grave risks which have been

ded only because of the self-control of the U.S. Government and the American people.

Restraint

identally, if I may be permitted a personal aside, I happen to reside only six blocks from the Iranian Embassy in Washington, and I pass the Iranian passy almost every day on my way and from the State Department. Also, every day over the past 4½ months I have been struck anew by the force of the fact that while our Embassy and our diplomats in Iran have been in a state of captivity, the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington has been fully protected by the United States and has been going about its business in a perfectly peaceful fashion without the slightest molestation of any kind.

For 4½ months our Embassy has been physically held captive and has been totally unable to function as an Embassy, and the Iranian Embassy in Washington has been functioning without interruption throughout.

For 4½ months—more than one-fifth of the year—the American hostages have been imprisoned and for at least a part of this time, bound hand and foot and intimidated and threatened and harassed in inhumane conditions, while the Iranian diplomats still in Washington have been left free to come and go as they please, to carry out their diplomatic duties, and to enjoy the ordinary peaceful pleasures of life.

For the past 4½ months the premises and records and documents and archives of the American Embassy in Iran have been ransacked, used at will by the militants in Tehran, and displayed in the public press by high Iranian officials, while the Iranian premises and archives in Washington have been preserved inviolate.

I submit that the restraint thus demonstrated by the United States should not be regarded as a sign of weakness. It should be regarded as a demonstration of strength, a demonstration of the ability of the U.S. Government and the American people to overcome and contain the very strong and understandable temptation to strike back at Iran. In my decision to exercise such restraint on U.S. commitment to the rule of law played a great part, and we are justified by the fact that our commitment has been supported by almost universal approbation of our restraint by a correspondingly universal

condemnation of the conduct of the Government of Iran, especially as reflected in the proceedings of the United Nations.

Nevertheless, we feel very strongly, indeed, that if such condemnation is to operate as a deterrent to repetition of the Iranian conduct, either in Iran or elsewhere, there is one more element that must be added; namely, a final judgment of this Court on the merits of the claims of the United States. It is because we believe that a clear and emphatic judgment is bound to be a deterrent to future and similar violations of international law that we have been moving forward as vigorously as we can in pursuit of a final decision.

Iranian Government's Control

At this point I should like to pause to comment on a relatively recent development which some may regard as undercutting our claim that the Government of Iran itself continues to be a wholehearted participant in the violations of international law that have occurred in this case. In very recent weeks, according to press accounts, there has developed a certain tension between some elements of the Iranian Government and the so-called militants occupying the Embassy compound. The newly elected President, Mr. Bani-Sadr, and some of his colleagues have criticized the students for their recent independence of action, asserting that the students are improperly attempting to act as "a government within a government." I respectfully submit, however, that this recent tension should not be permitted to obscure the fundamentally important fact that from 4 November down to the present time, the students have repeatedly emphasized their subservience to the orders of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Again and again they have stated to the world that they would obey any instructions received from the Imam, who continues to be the supreme authority in Iran and to whom even the elected President is answerable under the Constitution. On 17 November, as I noted earlier, the Ayatollah directed the students to release certain specified hostages, and the students obeyed. On 28 December the students were asked whether an order from the Ayatollah to release the rest of the hostages would be obeyed, and they replied unequivocally in the affirmative. In very recent days there may have arisen reason to doubt that

the students will obey orders from Mr. Bani-Sadr; but as recently as 10 March the students reiterated their willingness to bow to the authority of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Such recent reaffirmations are reflected in several of the Supplemental Documents which we will be submitting to the Court.¹

The power to control the fate of the hostages, therefore, lies in the Ayatollah's hands, and he has decided against their release for the time being. Instead he has publicly announced that the question of the hostages is for the National Assembly to decide.² That body will not even take office until late April at the earliest, and it may not begin functioning until the month of May.³ In the interim the Ayatollah supports the continued detention of the hostages. It is, thus, entirely clear that the internationally wrongful acts for which the United States seeks judicial redress have been and are under the continuous control of the leader of the Government of Iran, which must take full responsibility for the conduct of which we complain here.

U.S. Efforts in the United Nations

As I mentioned earlier all of the U.S. reactions to the conduct of the Government of Iran have been peaceful actions taken within the law, and I would like at this point to describe for the Court the additional actions which the United States has taken in seeking to bring about a solution to its ongoing dispute with Iran over the hostages and the Embassy. Those efforts started with the immediate dispatch of Mr. Ramsey Clark on a mission to negotiate with the Government of Iran, but after an extended stay in Istanbul seeking to open negotiations Mr. Clark returned to the United States totally rebuffed.

The next step was to take the matter up with the United Nations. On 9 November 1979, as I mentioned earlier, Ambassador McHenry urgently requested on behalf of the United States that the Security Council undertake immediate deliberations as to what might be done and the same day the President of the Security Council expressed, and I quote, "profound concern over the prolonged detention of American diplomatic personnel in Iran." I might note, incidentally, that it now seems odd that a statement issued on 9 November, just 5 days after the attack on the Embassy, should have referred to the prolonged detention of

the hostages. Little did we know that that detention would still be continuing almost 5 months later.

At any rate, in his statement of 9 November the President of the Security Council called attention to the violations of international law involved. As indicated at page 134 of our Memorial, he urged "that the principle of the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and establishments be respected in all cases in accordance with internationally accepted norms," and on the same day the President of the U.N. General Assembly appealed to the Ayatollah Khomeini for the release of the hostages—as demonstrated at page 135 of our Memorial.

Ironically, it was shortly after these U.N. declarations that the authorities in Iran began to threaten criminal trials of the hostages. The Ayatollah Khomeini made a series of such threats himself, and as indicated at page 183 of our Memorial, the U.S. Government responded with a series of statements charging that any such trials would be clear violations of international law. The same protest was also asserted by the Secretary General of the United Nations on 20 November.

It was on 25 November, with captivity and threats of trial continuing, that the Secretary General exercised his extraordinary authority under Article 99 of the U.N. Charter to convene the Security Council in an urgent effort to resolve the crisis which the Secretary General characterized as a serious threat to the international peace and security. He made a full statement to the Security Council on 27 November stating in part that over the preceding 3 weeks he had been continuously involved in efforts to find a means of resolving the problem. At the same time he announced that the then Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. Bani-Sadr, had requested that the meeting of the Security Council be adjourned until 1 December in order to allow him to participate personally. The Council granted that request. In fact, when the Security Council reconvened on 1 December the Iranian Government had changed its mind and boycotted the meeting.

The initial result of the Security Council deliberations, as the Court is aware, was Security Council Resolution 457 [December 4, 1979], which is reprinted in our Memorial at page 140. In that resolution the Security Council reaffirmed "the solemn obligation of all

States Parties to both the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations . . . to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and . . . premises," and it also called upon Iran to immediately release the hostages.

In this connection I should point out one significant aspect of the language of Resolution 457. As I mentioned earlier in my argument, the evidence clearly establishes that the Government of Iran was a direct and active and continuing participant in the capture and continuing detention of the hostages, and those facts seem to have been clearly recognized by the Security Council. The resolution of 4 December urgently called upon the Government of Iran—not the students but the government itself—"to release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the United States . . ." In another portion of the resolution the Council called upon the two governments "to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them," but in the earlier paragraph relating directly to the hostages, there was no call "to take steps" to achieve the hostages' release. On the contrary, there was simply a direct command to the Government of Iran "to release," thus recognizing the fact that in substance, if not in form, the hostages were and are in the custody of the Iranian Government.

U.S. Efforts in the ICJ

Throughout this period—in the months of November and December 1979—the U.S. Government continued its efforts to achieve a resolution of the dispute through peaceful means, and for present purposes the most important of those efforts was our institution of the present proceeding before this Court. When we filed our Application on 29 November we had in mind two different kinds of commitments previously made by the Government of Iran. First, in each of four different treaties, as cited in our Application, Iran had formally acquiesced in and bound itself to the proposition that a dispute of the kind presented here is within the jurisdiction of this Court. Frankly, we did not see how Iran could make any plausible argument that this dispute is not within the jurisdiction of this Court, and, in fact, Iran has not done so. Secondly, at the time we filed our Application we had in mind that as a member of the United Nations, Iran has formally undertaken, pursuant to Article 94, para-

graph 1, of the U.N. Charter, to comply with the decision of this Court in any case to which Iran might be a party. Accordingly, it was the hope and expectation of the United States that the Government of Iran, in compliance with its formal commitments and obligations, would obey any and all orders and judgments which might be entered by this Court in the course of the present litigation.

These considerations prompted the United States, when it filed its Application on 29 November, to file simultaneously a request for an indication of provisional measures. As the Court is fully aware, we respectfully requested the earliest possible hearing on that request, and the Court acknowledged the gravity of the matter by allowing both parties full argument on 10 December.

The Court will recall that on the day before the hearing, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran made a formal submission to the Court in the form of a letter transmitted by telegram. Although we will have more to say about the letter of 9 December at a later point, I should like to note now two significant aspects of that letter. My first point appears in the first paragraph of the letter and, indeed, in the first sentence of that paragraph, which I should like to quote:

First of all, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express respect for the International Court of Justice, and for its distinguished members, for what they have achieved in the quest for just and equitable solutions to legal conflicts between States.

Again, that seemed to us to be a good sign in terms of the likelihood that Iran would obey any orders entered by the Court.

The second significant feature of the Iranian letter of 9 December, I submit, was the total absence of any legal or factual argumentation to the effect that the Iranian seizure of the hostages and the Embassy was lawful. Although the U.S. Application and Request for Provisional Measures had made clear that we were accusing the Government of Iran of flagrant and plain violations of Iran's international legal obligations under the four cited treaties, the Iranian letter of 9 December made absolutely no response to those charges. The Court will recall that the letter simply took the position that the Court should not take cognizance of the case on the theory that the seizure of the hostages was only "a

original and secondary aspect" of a larger problem. The net result of that Iranian position on 9 December, I regretfully submit, was and is that the Government of Iran has virtually conceded the total illegality of the course of conduct upon which it embarked on 4 November 1979.

At this point, incidentally, I should make note of the fact that a second message was conveyed by Iran to the Court just 2 days ago. I will not discuss that message separately, however, because it is really simply a reiteration of the substance of 9 December. Two or three sentences of the earlier message have been omitted and the position of the sentence has been changed, but the substance of the two is absolutely identical. Thus in substance, if not in form, all that Iran has chosen to say to the Court about the case is set forth in the message of 9 December—and we treat that letter as a concession of illegality.

Furthermore, and more importantly, there is other documentary evidence that confirms such a concession. The fact is that in the 4½ months since the attack on the Embassy, both the President of Iran, Mr. Bani-Sadr, and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Zibzadeh, have expressly acknowledged that the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages was carried out in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and another government official has expressly acknowledged the responsibility of the Iranian Government for all that has transpired. The significant facts are set forth in Supplemental Documents 18, 115, and 13, as well as at page 23 of our Memorial.

[Recess]

Before the recess I had been pursuing a chronology of the proceedings in this case and I had reached 15 December when the Court announced its unanimous decision to order provisional measures calling upon Iran to insure the immediate release of the hostages and the immediate restoration of the premises of the Embassy to U.S. control. I think it is fair to say that the world generally regarded that pronouncement by the Court as a major step toward the solution of the crisis. I hoped that that would turn out to be so. It is tragic that it has not as yet.

The Government of Iran has remained not only unmoved by the Court's action but, if I may say so, defiant. As reflected in an annex at page

141 of our Memorial, on 16 December—just 7 days after he had expressed profound respect for the Court—the Foreign Minister of Iran referred to the Court's provisional measures as a "prefabricated verdict" which was "clear . . . in advance," and instructed the Iranian Embassy here in The Hague officially to reject the decision. That reaction, I submit, simply reemphasizes the responsibility of the Government of Iran for the seizure and continuing captivity of the hostages.

Security Council Resolution 161

The United States, disappointed by Iran's decision to continue in this illegal course of conduct, thereafter returned to the U.N. Security Council and sought further action from the Council. On 31 December 1979, the Security Council adopted Resolution 461, which is set forth in our Memorial at pages 27 and 28. In that resolution the Security Council again recognized that the hostages were being held in Iran in violation of international law and that the situation resulting from the conduct of Iran could have grave consequences for international peace and security. The resolution also took into account the order of this Court of 15 December and reemphasized the responsibility of states to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force. The resolution then urgently called, once again, on the Government of Iran to release the hostages immediately and announced the decision of the Security Council, in the event of noncompliance by Iran, to adopt effective measures under articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter. Although the Security Council has since been prevented from carrying out its decision to adopt effective measures against the Government of Iran, the fact remains that the members of the Security Council were unanimous in expressing the view that the conduct of which we complain here constitutes a plain violation of international law and that the hostages should be released immediately.

U.N. Commission of Inquiry

My discussion has now reached the point in January when the United States filed its Memorial. Since 2 months have now elapsed since that filing, and since that 2-month period has encompassed some events in which the Court has a proper interest, I intend to

turn to this new subject now. Regrettably, since the hostages remain in captivity, the fundamental problem of which we complain here has not been altered in any of its legal essentials, but there have been a number of developments which are worthy of comment and which are reflected in the Supplemental Documents which we are submitting to the Court. In summarizing these events, I shall not attempt to trace through every twist and turn of Iranian politics. As the Court is aware from the public press, over the past 2 months there has been literally an outpouring of varied and confusing and inconsistent political statements from many different figures on the Iranian political scene, and I must content myself here with a summary of only the most significant events based on the supplementary documents.

One major political development occurred in late January when Mr. Bani-Sadr was elected President of the Islamic Republic. I think it fair to say that the world generally regarded the installation of the new President as a hopeful event which might well lead to a new element of stability on the Iranian political scene, thus perhaps improving the chance that the Iranian Government would begin to behave responsibly with respect to the hostages.

Then in February the Secretary General of the United Nations decided, building on his January discussions in Tehran, to form a commission to visit Iran as an aid toward the solution of the hostage crisis. The commission was officially established by the Secretary General on 20 February;⁴ in the last several weeks, as the Court is aware, the commission has visited Iran and conducted a series of interviews. On 11 March it left Iran with its task unfinished because the Ayatollah Khomeini had, in effect, refused to create the conditions necessary for the completion of the commission's work.⁵

You have asked us to respond to a question as to whether the commission of inquiry in any way affects the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to these proceedings, and I should like to give a detailed answer to that question at this point. In our view, the answer to the question is very clearly no. To demonstrate that that is so, I should refer at once to the official announcement of the establishment of the commission on 20 February.⁶ The announcement of the Secretary General is short, and I should like to read it in its entirety.

I wish to announce the establishment of

a commission of inquiry to undertake a factfinding mission to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States. Iran desires to have the commission speak to each of the hostages.

The Secretary General's statement then listed the names of the five members of the commission and then he continued as follows:

The members from Algeria and Venezuela will serve as the Co-Chairmen of the commission. The commission, which will leave for Tehran from Geneva over the weekend, will complete its work as soon as possible and submit its report to the Secretary General.

It should be noted that, as stated by the Secretary General, the commission's responsibilities were very limited, both in terms of function and in terms of subject matter. As to function, the commission of inquiry was to serve as a factfinding body, which obviously makes clear that it was not to reach legal judgments or otherwise engage in the function of adjudication as such. In addition, so far as the process of finding facts is concerned, the subject matter is confined to what the Secretary General described as "Iran's grievances." The Secretary General also expressed the hope that the process of allowing Iran to express its grievances—and having the commission find the facts with respect thereto—would promote an early solution to the crisis between the two governments, but neither the Secretary General nor the two governments gave the commission any responsibility whatever with respect to the adjudication of the claims of the United States. That function remains entirely, and we think very clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court. The conclusions which I have just expressed are fully corroborated, I submit, by the statements made by officials of both of the governments involved. On the U.S. side, on 20 February following the establishment of the commission, the White House declared that both the United States and Iran "have concurred in the establishment of the commission, as proposed by the Secretary General." The statement⁷ took specific note of the Secretary General's statement that the commission "will undertake a factfinding mission." While the statement included language to the effect that the commission would hear grievances of "both sides," its reference in that regard was in the context of the stated hope that the commission would help bring about the early release of the hos-

tages for whose welfare the American people have been concerned for so many months. The White House statement flatly asserted the position of the United States that the commission "will not be a tribunal."

Subsequent statements by U.S. officials are consistent on this point. In a press briefing on 23 February,⁸ the State Department spokesman reiterated the understanding that the purposes of the commission were to hear Iran's grievances and to bring about an early end to the crisis. He emphasized that "the official mandate is as stated in the Secretary General's own release on this subject." That position was reemphasized by the spokesman on 26 February when he said:

The Secretary General has outlined the objectives of the commission that he put together and sent to Iran. He has projected what it is; we agree with that.⁹

In response to questions at a press conference the following day, the Secretary of State of the United States repeated this understanding of the commission's objective and also added the following:

Let me say that the understanding of the United Nations and ourselves has been clearly set forth by the Secretary General. He was asked what the mandate was after a question had been raised as to the nature of the mandate, and he confirmed it was as he had originally stated it.

I think the terms of reference and the understanding with respect to those terms of reference was clear, remains clear, and I think they have been correctly reflected by what the Secretary General has said.¹⁰

The Iranian Government has also made relevant statements on this subject, and those statements clearly indicate the understanding on the part of Iran that the commission has no function with respect to the claims which are presently pending before this Court. In announcing the establishment of the commission, President Bani-Sadr stated the Iranian view that the commission was to engage in "an inquiry and investigation into past American intervention in the internal affairs of Iran through the regime of the former Shah and investigation of their treachery, crimes, and corruption."¹¹ Similarly, in a message issued on 23 February, the Ayatollah Khomeini referred to the commission as a body which is "investigating and studying past U.S. interventions in Iran's internal affairs through the bloodletting

Shah régime."¹² And in an interview on 25 February, President Bani-Sadr stated to German correspondents that "it is the task of the committee to investigate the crimes of the Shah and his dependence on the United States and to make the results known to the world public. The committee has no other mission."¹³

It is evident, I submit, that neither the Secretary General nor either of the two governments involved has ever viewed the commission as having any responsibility for the adjudication of the U.S. claims which are now before this Court. Even if the commission had met with full success in its mission to Iran, the United States would still be presenting its claims here today. It is thus very clear, we submit, that the jurisdiction of this Court has been and remains unaffected by the activities of the U.N. commission.

Perhaps the best way for me to conclude my discussion of the commission is to quote from Judge Lachs' opinion in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf* case. In discussing the relationship between the functions of the Court and other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes, Judge Lachs used language which to my mind precisely fits the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations since 4 November, and I would like to quote:

The frequently unorthodox nature of the problems facing States today require as many tools to be used and as many avenues to be opened as possible in order to resolve the intricate and frequently multidimensional issues involved. It is sometimes desirable to apply several methods the same time or successively. Thus no incompatibility should be seen between the various instruments and fora to which states may resort, for all are mutually complementary. Notwithstanding the interdependence of issues, some may be isolated, given priority and their solution sought in a separate forum. In this way it may be possible to prevent the aggravation of a dispute, its degeneration into a conflict. Within this context, the role of the Court as an institution serving the peaceful resolution of disputes should, despite appearances, be of growing importance.

The U.S. Government consented to the establishment of the U.N. commission in the hope that by providing Iran with an opportunity to air its grievances, the climate would be that much more favorable for the release of the hostages and the eventual resolution of other issues now pending between the two states. Unfortunately, the commis-

on's efforts have not yet borne fruit. At, and I think this is the critical point made by Judge Lachs in the passage I have quoted, the Secretary General's attempt to allow Iran to air its grievances by establishing the commission was not and is not in any way incompatible with the simultaneous pursuit of the case before this Court or with the Court's full and prompt consideration of the case on the merits.

That concludes my discussion of the factual background underlying the claims of the United States, and I would like now to turn for just a moment to a preliminary review of the legal issues.

Summary of Substantive Legal Principles

As the Court will recall from the hearing which took place on 10 December, the United States relies in this case upon four treaties, the first and most significant of which is the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. As we pointed out to the Court at that time, the purpose of that convention, to which both the United States and Iran have long been parties, was to codify a set of principles which have been firmly established in customary international law for centuries. The essential principle involved is that diplomatic agents and their staff and the embassy premises in which they serve enjoy an immunity and inviolability which must be respected in all events and that in no circumstances may the receiving state arrest or incarcerate such persons or enter or seize such premises. One of the essential provisions of the Vienna convention, article 29, reads as follows:

1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving state may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.

2. The receiving state is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.

3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment, or execution.

As I shall explain later in our presentation, the Iranian course of conduct that commenced on 4 November has included flagrant and very serious multi-

ple violations of every one of these three paragraphs of article 22.

Turning from the physical premises to the more important question of the immunity of the people within such diplomatic premises, article 29 of the same Vienna convention provides that every diplomatic agent "shall be inviolable" and "free from any form of arrest and detention." Moreover, article 31 requires that every such agent enjoy complete "immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State." There is absolutely no doubt but that the Government of Iran had a duty to prevent any seizure or detention of any of the U.S. diplomatic agents and staff in Tehran. Under article 9 of the Vienna convention, Iran could, in effect, have expelled any of the American diplomats whom Iran considered objectionable, but the Government of Iran was totally without any legal right to seize, or to allow the seizure of, any of the American diplomatic personnel involved in this controversy.

The basic rights that I have just been describing find relevant elaboration in a number of other treaty provisions to which we will be referring at a later point in our presentation. For present purposes it is enough to say that additional relevant guarantees of protection are set forth in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, and in the 1955 bilateral Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran. Under the latter treaty, for example, the Government of Iran was and is under a legal obligation to insure that all U.S. nationals in Iran receive "the most constant protection and security," as well as "reasonable and humane treatment," but as we will later describe to the Court treaty provisions of this kind, as incorporated in the four treaties to which I have referred, have been violated by Iran on a multiple and daily basis for the past 4½ months.

[At this point in the proceedings, Mr. Schwebel summarized the U.S. arguments on the jurisdiction of the Court to render judgment.]

• The United States and Iran are, as members of the United Nations, parties to the Statute of the Court.

• The United States and Iran are parties to four conventions whose

paramount provisions Iran has violated and continues to violate.

• These four conventions or their protocols give to the Court jurisdiction to render judgment upon any dispute that arises between the parties to those conventions over their interpretation or application.

• There is a dispute between the United States and Iran.

• That dispute is over the interpretation or application of the conventions.

• Resort to alternative means of third-party settlement, which are referred to in these conventions, is entirely optional. There is no requirement of preliminary recourse to such alternative procedures.

• Even if *arguendo* preliminary recourse to these alternative means of peaceful settlement, namely arbitration or conciliation, were to be viewed as normally required, on the facts of *this* case such recourse would not be.

• In any event, any need for such recourse has been obviated in this case by the lapse of time.

• The remedies sought by the United States in this case are appropriately addressed to the violations by Iran of the four conventions in question; accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to grant those remedies.

Mr. Schwebel then expanded on these points, and Mr. Owen resumed his presentation to the Court.)

MAR. 19, 1980

It is now my privilege to resume the argument on behalf of the U.S. Government, and I propose now to discuss the U.S. claim on the merits as against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran's Nonparticipation in Court

At the outset I would like to make one preliminary comment about the fact that the Government of Iran has deliberately decided not to participate in the proceedings before this Court. There are situations, of course, where it is not fair to infer anything substantive about the merits of the case from an absence of this kind, but for a series of reasons we think that it is very apparent that this is not such a situation. In the first place, there is absolutely no reason at all why Iran, if it had any defense to make in this proceeding, should not have appeared here to make it. In various countries of the world, including

the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, the intensely strained relations which arose as between Iran and the United States last November have given rise to a very high volume of civil litigation in which the Government of Iran appears as a litigant, both offensively and defensively. There are almost 200 such cases now pending in many different courts, and the Government of Iran has demonstrated its ability to litigate with vigor in any forum that it chooses. It has retained able counsel in several different countries and mustered all of the arguments that could possibly be presented in such cases. So far as we know, out of all the different courts involved, this is the only court in which Iran has failed to appear.

In such circumstances, I suggest, the reason for the Iranian absence is clear: If Iran had any possible defense to be presented on the merits, it would be here to present it, but it has none.

Indeed, I suggest that that conclusion is supported by the letters which the Government of Iran sent to the President of the Court on 9 December and 16 March. Those letters did not present disrespectful or casual comment. They set forth a most respectful and carefully thought-out position, and for that reason their silence on certain matters is as significant as their actual words. The fact that Iran made absolutely no attempt to argue that its conduct with respect to the hostages in the Embassy is legally defensible is a matter, I submit, of which the Court is entitled to take note.

World Opinion on Seizure

Moreover, the indefensibility of Iran's conduct is corroborated by the truly unanimous reaction of the countries of the world. Obviously, there are many countries in which the Iranian revolution is regarded with great sympathy and approval. There are many countries that will support Iranian positions on different issues, provided that there are grounds for doing so. So far as we know, however, there is not a single country in the world which has suggested in any way that the Iranian conduct in seizing the Embassy and the hostages was justified within the framework of international law. The absolutely unanimous view that Iran has broken the rules is reflected in the vote of the Security Council on 4 December, and in the outpouring of opin-

ion from countries all over the world within the last 4½ months. That opinion, I should emphasize, is shared by states representing every shade of political and economic, and even religious, persuasion. It is shared by the largest countries in the world and by the smallest. It is shared by the richest, the poorest, and by the East and West; by the aligned and nonaligned—in fact, by everyone.

The Iranian Government would clearly prefer that this were not so. Seeking to mollify, to some degree at least, the worldwide criticism which has come raining down upon the Iranian Government since the seizure of the hostages, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ghotbzadeh, has suggested that the ordinary rules of diplomatic immunity are essentially irrelevant because, he has said, they were devised by, and for the benefit of, what he refers to as "the big powers." It is Mr. Ghotbzadeh's theory that the purpose of the international legal principles involved is to prevent prosecution of "the crimes that the representatives of the big powers have committed in the small countries," a comment which is reflected at page 223 of our Memorial.

Along the same lines, the grandson and adviser of the Ayatollah Khomeini has asserted, as indicated at page 130 of our Memorial, that the Embassy seizure has found favor in the Third World, that the seizure of diplomats as hostages is *not* regarded by Third World populations as violating international law, and that "the poor and underprivileged despise the legal and meddlesome minds of the rich and powerful."

The actual reactions of such states demonstrate that this Iranian thesis is factually incorrect in every particular. The views of the smaller countries, including countries in the Third World, are reflected in the records of the U.N. Security Council debates during December and January. Just as one example, let me refer to the views expressed by the representative of Zaire, who explicitly called on the Government of Iran to bring itself into compliance with the principles of international law. He stated as follows:

We in the Third World who continue unwaveringly to strive for the democratization of international relations, for a more just and equitable system of international relations, protected from fear, arbitrary actions, and the rule of force, but guaranteed by the force of law, attach the utmost importance to this, bearing in mind the

means available to us, because we are convinced that in a world without principles and laws we should be the losers.¹⁴

The same theme was urged by the representative of Panama, appealing the Iranian authorities to "cease their illegal and inhuman detention of persons protected by international law." He stated:

... for a small country, existence as a nation is only possible in a world in which law and order prevail. The sole weapon, the only defense of a small nation, lies precisely in the maintenance of the legal system that governs international relations.

Again, the representative of Gabon referred to the long-established principles of diplomatic immunity and made the following observation:

Respect for these diplomatic customs even more fundamental for countries such as ours, which owe their very existence to the face of power politics and hegemony all kinds to the recognition of this international law. . . .¹⁶

And finally, the same position was summed up by the representative of Portugal in the following terms:

In any country the rule of law is the best defense of ordinary people against oppression and tyranny. Similarly, between states, international law is the only defense of the small, poor, and weak countries against the rich and powerful.¹⁷

It is simply inaccurate for the Government of Iran to suggest that there is an element of world opinion which regards their hostage-taking as lawful. There is not. The small and nonaligned countries, together with the major powers from East and West, including such countries as the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, and France, are totally agreed that the seizure of the American Embassy and the capturing of the American hostages in Tehran constitute flagrant and continuing violations of international law.

The principles of international law which this Court is being asked to vindicate are of deep concern to *all* states for they are indispensable to a civilized international order. Moreover, although I regret the need to make this observation, there is clear evidence that the world is entering upon a new era of terrorism in which the seizure of hostages, including particularly diplomatic hostages, is a political technique which is being used with increasing frequency. In most such cases, it is true diplomatic agents have been seized by

terrorist groups who reflect at most a minority political position within the particular country involved, but it is, nevertheless, the fact that in the past trade diplomats from a great many different countries have been seized and detained for political purposes. Just one recent episode, the seizure of the Mexican Embassy in Colombia, diplomats from no less than 14 different countries were taken captive, including diplomats from Austria, Brazil, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Israel, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Switzerland, Uruguay, the United States, the Vatican, and Venezuela.

Every one of these episodes, of course, reflects a terribly serious situation for the affected states. But the severity of the episode in Tehran far exceeds any of the other examples, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In Tehran the host government itself participated from the outset, seizing a large number of hostages and maintaining their captivity for months on end in order to achieve its political purposes. From the point of view of the future of international relations and world peace, the events elaborated in the present record are truly frightening and ominous. Unless the world community takes every possible step toward condemning and discouraging such conduct, the rule of international law will be gravely imperiled.

Lack of Relevant Exceptions to Diplomatic Immunity

Before I begin my discussion of the particular substantive rules which Iran has violated since 4 November 1979, I would like to address myself to the second question put by the President of the Court yesterday. That is, "whether the state may have an inherent right in very extreme circumstances to override its obligations under the rules of diplomatic and consular law to respect the inviolability of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises, and if so, in what circumstances." As discussed in my Memorial at pages 49 and 53, there have been suggestions that the general rule of inviolability is subject to a few extremely narrow exceptions. Arguably, the police agents of a state may apprehend a diplomatic agent who is actually in the act of committing a crime, briefly use force to restrain a diplomatic agent who is engaged, for example, in an actual assault upon another person. Even these limited exceptions,

however, are controversial, particularly in regard to the inviolability of premises.

In any event, we submit that by no stretch of the imagination can any of these possible exceptions have any application in the present case. The American Embassy and its personnel were not seized to avert an imminent peril of the kind envisaged in these possible exceptions to the rule of inviolability. Instead, as indicated by the statements of the Government of Iran, the apparent purpose of the seizure and of the prolonged detention of the hostages was and is to coerce the United States into complying with certain Iranian demands. Iran is under no obligation to maintain diplomatic relations with the United States or to permit the United States to maintain an Embassy in Iran or even to tolerate the presence in Iran of some officials whom Iran may consider objectionable. But having established diplomatic relations with the United States, Iran is obligated to respect the inviolability of the U.S. diplomatic mission and its personnel, an obligation which exists even in time of war.¹⁸

In short, any exceptions to the rule of inviolability have no application in this case, and this Court was absolutely correct when it stated in its order of 15 December that the rule of inviolability is "unqualified."

Categories of U.S. Claims

Against that background, I should like now to turn to the specific claims asserted here by the United States. As we see it, there are five broad categories of unlawful conduct from which those claims arise. They are, first, the seizure and continuing detention of the American hostages in Tehran. Second, the harsh treatment and other conditions associated with that detention. Third, the interrogation and threatened trial of the hostages. Fourth, the invasion and occupation of the U.S. diplomatic and consular premises in Tehran. And fifth, the failure of the Iranian Government to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice.

Seizure and Detention of the Hostages

In setting forth the U.S. claims as they arise from the seizure and continuing detention of the American diplomatic

agents and staff in Tehran, we are relying upon what is probably the oldest and most fundamental rule of diplomatic law.

As I indicated yesterday, it has been established customary international law for centuries that every diplomatic agent enjoys diplomatic immunity and that under no circumstances may he be seized by the receiving state, either as a hostage or for any other purpose. The rule of personal inviolability was followed even in early civilizations, simply because a diplomat cannot perform his functions without such a rule. Many authorities view the principle of inviolability as the core or central principle from which all diplomatic privileges and immunities have been derived. It is a rule which has found such universal acceptance that according to one leading authority, as set forth in our Memorial at page 40, from the 16th century down to the present time no receiving state has authorized or condoned a breach of a diplomat's personal inviolability.

This is not to say that there have not been instances when a diplomatic agent has been unlawfully detained. The point is that although there have been such instances, the practice has been for the receiving state to recognize the seizure as a violation of international law and to make amends in one way or another. For example, in 1917 the American Minister to Guatemala was briefly detained by the Guatemalan police. In that case, however, the President of Guatemala immediately apologized and issued orders that the officers involved be punished. Similarly, in 1932 when the American Minister in Ethiopia was attacked by police officers, the Ethiopian Government brought about the prosecution of the officers and gave broad publicity to the resulting sentences.

I think it is truly safe to say that, with the possible exception of the present Government of Iran, there is not a single government in the world which would dissent from the fundamental proposition that every diplomat is entitled to absolute personal immunity from attack or seizure, except in exceptional circumstances which are not relevant here.

The universal acceptance of these principles, of course, led to their inclusion in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and that convention gives rise to the most important claims asserted by the United States in this proceeding. Specifically, article 29

of the convention provides in the most explicit terms that "the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable," that he shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention," and that "the receiving State shall treat him with due respect" and "take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity." All of these principles constitute simply a codification of previously existing law. In addition, the 1961 convention added the principle that the same privileges and immunities should be enjoyed by the members of the administrative and technical staff of a diplomatic mission. The relevant provision of the 1961 Vienna convention is article 37.

With these fundamental principles in mind, it really requires no argumentation to demonstrate that on 4 November 1979, the Government of Iran embarked on a course of conduct which violated these principles in the most flagrant and indisputable way. At that time, with the assistance of the government's Revolutionary Guards, the so-called student followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini physically captured some 63 U.S. nationals and a number of non-Americans as well. In addition, three U.S. diplomats have been physically confined within the premises of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, bringing the total number of detained Americans up to 66 individuals. That total, of course, does not include the six additional Americans who were able to slip away from the Embassy at the time of the attack and achieve a safe refuge and eventual escape through the good offices of the Canadian Government. As to the 66 Americans who have actually been in captivity, all but two enjoyed diplomatic status either as agents or staff. The other two are an educator and a businessman who happen to have fallen into the hands of the student followers of the Ayatollah, and as to those two individuals we claim no personal immunity as such. On the other hand, as indicated in our Memorial, those two individuals, being present in the Embassy, were entitled to the immunities arising from their presence there, and as U.S. nationals within Iran they were separately entitled to receive "the most constant protection and security" under the treaty of amity between the United States and Iran.

Of the 64 persons who were and are entitled to diplomatic immunity 13 were released on 20 November pursuant to an order issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In that same order the Ayatollah

commanded, in effect, that the remaining 51 diplomatic agents and staff be continued in confinement, and their confinement continues to this day. As I mentioned earlier, three of them, one of whom is the American Charge d'Affaires Mr. Bruce Laingen, are confined in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and the other 48 are held by the so-called militant students.

Direct Responsibility of the Iranian Government

As I noted yesterday, we think it is really beyond dispute that since 4 November all of the confined Americans have been under the continuous authority of the Ayatollah, to whom the student captors have repeatedly pledged their allegiance. On 17 November, when the Ayatollah directed that 13 be released and that the remainder be detained, the students obeyed with precision. A few weeks ago, when the President and the Foreign Minister sought to bring about the transfer of the hostages from the custody of the students to the custody of the government, the students quickly focused on the question whether the transfer had been ordered by the Ayatollah. They made claim that if the Ayatollah issued such an order for a transfer they would obey, but when he declined to do so they retained the hostages in their custody. It may be that some officials of the Islamic Republic would prefer that the hostages be released, but it is the will of the Ayatollah that has controlled to this day.

Under the circumstances, I respectfully submit, the Court has no real alternative but to attribute the conduct of the students to the Government of Iran. Time and again since 4 November officials of the Iranian Government have acknowledged that the students are acting on behalf of the state,¹⁹ and the facts have been publicly recognized by nations throughout the world. We have reviewed the debates in the Security Council in December with respect to the responsibility of the Government of Iran in carrying out these violations of international law, and those debates, as well as the resulting resolution, make clear that all of those who participated were agreed on the responsibility of the Iranian Government itself.²⁰ As soon as the Ayatollah, the chief of state, decides that the hostages are to be released, they will be, but so long as he adheres to the belief that the detention of the hostages serves his political

purposes, they will presumably remain in captivity.

It should be noted that in a very real sense this conduct on the part of the Iranian Government constitutes a retreat from the standards which Iran itself has endorsed for many years. In 1924, for example, an Iranian mob attacked and killed one Maj. Robert Imbrie, an American Vice Consul in Tehran, and the Persian Government immediately recognized that by failing to protect Maj. Imbrie it had violated an international legal obligation which it owed to the United States. At that time the government acknowledged its responsibility, agreed to pay an indemnity to the Major's widow, and initiated action to apprehend and punish the offenders. More than 50 years ago the Government of Iran recognized its legal responsibilities, but it has refused to do so today.

At a much earlier point in my presentation, I made mention of the fact that the conduct of the Iranian Government toward the hostages represents compound violations of international law, and the point, I think, is well illustrated by the Imbrie case to which I have just referred. Under the treaties upon which the United States relies, the Government of Iran has a continuing obligation to protect U.S. nationals from seizure or other harm and to prevent such crimes from going forward, and this duty of protection and prevention arises under article 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, under articles 2 and 4 of the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, and under article 11 of the 1955 treaty of amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran. In other words, the conduct which we have described to the Court at such length has violated Iran's duties of protection and prevention under several different treaties and yet, I submit, that it would be a vast understatement to suggest that the Government of Iran is guilty of nothing more than a failure to protect the Americans and prevent the crimes. The most significant fact that, far from merely failing to protect the individuals and prevent the crimes the Iranian Government itself has participated in the seizure and in the commission of the crimes, thereby compounding the violations many times over. Where a policeman fails to prevent a kidnapping from taking place, may be criticized at one level, but

ere he affirmatively participates in kidnapping, he is engaged in a far more flagrant violation of the law.

Conditions of Hostages' Captivity

At this point I would like to turn to a related, but somewhat different set of grievances stemming from the seizure of the hostages. It relates to the conditions under which these U.S. nationals have been held in captivity. It would be something if the Iranian Government had placed these individuals under house arrest and allowed them to continue to live in relatively humane conditions. Such conduct would, of course, not constitute a serious and totally unacceptable violation of international law, but it would not have been nearly as egregious as the conduct which has occurred in fact.

As I embark upon this aspect of the case, I should remind the Court that we do not, of course, have access to the 53 individuals who remain in captivity in Iran today and, therefore, cannot furnish the Court with any very concrete information as to exactly the conditions under which these hostages have been existing for the past several months. On the other hand, the Court may also recall that on 20 November, 13 of the hostages were released, and these released hostages have provided the U.S. Government with detailed information as to the manner in which they were treated during the first 2½ weeks of their captivity. Affidavits containing such information are available to the Court's *in camera* inspection, if they are desired. Although there appears to have been some variation as to the treatment of different hostages, it is fair to say that the conditions which existed during the first 2½ weeks of incarceration were harsh. Without going into great detail I might simply give some examples of the kind of treatment meted out to these people in the early period of their confinement.

The female hostages were tied to straight chairs facing the wall and kept in that position for 16 hours a day. All windows were boarded up, and incandescent lights kept burning 24 hours a day, thus inhibiting sleep. The hostages were frequently blindfolded—the punishment for attempting to speak to other hostages or for disagreeing with one of the guards was to be blindfolded many hours at a time. Hands were kept either bound or handcuffed at waist height, thus inhibiting sleep. Some hostages were required to sleep on the cold floor with their hands tied, with-

out blankets or other amenities. In some cases changes of clothing were not permitted and a bath or shower was permitted only rarely. Several hostages were repeatedly threatened with guns and other weapons. On one occasion a student who was interrogating a woman hostage showed her his revolver to let her know that one of its several chambers was loaded and then proceeded to intimidate her by pointing the gun at her and repeatedly pulling the trigger. Happily, he stopped in time, but the experience must have been terrifying. The hostages have not been permitted to see newspapers or obtain news in any other fashion. We also know that on a number of occasions some of the hostages had been paraded blindfolded before hostile and chanting crowds. I submit that if one closes one's eyes and imagines the sort of terror that would necessarily be evoked by that treatment, one gets some inkling of what these people have been put through.

Despite repeated requests to allow contact between the hostages and their government, all such contact has been absolutely prohibited. On a few isolated occasions an outside observer has been allowed to see some of the hostages, presumably because such visits have served the interests of their captors. But the Secretary General of the United Nations was not allowed to see any of the hostages during his visit in late December and early January, and the U.N. commission was denied access to the hostages in the Embassy despite the prior assurances of the Iranian Government.

All of these actions, we submit, have constituted flagrant violations of the international legal obligations which the Iranian Government owes to the United States and to the hostages themselves.

Under article 26 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, all of the American diplomatic and consular officials have been continuously entitled to "freedom of movement and travel" within Iran and, under articles 27 and 35 of the same convention, they have been continuously entitled to free communication with their government.

All of those fundamental rights, which are absolutely essential to the performance of diplomatic and consular functions, have been totally denied for 4½ months. Instead of being left free to go about their diplomatic and consular

duties, they have been confined like common criminals. As indicated during the Security Council's debate, particularly by the representative of Portugal, the Government of Iran has imposed upon these hostages, what that representative described as "an inexcusable form of cruel and inhuman treatment."

I think it is striking, incidentally, that at the beginning of the Second World War, when the Axis and Allied Powers went to war against one another, the practice of each government was to politely escort the diplomatic agents of the enemy out of the country or intern them in comfortable quarters pending exchange, whereas here the Iranian Government, with which the United States is not at war, has subjected our people to harsh confinement.

Moreover, over and above the other severe aspects of this confinement, it is apparent that some or all of these individuals have been subjected to grueling interrogation under conditions which by definition constitute coercion—as illustrated, for example, by the woman who was so alarmingly interrogated at the point of a loaded revolver.

Apparently, the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers have been hoping to find evidence that some of these hostages are, to use their words, "spies" and have permitted coercive interrogation for that purpose. All of this has been done under the auspices of the Ayatollah who explicitly stated on 18 November, as indicated at page 215 of our Memorial, that his student followers were properly carrying on these so-called investigations. The Ayatollah declared as follows: "What our nation has done is to arrest a bunch of spies who, according to the norms, should be investigated, tried, and treated in accordance with our own laws."

Needless to say, this treatment of the hostages constitutes an independent and gross violation of international law. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides in the most straightforward terms that every diplomatic agent "shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State" and that he shall not be "obliged to give evidence as a witness." If the clear terms of the convention preclude interrogation of these Americans in an official courtroom of Iran, *a fortiori* the convention precludes interrogation behind closed doors under hostile and coercive conditions as apparently endorsed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Again, it is dif-

difficult to think of a more gross violation of international law than locking up diplomatic envoys and subjecting them to this kind of treatment. As the Court recognized in the provisional measures which it indicated on 15 December, it seems clear that for the past 4½ months the Government of Iran has been subjecting the American hostages in Tehran to, what the Court described as "privation, hardship, anguish, and even danger to life and health."

It should be noted that even if all of the 53 Americans still in captivity in Tehran were ordinary U.S. nationals, as contrasted with diplomatic agents and staff, the treatment which has been meted out to them by the Iranian Government would, nonetheless, be far below the minimum standard of treatment which is due to *all* aliens, particularly as viewed in the light of fundamental standards of human rights. Paragraph 4 of article II of the 1955 treaty of amity between the United States and Iran explicitly requires Iran to provide reasonable and humane treatment in every respect to U.S. nationals in Iranian custody, together with the most constant protection and security. The right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention and interrogation and the right to be treated in a humane and dignified fashion are surely rights guaranteed to these individuals by fundamental concepts of international law. Indeed, nothing less is required by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Allegations of Espionage

As I indicated a moment ago, at various times during the last 4½ months the Iranian Government has attempted to justify its treatment of the American hostages by asserting that some of the hostages are spies who have violated the laws of Iran and who, therefore, may be treated as common criminals.

Yesterday Judge Gros posed three questions about such allegations, and perhaps this is an appropriate point for me to provide the answers.

He asked whether, in any diplomatic exchanges prior to 4 November 1979, the Government of Iran voiced criticisms to the effect that the U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel in Iran had engaged in espionage or other unlawful actions against the Government of Iran. The answer is that on several occasions during that period representatives of the Iranian Government suggested to American officials in

very general terms that the United States was somehow engaged in some sort of conspiracies or subversive actions against the new Iranian Government, but on each of those occasions the American representatives unequivocally denied the charges and asked the Government of Iran to produce any evidence that it might have to support its allegations. At no time did any Iranian official respond to these requests by presenting any evidence or other material bearing on any alleged conspiracy or acts of subversion attributable to the United States.

Moreover, I should emphasize that none of the generalized suggestions made by the Iranian officials related to any of the diplomatic or consular staff in Iran. At no time during the period involved did the Iranian Government raise any question about the propriety of any activities of the American Embassy in Tehran. In response to Judge Gros' question whether the Iranian authorities ever indicated an intention to declare any member of the U.S. diplomatic or consular staff *persona non grata*, or "unacceptable," the answer is that they did not.

Next, Judge Gros has referred to the repeated suggestion, as advanced by the Ayatollah Khomeini and others, that the American Embassy in Tehran was not really a proper diplomatic mission but instead a "den of espionage." The response of the United States is that the charge is untrue; the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was a normal diplomatic mission operating as such missions normally do.

In response to Judge Gros' further question whether the United States was involved in sabotage operations in Kurdistan or Khuzestan, or had plans of intervention in Iran, the answer is no.

Apart from the answers which I have just given, I should also make clear that for at least two reasons, the Iranian allegations of spying, which have been advanced in an effort to justify the seizure of the Embassy, cannot properly enter into this Court's decisionmaking process in any way at all. In the first place, those Iranians most closely associated with the spy charges apparently do not appreciate the fact that the collection and transmission of information about the host country is one of the most fundamental functions that diplomatic agents are expected to perform. I have no doubt that when the U.S. Embassy was operating in Tehran there was a flow of information about Iran from that Embassy to the State

Department in Washington and that there is today a flow of information about the United States from the Iranian Embassy in Washington to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in Tehran. Such activity obviously is normal and proper as confirmed by the fact that article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations explicitly lists such activities as a normal part of diplomatic agents' functions.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, even if there had been some called spying on the part of one or more of the hostages, proof to that effect would, nevertheless, be absolutely irrelevant to the present proceedings. Long-established principles of international law and long-established state practice make clear that if a diplomat or consular agent engages in espionage or other unlawful conduct directed against the receiving state, that does not give the receiving state the right to arrest him or interrogate him or subject him to any other aspect of the criminal prosecution process. Under article 31 of the diplomatic convention it is clear that every such agent enjoys complete immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state, no matter how displeased that state may be with particular conduct. This is not to say, of course, that the receiving state is without a remedy. Obviously, it has the right at any time and for any reason to declare a diplomatic agent *persona non grata* and thus, in effect, bring about his expulsion from the country.

Exactly that remedy has been continuously available to the Government of Iran if it was dissatisfied in any way with the conduct of any of the U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel. By instead of invoking the only lawful remedy available to it, the Iranian Government chose instead the flagrantly unlawful alternative of seizing the diplomatic agents and confining them for months on end in harsh and inhuman conditions. There is no possible way, submit, that that conduct can be justified.

Threat of Trials

Before I leave the subject of the treatment of the hostages, I should mention one additional problem which, though has not actually come into existence yet, constitutes a potential threat in the future. As the Court will recall from our earlier oral presentation and our Memorial, over the past 4½ months, various different figures on the Iranian

political scene have advanced the notion that at some point in the future some or all of the American hostages would be on trial in the criminal courts of Iran. These suggestions have been advanced by Foreign Minister Jazayeri, by the students, and, indeed, by the Ayatollah Khomeini himself.

Moreover, different types of penalties have been threatened as appropriate sentences following such criminal trials. One Iranian magistrate, as indicated on page 107 of our Memorial, has suggested that the hostages should be sentenced to slavery, but the more frequent suggestion has been that once the hostages have been tried and convicted, they should be brought before a firing squad, as indicated for example, on page 101 of our Memorial. Although it is difficult to tell how seriously these suggestions have been advanced, they are of an ominous significance when it is recalled that in recent months over 100 Iranian nationals have been tried in summary fashion before revolutionary courts and then put to death.

Needless to say, any kind of criminal prosecution of any of these hostages would constitute fresh violations of the press prohibition set forth in article 2 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. I will not labor the point at this time, however, because although threats of criminal prosecution have been heard with great frequency at an earlier stage of the crisis, there have been relatively fewer such suggestions in the early December, perhaps because on 15 December this Court expressly relied upon the Government of Iran to provide to all American diplomatic and consular agents immunity from criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, the Supplemental Documents which we have in submitting to the Court demonstrate that occasional threats of criminal trials are still being made²¹ and for that reason, as I shall indicate later in my submission, we have included an appropriate provision on the subject in our prayer for relief.

Violations of Premises and Archives

It concludes my discussion of the treatment of the hostages, and at this point I would like to turn to a different subject, namely the legal violations affecting the physical properties of the United States in Tehran. By physical properties I refer both to the real estate—the Embassy in Tehran and the Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz—and

also to another important category of property, namely the files, records, and equipment located within these buildings. All of these properties, of course, were seized in the early days of November 1979.

As to the seizure of these properties I will not dwell on the facts. The Court will recall that on 4 November the students assaulted the compound, cut chains, removed window bars, attempted to set fire to the Chancery, burned through steel doors with torches, and by these methods gained possession of all of the buildings in the compound—possession which was then confirmed by the presence of the Revolutionary Guards. Some hours after the seizure of the Embassy, similar seizures were made of the U.S. Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, again with the cooperation of the Revolutionary Guards. Obviously, the Embassy compound remains in the control of the militant students, but the U.S. Government has no reliable information as to the current status of the two consular properties.

Once again, there can be no possible dispute as to whether the physical invasion of the diplomatic and consular premises of the United States was unlawful. Article 22 of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations is as explicit as it can be on that point. Similarly, article 27 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations explicitly provides that the receiving states shall respect and protect the consulate premises. The importance of such respect and protection is emphasized by the fact that under article 27 the consular premises are to be protected even where consular relations have been severed or where a consular post has been closed.

At an earlier point in my argument I commented on how striking it is that the legal principles on which we rely in this case are so uniformly regarded as valid, and the principle of the inviolability of the premises of a diplomatic or consular mission is no exception. Over the years, of course, there have been relatively rare occasions when a mission has been attacked, but this appears to be the first case in many centuries in which a receiving state itself has participated in the attack and then retained possession of the premises and attempted to use that unlawful possession to political advantage.

At this point it may be appropriate for me to remind the Court of the

marked inconsistencies that have occurred as between different actions taken by the Iranian Government. Yesterday I mentioned that both before 4 November and after that date, threats of attack were made against the Embassies of the United States and the Soviet Union, and on those other occasions the Iranian Government acknowledged in a straightforward fashion that it had an obligation to protect the missions involved. On those occasions it deliberately obeyed the rules of international law, but on 4 November and since, the Iranian Government has deliberately disobeyed those rules. In so doing I respectfully submit it has indisputably subjected itself to liability to the Government of the United States.

With respect to physical properties, I should also refer, at least briefly, to the fact that as widely reported in the press the militant students who have occupied the Embassy premises for the past 4½ months appear to have thoroughly ransacked all of the diplomatic and consular archives and documents upon which they could lay their hands. Indeed, there have been recent press reports to the effect that when the students discovered that some private documents had been shredded, that is torn up, in order to preserve their privacy, they painstakingly pieced the shreds together in order further to invade the privacy of the Embassy records.

Moreover, the occupiers of the Embassy have not refrained from using these private records in public from time to time; to use their own words, they have "exposed" groups of Embassy documents, claiming that they prove this or that with respect to alleged American espionage, and I think it is remarkable how little sympathy these supposedly dramatic exposures have elicited in other countries of the world. The fact is, of course, that there is the universal recognition that it is totally illegitimate to seize the archives and documents of a diplomatic or consular mission. Under the express terms of article 24 of the diplomatic convention and article 33 of the consular convention, all such archives and documents are to be inviolable at all times and wherever they may be.

It seems particularly shocking that these fundamental principles of diplomatic law should be tossed aside so casually, not only by the militant students and not only by the Iranian Government at large but even by the Iranian

nian Foreign Minister, the chief of the Iranian diplomatic service. In an interview, which is reprinted at page 110 of our Memorial, the Foreign Minister proudly announced that the government had taken possession of the U.S. Embassy's documents and planned to make such use of them as might be directed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. I think that any one of us would be hard-pressed to think of a more outrageous violation of international legal principles applicable to the inviolability of the premises and archives of diplomatic missions.

Insofar as the substantive claims of the United States are concerned, I want to make one more major final point. Judging by the outpouring of criticism that has rained down upon the Government of Iran as a direct result of the course of conduct which commenced on 4 November, virtually every country in the world is saying to itself, "there but for the grace of God go I." Countries throughout the world recognize that if this can happen to American diplomats in Tehran, it can happen to other diplomats wherever any diplomatic mission is located.

Iran's Duty To Prosecute or Extradite Offenders

It is quite obvious to the Court, I am sure, that one of the principal reasons for our bringing this case here and one of the principal reasons why our bringing of the case has received such wide acclaim is the widely shared concern that a way must be found to deter similar seizures in the future. The need to create a deterrent, I submit, is an overwhelmingly important factor in the present proceedings.

In this respect it seems to us vitally important to look to the provisions of the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents. That convention, to which both the United States and Iran are party, defines certain crimes which are plainly involved in this case, and it then tacitly recognizes that if such crimes are to be prevented in the future, a strong element of deterrence is required. Not surprisingly, the element of deterrence contemplated by the convention is prosecution on the conventional theory that if an offender is forcefully prosecuted, similar offenses are less likely to occur in the years ahead. Specifically, article 7 of the convention explicitly provides

that when a crime of this kind is committed within a specific state, that state shall have a duty, if it does not extradite the offender, to submit his case "without exception whatsoever and without undue delay" to the appropriate prosecuting authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

On the facts before the Court in this case, therefore, the Government of Iran has had a continuing duty ever since 4 November to submit to the appropriate prosecuting authority the case or cases against those who have been responsible for the commission of crimes against the U.S. Embassy and its personnel in Tehran.

Having in mind the evidence indicating the complicity of senior Iranian officials in the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages, you have asked for our views as to the implications for the purposes of this case of our suggestion that there is a duty on the part of the Iranian authorities to set the prosecutorial machinery in motion. Our answer is that Iran's obligation under international law to submit alleged offenders to its competent authorities for prosecution, if it does not extradite them, is in no way affected by the circumstances that some of the accomplices in the crimes may have been official personnel. Neither the New York convention nor customary international law recognizes any exception to the obligation for alleged offenders who occupy governmental office. States have, in practice, prosecuted governmental officials for acts that violated diplomatic immunity, as witness the Guatemalan and Ethiopian episodes which I mentioned earlier.

The Court may be concerned that a declaration that Iran is required to submit alleged offenders to its competent authority for prosecution could not be effectively implemented where high governmental officers are implicated in the crimes, or where the government, as a matter of policy, has encouraged or acquiesced in the commission of the crimes. I submit, however, that political or practical difficulties in the implementation of the Court's judgment do not detract from the entitlement of the United States to such a judgment. Moreover, the Court should render an affirmative declaration as to the duty to submit for prosecution in order to provide the maximum deterrent against future crimes of this kind. It is important, we submit, that the Court declare

to the world that the duty to prosecute and to submit for prosecution exists such circumstances. Even if the Government of Iran persists in its role as an outlaw, the vast majority of states will obey the rules declared by this Court, and the probability of such obedience will be an important deterrent against future violations of the rules of diplomatic relations. It is for this reason that the United States is persisting in seeking a declaration of the Government of Iran has a duty to submit for prosecution those who have committed these offenses.

On this question of providing deterrents against future violations of such laws, I should add that our claim in this respect does not solely depend on the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons. On the contrary, even if that convention had never come into existence our claim would find, we think, ample support in customary international law.

For example, an effort was made to codify customary international law on this subject in the 1961 Harvard draft convention on the international responsibility of states for injuries to alien and article 13 of that draft convention provides as follows:

Failure to exercise due diligence to afford protection to an alien by way of preventive or deterrent measures is wrongful if the act is generally recognized as criminal by the principal legal systems of the world.

In other words, where a state owes a duty to protect an alien, that duty compasses a duty to deter future attacks, and I have previously referred to the fact that under the 1955 treaty of amity between the United States and Iran, the Government of Iran has a continuing duty to provide all U.S. nationals with the most constant protection and security. Similarly, as I have also noted, under article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Iran had a special duty to take appropriate steps to prevent attacks upon our diplomatic personnel, and submit that that duty also encompasses a duty to submit the cases of offenders for prosecution and thereby deter future attack.

The existence of such a duty has been recognized by international tribunals. An example is a case entitled *The Claim of Walter M. Dexter*, which was decided in the 1940s by the U.S. Mexican Claims Commission. The offense in that case was murder, and claim under international law was that

Mexican Government had failed not only to prevent the murder but also to apprehend and punish the offender. The finding of the tribunal on this point was as follows:

The authorities of the Mexican Government were under an obligation to take appropriate measures for the apprehension and punishment of those participating in the murder of Dexter and failure to do so establishes Mexican liability under international law.

By the same token, we respectfully submit that the failure of the Iranian Government to prosecute the perpetrators of the crimes involved in this case establishes Iranian liability to the United States and its affected nation-

This brings me to the conclusion of my argument with respect to the substantive claims which we are asserting in this case. As I have indicated, the case does not involve one or two or even isolated acts in violation of international law. On the contrary, commencing on 4 November, the Government of Iran has brought about a steady stream of offensive actions which have been continuing minute by minute and hour by hour and day by day for 4½ months. When one considers the entire breadth of the case, literally hundreds of different offenses have been committed. But for present purposes, it is useful to break these hundreds of different actions down into five or six categories: the seizure and continuing detention of the hostages; the harsh and inhumane treatment imposed on them; the totally unlawful interrogation to which they have been subjected; the seizure and continued holding of the diplomatic and consular facilities of the United States in Iran, including the ransacking and defilement of the archives and documents; and the failure on the part of the Government of Iran to prosecute those who have, in effect, been carrying out the government's orders.

During my description of these activities, I have not attempted to identify for the Court every single treaty provision which has been violated by each separate action. I have focused instead upon the fundamental treaty provisions and principles for the sake of clarity. In our Memorial, however, we have identified a series of additional treaty provisions which have been violated by the same courses of conduct which I have been describing during my presentation.

Iran's Response to U.S. Claims

Having summarized, and I hope clarified, the substantive claims of the United States I want to pause briefly to consider again the question whether the Islamic Republic of Iran has any possible defense against those claims. As I noted earlier in my argument, although the Government of Iran has been given every encouragement by this Court to appear and present defenses, and although the Iranian Government has demonstrated its continuing ability to litigate effectively and vigorously in other courts, it has deliberately chosen not to present any substantive defense to the present claims.

We are left then with the narrow question of whether the letter of 9 December, which was presented to the Court in the name of the Foreign Minister of Iran just before this Court's prior hearing, or its virtually verbatim copy—the letter received just 2 days ago—contain any factual or legal argumentation which should be taken into account by the Court in reaching its decision on the merits.

On that score, I have nothing to add to what the Court itself said on this subject in its order of 15 December. Although I hesitate to characterize the Court's own words I think it is fair to summarize the Court's comments of the Iranian position in these terms.

First, although the Government of Iran has suggested that its hostage-taking should be regarded merely as a secondary or marginal aspect of a larger dispute, that suggestion is laid to rest by the contrary view of the Secretary General and the Security Council of the United Nations, both of whom regard the hostage-taking in and of itself as a serious threat to international peace.

Second, if the Government of Iran really believes that its own conduct should be considered together with, and as justified by allegedly grave misdeeds on the part of the United States, it could have responded accordingly by presenting such alleged offenses in a counter-memorial, but having failed to do so, Iran is scarcely in a position to argue that its own inaction should preclude the Court from considering the legitimate claims of the United States. As the Court observed on 15 December, there is no reason why the Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of the dispute on the basis of an assertion that the dispute has other aspects

which have not been brought before it.

In short, on 15 December the Court could perceive no obstacle to its consideration of the present claims of the United States, and those claims continue today to be both unanswered and, I submit, unanswerable.

Since Iran has failed to defend, within the meaning of article 53 of the Court's Statute, we must enable the Court to satisfy itself both that it has jurisdiction of the case and that the claims are well founded in fact and law. With all due respect, I submit that since neither the facts nor the law are subject to serious dispute, the requirements of article 53 have been fully met and that the United States is, therefore, entitled to judgment on the merits of our claims.

Iranian Assurances of Embassy Protection

In the course of our presentation, I believe that we have given complete answers to a number of the questions which were posed by three Members of the Court yesterday. But according to my reckoning there are yet two questions to which we have not yet responded. That is, two questions posed yesterday. One posed by Judge Gros and one by Judge Tarazi. In order to fulfill our obligations to the Court I would like now to state each of the two questions and the answer of the Government of the United States.

First, Judge Gros pointed out that the Memorial of the United States refers to three undertakings which were given by the Government of Iran to the Government of the United States with respect to the protection of the Embassy, and Judge Gros has asked that we communicate these undertakings to the Court. The answer of the United States is as follows:

On Sunday, 21 October, there was a meeting between the Iranian Prime Minister, the Iranian Foreign Minister, the Iranian Ambassador to Sweden, the American Charge d'Affaires, and the visiting Director of Iranian Affairs from the U.S. Department of State. The American Charge d'Affaires informed the Iranians of plans for the former Shah to come to the United States, and he explained our concern about the possible public reaction in Tehran. He requested assurances that the Embassy and its personnel would be adequately protected. The Foreign Minister gave those assurances without hesitation. On

the following day, 22 October, the American Charge d'Affaires and the visiting Director of Iranian Affairs again met with the Foreign Minister. The Charge, in a discussion of the Shah's travel to the United States, again requested assurances that the American Embassy and its personnel would be protected. The Foreign Minister renewed his assurances that protection would be provided. The Shah, incidentally, arrived in the United States the next day, 23 October. On 31 October, the Embassy security officer met with the Commander of the Iranian National Police at the American Embassy. The Police Commander told the security officer that the police had been told to provide full protection for the American personnel. This is our answer to Judge Gros' question.

The following day, 1 November, there was a demonstration of 5,000 people around the Embassy and complete security was provided. Three days later, however, the assurances were breached, and the Embassy was sacked under the protection of the Government of Iran.

Judge Tarazi has asked whether responsible U.S. authorities were aware of the fact that granting of authorization to the former Shah to visit the United States in order to obtain medical treatment for cancer might possibly lead to the occupation of the Embassy and the seizure of the hostages. The answer is that such officials were aware that the admission of the Shah might result in some sort of violence against the Embassy, and it was precisely for this reason that the United States requested assurances from the Iranian Government that adequate protection for the Embassy would be provided following the arrival of the Shah in the United States. As I have just indicated, clear and firm assurances were provided on three occasions during the last days of October, and on 1 November, at which point the Shah had been in the United States for more than a week, the Government of Iran honored its assurances in full. The breach of those assurances occurred 3 days later, giving rise to the tragedy with which we are concerned in this case.

Relief Sought by the United States

Finally, I should like to turn to the question of the relief which we seek in

the Court's final judgment. In such a judgment we are seeking three quite separate types of relief. To over simplify, we seek first declarations to the effect that various actions attributable to the Government of Iran have violated various legal principles, embodied not only in customary international law but in the four specific treaties on which we rely. Second, we seek a judgment that in order to bring the foregoing violations to an end, the Government of Iran shall take certain specific corrective steps. And third, since grave injury has been done both to the United States and to its nationals in Tehran, we seek a decision by the Court that the United States and its affected nationals are entitled to recover financial reparations in an amount which cannot yet be determined but which can and should be determined in a subsequent proceeding to be conducted when Iran's unlawful conduct has been terminated.

I shall now briefly discuss these separate forms of relief. First, I think that there is and can be no question whatever but that the United States is entitled to a declaration that in the ways specified in detail in our Memorial, the Government of Iran has violated and is continuing to violate its international legal obligations to the United States and its nationals. It has long been a part of the jurisprudence of this Court that such declarations serve the vital function of establishing the legal situation between the parties with binding force so that the legal position thus established cannot again be called into question insofar as the legal effects ensuing therefrom are concerned. For that proposition I would refer the Court to the decision in the case of the *Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzow)*, Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, at page 20.

In reliance upon that well-established principle, the U.S. Government is respectfully requesting that the Court adjudge and declare that the Government of Iran, through the conduct described in our Memorial, has violated its international legal obligations to the United States, as provided by articles 22, 24-27, 29, 31, 37, 44, and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 33-36, 40 and 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; articles 2, 13, and 18-19 of the 1955 treaty of amity between the United States and

Iran, and articles 2, 4, and 7 of the New York Convention on the Prevention of Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents.

With all due respect to the Court the clarity of the facts and the legal principles is such that we consider our right to the specified declarations to be beyond dispute. This brings me to the question of whether the Court should now direct the Government of Iran to take specific action to terminate its continuing unlawful conduct. In suggesting an affirmative answer to that question I am keenly aware of the fact that at an earlier stage in this case we asked the Court for somewhat similar relief in the form of provisional measures and the Iran's subsequent refusal to comply with the resulting provisional measures has surely created doubt as to whether it will comply with the final judgment of this Court. In response, I will simply draw an obvious legal distinction.

Within the community of international legal scholars there is at least some doubt as to whether an indication of provisional measures under article of the Court's Statute is binding and enforceable, but there can be no equal doubt about a judgment of the Court on the merits. Conceivably, the authorities in Iran have felt that they were not legally bound by the provisional measures indicated by the Court on 15 December. But article 94 of the U.N. Charter specifically requires obedience to the final judgment on the merits and provides for its enforcement.

In these circumstances, I submit the only proper assumption that can now be made is that if the Court now incorporates, in its final judgment, appropriate directions for the termination of Iran's continuing unlawful conduct the Government of Iran will bow to U.N. Charter and obey. As to the right of the United States to such relief, I think the law is clear. In the Court's 1971 advisory opinion in the *Namibia* case, it was very clearly held that the Court has made a binding determination that an unlawful situation is in existence, and I will now quote the Court's language:

It would be failing in the discharge of judicial functions if it did not declare that there is an obligation, especially upon the members of the United Nations, to bring that situation to an end. [*I.C.J. Reports* 1971, p. 82]

The present unlawful situation is

Iran can be terminated, if not completely remedied, by obedience to the visions which we have requested in Memorial.

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order to terminate the unlawful situation in Iran, the United States respectfully requests that the Court rule within its final judgment the following five provisions.

1. The Government of Iran shall immediately insure that the premises of U.S. Embassy, Chancery, and Consulates are restored to the possession of U.S. authorities under their exclusive control and shall insure their inviolability and effective protection as provided for by the treaties in force between the two states and by general international law.

2. The Government of Iran shall insure the immediate release, without exception, of all persons of U.S. nationality who are or have been held in Embassy of the United States or in Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iran, or who are or have been held as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to all such persons in accordance with the treaties in force between the two states and with general international law.

3. The Government of Iran shall, at that moment, afford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges, and immunities to which they are entitled under the treaties in force between the two states and under general international law, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave the territory of Iran.

4. The Government of Iran shall, in ordering the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges, and immunities to which they are entitled, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction, insure that no such personnel will be obliged to appear on trial or as witness, deponent, source of information, or in any other role, in any proceedings, whether formal or informal, initiated by or with the acquiescence of Iranian Government, whether such proceedings be denominated a trial, and jury, international commission, or otherwise.

Before I move on to the fifth paragraph in this series of affirmative steps to terminate the Iranian violations, I

should note, with respect to the fourth paragraph, that it will have no effect on the U.N. commission assembled by the Secretary General, if indeed that commission ever resumes its functions. The fourth paragraph would prohibit any of the hostages from being obliged to give evidence before any sort of commission, but it has never been contemplated that the Secretary General's commission would take testimony or evidence from the hostages. It is true that it was contemplated that the commission would visit the hostages and speak to them, primarily for the purpose of assessing their health, welfare, and general status, but the commission has no authority to interrogate the hostages in any substantive sense and will not do so. Accordingly, the fourth paragraph, which is squarely based upon article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, will not interfere with any legitimate international efforts to resolve the crisis.

This brings me to the fifth and last of the declarations which we are requesting in order to bring an end to the Iranian violations of international law. This last declaration would read as follows:

5. The Government of Iran shall submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, or extradite to the United States, those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the personnel and premises of the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Iran.

As I have previously stated, we regard such a declaration of the utmost importance, in order to maximize the possibility that persons who engage in hostage-taking, and particularly in taking of diplomatic hostages, will be properly punished, thus creating a deterrent against such future violations of the fundamental rules of diplomatic law.

Finally, we seek financial reparations from Iran, and we think that there can be no doubt whatever as to our entitlement to such a remedy. As demonstrated at page 78 of our Memorial, this Court has repeatedly held that where, as here, a state has committed a breach of its international legal obligations, it must pay reparations in order to wipe out as far as possible all of the consequences of its illegal acts so as to reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if such acts had not been committed. In short, when the damage has been done, the

United States and its nationals must be made whole insofar as possible.

At the present time, of course, it is not possible to measure the damage, in part because the political situation in Iran precludes us from obtaining essential information and in part because the damage is actually continuing day by day. For example, we know that there has been substantial physical damage to the buildings included within the Embassy compound, but it would take an extensive technical evaluation of the damage in order to put a financial value on it, and there is no way that such an evaluation can be made now. Again, we know that individual hostages have been subjected to severe psychological stress and may have sustained physical injury as well, but by definition we cannot have access now for the purpose of determining an appropriate reparation figure. When the hostages have returned home and the U.S. premises have been returned to our control, it will be possible to make the necessary evaluations, but not before.

Despite the impossibility of determining the amount of reparations at this stage, we believe that we are clearly entitled now to an immediate declaration which will make clear to the world, including the Government of Iran, that reparations in some amount will eventually be due. The issue of our entitlement to some amount of reparations is ripe for judicial decision; given the nature of the Iranian conduct and the clarity of the Iranian violations, I can think of no conceivable reason why our right to reparations should not now be declared in principle, thus narrowing the remaining issues between the parties; and we think it likely that such a declaration will accelerate the final resolution of the dispute. As pointed out at page 79 of our Memorial, the Court's 1974 opinion in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction* case makes plain that it is entirely proper for the Court to make a general declaration establishing the principle that compensation is due, even though a further proceeding may be necessary in order to receive evidence and establish the amount. As I conclude my argument with respect to the terms of the judgment, I wish to formally confirm to the Court that the final submissions of the U.S. Government are as stated at pages 80 and 81 of its Memorial.

I shall now address myself to the several questions which were posed

yesterday and this morning by a number of different judges of the Court.

Question of Deferral of Oral Proceedings

Judge Morozov's first question recalls that on 19 February—which happens to have been one day prior to the announcement by the Secretary General of the formation of the U.N. commission—the U.S. Government requested the President of the Court to defer oral proceedings in this case for the time being, with the result that the present hearings have taken place some 3 weeks later than they otherwise would. Judge Morozov's first question correctly suggests that there was a relationship between the proposed work of the proposed U.N. commission and the U.S. request for a brief postponement. Against that background Judge Morozov has asked the following question:

If the establishment by the United Nations of a special commission, and the activity of that commission, does not relate specifically to the question of the release of the hostages, and if the Court should, according to the U.S. Government, consider the case as one of urgency, what was the reason why the U.S. Government has wasted approximately 1 month before pursuing the defense, with the assistance of the Court, of its diplomatic and consular staff detained in Tehran?

In order to understand the reason for our request on 19 February, it is important to understand that there is a distinction between what the U.N. commission was directed to do, in terms of actual work, and the side-effects which might be expected to result from that work. As we have previously explained, the commission was sent to Iran in order to give Iran a chance to air its grievances. The commission was to hear *Iran's* grievances and make a report with respect thereto, but it was not part of the commission's function to hear the U.S. grievances with respect to the seizure of the U.S. Embassy. On the other hand, it was the hope of the Secretary General and the U.S. Government that, once Iran had been given an opportunity to air its grievances before the commission, this would, in fact, lead the Government of Iran to release the hostages.

Against that factual background I would answer Judge Morozov's question in this fashion. We knew that any oral hearings before this Court on the merits would involve strong charges

against Iran, and we thought that those charges might be an irritant which might cause the Iranian authorities to continue the captivity of the hostages, whether Iran's grievances had been heard by the U.N. commission or not. We wanted to do nothing which might unfavorably affect the hostages. That was the reason for our request for the relatively brief 3-week postponement, but, as I shall subsequently explain, the situation is different today. Today, with the captivity of the hostages continuing, we urgently need the Court's assistance in resolving the hostage dispute, and at the conclusion of my presentation I will ask the Court, with respect, to render its decision as rapidly as possible.

Question of Restraint, Assets Freeze, and U.S. Threats of Force

As Judge Morozov has correctly noted, during the presentation on behalf of the United States, we have called attention to the policy of restraint which the United States has followed in its relations with Iran during the hostage crisis. In this connection Judge Morozov has asked the following question:

How would the U.S. Government explain such well-known acts on its part as the freezing of Iranian investments in the United States and abroad which, according to the press and broadcast reports, amount to some \$12 billion?

The facts are that for many years the Iranian Government has maintained very large deposits in U.S. banks, both in the United States and abroad. In the early days of November, shortly after the seizure of the American Embassy, Iranian Government officials threatened suddenly to withdraw all Iranian funds from U.S. banks, to refuse to accept payment in dollars for oil, and to repudiate obligations owed to the United States and to U.S. nationals. Given the enormous sums of money involved, those threatened actions by the Government of Iran constituted nothing less than an attack on the stability of the world economy and the international monetary system. Moreover, the threat by the Iranian Government to repudiate all of the loans made by U.S. banks and other institutions constituted a totally unlawful threat and placed in jeopardy billions of dollars of U.S. claims against the Government of Iran.

For these reasons the United States came forward with a peaceful response which we considered totally appropriate under accepted principles of

international law and comity among nations. In response to Iran's efforts to harm the U.S. economy and the dollar and having in mind Iran's unlawful detention of American hostages, the President of the United States simply froze all Iranian assets in U.S. control for the time being, in part simply to make it possible for U.S. claimants to be made whole if the Government of Iran carried through with its threats to repudiate all of its obligations to such claimants. At the same time the U.S. Government has made it clear that on the hostages have been released the United States will be willing to open negotiations looking toward a mutual settlement of claims, which in turn would lead to the lifting of the freeze. In the meantime, the United States regards the freeze of Iranian assets as a justified, prudent, and proportional measure of restraint in the circumstances.

In his second question Judge Morozov has also asked the following

Is it possible to regard such acts (that is, I take it, the freeze), as well as threats to use other unilateral measures of coercion, and threats to use force against the Islamic Republic of Iran, as in conformity with the U.N. Charter and with paragraph 47 (B) of the Court's order of 15 December 1979, which required the U.S. Government not to take any action, and to insure that action is taken, which may aggravate the tension between the two countries or render the existing dispute more difficult to solution?

In responding to that question I should note at the outset that the freezing of the assets occurred more than a month before the entry of the Court's order of 15 December, and we are quite confident that it was not the Court's intention, when it entered that order, to call upon the United States to lift the existing assets freeze. Moreover, as we pointed out in the course of the hearings which took place on 10 December, under the jurisprudence of this Court and accepted principles of international law, obedience to a provision of the kind cited by Judge Morozov is required only on a reciprocal basis—which means that the United States would be obliged to obey the order only if Iran did so as well. In fact the United States has complied with the order, but Iran obviously has not.

As to the suggestion in Judge Morozov's question that the United States may have threatened to use force against Iran, there have been no such threats in fact, although the United States has drawn attention before the rights of the United States under international law and to the use of force

coercion by Iran in violation of its obligations under paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 2 of the U.N. Charter. The Court is aware, every effort has been made by the United States in seeking a solution to the present crisis has been peaceful.

Judge Morozov's third question is whether the actions to which he referred in his second question—namely particularly, again, the U.S. freeze of Iranian assets—are in compliance with the provisions of the 1955 treaty of amity between the United States and Iran.

The answer is that the assets freeze—which constituted a peaceful response to the hostile actions previously taken by the Government of Iran—did not violate the treaty of amity. As we have previously explained in detail, on 4 November 1979, the Government of Iran began to engage in suspected violations of several articles of the treaty of amity, including article 2, paragraph 4, article 13, article 18, and article 19. Accordingly, under accepted principles of treaty law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the United States was under obligation, after 4 November, to extend to Iran the treaty benefits to which Iran would have been entitled if it had itself complied with the treaty of amity. There has been no violation of the treaty by the United States.

Question of Request for Arbitration

In his fourth question Judge Morozov asked whether the United States ever made a written suggestion to the Government of Iran directed to bringing the present dispute to arbitration as provided for in article XXI, paragraph 4 of the 1955 treaty of amity. The answer is that the United States made no such suggestion, and in that connection could make two brief observations. First, as we read article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 treaty of amity, it simply does not provide for arbitration; indeed, it makes no mention of arbitration. That provision does contemplate the possibility that disputes between the parties may be "satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy," but I would remind the Court that on 7 November the ayatollah Khomeini flatly forbade any diplomatic negotiations between the two governments. I might add that this prohibition was in clear violation, in our view, of Iran's obligation under paragraph 1 of article XXI of the treaty of amity, which in effect required Iran to

provide an opportunity for consultations. I respectfully submit that there is absolutely no basis for a suggestion that the United States has failed to live up to any of its obligations under article XXI or to satisfy any of the preconditions to filing suit in this Court under that article.

In his fifth question Judge Morozov has similarly inquired whether the United States, through a written suggestion to Iran, sought to bring the dispute to arbitration as provided for by article 13 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents.

With respect, I believe that the United States has addressed that question in its Memorial, at pages 42 and 43 and also, if I may say so, in the presentation made here by Mr. Schwebel. We have urged, and continue to urge, that article 13's provision for arbitration assumes a respondent state party which recognizes its obligation to settle its disputes by peaceful means, including negotiation and arbitration. From the very outset of the crisis on 4 November, however, the Government of Iran has been committed to a course of coercion and has flatly refused to have direct contact with U.S. officials. The answer to the question, therefore, is that the United States did not make a suggestion of arbitration to Iran for the simple reason that, in our judgment, such a suggestion would have been completely futile. Indeed, we believe that Iran's refusal to allow such discussions has stopped Iran from asserting that the U.S. application was premature or should have been preceded by a formal suggestion that the dispute be arbitrated.

Conversely, ever since the time when Mr. Ramsey Clark made his aborted effort to open negotiations, the United States has maintained and declared its willingness to seek a peaceful solution and has pursued a number of avenues to that end.

Question of Obligation To Prosecute or Extradite

Turning to Judge Morozov's sixth question, he has inquired as to the basis for the submission in the U.S. Memorial that the Government of Iran has an obligation either to submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution or to extradite to the United States those persons responsi-

ble for the crimes committed against the personnel and premises of the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Iran. As Judge Morozov has noted, that submission appears at page 80 of the Memorial.

The basis for the submission is article 7 of the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. Under that article Iran has a duty either to take steps toward prosecution of the offenders or to extradite them, and under the treaty the choice is Iran's. The treaty does not require extradition, but it permits it as an alternative to submission for prosecution.

The fact is that there is no extradition treaty between the United States and Iran, and under international law, absent such a treaty, there is generally no obligation to extradite, but, at the same time, international law does not prohibit extradition without a treaty. Consistent with this last principle, article 8 of the New York convention provides in paragraph 2 that a state which makes extradition conditional on an extradition treaty *may* consider the New York convention as a legal basis for extradition for crimes covered by it.

Question of a "Larger Dispute"

Finally, Judge Morozov has referred to the Iranian assertion that the dispute before the Court is only part of a larger dispute between the two countries, and, in that connection, Judge Morozov has inquired whether the United States recognizes the existence of such a larger dispute between the United States and Iran.

I can answer the question only in this fashion. At various times in recent months, as I indicated yesterday, various officials of the Iranian Government have voiced generalized allegations of misconduct as against the United States, and, of course, the U.S. Government recognizes that such allegations have been made. On the other hand, the Government of Iran has never brought forward any specific dispute for peaceful resolution, and the U.S. Government is, therefore, not in a position to describe the characteristics of the dispute, if any, which the Iranian authorities believe to exist. It may be that, during its visit to Tehran, the U.N. commission heard specific allegations of a concrete nature, but the proceedings of the commission were not public, and the United States does not know what grievances, if any, were

presented to the commission before it departed from Tehran.

Question of Applicability of Consular Convention

First, Judge Oda has asked whether there are any personnel among the hostages to whom the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations alone applies. Our answer is that all of the U.S. consular personnel involved were serving in a diplomatic mission on 4 November, with the result that under article 70 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—to which Judge Oda has referred—all such consular personnel were and are entitled to exactly the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In short, there are no personnel among the hostages to whom the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations alone applies.

Judge Oda's first question also inquired as to the significance which the United States attaches to article 70 of the consular convention. The significance is exactly that implied by Judge Oda—that all of the diplomatic and consular agents held captive in Tehran are entitled to the same privileges and immunities; namely, the privileges and immunities conferred by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Question of U.S. Consulates

In his second question Judge Oda has pointed out that at page 60 of the U.S. Memorial we set forth our then current knowledge of the status of the U.S. Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, whose operations were suspended in February 1979. Judge Oda has asked the United States to supply any available information as to what has happened to these Consulates from February 1979 onwards, and I am afraid that we are not in a position to add very much to the facts which were set forth in the Memorial. All that I can add is to say that from February 1979 until the seizure of these Consulates in November 1979, the premises were under the custodial care of local employees. In November, of course, both of the Consulates were seized, and the United States has no information as to the status of the properties since that time.

As his third and final question Judge Oda has inquired whether it is the contention of the United States, in so far as the Tabriz and Shiraz Consulates are concerned, that Iran has an

obligation to do anything more than protect the consular premises. As an example, Judge Oda has asked whether we contend that Iran has an obligation to accord full facilities for the operation of these two consulates.

I should point out that up until the present time, at any rate, Iran has evidently desired to maintain consular relations with the United States. Iran currently operates four consulates in the United States, located in Houston, San Francisco, Chicago, and New York City. To the extent that Iran wishes to continue such relations, it has an obligation to afford the United States full facilities, on a reciprocal basis, for the operation of our corresponding consular posts in Iran. In these proceedings we are not contending that Iran has an obligation to maintain consular relations between the two countries, but, so long as consular relations exist, Iran must accord us full consular facilities and the immunities that follow therefrom.

Question of Exceptions to Diplomatic Immunity

Turning to your own question, I shall be pleased to attempt the further clarification you have requested of our views concerning exceptions to the obligations normally owed a diplomatic mission. You have asked specifically if the receiving state, convinced of unlawful activity on its territory by the sending state's diplomatic mission or other services, may, by reason of sanction, necessity, or self-defense, depart from the obligations normally incumbent upon it with respect to diplomatic and consular relations.

First, let me say that such exceptions to the general rule of inviolability as have been discussed in the International Law Commission and elsewhere relate to the right of an individual—such as an individual police officer—to defend himself against an actual assault or similar action by a diplomatic agent. As I said in my answer to your earlier question, even such very limited exceptions are controversial and, of course, can have no conceivable application to the present case.

On the other hand, your question may refer to self-defense in a different sense; that is, the state's inherent right to self-defense, as confirmed in article 51 of the U.N. Charter. I would observe that the right of self-defense is emphatically not a right to act lawlessly. The state, when it acts in the

exercise of its right of self-defense or on the basis of the ultimate necessity of national existence, does not operate in a realm beyond the reach of international law. The law of armed conflict, with which, of course, the Court is familiar—embodies a whole host of restraints upon state conduct, even in the most compelling of circumstances. We think it most significant that the taking of hostages is absolutely proscribed, even in armed conflict. Moreover, authorities from Grotius to Lauterpach agree that if a state like Iran feels its injured by another, some form of reprisals may be appropriate, but reprisals against the diplomats of the offending state, either as individuals or as mission, are absolutely prohibited. The necessity for continuing respect for diplomatic inviolability, even in time war, is crystallized in article 44 of the Vienna convention, which obligates a receiving state to permit and facilitate the departure of diplomats representing a country with which that state is at war. Indeed, if Iran were now at war with the United States, it would have clear obligation, under article 45 of the convention, to "respect and protect the United States Embassy."

Finally I should note that if Iran any time had felt that its supreme security interests so required, it could, of course, have compelled all U.S. diplomatic personnel to depart from Iran on a wholesale basis, but I submit that there can be no possible legal justification for what it did in fact on 4 November 1979.

Question of Mandate of U.N. Commission

Finally, Judge Gros has inquired as to the grievances which, according to the understanding of the U.S. Government, Iran may bring before the U.N. commission.

First, I would point out that the commission has suspended its operations for the time being. Assuming, however, that the commission resumes its work, the Secretary General has declared that the commission's function will be to hear whatever grievances Iran may wish to bring before it. This is to say, the commission would receive whatever lawfully obtained information the Iranians wanted to present to the commission and, thereafter, the commission would report on the basis of that information. I should emphasize, however, that the commission is not to be a tribunal which would reach conclusions.

which would be binding either on the United States. I wish to make one further observation on the subject. In this case the United States has advanced very specific claims against Iran, and this, I submit, has a duty to decide whether those claims are valid. If Iran pursues any alleged grievances which it considers to constitute some sort of case against the claims of the United States, it has been afforded every opportunity to bring those defenses before this Court. The fact is that Iran presented no defenses or counterclaims here, and for that reason I refuse to submit that the Court cannot properly concern itself with any grievances or allegations which may have been voiced by Iran elsewhere. In concluding my observations on the Gros' question I should like again refer the Court to Judge Lachs' opinion in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf* case and to the Court's opinion in the *CAO Council* case. Judge Lachs, properly in our view, pointed out "notwithstanding the interdependence of issues some may be isolated, in priority, and their solution in a separate form." While Iran contends that its grievances, whatever they may be, are interconnected with the claims of the United States before the Court, a contention that the United States has not accepted, Iran has chosen to use Judge Lachs' phrase, to "leave those grievances from these proceedings and to air them before a separate body, namely, the U.N. commission. But that choice—Iran's—does not to utilize the processes of the Court cannot constitute an obstacle to the Court's consideration of the claims of the United States over which the Court assuredly has jurisdiction. It is extraordinary, to say the least, to adopt a rule which permits a respondent state to frustrate resort to the Court merely by referring to realized and entirely hypothetical defenses or counterclaims which it refuses to present as such to the Court which it intends to handle instead through an entirely nonjudicial hearing in some other forum. To quote the Court in the *ICAO Council* case: "The competence of the Court must depend on the character of the dispute submitted to it and on the issues thus raised, and those defenses on the merits or considerations which become relevant only after the jurisdictional issues have been settled."

REFERENCES

Throughout his oral argument, Mr. Owen referred to several documents which were printed in earlier issues of the *DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN* .

Issue of January 1980

U.S. Application to the ICJ, p. 38.
Request for Interim Measures of Protection, p. 40.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 457 of Dec. 4, 1979, p. 51.

Issue of February 1980

Oral argument before the ICJ by Attorney General Civiletti and Department of State Legal Adviser Owen on Dec. 10, 1979, p. 41.
Text of the Court order of Dec. 15,

1979, p. 49. U.N. Security Council Resolution 461 of Dec. 31, 1979, p. 68.

Issue of March 1980

Announcement of January 15, 1980, that the United States had filed its Memorial with the ICJ, p. 60.

Issue of April 1980

White House statement of February 20, 1980, concerning the establishment of the U.N. commission of inquiry, p. 47.

In addition, a monthly chronology of events concerning Iran from November 1979 through February 1980 is printed in the above issues of the *BULLETIN* . ■

This rule, we submit, applies *a fortiori* when the respondent has not even appeared in order to present such potential defenses or other considerations for which it is openly seeking consideration elsewhere.

Conclusion of Argument

On behalf of the U.S. Government I believe that I have now submitted an answer to every question which has been propounded by the Court and I would propose now to conclude the presentation of the U.S. Government.

In doing so I would hark back to 10 December, at which time the Court was considering the U.S. request for an indication of provisional measures, and I took the liberty of urging the Court to act on that request with the maximum possible expedition. I emphasized that at that time more than 50 American lives were in imminent peril and that it was critically important to those individuals, as well as the world community and the rule of law, that the judicial function be performed as quickly as possible. The U.S. Government is grateful to the Court for its action in responding to that appeal and granting the requested relief just 5 days after the request was heard.

I hope that the Court will recall also that in the days immediately following the Court's order of 15 December the United States pressed forward with this case as rapidly as possible. We filed our Memorial on 15 January, well ahead of the schedule

that would be followed in a normal case. Moreover, it was our hope at that time that the Iranian Government would file a counter-memorial on 18 February, in accordance with the orders of the Court, in order that the parties could come to grips with the dispute between them. In mid-February we were still anxious to proceed with this case as rapidly as possible.

In one of his questions, Judge Morozov has pointed out that on 19 February we found it necessary to ask this Court for a brief postponement of any further oral hearings. The reason, as I have explained, was that the Secretary General's appointment of the U.N. commission had raised the hope that when the commission had heard Iran's grievances the Government of Iran would decide to release the hostages, and we were concerned that if we appeared before the Court and made strong charges against Iran, as we have in these past 3 days, the confinement of the hostages might be unnecessarily continued. I want to assure the Court, however, that throughout the entire period the United States has been determined to press the case forward just as rapidly as it could, consistent with the welfare of the Americans who are in captivity in Tehran.

As you know, our tenuous hopes for a quick release of the hostages in February were shattered in early March when the U.N. commission found itself unable to pursue its mission. In short, the situation today is very different than it was when we

asked for the brief delay in the hearings. The signals, if I may use that term, that are coming out of Iran suggest that the detention of the hostages may continue indefinitely and no one in this courtroom has any way of knowing how long the Government of Iran will continue to hold the hostages. Since the U.S. Government continues to view this Court as the most promising hope for bringing about the ultimate release of the hostages through the entry of a binding and enforceable final judgment, the United States wishes at this time to press forward to judgment as rapidly as possible.

Given the fact that I once urged expedition upon the Court and then urged a brief delay, I am reluctant to presume upon the Court by requesting expeditious action now, and yet I feel duty bound to do so. In making this request the primary focus of my government's interest is upon the well-being of the 53 Americans still held in captivity, but my government is motivated by broader concerns as well. As I stated in my opening remarks 2 days ago, if it becomes clear that a country like Iran can seize diplomatic agents and hold them hostage for indefinite periods of time in order to coerce desired political action, it can only lead to a complete unraveling of the fabric of peaceful international relations. For these reasons our call for judgment is urgent. Since the dispute before the Court continues to imperil international peace, I submit that the high responsibilities imposed upon the Court by the U.N. Charter call for the entry of the final judgment requested in this case as rapidly as possible.

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I respectfully request that the Court enter judgment in favor of the United States and against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

¹For these and other indications of Ayatollah Khomeini's control over the hostage situation, see Supplemental Documents 13, 21, 34, 58, 62, 65, 66, 72, 101, 102, 115, 117, 133, 134, 135, and 140.

²Supplemental Documents 100, 102, 134, 135, and 141.

³Supplemental Documents 107 and 152.

⁴Supplemental Document 156.

⁵Supplemental Documents 149, 151, 161, and 162.

⁶Supplemental Document 156.

⁷Supplemental Document 157.

⁸Supplemental Document 158.

⁹Supplemental Document 159.

¹⁰Supplemental Document 160.

¹¹Supplemental Document 90.

¹²Supplemental Document 100.

¹³Supplemental Document 106.

¹⁴U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175, 1 Dec. 1979, at p. 58.

¹⁵U.N. doc. S/PV. 2176, 2 Dec. 1979, at p. 47.

¹⁶U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175, at p. 22.

¹⁷U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175, at p. 12.

¹⁸See, for example, articles 44 and 45 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

¹⁹See, for example, Memorial, pp. 16-18, 92, 95, and 215; Supplemental Documents 3, 21, 65, 72, 79, 100, 115, 129, 130, 135, and 139.

²⁰See, for example, U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175 at 11 (Norway), 12 (Portugal), 28-30 (Bolivia), 38 (Nigeria); S/PV. 2176 at 22 (Federal Republic of Germany), 23-25 (Austria), 33-35 (Malawi), 42 (Panama), 53 (Spain); S/PV. 2177 at 5 (Swaziland), 11 (Belgium); S/PV. 2182 at 26 (Singapore).

²¹Supplemental Documents 20, 37, 40, 117, and 138. ■

PUBLICATION OF PROCEEDINGS

At the conclusion of the case concerning *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran*, the International Court of Justice will publish the verbatim texts of the Court's proceedings—including the oral argument, the U.S. Memorial, and all Supplemental Documents—in its *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents* series. ■

U.N. Inquiry Commission Suspends Activities

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAR. 10, 1980¹

The commission of inquiry, after consulting with Secretary General [Kurt] Waldheim and the authorities in Tehran, has decided that it should suspend its activities in Tehran for several days. The commission will return to New York to confer with the Secretary General. We understand it is prepared to return to Tehran in accordance with its mandate and the instructions of the Secretary General when the situation requires.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 17, 1980. ■

Iran Chronology, March 1980

March 3

After waiting 3 days for a decision Iranian authorities, the U.N. commission of inquiry presses Iran to end uncertainty over seeing hostages.

March 4

Iranian militants set new condition a meeting between the hostages and the commission of inquiry stating that such meeting, during which the members of the commission would inquire into the living conditions and health of the hostages, would only be possible provided the commission's report managed to convince the United Nations that the Shah and the United States were guilty of "crimes" against Iran.

March 6

Militants, under pressure from Iranian authorities, agree to surrender hostages governing Revolutionary Council.

March 7

Iranian Government announces that Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh will be in custody of the hostages.

March 8

Militants and Ghotbzadeh accuse others of lying over whether Khomeini approved a plan under which the inquiry commission could meet with the hostages thereby blocking plans for the transfer.

March 10

Khomeini supports militants' move which blocked hostage transfer. Commission of inquiry departs Iran after failing to see hostages.

March 16

Iran holds first round of parliamentary elections. Returns indicate clergy-dominated Islamic Republic Party leads.

March 18-20

International Court of Justice resists to hear oral arguments on the case concerning *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran* brought by the United States against Iran. During this period, the United States makes final arguments on the jurisdiction of the Court and the merits of the case.

March 19

Based on information from the 13 hostages released November 20 concerning humane treatment of the remaining hostages, U.S. renews its request to the International Court of Justice to order Iran to speed up their release.

March 20

Fearing the hostages will be held indefinitely, the U.S. again urges ICJ to hand down an order as quickly as possible to release them.

Ambassadors representing nine members of the Common Market and Greece, demand that their governments consider breaking relations with Iran if all else fails to win release of the hostages.

h 23
Deposed Shah departs Panama for Egypt despite U.S. fears that his departure would damage efforts to free the hostages.

h 24
Shah arrives in Cairo, the sixth country which he has sought refuge. President Sadat says Shah's stay in Egypt will be permanent. Islamic clerical groups call for demonstrations to protest the Shah's move from Iran.

h 25
Team of U.S. physicians, including the nation's heart surgeon Dr. Michael E. DeBakey, fly to Cairo to prepare for surgery on the Shah.

h 26
Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, leader of the Islamic Republican Party, announces plans for holding trials for those hostages charged with espionage if the Shah is not released to Iran to stand trial.

h 27
Because of charges of irregularities and fraud in the first round of parliamentary elections, Iran postpones indefinitely a second round, thereby delaying any decision on the hostages. Revolutionary Council, urged by President Bani-Sadr, appoints a seven-member commission to look into the alleged irregularities.

h 28
Shah undergoes surgery. Iranian publicizes an alleged message from President Carter to Khomeini admitting past mistakes in U.S. policy toward Iran. Carter Administration denies allegations.

h 30
U.S. and its Western allies are said to make major efforts to pressure Iran to take steps to release hostages. Bani-Sadr reportedly receives two letters—delivered by emissaries—from President Carter warning that if steps are not taken to release the hostages, the U.S. will initiate actions against Iran which would include:

- An embargo on trade of all goods except food and medicine;
- Expulsion of Iranian diplomats from the U.S.; and
- A request that U.S. allies take similar economic steps against Iran and withdraw their representatives.

h 31
U.S. gives Iran until April 1 to announce steps to remove hostages from Iranian control or face new U.S. economic and political retaliations. ■

Middle East Peace Process: A Status Report

by Secretary Vance

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, 1980.¹

There has been a great deal of discussion about the subject of today's hearings: the events surrounding the U.S. vote in the U.N. Security Council on March 1. I know that all of us here are aware of the importance of approaching our discussions today with a view to their possible impact on our efforts for a comprehensive peace. In this regard, Ambassador Linowitz [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] is leaving tomorrow for a round of particularly sensitive negotiations with the Egyptians and Israelis.

Over the years the United States has been forthright in stating its position on these issues. We have made clear:

- Our unwavering support for Israel's security and well-being;
- Our longstanding commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the Middle East, including Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
- Our support for Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts as the foundation of a comprehensive peace settlement;
- Our belief confirmed by Egypt and Israel at Camp David that negotiations are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338;
- Our conviction, shared by Egypt and Israel, that a comprehensive peace must include a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects;
- Our firm position that we will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
- Our unswerving commitment to the negotiating process laid out at Camp David; and
- Our strong view that in the interim the parties should conduct themselves in accordance with international law and common-sense restraint so as to build trust that a sequence of successful negotiations can bring about a just, honorable, and lasting peace for all.

After nearly 30 years of stalemate and strife, we finally have seen concrete progress toward peace through negotiations. President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter embarked on a process that has led to the Camp David frameworks, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, and the present negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. At the request of the parties, the United States is a full partner in these negotiations.

It is important to stress that the objective of all three partners is a peaceful settlement compatible with the Camp David accords and achieved through negotiation. The approach which has begun to bear fruit in the last 2 years is to reach accommodation on those issues that can be tackled now and then to use the progress made in the present stage to facilitate resolution of the tougher issues in later phases of negotiations. It is critical to this process that each side gain trust that a negotiated settlement on fair terms is possible.

Let me turn now to several specific issues.

The Present Negotiations

The current negotiations provide the context for concrete discussion of individual issues. It is important to define what the current negotiations are and what they are not.

They are not, for example, designed to define the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. All issues relating to permanent institutions in these areas are to be resolved in a later negotiation where the Palestinians can participate in the determination of their own future through the process set forth in the Camp David accords. Our concern is that unilateral acts tend to prejudice the outcome of those negotiations and, therefore, to undercut the avenue to a peaceful and honorable resolution of these complex issues.

The current negotiations are an effort to establish a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period while fully protecting Israel's security. In order for that effort to succeed, some important issues will have to be resolved.

The current negotiations must also define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exer-

cised in the West Bank and Gaza. These arrangements should assure full autonomy for the inhabitants of these territories while providing for the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

There is, also, the question of how the elections will be conducted which will produce the freely elected body called for by the Camp David frameworks. Those elections should assure that that body has the popular support necessary to carry out, during the transitional period, its responsibilities as agreed among the parties.

On the question of security, let me reaffirm the statement in the Camp David accords that: "All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond." That commitment is an integral part of the Camp David frameworks, and this Administration intends to see that it is honored in full.

The U.N. Resolution

In February, we were faced with a draft resolution on the question of Israeli

settlements which was circulated in the Security Council.

We disagreed with a reference in the resolution to dismantling existing settlements and sought unsuccessfully to have it removed. As often happens in the U.N. Security Council, therefore, we stated our reservations without opposing the resolution as a whole. President Carter has stated clearly our view that this call for dismantling was neither proper nor practical.

As you know, we did succeed in removing paragraph seven of the draft, which called on Israel to assure the exercise of religious freedom in Jerusalem, thereby wrongly implying that it is not already doing so.

There was a misunderstanding, however, with regard to our position on other references to Jerusalem in the resolution. The President understood that all references to Jerusalem would be removed before we would vote for the resolutions, believing that in the present phase of the autonomy negotiations it would not be helpful to raise the issue of Jerusalem in a U.N. resolution concerning settlements. I believed that what the President wished

to have removed was the reference to Jerusalem and related material contained in paragraph seven. I was mistaken to have accepted full responsibility for this misunderstanding.

As Ambassador McHenry [Donald McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations] stated in the Security Council immediately following the vote the United States considers Resolution 465 as commendatory rather than binding. With regard to the references in resolution to "Palestinian and other lands," it is our position that this phrase should not be construed as in any way prejudicing the outcome of the autonomy negotiations or negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

As the President unequivocally stated on March 3, our policies with respect to settlements in occupied territory and with respect to Jerusalem, have changed. I think it is important that take a moment to reiterate briefly our policies on these two issues.

Settlements in Occupied Territory. U.S. policy toward the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is unequivocal and has long been a matter of public record. We consider to be contrary to international law an impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process. We have consistently urged Israel to halt plans to create new settlements or to seize land to expand existing ones. We regard such restraint as particularly important while the autonomy negotiations are underway.

The Camp David frameworks do refer specifically to Israeli settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, certain questions concerning the status of the settlements during the transition period will obviously have to be resolved in the course of the autonomy negotiations.

The permanent resolution of the settlements issue must then be decided by the subsequent negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories.

Jerusalem. Our policy on Jerusalem has remained consistent under the past four Presidents. As President Carter stated on March 3, our position on the status of Jerusalem has not changed. That position remains as indicated by President Carter in his letter to President Sadat signed at the time of the Camp David accords.

With respect to the future of Jerusalem, it has been our consistent position that the final status of the city must be settled in the context of negotia-

Arms Sales to Egypt

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, FEB. 25, 1980¹

Over the past several days, we have had a number of questions about proposed American arms supply relationship with Egypt. As you know, Assistant Secretary of Defense, David McGiffert, has been in Cairo discussing a proposed program with the Egyptian Government. Those discussions, which took place over a period of about 5 days, are not complete, and Mr. McGiffert is now on his way back to Washington. Let me address what is the result of that meeting. This is necessarily going to be general, in that we must still deal with specifics with the Hill; some of it remains to be refined in specific terms.

The discussions concerning the U.S. military assistance in Cairo included Minister of Defense Kamel Hassan Ali, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ahmed Badawi, and other Ministry of Defense officials. The team from the United States was led by Assistant Secretary McGiffert.

The U.S. team conveyed President Carter's decision concerning the amount of dollar credits potentially

available for defense purchases and his decision that the United States was prepared to consider for sale to Egypt M60A3 tanks and F-15 and F-16 aircraft.

In light of these decisions by President Carter, the Egyptian Government has provided to the U.S. team a request for military equipment and other services, including 40 F-16 aircraft, about 250 M60A3 tanks, and a variety of other equipment. The United States will submit the major items requested to the U.S. Congress for review in accordance with U.S. legal requirements.

With respect to F-15 aircraft, the Egyptian Government expressed appreciation for the offer of the United States and decided to postpone action on that offer until a later time so as to devote available resources to the balanced equipment acquisitions outlined above. The Egyptian Government hopes in due course to order such F-15 aircraft as may be necessary for its defense needs.

The program agreed to by the two governments is a step in the long-term program based on the common interests of the two governments and peace and security in the area.

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III. ■

ns for a final peace. We believe that
tever solution is eventually agreed
n should preserve Jerusalem as an
divided city. It should provide for free
ess to the Jewish, Muslim, and Chris-
holy sites without distinction or dis-
mination for the free exercise of wor-
p. The solution should assure the basic
ts of all the city's residents. We have
en no position on exactly how the final
us of Jerusalem might be defined.

Peace Process

um, there has been no change in U.S.
ry as we continue our dedicated ef-
s toward a comprehensive settlement.
re turning to your questions, I would
to say a few final words about the
le East peace process as a whole.
r the past 3 years, there is no foreign
y goal on which the President and I
worked harder than a genuine peace
e Middle East. The achievement at
p David, the Peace Treaty between
pt and Israel, the launching of nego-
s to establish full autonomy in the
Bank and Gaza are historic accom-
ishments, particularly when viewed
nst the past history of this tragic con-

It is critically important that we con-
rate our full and undivided attention
e autonomy negotiations and do all
an to give these talks the best possi-
rospect for success. The autonomy
tations offer the first real opportu-
for Palestinians living in the West
k and Gaza to achieve full autonomy
in the context of assured Israeli se-
y, as the next step toward achieving
it, lasting, and comprehensive peace
ement.

As reflected in the agreement
hed at Camp David, such a peace is
ly in the interests of the United
es, of Israel, of Israel's neighbors,
of the world. Every decision we have
e—and will make—is designed to
e us toward that goal.
With this in mind, the President has
ed President Sadat and Prime Minis-
begin each to come to Washington in
y April to discuss with him how best
an accelerate the movement toward
mutual objective.

Protecting U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf Region

by Harold Brown

Address before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on March 6, 1980. Mr Brown is Secretary of Defense.

The 1970s closed with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 1980s opened with the ensuing debate, both in this country and around the world, about how to respond to the invasion. At times confused, at times angry, at times profound, this debate is not yet resolved.

In my remarks today, I want to talk about U.S. interests—some of them vital—in that part of the world, about the nature of the challenge presented by the Soviet threat there, about our response to that challenge, and particularly about how our military capabilities fit into an overall security policy framework for the region and contribute to that response.

While recent events in Afghanistan are of critical significance, they are by no means the entire problem. Any discussion of the appropriate U.S. response must begin by placing these specific events—the invasion and its consequences—in the broader context of historical and possible or likely future developments.

The full context of the Soviet invasion includes historical Russian ambitions in that region, a 20-year buildup of Soviet military forces, the more recent development of Soviet power projection capabilities, and the very recent upheavals in the Islamic world.

Interpretations of the reasons for the Soviet invasion vary. The simple fact is that their motives are very likely to be mixed, and we don't know the exact mixture. But policymakers cannot avoid dealing with both the specific incident—the invasion—and the longer range question of how to deter such actions in the future. Reflecting this, the U.S. response since the December invasion has been on two levels:

- Extracting a real price from the Soviets for this specific case of outright aggression and
- Continuing to design a strategy and to develop a set of economic, political, diplomatic, and military measures to deter or defeat similar Soviet moves

in the future—moves that could more directly threaten U.S. interests.

U.S. Interests

U.S. interests related to the Persian Gulf-southwest Asian region, certainly in the short term, focus on the safe and speedy release of the Americans held hostage in Tehran. For the longer term, our interests can be stated quite simply:

- To insure access to adequate oil supplies;
- To resist Soviet expansion;
- To promote stability in the region; and
- To advance the Middle East peace process, while insuring—and, indeed, in order to help insure—the continued security of the State of Israel.

Let us look more closely at each of these in turn.

Oil is the lifeblood of modern industrial societies. Sixty percent of the world's imported petroleum comes from this region; about 13% of the oil consumed in the United States and much higher percentages for our allies—45% for Germany and 75% for France and for Japan.

The loss of this oil to the economies of the West and the industrialized Far East would be a blow of catastrophic proportions.

Even given success in the much needed effort to reduce American dependence on imported oil, the loss of Persian Gulf supplies would do irreparable damage to our allies and friends. In fact, Soviet control of this area would make virtual economic vassals of much of both the industrialized and the less developed worlds. The U.S.S.R. would not even need actually to interrupt the flow of oil.

Russian dreams and schemes of expansion and dominion in this region go back to Tsarist days. But our long term interests, and those of the area, are best served if the countries of that region are free to develop in their own ways, not subject to foreign pressure of domination. Putting Soviet power astride, vast oil resources would, for

¹Press release 63. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by committee and will be available from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 20402. ■

the first time, give the Soviet state international economic leverage on a par with its military might.

Stability in the region does not mean the absence of change. It does require a strong measure of security for each of its states and opportunities for the nonviolent resolution of local tensions and differences. The influences of both the industrialized West and Islamic fundamentalism will continue to touch directly the lives of individuals and the future of nations in that region. But there is a role for us to play in building individual and collective local security, while at the same time discouraging such destabilizing developments as the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Middle East peace process is a fundamental component of U.S. policy as is our commitment to the security of Israel. These aspects of striving for a stable and secure Middle East have taken on new significance in the wake of the recent events in Iran and Afghanistan.

The road to peace in the Middle East is long, steep, and hazardous. But progress along that road has been—viewed overall—one of the great success stories in international affairs. In 1973 Israel and Egypt were at war. When this Administration took office, the only international exchanges between the two nations came from the barrels of guns used in border attacks.

In 3 short years, we have witnessed the Camp David accords, the frameworks for a comprehensive peace, and open borders and exchanges of ambassadors. In pursuing peace we will continue to honor our national commitment to the security of Israel. We will also work with our Arab friends to provide a security framework that helps protect the region from Soviet expansionism and any consequent threats to the free flow of oil which is so important to them and the rest of the world.

As we seek to advance these four interests, our determination to respond to any threat to them is clear. As President Carter said in his State of the Union speech: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

International Complications for the Soviets

Before I elaborate on our strategy and capabilities to deter any such threat in the future, I would like to outline several other factors which compound Soviet calculations in the area and could contribute to the solution of our problems there.

First and foremost of these is the resurgence of Islam, reinforcing an historic trend toward nationalism in that part of the world. Unlike the Soviet Union, we are not seeking to insulate a large Islamic population from the influences of their religious tradition. We do not seek to suppress religious activism in the Islamic world. And this is true even with respect to Iran. As we have made clear many times during the continuing hostage crisis, if there is an external threat to Iran's Islamic revolution, it comes from the Soviet Union, not from the United States.

Second, and related to the first, is the active resistance of nationalistic peoples to outside domination. Recent events in Afghanistan remind us—and, more immediately no doubt, the Soviets—of the timeless truth of Toynbee's description of the classic problem of invaders:

... an overweening self-confidence, bred by this mistaken belief in their own invincibility, then leads them on to court disaster by rashly attacking still unbroken peoples whose spirit and capacity for resistance takes them by surprise.

I do not mean to imply that the Soviets cannot prevail in Afghanistan. They can—but only at a price, and it is a steep one. And whatever problems the forces of religion and independence which are sweeping the area create for us, let us not forget that ultimately they can help inhibit Soviet expansionism.

Third World concerns have played what is to some observers a surprising role in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan had been friendly, indeed pro-Soviet. An underdeveloped nation, it historically has been a buffer state between great power rivals. The swift dispatch of Soviet tanks, helicopter gunships, and tens of thousands of troops to suppress "friendly" Afghanistan rightly shocked much of the Third World.

Our allies and the other industrialized democracies—and, to take a different example, China as well—share our interests and concerns in the area—and, by and large, our evaluation of the dangers—even if they do not accept

every element of our formulas for dealing with the situation. Western Europe and Japan, even more than we depend on the oil resources of the region. Many of our allies have historic ties to countries there.

While we seek allied support in this region, we must realize that direct contributions are not the only way they can help. For example, increased allied contributions to their own security provides greater flexibility in the measures we must take to bolster our military capabilities for meeting threats to the peace and our common interests in the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia.

These diverse factors can help us meet the challenge posed by the Soviets—indeed, they are an indispensable part of the total response. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the United States must take the lead in organizing a comprehensive response to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and must be an effective deterrent to still more dangerous actions they might otherwise be tempted to take in the future. This comprehensive response must have many facets—military and nonmilitary.

Nonmilitary Components of Deterrence

The first nonmilitary ingredient is an effective, long term energy policy to reduce our dependence on imported oil. This objective is crucial to our nation's security in the future.

However, it must also be clearly understood that no conceivable combination of measures—conservation, stockpiling, or alternate energy sources—can totally eliminate the near term security problem that is created by threats to the gulf and its oil. The hard fact is that there is nothing the United States—or our industrial world partners or the less developed countries—can do in the coming decade, or probably even the next, that would save us from severe damage if the bulk of the oil supply from the Persian Gulf were cut off for a sustained period.

The issue here is not, as some have claimed, one of going to war for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries or to avoid waiting in gas lines. Conservation is necessary in an event. But to advocate it as a substitute for U.S. leadership in strengthening the security of the area is simply to to grasp, or to wish away, the gravity of the true situation, as it affects not

us but our allies and friends. Even energy self-sufficient America would be secure in a world in which Western Europe or Japan or Turkey or Israel could be made energy hostages of hostile power.

The second nonmilitary aspect is economic assistance to those countries in the region that are grappling with problems of development. A particularly important example is the case for ally Turkey. Economic uncertainty tends to fuel political instability. Helping a country solve its internal problems enables it to deal more effectively with common security and other regional concerns. We look to our friends in the industrialized world and the wealthy oil producers in the area to bear their full share of this part of the task.

Military Components of Deterrence

Let me turn now to the military components. In our military planning for the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia—ascended across the board—our first objective is to deter; that is, we seek to make clear that there will be major costs and penalties associated with aggression. We must be able, if need be, to defeat aggression at various levels. Without question, such an ability and the will to use it constitute the most effective deterrent.

Before I move on to discuss the kinds of forces that are necessary to carry out this objective, let me make a few general observations about the military components of our response. First, while the terms "rapid deployment forces" and "power projection" are relatively new additions to the lexicon, the military missions they signify are not new at all. The United States has been in the rapid deployment and power projection business for a long time. If you doubt that, ask the lines who 5 years ago celebrated their 200th anniversary.

In both World Wars, in Korea, and in Vietnam, we showed that we were able to sustain very large military forces very far from our shores. Whatever our other difficulties in those wars, the logistics capability which the United States demonstrated was impressive indeed. Moreover, it has long been a part of our military doctrine to be ready to engage in contingencies in remote areas, without unacceptably promising our ability to maintain

deterrence and defense in other theaters.

Second, I reject altogether the proposition that we should not develop the capability to use military forces effectively because we might then be tempted to use them unwisely. I believe the American people and their political and military leaders are wise enough—and, one might add, experienced enough—to understand and accept a few simple truths.

- Military forces alone cannot solve all the world's problems.
- Their commitment is a very serious business.
- Such forces and the will to use them when necessary are essential to the defense of our vital interests.
- Those interests must be carefully defined.

We must be guided by the lessons of history and not haunted by its ghosts.

Third, there have been some press reports of alleged U.S. reliance on a "trip wire" strategy, in which we would, by preference or necessity, quickly resort to theater nuclear weapons to defend against Soviet attack in the area. Several points need to be made. Any direct conflict between American and Soviet forces carries the risk of intensification and geographical spread of the conflict. We cannot concede to the Soviets full choice of the arena or the actions.

But that by no means implies that escalation to the use of nuclear weapons will be the consequence of a U.S.-Soviet clash in southwest Asia. In part to make such a result less likely, a major portion of our effort in the region is devoted to improving the conventional strength we can bring to bear there. In fact, given U.S. capabilities and those of others whose interests would be threatened by Soviet aggression, given the difficulties inherent in any Soviet military actions beyond its borders in rugged terrain and hostile surroundings, and given our wide range of options both to exploit other Soviet vulnerabilities and to defend against attack, conventional deterrence and defense are feasible goals.

My fourth general observation is that this overall response is, and must be, a multilateral one, involving local forces, U.S. forces, and those of other countries outside the region. For example, we are working with several countries in the region for increased

U.S. access to local facilities. We are talking with both potential contributors and potential recipients concerning programs of economic support and security assistance—which are necessary complements to our other efforts. And we are consulting with countries both in the region and outside concerning military cooperation there.

Despite the complexities inherent in multilateral action by independent nations, on the whole we have been quite successful in our endeavors, and we expect this to continue. I should note that in many instances, we seek not formal, public guarantees and agreements but rather the establishment of a pattern of quiet consultation and parallel pursuit of common security goals.

Meeting the objective of deterrence will require a combination of local forces for self-defense, U.S. forces present in the area, and, as appropriate, U.S. and other forces capable of rapid deployment to reinforce threatened areas.

In most cases—indeed, to some degree in all cases—local forces in a country under attack or directly threatened would mobilize for its defense. We cannot hope, nor do we plan, to defend peoples in the region who will not help defend themselves. By that same token, where we are involved, we do not expect to stand alone. Because aggression against one could spread to threaten all, others in the regions may well—and surely ought to—join in the collective defense. The kinds of assistance they would contribute would vary greatly from case to case, ranging from providing necessary access and support facilities to mobilizing forces that would stand alongside our own to deter and engage an enemy.

In addition to indigenous forces, deterrence involves both U.S. military presence in a troubled region and U.S. forces which can be quickly moved to it. What is important is the ability rapidly to move forces into the region with the numbers, mobility, and firepower to preclude initial adversary forces from reaching vital points. It is not necessary for our initial units to be able to defeat the whole force an adversary might eventually have in place. It is also not necessary for us to await the firing of the first shot or the prior arrival of hostile forces; many of our forces can be moved upon strategic warning and some upon receipt of even very early and ambiguous indications.

An effective U.S. response to ag-

gression in this or other troublespots consists of several ingredients. The first—an enhanced continuing peacetime presence—will involve primarily naval forces. Our current naval power in the region is greatly superior to that of the Soviet Union in the area. It provides us with an immediate tactical air capability. I might add that the French also have a powerful naval force in the Indian Ocean. Further, we are continuing to make improvements, begun several years ago, in the facilities on Diego Garcia. We will have a permanent presence in the region that is much greater than it was a year ago.

Prepositioning of equipment is the vital second ingredient. We have begun a program to procure a number of maritime prepositioning ships, which will give us greater flexibility and avoid the problems of large, permanent U.S. bases overseas in sensitive areas.

As a near term option, we are now actively assembling a seven-ship force of commercial-type vessels, including roll-on, roll-off ships, break-bulk cargo ships, and tankers to provide us with this capability within the next several months. These ships will be loaded with unit equipment, supplies, fuel, and water that would enable a Marine amphibious brigade of some 10,000 men, as well as several U.S. Air Force fighter squadrons, to operate until further logistic support can arrive from the United States.

The loaded ships will be prepositioned within a few days' sailing distance of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea area. In an emergency they could move to a designated port near the objective and join up there with personnel and planes flown directly from U.S. bases. This arrangement will provide us the capability of responding to a crisis in the area in days rather than weeks.

Mobility—especially air and sealift capabilities—is the third ingredient. We are not without such capabilities today. For example, the first land-based tactical aircraft could be in the region in a matter of hours and significant units backed up by AWACS [airborne warning and control system] within a few days. The first battalion of the 82d Airborne Division could arrive within 48 hours of a movement order; the entire division could close in in about 2 weeks. A full Marine amphibious force (one division and air wing) could be deployed in 4 weeks.

Moreover, we are now programming

major improvements to our rapid deployment capabilities. Several years ago, we started procurement of KC-10 aerial tankers, and we are now accelerating our purchases. We have also begun a long-term program for procurement of a new "CX" transport aircraft—either of new design or based on an existing aircraft—for long-distance deployment of out-sized cargos. We are also, as an interim measure, in the process of acquiring high-speed civilian ships which have immediate military sealift potential.

Fourth is the access and transit rights which I alluded to earlier. We are intensively—and I judge successfully—negotiating increased access to port, airfield, and other facilities to improve our ability to sustain naval and aircraft deployments.

Let me again emphasize the difference between seeking access and seeking permanent bases. Essentially, we are asking various countries in the area to enable us to come more effectively to their assistance if and when they need and want us. This is far different from asking them to host permanent U.S. garrisons.

Frequent deployment and exercises in the area comprise another key ingredient. We have increased the scale and pace of our periodic naval task force deployments in the region.

For example, to take a specific point in time, last October the U.S.S. *Midway* carrier battle group was conducting an exercise in the Indian Ocean with naval units from the United Kingdom and Australia. Additionally, four ships of the U.S. Mideast force were on station in the Persian Gulf. A second aircraft carrier battle group from the western Pacific arrived in the Arabian Sea in December. Since that time, more than 150 carrier-based tactical aircraft and 14 warships have been continuously available in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea to maintain a visible U.S. presence.

Our ability to project air power at extended distances has been further demonstrated by three B-52 sea surveillance and three airborne warning and control missions flown in the Indian Ocean area. Finally, a Marine amphibious unit will arrive in the Arabian Sea later this month. And even earlier, we deployed tactical aircraft there—for example, F-15s and AWACS to Saudi Arabia—as part of our response to the threat to North Yemen.

In the debate growing out of the

Persian Gulf crisis, we seem sometimes to labor under attack from a curious combination of critics. On the one hand there are those who pound the podium and call for ill-defined tough measures—often to cure problems for which there is no military solution—while at the same time deriding our military capabilities. On the other hand, different voices declare that we face no real problems except those created by our own overreaction and thus need not be concerned about our military capabilities.

Adopting either attitude as our nation's policy would leave our security great hazard and would give a serious and dangerously wrong signal to the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The policies and the approach I have outlined are not steps toward war. They are designed to build strength to prevent war. What we are doing constitutes a necessary and reasonable response to real needs. The massive growth of Soviet military capabilities is a fact. Their willingness to use surrogates and, indeed, units of the Red Army to assert military and political power outside the borders of the Soviet Union has been demonstrated. The United States and the nations to which we have the closest ties are now, and will be for a long time, linked by a highly vulnerable lifeline to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps the Soviets will never move to threaten that lifeline. Perhaps the more "benign" interpretations of their invasion of Afghanistan—if that word "benign" can be used at all—is correct. But, as policymakers and responsible citizens and world leaders, we cannot safely assume that it is. Indeed, the actions that we must take guard against the consequences of the immediate threat posed by recent aggressive Soviet behavior are probably the most effective way to moderate future Soviet actions over the long term.

We are not saying to the Soviet Union that competition is the only p between us. We remain willing to cooperate in those areas where our interests overlap, as in the case of SALT. But where they threaten our interests, we will meet them on that ground as well.

We must demonstrate to the Soviet Union that:

- The invasion of Afghanistan is

throughout that part of the world is not ruled from Moscow, as a violation of the norms of international behavior;

- Their stated justification for it is universally regarded as a transparent representation; and

- The international community believes that similar steps in the future are the gravest dangers for the world as well as for the rest of us.

For the United States to assume its role in deterring such aggression in the future, we must have adequate military capability and the ability to use it if necessary. If we intend to remain a major world power, and to serve our own pluralistic and economic systems, then we must engage in the long haul in an economic regime, a program to reduce our dependence on imported energy, and not an enhancement of our military capability, including an ability to deploy weapons rapidly to areas far from but close to us, in a security framework that is to stabilize such regions.

These tasks will not be easy. They will not be done as a one-time crash program. They will not be inexpensive. If we fail to carry them out, the century will be a dangerous one for our ideals, for our society, and for our children.

Text from Defense Department press release 87-80. ■

Ports of Nuclear Vessels Extended

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 7, 1980¹

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) amended the Atomic Energy Act to establish new criteria for nuclear export. Included was a requirement that the United States have a right to consent to the reprocessing of fuel exported from the U.S. In our agreements with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the United States contains such a right. To avoid disrupting cooperation with EURATOM, the NNPA included a proviso permitting continued cooperation until March 10, 1980, if EURATOM agreed to negotiations concerning our cooperation agreements. In July 1978, EURATOM agreed to discussions on the agreements on the un-

derstanding that the issues being studied in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) would not be addressed in the US-EURATOM discussions until completion of INFCE, and that the results of INFCE would be taken into account in the final negotiations. We have had two rounds of such discussions with EURATOM—in November 1978 and September 1979. A third meeting is scheduled for April 1980, shortly after INFCE concludes its work.

To continue nuclear cooperation with EURATOM after March 10, 1980, we have to extend our waiver of the provision relating to U.S. approval of reprocessing. Under the law, this can be done only on an annual basis, and only after a Presidential determination that failure to cooperate would seriously prejudice the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. The Act further provides for notification to the Congress of any such determination.

During the November 1978 and September 1979 discussions with EURATOM, progress was made in clarifying the issues and positions relating to our agreement for cooperation. Our next session with EURATOM, in April 1980, will be our first chance to deal with the substantive issues addressed in INFCE and to determine how we can factor the results of that study into our agreement for cooperation. Our continued cooperation with EURATOM during this period is essential to demonstrating our reliability as a reliable partner in the sensitive area of energy supply—and thus improving the prospects for international acceptance of measures to limit proliferation.

For these reasons, I have determined that failure to continue peaceful nuclear cooperation with the European Atomic Energy Community would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives and would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security of the U.S. I will therefore issue, in the immediate future, an Executive Order extending the waiver of the application of the relevant export criterion of the NNPA for an additional twelve months from March 10, 1980.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate (Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 11, 1980). ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International agreement for the creation at Paris of an International Office for Epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris Jan. 25, 1924. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for the U.S. July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141.

Accession deposited: Angola, Apr. 6, 1979. Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.¹ Ratifications deposited: Colombia, Mexico, Mar. 6, 1980.

Antarctic

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Adopted at Washington Oct. 5, 1979, at the 10th Antarctic Treaty consultative meeting. Enters into force when approved by all the contracting parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in meetings held to consider measures.

Atomic Energy

Agreement amending the agreement of June 14, 1974, for the supply of uranium enrichment services for a nuclear power facility in Yugoslavia. Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade and Vienna Feb. 26, 1980. Entered into force: Feb. 26, 1980.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. Adherence deposited: Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Mar. 13, 1980.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Done at Montreal Oct. 16, 1974.² Ratifications deposited: Colombia, Feb. 15, 1980; El Salvador, Nicaragua, Feb. 13, 1980; U.K., Feb. 29, 1980. Entered into force: Feb. 15, 1980.

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation (Chicago, 1944; TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.³ Ratification deposited: Portugal, Mar. 18, 1980.

Collisions

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.

Accessions deposited: Australia, Feb. 29, 1980; Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora,

with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.
Ratification deposited: Israel, Dec. 18, 1979.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.
Ratification deposited: Poland, Jan. 14, 1980.
Accessions deposited: Australia, Feb. 22, 1980; Italy, Oct. 31, 1979.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th session of the UNESCO general conference. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972.²
Ratification deposited: Cuba, Jan. 30, 1980.³

Cultural Relations

Constitution of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at London Nov. 16, 1945. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.
Accessions deposited: Botswana, Sept. 24, 1979; Equatorial Guinea, Nov. 29, 1979; Sao Tome and Principe, Jan. 22, 1980.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Burma, Mar. 7, 1980.

Human Rights

International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.²
Accession deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 12, 1980.

International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.²
Accession deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 12, 1980.

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Adopted at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948; reentered into force for the U.S. Feb. 18, 1980. TIAS 1868.
Readmission: U.S., Feb. 18, 1980.

Law

Statute of the International Institute for the unification of private law. Done at Rome Mar. 15, 1940. Entered into force Apr. 21, 1940; for the U.S. Mar. 13, 1964. TIAS 5743.

Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, Jan. 1, 1980.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629.

Accessions deposited: Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980; Samoa, Oct. 23, 1979.

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331), relating to amendments to the convention. Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975.¹
Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Republic, Feb. 21, 1980.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Accessions deposited: Benin, Mar. 19, 1980; United Arab Emirates, Mar. 4, 1980.

Amendments to Articles 17 and 18 of the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Done at London Sept. 15, 1964. Entered into force Oct. 6, 1967. TIAS 6285.

Acceptance deposited: Benin, Mar. 19, 1980.

Amendment to Article 28 of the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285). Done at Paris Sept. 28, 1965. Entered into force Nov. 3, 1968. TIAS 6490.

Acceptance deposited: Benin, Mar. 19, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1978. TIAS 8606.

Acceptance deposited: Burma, Jan. 29, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.¹

Accessions deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 4, 1980; Burma, Jan. 29, 1980; Ghana, Feb. 5, 1980; Maldives, Feb. 25, 1980; Portugal, Mar. 3, 1980; United Arab Emirates, Mar. 4, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.¹

Accessions deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 4, 1980; German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Feb. 5, 1980; Liberia, Dec. 14, 1979; Maldives, Feb. 25, 1980.

Convention on facilitation of international

maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London Apr. 9, 1965. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1967; for the U.S. May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.

Acceptance deposited: Argentina, Jan. 1980.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Fiji, Mar. 18, 1980.

Nuclear Material

Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, with annexes. Adopted Vienna Oct. 26, 1979. Open for signature Vienna and New York Mar. 3, 1980. Entered into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the 21st instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval. Signature: Dominican Republic, U.S., 3, 1980.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annex as amended. Done at London May 12, 1973. Entered into force July 26, 1978; for the U.S. Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109, 8.
Accessions deposited: German Democratic Republic, Jan. 25, 1979;^{3,4} Republic of Korea, July 31, 1978; Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980.

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force Jun. 1975.²

Accession deposited: China, Jan. 30, 1980.

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force Mar. 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.

Ratification deposited: Portugal, Feb. 1980.

Patents—Microorganisms

Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 2, 1977.¹
Ratification deposited: France, Feb. 2, 1980.

Pollution

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratification deposited: Portugal, Apr. 1978.

Accessions deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 10, 1980; South Africa, Aug. 7, 1980.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883,

Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1-12 entered into force May 19, 1968, for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. Articles 13-15 entered into force Apr. 26, 1970, for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Organization of deposit of accession: WIPO, Feb. 4, 1980.

Registration treaty, with regulations. Done at Vienna June 12, 1973. Accession deposited: U.S.S.R., Feb. 7, 1974.

Entered into force: Aug. 7, 1980.

Property—Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm, July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Colombia, Feb. 4, 1980.

Publications

Convention of the international center for the registration of serial publications. Done at Paris Nov. 14, 1974, and amended Oct. 11, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 21, 1978, for the U.S. Mar. 31, 1978 (provisionally).
Accession deposited: Senegal, July 12, 1978.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.²
Accession deposited: Gabon, Feb. 29, 1979.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accessions deposited: Colombia, Mar. 4, 1980; Liberia, Feb. 27, 1980.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Enters into force Oct. 1, 1980, provided certain conditions have been met.

Signatures: France, U.S., Jan. 8, 1980; India, Mar. 17, 1980; Malaysia, Jan. 28, 1980.
Accession deposited: Malaysia, Jan. 29, 1980.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965.

Accessions deposited: Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980; Samoa, Oct. 23, 1979; Yemen (Sana), Jan. 9, 1979.
Declaration of denunciation: Argentina, Jan. 5, 1979, effective Dec. 5, 1980.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Enters into force May 25, 1980.

Proclaimed by the President: Jan. 28, 1980. Ratifications deposited: Argentina, Dec. 5, 1979; China, Jan. 7, 1980.

Acceptance deposited: U.S.S.R., Jan. 9, 1980.

Approval deposited: Hungary, Jan. 9, 1980. Accession deposited: Peru, Dec. 4, 1979.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Done at New York Jan. 14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1976. TIAS 8480.

Ratification deposited: Austria, Mar. 6, 1980.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978, definitively Jan. 2, 1980.

Ratifications deposited: Dominican Republic, Mar. 19, 1980; Indonesia, Feb. 27, 1980.

Telecommunications

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), with annexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.²

Approvals deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, Jan. 3, 1980;⁵ Paraguay, July 10, 1979.

Terrorism

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 19, 1979.¹

Signatures: Greece, Mar. 18, 1980; Sweden, Feb. 25, 1980.

Trade

International dairy arrangement. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623.

Acceptance deposited: Australia, Feb. 1, 1980.

Transportation

Agreement on the international carriage of perishable foodstuffs and on the special equipment to be used for such carriage (ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976.²

Senate advice and consent to accession: Mar. 20, 1980.

UNIDO

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes.

Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.¹

Signatures: Australia, Mar. 3, 1980; Iraq,

Feb. 26, 1980; Ivory Coast, Feb. 21, 1980; Laos, Mar. 5, 1980.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Mar. 12, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Mar. 12, 1980.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.

Acceptance deposited: Nicaragua, Dec. 17, 1979.

Ratification deposited: Haiti, Jan. 18, 1980.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 2, 1978 (TIAS 9389), with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca Mar. 7, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1980.

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 31, 1978 (TIAS 9518). Effected by exchange of letters at La Paz Feb. 28, 1980. Entered into force Feb. 28, 1980.

Dominican Republic

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 7 and 8, 1979 (TIAS 9454), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 5 and 7, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1980.

Finland

Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 11, 1976. Enters into force May 11, 1980. Proclaimed by the President: Mar. 4, 1980.

Japan

Treaty on extradition, with exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1980. Proclaimed by the President: Mar. 4, 1980.

Mexico

Agreement relating to tariff concessions.

Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Oct. 31 and Nov. 8, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 8, 1979; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Norway

Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977.

Instruments of ratification exchanged: Mar. 7, 1980.

Entered into force: Mar. 7, 1980.

Peru

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Washington July 6, 1979.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Mar. 25, 1980.

Sri Lanka

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 25, 1975 (TIAS 8107), with agreed minutes. Signed at Colombo Mar. 18, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1980.

Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement on trade, with related letter. Signed at Washington Dec. 19, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.

United Kingdom

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Dec. 31, 1975.

Instruments of ratification exchanged: Mar. 25, 1980.

Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

Agreement amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Effected by exchange of notes at London Apr. 13, 1976.

Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

Protocol amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Aug. 26, 1976.

Instruments of ratification exchanged: Mar. 25, 1980.

Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

Second protocol amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Mar. 31, 1977.

Instruments of ratification exchanged: Mar. 25, 1980.

Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

Third protocol further amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Mar. 15, 1979.

Instruments of ratification exchanged:

Mar. 25, 1980.

Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the U.S.

³ With a declaration.

⁴ With a reservation.

⁵ Applicable to Berlin (West). ■

March 1980

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page 60.

March 1

U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 465 regarding Israel's settlements policy. While voting for the Resolution, the U.S. Representative makes clear U.S. opposition to the section calling for the dismantling of existing settlements.

March 3

President Carter states that the affirmative U.S. vote on Resolution 465 took place because of a failure of communication. The U.S. should have abstained.

In accordance with the 1974 Trade Act, President Carter notifies the Congress that as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. no longer has reasonable access to commercial markets there and that it is not in the U.S. national interest to continue preferential duty-free treatment. Therefore, he intends to suspend Afghanistan as a beneficiary developing country for the Generalized System of Preferences, effective in 60 days. Reinstatement will be considered when Soviet troops withdraw.

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau is sworn in for a fourth term.

March 4

Robert Mugabe, co-leader of the Patriotic Front guerrilla alliance wins an absolute majority in the 100-member House of Assembly.

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt makes official visit to Washington, D.C., Mar. 4-8.

March 5

Agha Shahi, Pakistan's adviser to the President for Foreign Affairs, states that Pakistan will not accept the U.S. proposal of \$400 million in defense and economic aid.

March 11

Robert Mugabe is formally appointed Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.

March 13

P.R.C. Vice Foreign Minister, Zhang Wenjin, visits U.S., Mar. 13-23.

March 19

Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Cossiga, resigns.

March 21

Japanese Foreign Minister, Saburo Okita, visits U.S. Mar. 19-22.

March 25

Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Romero, is assassinated.

British Olympic Association votes to participate in Moscow Summer Olympics.

March 29

U.S. and Turkey sign a new 5-year fence agreement based on their common membership in NATO. ■

Department of State

March 3-31

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*48	3/3	Itinerary of German Chancellor Schmidt official visit to the U.S. Mar. 4-6.
*49	3/3	U.S. Organization for International Radio Consultative Comm (CCIR), study group CMIT, Apr. 8.
*50	3/3	U.S. Organization for International Teleg and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group B, Mar. 27.
*51	3/3	Advisory Committee International Intellectual Property, Mar. 3.
52	3/4	Vance: address before Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Mar. 3.
52A	3/4	Vance: question-and-answer session following address in Chicago, Mar. 3.
*53	3/5	U.S., U.K. expand transatlantic air service Mar. 5.
*54	3/6	U.S., Hong Kong establish specified limits six textile categories.
*55	3/7	U.S., Canada discuss Popular River bilateral monitoring arrangements.

- 3/11 Robert E. White sworn in as Ambassador to El Salvador (biographic data).
- 3/10 Mabel Murphy Smythe assumes duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (biographic data).
- 3/11 Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group international multimodal transport and containers, Mar. 26.
- 3/11 Status of U.S. contribution to international relief efforts for Khmer relief.
- 3/17 U.S., Dominican Republic amend textile agreement, Mar. 5 and 7.
- 3/17 CCITT, study group D, Apr. 15.
- 3/18 Vance: statement before the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee.
- 3/20 Vance: statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- 3/21 Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Apr. 28.
- 3/21 CCIR, study groups 10 and 11, Apr. 22.
- 3/21 U.S., Scandinavian aviation consultations concluded.
- 3/25 Robert C. F. Gordon sworn in as Ambassador to Mauritius (biographic data).
- 3/27 Vance: statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- 3/27 SCC, SOLAS, working group on carriage of dangerous goods, Apr. 8.
- 3/27 SCC, SOLAS, working group on the subdivision, stability, and load lines, Apr. 9.
- 3/29 SCC, SOLAS, working group on radiocommunications, Apr. 17.
- 3/28 Harry H. Pollak designated Special Assistant and Coordinator of International Labor Affairs (biographic data).
- 3/31 James Eugene Goodby sworn in as Ambassador to Finland, Mar. 26 (biographic data).
- †74 3/31 1951 "Foreign Relations of the United States," Volume I: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy.

* Not printed in the BULLETIN.
† Held for a later issue. ■

"The Eagle and the Shield"

This 637-page book, prepared under the auspices of the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration, was largely researched and written by the late Richard S. Patterson, formerly a historian in the Department of State and for many years the government's expert on the history of the Great Seal. Publication, originally planned for 1976, was delayed because of Mr. Patterson's death that year. The book was completed by Richardson Dougall, retired Deputy Director of the Department's Historical Office.

The history of the Great Seal begins on July 4, 1776, when the Continental Congress approved the following resolution: "Resolved, That Dr. Franklin, Mr. J. Adams and Mr. Jefferson, be a committee, to bring in a device for a seal for the United States of America."

Replacing the last standard official history of the Great Seal—that by Gaillard Hunt issued in 1909—this new history, *The Eagle and the Shield: A History of the Great Seal of the United States*, traces the designing of the seal in the period 1776–82 and the execution and use of the various seal dies from 1782 to 1976. Much new information is included. The book has more than 50 pages of illustrations—two in color and many printed here for the first time. It also contains chapters on the seals of the President and Vice President of the United States and on the seal of the Department of State.

Copies of *The Eagle and the Shield* may be ordered from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$12.00 each. Checks or money orders, made payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order. The stock number of this publication is 044-000-01543-9. ■

International Law Digest, 1977

The *Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law* contains materials relating to U.S. international legal practice for 1977. This 1,081-page, fifth annual edition was edited by John A. Boyd with a foreword by Herbert J. Hansell, formerly the Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

It contains 15 chapters dealing with such varied topics as the implementation of President Carter's human rights policy, the constitutionality of the transfer of U.S. property to Panama in the 1977 canal treaties, the litigation concerning the return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary, conservation efforts in behalf of bowhead whales, and the Bermuda II agreement concerning air service between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Some of the precedent-setting items reported include the U.N. resolution imposing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, the 1977 U.S.-Canada agreement concerning transit pipelines, the announcement of America's first deepwater port, and the new special consular services handbook on protection of American nationals arrested, on trial, or imprisoned.

Of special interest to lawyers is the chapter on private international law featuring key portions of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules of arbitration and the 1977 arrangements between the American Arbitration Association, the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce concerning the arbitration of contract disputes between U.S. business firms and Soviet foreign trade organizations.

An appendix to the *Digest*, edited by Michael Sandler, Detlev F. Vagts, and Bruno Ristau, reviews the sovereign immunity decisions made by the Department of State during the period 1952–77. This case-by-case review of the immunities of foreign states and their officers quotes extensively from previously unpublished diplomatic notes.

Copies of the *Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law, 1977* may be purchased from the Superintendent of

Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$12.75 each. A check or money order, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order. The stock number for this edition is 044-000-01720-2. Earlier editions of the *Digest* may also be purchased in the same manner. They are:

- 1973, Stock number 044-000-01525-1, 618 pages, \$7.50
- 1974, Stock number 044-000-01566-8, 796 pages, \$11.00
- 1975, Stock number 044-000-01605-2, 947 pages, \$11.00
- 1976, Stock number 044-000-01645-1, 850 pages, \$9.50. ■

1951 U.N., Western Hemisphere Foreign Relations Volume

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume II, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere is the second of seven volumes for the year 1951 and was prepared by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State.

This volume of 1,673 pages presents high-level documentation (nearly all of which is newly declassified) on the policies of the United States in the United Nations on such major issues as the Chinese representation question, admission of new members, Soviet peace propaganda, the Southwest Africa question, and the draft international covenant of human rights.

It also includes the record of U.S. relations with the American Republics and Canada. Of particular note are those papers dealing with the fourth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; hemisphere defense; economic and technical assistance policy; the attitude of the United States toward Communist activity in Guatemala; negotiation of military matters with Brazil and Venezuela; and political and economic relations with Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Panama, and Peru.

Copies of this volume may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$20.00 each. Checks or money orders, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order. The Department of State publication number is 8962. ■

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
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**Department
of State**
bulletin

Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 80 / Number 2039

June 1980



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Department of State bulletin

Volume 80 / Number 2039 / June 1980

Cover:

Secretary Muskie

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

The Secretary of State has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through January 31, 1981.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 27, 1980, printed in the May BULLETIN on page 16, was by Secretary Vance, not Secretary Muskie. We regret if the introductory paragraph may have caused any confusion to our readers.

SPECIAL (See Center Section)

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of May 20

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foreign policies. And I intend to consult very closely with the Congress on the shape and direction of our foreign policies.

Third, the Secretary of State must make sure that the State Department and the Foreign Service, as a whole, are fully engaged in the processes by which policy is made and in discussions of foreign policy with the Congress and our public. Neither the Secretary nor the Department can succeed if they do not have confidence in each other, and work together.

I intend to make full use of the Department and our Ambassadors in a fourth role: the conduct of our diplomacy abroad. There are times when only a Secretary of State can manage a negotiation for our nation. But to the extent possible, I will limit my own travel and rely on our skilled diplomats.

A Secretary of State has other roles, as well: in administration of the State Department, in helping manage and coordinate the overseas activities of U.S. Government agencies, and in managing the flow of information from the State Department to the White House and other agencies. Each must be carried out efficiently. Each should require less of the Secretary's time than the first roles I discussed.

This is my concept of the job. The President has said that he supports me in it. I will need your support, and counsel, as well.

Concluding Thoughts

Let me conclude with these thoughts. I come to this new assignment after 22 years as a member of the U.S. Senate. I have participated with many of you in the foreign policy debates of the past decade—indeed, the past generation.

Through these trials our society has been moved to strengthen and vigorously exercise our machinery for dissent and disagreement. That is all to the good. We are better for it.

But our challenges call on us to focus as intently upon another part of our national character—our ability to pull together and respond as Americans when our interests are under attack.

I do not believe there can be unanimity on the great and complex questions before us. But there can be a spirit of cooperation as we address them. I appear before you today in that spirit.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Secretary Vance Resigns; Senator Muskie Nominated

**SECRETARY VANCE'S
LETTER OF RESIGNATION,
APR. 21, 1980¹**

Monday, April 21

Dear Mr. President:

I have the greatest respect and admiration for you and it is with a heavy heart that I submit my resignation. It has been a privilege and a high honor to serve you and our nation. I look with pride and satisfaction at the many actions and new directions which have marked our foreign policy under your leadership. The Panama Canal Treaty, the Camp David Accords, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, the strengthening of our military forces and our alliances, the negotiation of the SALT II Agreement, the Zimbabwe settlement, and the new thrust and direction given to our relations with the nations of the Third World are several of these major steps.

I know how deeply you have pondered your decision on Iran. I wish I could support you in it. But for the reasons we have discussed I cannot.

You would not be well served in the coming weeks and months by a Secretary of State who could not offer you the public backing you need on an issue and decision of such extraordinary importance—no matter how firm I remain in my support on other issues, as I do, or how loyal I am to you as our leader. Such a situation would be untenable and our relationship, which I value so highly, would constantly suffer.

I shall always be grateful to you for having had the opportunity to serve. I shall always have for you the deepest respect and affection, and you know you can count on my support for your continued leadership of our nation.

Respectfully yours,

CY

**PRESIDENT CARTER'S
LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE,
APR. 28, 1980¹**

April 28, 1980

To Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
I accept your resignation with regret, but with deep appreciation for your dedicated and effective service to me and to our country.

As mentioned in your letter, we have had notable accomplishments under your leadership as Secretary of State. I share your pride in what has been achieved.

Because you could not support my decision regarding the rescue operation in Iran, you have made the correct decision to

resign. I know this is a matter of principle with you, and I respect the reasons you have expressed to me.

You leave your post with the admiration and best wishes of a grateful nation. Our close friendship and partnership during challenging times have been a source of strength and reassurance to me.

I look forward to your continuing advice and counsel on matters of importance to the United States—our country, which you have served so well.

Your friend,

JIMMY CARTER

**SECRETARY VANCE,
APR. 28, 1980²**

I believe that all of you have received copies of my letter to the President and the President's letter to me.

I have the greatest admiration for the President, and I am most grateful for the opportunity which he has given me to serve him and our nation.

As I leave office, I'm proud to have been able to participate in the important foreign policy actions and new directions which have been taken under President Carter's leadership. They are important, not only for the present but for the future of our nation as well.

As you know, I could not support the difficult decision taken by the President on the rescue operation in Iran. I, therefore, submitted my resignation to the President last week. I have told the President that I continue to support fully his policies on other foreign policy issues. I have assured him that he can count on my support his continued leadership of our nation. He will always have my deepest respect and affection.

Thank you all whom I have gotten to know well over these last 3½ years. That has also been a pleasure for me.

Q. What is it about the rescue mission that you could not support?

A. I do not want to go into detail. I think my position is very clear on that, and that's all I want to say. Thank you very much.

Q. Is anybody else leaving with you?

A. No. I hope that everyone in the Department will stay and support the Acting Secretary and the President, and I'm going to tell him that.

Q. Are you going back to Wall Street?

A. I haven't made up my mind what I'm going to do. That might well be the case.

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, APR. 29, 1980¹

I'm extremely pleased to announce to the nation that Senator Ed Muskie has accepted my offer to become our next Secretary of State. Senator Muskie brings to the senior position in a President's Cabinet years of experience in foreign policy, a very deep and profound knowledge of our country, the esteem and respect of his fellow Senators, sound judgment, and integrity which will be a great asset in this challenging position.

His extensive knowledge of foreign affairs will be a very valuable asset as he joins Warren Christopher, who will be the Deputy Secretary of State, and their partnership will be of great benefit to our entire nation. This will provide continuity for our foreign policy and give us the strength and wisdom which is necessary in this important post.

I'm very grateful this afternoon that Secretary Vance has joined us. He

President Carter announces his intention to nominate Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine to be Secretary of State on April 29, 1980; from left to right are National Security Adviser Brzezinski, Mrs. Muskie, Senator Muskie, Vice President Mondale, and President Carter. (White House photo by Karl Schumacher)



has served with distinction and with honor. The constructive accomplishments of his administration as Secretary of State have brought credit not only to him but to our nation as well.

Our country has always benefited in times of trouble when strong men and women have come forward to serve. I'm very glad that the strength and vision of Senator Ed Muskie will now be applied to the tasks that face us all—the challenge of defending our nation's honor, of promoting our national interest, of providing leadership throughout the world and maintaining our country at peace.

It's a distinct pleasure and honor for me to introduce to this group and to our nation Senator Ed Muskie who will be our next Secretary of State. Ed, congratulations to you.

SECRETARY-DESIGNATE MUSKIE'S QUESTION-AND- ANSWER SESSION, APR. 29, 1980²

Thank you very much, Mr. President, for that generous expression of confidence. You notice I didn't say thank you for the appointment. I'll reserve that judgment until later. But, in any case, it is a pleasure to have this—and

a privilege—opportunity of service in a new field in the months ahead.

I've got to say at the outset that I leave the Senate with very genuine regret. It has been my home and my life for more than 20 years. I hope that I've contributed something to making it a better institution.

May I say secondly that to follow in the footsteps of a close friend and a man for whom I have the most profound respect is a silver moment. Cy Vance has been a dedicated and effective world leader. He has left a legacy of good will and concern for the welfare of all people. He has dedicated himself to the endless search for peace.

The world is in turmoil. The issues are complex. But I believe that in this instability the United States must be perceived as stable and as a source of strength in the free world.

As Secretary of State, I will devote my full energies to achieve these goals. I respond to this challenge with genuine hope. America remains a land of great opportunity.

If these are dangerous times, they are also times of uncommon opportunities. I harbor no doubt that the great majority of Americans share that view and will sacrifice to that end, and I cannot stand in the wings when so much is at risk and so many have raised questions about the country's sense of purpose.

And so let me end as I began: First to thank the people of Maine for their unstinting support for many years and to recognize a great contribution already made by Secretary Vance and my thanks to the President for an awesome but a stimulating challenge as I face the months ahead. Thank you, Mr. President.

Q. Will you take questions here? When did the President ask you to be his Secretary of State?

A. He asked me in Nashville, Sunday evening, at a time when I was not aware of Secretary Vance's resignation and so when the President got through to me I thought probably all he was interested in was arranging for a fishing trip in Maine. [Laughter]

Q. Did you have any doubts when he asked you? Did you do any soul searching?

A. I don't think I really had doubts, that I would have no choice eventually. It did occur to me, as is often the case, all of the questions that I had to deal with and resolve before I could say yes, if that was my final determination. My first question was one

that I really was not in a position to answer, and that is whether I was the person to fill what I thought was a great responsibility at a time when the country needed it filled by an outstanding individual.

I had real doubts that I was that person. I can think of others who've had more actual foreign policy experience. I can think of others who have more foreign policy contacts around the world and the world with which he must deal. I'm not a foreign policy technician. I'm simply a Senator of 22 years who's had the exposure to foreign policy that a Senator with that length of service would have. So I did have those doubts.

Q. Do you have any doubts about the President's policy, for instance the raid and the attempt to rescue the hostages? Do you think that was a correct decision which Mr. Carter made?

A. I don't think it's appropriate at this point for me to undertake a review of the past. More than that, in response to any other questions that may be on the tips of your tongues, I don't think it appropriate for me to speak as the foreign policy spokesman of the State Department until I am confirmed. You will all understand that, although I have had the kind of exposure to foreign policy that a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will have, that before I can really speak as the spokesman I will have to undergo a process of long briefings with respect to the incident which your question raises and others.

Q. Will you be the number-one foreign policy adviser? There seems to have been some conflict in the past, some confusion as to who really speaks for the Administration as between former Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs].

A. The President has left no doubt in my mind on that score.

Q. What was the answer?
[Laughter]

A. No doubt that I'll be the foreign policy spokesman.

Q. May I ask you a question as a Senator, then? Have you endorsed President Carter for reelection and, if not, why not?

A. I did not accept this job for political reasons and will not associate it with political reasons. I have not endorsed a candidate in this campaign.

Q. Were you and the President together in Nashville or did he call you up there?

A. He was not with me in Nashville. [Laughter] I think he might have enjoyed it, but, no, he was not. I was there alone, and he called me there.

Q. What do you hope to accomplish when you go back to Maine tomorrow?

A. I simply wanted to go back to Maine and to say to my people on my own turf how grateful I am for the opportunities for service they've given me and to express my appreciation for that and to tell them personally my reasons for accepting this new responsibility.

Q. Have you decided when you will resign from the Senate, and have you a preference or have you had discussions regarding a successor, somebody to fill the remaining 2½ years of your term?

A. I would assume that I will resign from the Senate when I am confirmed in this job, and I don't know how long that process will take. It may take the rest of this session, I don't know. [Laughter]

About the second question you raised, I have discussed the matter of my succession with the governor today in Maine, and he is giving it his consideration.

Q. Is that his choice or yours?

A. It's his choice.

Q. Are you confident this Iranian hostage situation can be settled without an actual situation such as war—

A. If I were not confident that that route should be pursued with whatever prospects for success, ingenuity, persuasion, diplomacy, and all of the peaceful means that may be available to us could achieve, I wouldn't be taking this job.

Q. In other words, you're not a hawk on this matter?

A. I don't automatically classify myself before considering any question of war and peace.

Q. Will you be prepared to recommend military action if all the peaceful means seem to have failed?

A. If I were to answer that "yes," I'd be immediately labeled as a hawk, so I won't answer that question yes or no. I'd consider the options and obviously my effort would be to deal with the peaceful options available to us.

Q. How do you feel about Mr. Vance's resignation? Do you think it did the right thing in light of his feeling about military action, or do you think he should have waited?

A. I think any man who holds public office who feels he cannot do so without violating his principles does a courageous thing when he resigns the office. I was asked questions like that when I ran for Vice President, and that was my answer then, and it is my answer now. I could never be critical of a man who does anything as a matter of principle, and I think that's what Secretary Vance has done.

Q. On the other side of your career question—your choice today—after 22 years in the Senate why, at this point, to leave it?

A. I was never elected for life. I was elected for 6 years at a time, and I'm approaching the time when I would have to consider running again, but frankly, you know, I've never been a stagnant kind of individual. I've been the Senate 22 years. I'm still stimulated by the challenges that it offers, but here's a whole new arena in which to deal, whole new set of challenges, whole new kind of authority, a chance for growth. I mean, how could I say no. Especially when the President of the United States says it's important that say yes?

Q. You've left a little ambivalence here, if I may—

A. If I have, then I've had a successful press conference. [Laughter]

Q. Did you take this job on because you really believe in President Carter's foreign policy, or whether you think, as you put it, the times are so perilous that you could not stand by and let it fail, if it perhaps is failing?

A. I believe it's important at this time in our country's history that the best possible people undertake to shape our foreign policy for the future, as well as consider whatever mistakes may have been made in the past, you know, calls upon all of us to respond when we are told that we have something to offer. And it is in that spirit that I have accepted this assignment and am honored to do so and with that, thank you all very much.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 5, 1980.

²Press release 100.

³Text from White House press release. ■

U.S. Interests and Ideals

*Address before the World Affairs Council in Philadelphia on May 9, 1980.*¹

For the past 6 months, all our policies abroad have been conducted in the glare of two crises—the holding of American hostages in Iran and the brutal invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. In meeting these crises our tactics must change with changing circumstances. But our goals will not change and have not ever.

We will not rest until our fellow Americans held captive in Iran—against every tenet of law and decency—are safe at home free.

Along with other nations which have condemned Soviet aggression, we will continue to impose economic and political sanctions on the Soviet Union until it withdraws its armed forces and restores the independence of Afghanistan.

These two crises underline the reality that our world is indeed a dangerous place, but what I want to emphasize today is that amid the crises of the moment, no matter how profoundly significant they are, the fundamentals of American foreign policy are being carried forward with consistency, with strength, and with determination.

The central reality that confronts America today is that of a complex world, a world that is turbulent because it is politically awakened in its entire breadth for the first time in its collective history.

Our world is one of conflicting hopes, ideologies, and powers. It is a revolutionary world which requires confident, stable, and powerful American leadership—and that's what it is getting and that's what it will continue to get—to shift the kind of history away from the specter of fragmentation and toward the promise of genuinely global cooperation and peace.

Effective Foreign Policy

We must strive in our foreign policy to commitment to high ideals with a sober calculation of our own national interests. Unchanging American ideals are relevant to this troubling area of foreign policy and to this troubled era in which we live. Our society has always stood for political freedom. We have always fought for social justice and we have always recognized the necessity for

pluralism. Those values of ours have a real meaning, not just in the past 200 years ago or 20 years ago, but now, in a world that is no longer dominated by colonial empires, and it demands a more equitable distribution of political and economic power.

But in this age of revolutionary change, the opportunities for violence and for conflict have also grown. American power must be strong enough to deal with that danger and to promote our ideals and to defend our national interests.

That's why the foreign policy which we've shaped over the last 3 years must be based simultaneously on the primacy of certain basic moral principles—principles founded on the enhancement of human rights—and on the preservation of an American military strength that is second to none. This fusion of principle and power is the only way to insure global stability and peace while we accommodate to the inevitable and necessary reality of global change and progress.

The complexity of interrelated and sometimes disturbing events and circumstances requires that we in America increase the degree of public understanding of our foreign policy and public support for it. It is extremely complicated. It is rapidly changing in its tactical confrontations on a day-by-day basis, and the degree in a democracy with which Americans do understand these complex issues is a prerequisite for success. Foreign policy no longer has a single or simple focus, such as defeating Nazi aggression or repelling of a monolithic Stalinist threat.

Instead, Americans must be mature enough to recognize that we need to be strong and we need to be accommodating at the same time. We need to protect our own interests vigorously while finding honorable ways to accommodate those new claimants to economic and political power which they have not had in the past.

There are two obvious preconditions for an effective American foreign policy: a strong national economy and a strong national defense. That's why I placed the highest priority on the development of a national energy policy which our country has never had. That's why we must win the struggle against inflation, and I've been very pleased lately at the trend in

interest rates and the good news we had this morning on the producer price index. The Congress and I are moving resolutely toward this goal. In fact, every single American is involved. This common effort to deal with the worldwide economic challenge does require some sacrifice, and I am determined that the sacrifice will be fairly shared.

The response of our democracy to economic challenges will determine whether we will be able to manage the challenge of other global responsibilities in the 1980s and beyond. If we cannot meet these international economic problems successfully, then our ability to meet military and political and diplomatic challenges will be doubtful indeed. Although it will not be easy, the innate advantages of our nation's natural bounty which God has given us and the common commitment of a free people who comprise American society give us the assurance of success.

We must also be militarily strong. The fact is that for 15 years the Soviet Union has been expanding its military capabilities far out of proportion to its needs for defense—a 4% or 5% real growth above the inflation rate compounded annually for 15 years has caused us some concern. For much of this same period, our spending for defense had been going down. If these adverse trends had continued, we would have found ourselves facing a severe military imbalance, an imbalance all the more threatening because of mounting global turbulence. That's why I have launched a broad modernization of our strategic and conventional forces and worked to strengthen our alliances. We and our allies have pledged ourselves to sustained real annual increases in our defense spending.

Our task is to build together a truly cooperative global community, to compose a kind of global mosaic which embraces the wealth and diversity of the Earth's people, cultures, and religions. This will not be an easy task. The philosophical basis of such a community must be respect for human rights as well as respect for the independence of nations.

In promoting that prospect for a future of peace, we will stay on the steady course to which we have been committed now for the last 3½ years. We pursue five major objectives:

The President

- First, to enhance not only economic but also political solidarity among the industrialized democracies;
- Second, to establish a genuinely cooperative relationship with the nations of the Third World;
- Third, to persevere in our efforts for peace in the Middle East and other troubled areas of the world;
- Fourth, to defend our strategic interests, especially those which are not threatened in Southwest Asia; and
- Fifth, to advance arms control, especially through agreed strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union, and to maintain along with this a firm and a balanced relationship with the Soviets.

Allied Solidarity

Our first objective, solidarity with our allies, is the touchstone of our foreign policy. Without such solidarity, the world economy and international politics may well degenerate into disorder. This is why we have led the North Atlantic alliance in its program to upgrade its conventional forces. And last winter, in an historic decision, NATO agreed to strengthen its nuclear missiles in Europe in order to respond to a very disturbing Soviet missile buildup there.

Next month the seven leading industrial democracies will hold a summit meeting in Venice. I look forward to being there with the other six leaders of our most important allies. It's our collective intention not only to make the summit another milestone for global economic cooperation but also to advance our political and our strategic solidarity.

Cooperation With the Third World

Second, we will persevere in our efforts to widen the scope of our cooperation with the newly awakened nations of the Third World. By the end of this century, 85% of the world's population will be living in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. In the last several years—through the Panama Canal treaties, through our commitment to majority rule in Africa, and through normalization of relationships with China—we have vastly improved the relationship of the United States with these regions. We can be proud of our accomplishments in building strong new bridges to the developing world.

The United States respects the desire of the developing nations for genuine nonalignment, and we respect the nonaligned movement as the expression of that desire. Nations which value their

own independence are already resisting efforts to subvert the nonaligned movement and make it a tool of Soviet foreign policy. Last year's meeting in Havana was a notable example of Soviet failure, through their puppet Castro regime, to convince the other nonaligned countries to be subservient to the Soviets. The United States is eager to work with countries, which pride themselves on their independence, for the resolution of conflicts and for the promotion of greater global social justice.

Regional Peace

Third, we'll continue to work for peace in the Middle East. Such peace is essential to all parties concerned. Israel deserves peace and Israel needs peace for its long-term survival. The Arab nations require peace in order to satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and to insure that their own social development can move forward without disruption and without foreign intrusion. The West, including the United States, must have peace in the Middle East or run grave risks that the radicalization of that area will draw outsiders into its explosive conflicts.

The Camp David process has already led to the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state. Of course, Egypt is the largest and the most important and the strongest Arab state. We are determined to reach a comprehensive settlement. And we will not be diverted from that goal.

Sol Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations], our negotiator, is just now returning from the Middle East, and I will be meeting with him this weekend to get a full report from him on progress made and to determine the steps that our country will take in the coming weeks to bring a successful conclusion to this very difficult effort.

As we continue our efforts in the Middle East, I take pride, as well, in the contributions that we have also made in other areas, such as the Panama Canal treaties already mentioned and the achievement of peace and majority rule in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. These are major accomplishments not only of benefit to the people directly involved but to our national interest as well. And it may very well be that in retrospect in years ahead, looking back on this Administration and this time, that those particular efforts, making new friends among literally billions of people, as in China and Af-

rica, this will be recognized as the most important achievement of our time.

Defense of Strategic Interests

And fourth, and very important, the West must defend its strategic interests wherever they are threatened. Since 1945 the United States has been committed to the defense of our hemisphere and of Western Europe, and then later of the Far East, notably Japan and Korea. These commitments for common defense are very valuable to the people involved in those other areas, and, of course, they are extremely valuable to us as well.

In recent years it has become increasingly evident that the well-being of those vital regions and our own country depend on the peace, stability, and independence of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area. Yet both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the pervasive and progressive political disintegration of Iran put the security of that region in grave jeopardy.

I want to reemphasize what I said in my State of the Union address on January 23:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Peace is what we want. Peace is what we have maintained. Peace is a prerequisite for progress. Peace is a policy of our country. The maintenance of peace must be predicated on adequate American strength and a recognition of that strength not only by our own people and our allies but by our potential adversaries as well. We have been provoked in the last few months. Every action has been designed to take advantage not of our military force, which is formidable and unequalled, but on the benefits of the use of our alliances and on economic, political and diplomatic efforts.

The steps that we are taking on our own, and with the cooperation of others, involve complicated measures, considerable expense, and a careful balance between the collective security needs of the region involved and its political realities. These political realities, again, are difficult to understand, extremely complex, and in every instance rapidly changing. We are making good progress. We must and we will—make more progress.

The necessity of common action in the Southwest Asian region is dictated not by any belligerence on the part of

ce-loving nations but by the clear strategic threat that stems from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A failure to respond convincingly to that contemptuous act of aggression would only invite repetition.

Beyond the violence done to Afghanistan's independence and its people, Red Army troops consolidating their hold there are also taking positions from which Soviet imperialism could be expelled more deeply and more dangerously in the politics of this vital area. Afghanistan had long been a buffer against outsiders seeking to dominate that region. Any quick examination of a map will convince you of the truth of that statement. That is the historic role to which Afghanistan must be restored. Soviet aggression in their invasion of Afghanistan, at the high cost in blood and the high cost in respectability which Moscow now paying, could turn Afghanistan into a roadblock against aggression into launching pad for future incursions.

This would threaten Pakistan and not just those nations alone. Soviet aggression in Afghanistan—unless checked—confronts all the world with the most serious long-term strategic challenge since the cold war began. To underestimate the magnitude of that challenge would constitute an historic error—an error with probably historic consequences.

America's position is clear. It is consistent, as well, with the interests and the commitment of our allies, whose being—along with our own—is intimately tied to the security and the independence of this strategically vital region. We must therefore work together in meeting the challenge which we face in common.

Our goal is the withdrawal of Soviet occupying troops, the neutrality or realignment of Afghanistan as a nation, and the encouragement of the formation of a government acceptable to the Afghan people. Those goals and commitments are clear. They are simple. They are extremely important and they are shared with almost every other people on earth.

Within this region itself the nations must also realize that our desires match theirs—to cooperate in the preservation of the region's independence, stability, and peace.

Arms Control

In this Administration has been and remains committed to arms control, especially to strategic arms limitations, and to

maintain a firm and balanced relationship with the Soviet Union. Our resolve to pursue this goal remains as strong as ever.

Early this morning I had breakfast with the new Secretary of State, Ed Muskie, and with my other close foreign affairs and defense advisers. We expect later on this coming week that Ed Muskie will meet with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. They will be discussing these issues, again, in a clear, consistent, forceful, proper, balanced way. One statement that we will make very clearly is that arms control and strategic arms limitation are of crucial importance to the United States, to the people of the Soviet Union, and to all other people on Earth.

The SALT II agreement is a major accomplishment of my Administration. It contributes directly to the security of the United States, and we intend to abide by the treaty's terms as long as the Soviet Union, as observed by us, complies with those terms as well. Of course, we will seek its ratification at the earliest opportunity time.

The time is also fast approaching when we must think beyond SALT II—to negotiating wider and more comprehensive arrangements dealing both with additional categories of strategic nuclear weapons and with weapons of less than intercontinental capability. If the decade of the 1980s is not to become the decade of violence, we must make renewed efforts to stabilize the arms competition and to widen the scope of arms control arrangements.

After close consultation with our allies and with the Soviet Union we intend to pursue these expanded efforts to control weapons of all kinds.

Detente with the Soviets remains our goal, but detente must be built on a firm foundation of deterrence. The Soviets must understand that they cannot recklessly threaten world peace. They cannot commit aggression, and in doing that they must realize that they cannot still enjoy the benefits of cooperation with the West, and specifically with us. They must understand that their invasion of Afghanistan has had a profound adverse effect on American public attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

We represent a strong but peaceful nation and there can be no business as usual in the face of aggression. The Soviets will not succeed in their constant efforts to divide the alliance in Europe or to lull us into a false belief that somehow Europe can be an island of detente while aggression is carried out elsewhere. But let me be equally clear that the way to

improve relations is open if the Soviets alter their conduct. That is the path we prefer.

Together these five objectives that I have outlined are the compass points that guide America's course in this world of change and challenge. They link our specific actions to each other, to the past, and to the future.

Our foreign policy is designed to be responsive to the revolutionary age in which we live. To be effective, it must have the wise understanding and the wide support of the American people. That depends on public realization that foreign policy is not a matter of instant success. We must expect prolonged management of seemingly intractable situations and often contradictory realities. To play our historic role of protecting our interests and at the same time preserving the peace, the United States must be steady and constant. Our commitment to American ideals must be unchanging and our power must be adequate and credible.

Humanitarian Concerns

While we seek to attain our broad ultimate objectives, we must never lose sight of immediate human suffering. We have not forgotten and we will not forget the 53 Americans imprisoned in Iran.

Our nation places a great value on human life and on human freedom. We will continue to make every effort, using peaceful means if possible and through collective action with our allies, to obtain the release of our countrymen. And we will remind the Iranian leaders that the integrity and the independence of their own country can only suffer from this policy of theirs that led to international isolation and also internal disintegration. We have no permanent quarrel with the Iranian people. We wish to fashion a relationship of dignity with them, once this illegal action has been put behind us.

Our nation has continued to act responsibly and in good faith toward both the people and the leaders of Iran. Our rescue attempt was a mission of mercy—not a military attack. No Iranian was killed or harmed in any way. Its only aim was to rescue innocent victims of terrorist exploitation. I regret only that it did not succeed, and that eight gallant young men died in the accident as the rescue team was leaving its desert rendezvous.

This morning I participated in a memorial service for those eight young men. And before the service I met individually with every family involved. As I

approached them I had some trepidation, but in every instance they reached their arms out for me and we embraced each other, and I could feel that their concern was about me, not about them. And they made the comment to me, "God bless you, Mr. President. We'll pray for you, Mr. President. And we are proud of our son or our husband who was willing to give his life for our country and for freedom."

Our commitment to a world that represents human rights has been heard by all people, by free people and also by those who do not know the meaning of freedom. The eagerness of large numbers of Cubans, for instance, to flee their own country is eloquent testimony to the failure of the totalitarian Castro regime.

We must insure that the Cubans who arrive in the United States and the Haitians who arrive in the United States will be treated with all the humanity and the compassion which we've extended to other groups and which we extend to each other. Every family probably in this room, which came to our country, came here as immigrants, sometimes as refugees. And we should not be callous to those who come in our present day and age under the same or even more difficult circumstances. In order to bring an end to the suffering and the death on the high seas and to permit us to best allocate scarce Federal resources, the process of bringing in these refugees must be orderly, and it must be in accordance with our laws.

We're working vigorously yesterday and today with 16 nations and with international organizations, at a conference on refugees in Costa Rica, to develop alternatives that will permit a safe and orderly evacuation of the Cubans who are seeking to leave. For ourselves, we will give highest priority to family reunifications, and we prefer, of course, pre-screening in Cuba or in a third country, such as Costa Rica. Let me emphasize again that we treat those seeking asylum and those who are refugees from Cuba, from Haiti, and from other countries, equally on a case-by-case basis as is required by American law.

And finally I'd like to say to you that America's foreign policy must always reflect the kind of people we are. We are a strong people, we are a caring people. We care about human rights, we care about decent living standards, we care about the independence of nations, and we care about the rights of individual human beings. We have a sober, responsible recognition that American power is especially important in a turbulent world where

others depend upon us for their safety and for their freedom. Our interests and our ideals serve each other. Our power must be used in the service of both interests and ideals.

The course I have mapped to you today in this brief outline form is neither simple nor easy, but it's a sound course, the safe course which we must pursue. Our foreign policy deserves your understanding and your support, not only for our nation's own security but in order that people everywhere can be certain of America's commitment to use its vast power with a clear, firm, steady purpose: to seek for all humankind what we have—a future of progress, of freedom, and of peace.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 19, 1980, which also contains the transcript of the question-and-answer session held following the address. ■

News Conference of April 29 (Excerpts)

Before answering questions this evening, I would like to say a few words about the rescue mission in Iran. I share the disappointment of the American people that this rescue mission was not successful, and I also share the grief of our nation because we had Americans who were casualties in this effort to seek freedom for their fellow citizens who have been held hostage for so long.

But I also share a deep pride in the commitment and courage and the integrity and the competence and the determination of those who went on this mission. They were prepared to do their duty, and they did their duty. I can think of no higher compliment for a Commander in Chief to pay to brave men.

It was my responsibility as President to launch this mission. It was my responsibility to terminate the mission when it ended. This was a decision that was shared completely by the field commander in charge of the rescue team and by the officer in charge of the overall force that was involved in the rescue effort.

There is a deeper failure than that of incomplete success, and that is the failure to attempt a worthy effort, a failure to try. This is a sentiment shared by the men who went on the mission. Sunday I

met with a large group of men who were the core of this effort, and yesterday I visited in the San Antonio area the five men who were most seriously wounded.

They all shared a common message to me and to the American people. The first message was one of regret—deep regret—that they failed to carry out the mission as planned. The second one was an expression of thanks to me for giving them the honor to attempt to deliver to freedom the American hostages. And the third was a request expressed almost unanimously by them to be permitted to try again.

Our nation does face serious challenges, serious problems. And the meaning of those challenges and the solution those problems require sacrifice. Some times we, who are safe, consider the sacrifices to be onerous, but I forgot those sacrifices when I looked into the face of these men who are not only willing but eager to give their lives as a sacrifice for others whom they did not know personally, but in a determination to grant freedom to them.

Our goal in Iran is not to conquer; neither was theirs. Their goal was not to destroy nor to injure anyone. As they left Iran, following an unpredictable accident during the withdrawal stage with eight of their fellow warriors dead, the carefully released, without harm, 44 Iranians who had passed by the site and who were detained to protect the integrity of the mission. This is in sharp comparison to the ghastly action of the terrorists and some of the government officials in Iran in our Embassy this weekend who displayed, in a horrible inhibition of inhumanity, the bodies of our courageous Americans. This has aroused the disgust and contempt of the rest of the world and indicates quite clearly the kinds of people with whom we have been dealing in a peaceful effort to secure a resolution of this crisis. They did not bring shame and dishonor on those fallen Americans. They brought shame and dishonor on themselves.

We will continue to try for a peaceful solution. As we see the consequences of the actions that we've already taken economic and diplomatic actions continue to punish Iran, a nation that is suffering from economic deprivation and from political fragmentation because they persist in this inhuman act.

We will not forget our hostages and we will continue to take whatever steps are necessary and feasible to secure their safe release and their return to their homes and to freedom.

Q. Would you consider an early summit meeting with your principal allies who seem to seek some reassurance about the basic thrust of your foreign policy, and I'm talking about a meeting prior to the Venice summit in June?

A. No. I see no need for this. There is no doubt among our allies about our basic foreign policy, nor have they indicated any such doubt to me. I'm sure of that. When we do meet in Venice in June the primary purpose of this annual meeting is to discuss economic matters—energy, inflation, unemployment, the development of our common resources, and a better life for our people. But we have no adequate time for political discussions and for discussions about diplomatic matters, and I see no urgency nor need to meet prior to that time.

Q. After so many months of restraint, why did you undertake a mission that involved—endangered so many lives, a mission that you said was not feasible all along? And, with all due respect, has national pride taken precedence over the safety of the hostages, that is the need to end this problem?

A. No. I think the time that we chose was a proper time. We devoted those months of our hostages' incarceration to repeated and varied diplomatic efforts directly and through intermediaries, through the United Nations, through our friends, and others. We were promised repeatedly by Iranian officials, the president and prime ministers, the foreign minister, by a unanimous vote of the Revolutionary Council, even by the terrorists themselves that the hostages would indeed be released by the terrorists and turned over to control of the government at which time further steps would be taken to secure their complete release and their return home.

Beginning back in November, when the hostages were first taken, we began preparations for a rescue mission which would have had to be undertaken had the hostages been injured in any way. At the time we began final plans for this particular rescue mission, we had concluded related exercises and training of both men and equipment and technique and procedure and had honed it down to a fine operation which everyone believed had a good chance for success.

Had we waited later it would have been much more difficult to conclude the mission successfully because of the increasingly short nights and because of the prevailing winds being likely to change, making strong headwinds

against our planes and helicopters, and because the temperature of the air made it more difficult to lift large loads required in this long and very complicated process.

So we exhausted every peaceful procedure, we waited until the proper moment. We could not logically have waited much longer, and I think the decision was made properly.

Q. This is from the side that says you went too far: What were the odds on the success of the mission? And then the second question, that you didn't go far enough: Why didn't you press ahead with only five helicopters, overrule the guy on the ground?

A. I think the mission had to be planned with an optimum number of both men and with the equipment they required in order to insure secrecy, incision, staying on a very rigid schedule, accommodating unforeseen circumstances. And at the time the mission was terminated, we did it with great regret. There had been a prior understanding among all of us involved in the detailed planning that if we got below six functioning helicopters the mission to actually go in for the rescue attempt would have been very doubtful of success and ill-conceived.

The recommendation came back from the refueling operation in the desert area that since they were down to only five helicopters that the mission should not be undertaken, the actual rescue attempt. The commanding officer of the entire operation agreed, made this recommendation to me, and I agreed myself. The people who were on the ground in charge of the rescue team were extremely eager, courageous, dedicated, and determined to succeed. When they recommended that it not be done, that was a major factor in my decision, but I made the final decision.

Q. You said a great nation like the United States can be forgiving of its enemies without losing face or bringing insult on itself.

A. Yes.

Q. In view of the painful bloodshed and loss of life suffered by so many Iranian people under the Pahlavi rule, by the 53 hostages and their families, and now by the families of the American soldiers killed in the rescue attempt, isn't there some honorable way that the mutual sorrow of the Iranian people and now the American people can resolve this crisis without further confrontation? Can you now, will you

now, make a gesture to the people of Iran so that the bloodshed and suffering can be put behind after 27 years?

A. It's important for American people and for all the world to realize the tremendous restraint that we have demonstrated. We have tried every possible and feasible effort to resolve this crisis by humanitarian and peaceful means. We are still continuing those efforts.

The fact is, though, that a horrible crime, as measured by international law, by diplomatic custom, and against humanity itself, is being perpetrated at this very minute. The 53 hostages being held are not guilty of any crime. The crime is being committed by terrorists who are kidnapping innocent victims, sponsored by and approved by government officials themselves. In two votes in the Security Council of the United Nations, unanimous votes, Iran was condemned for this action. And in the International Court of Justice, that decision was confirmed.

We have nothing against the Iranian people, and we still want to see this issue resolved successfully and peacefully, but there is no guilt that I feel on behalf of our nation for what occurs in Iran. We were very careful on this particular operation to cause no harm or injury or death to any Iranians.

It is a very troubling thing for me that Americans, because of an accident, did lose their lives and were injured. They were not met by any Iranian forces. No Iranian officials discovered the presence of the American rescue team until several hours after the last one had left Iranian soil.

So we want this issue to be settled, but we cannot deal with inhumane people who have no respect for international law, who violate the tenets of their own religion, and who persecute innocent people who are American citizens and deprive them of their freedom for 6 months. There is no equality about it at all.

We are eager to see this issue resolved, but Iran is the nation which is committing a crime. We have tried to settle this in accordance with international law and peacefully, and we will continue to do so.

Q. You have noted that Iranian leaders joined in the desecration of the bodies of American servicemen.

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Do you think that this will affect our negotiations to try to free the hostages, and what effect do you think it will have?

A. The man who supervised the desecration of the bodies was a member of the Revolutionary Council. I think it is accurate to say that other members of the Iranian Government did publicly condemn this abhorrent act and have now promised to deliver the American bodies to intermediaries to be delivered ultimately back to our country. We hope that this commitment will be kept, and I pray that it will.

But the fact that the terrorists participated in the desecration is an indication of the kind of people they are and a vivid indication of the difficulties that we have experienced in getting what seems to be required—a unanimous decision by terrorists, the top officials, the Revolutionary Council, and the Ayatollah Khomeini before this crime can be terminated.

Q. Why have you permitted the taking of the hostages in Iran to continue to monopolize your time and your attention when there are other international crises that are equally important to the security of this country and when your preoccupation with what has happened in Iran only seems to make the Iranian leaders more stubborn?

A. There is no way that I could possibly confine my activities or my attention to one single facet of American life or diplomacy to the exclusion of others. It has been a major preoccupation of mine and the American people that these hostages are held. But we've had to deal with simultaneous domestic and international problems concurrently.

We have, for instance, met, I think, as forcefully as is practicable and advisable the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, mounting economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, marshalling support of other nations for the boycott of the Olympics, letting the Soviets know that 104 members of the United Nations are condemning their action in the invasion of Afghanistan.

I've spent a great deal of time the last couple of weeks, for instance, continuing our negotiations for peace between Israel and Egypt and the establishment of autonomous government in the West Bank and Gaza area. I've worked on inflation problems in our nation and also on the problem of employment and the dealing with the diplomatic relationships of a routine nature with other countries.

So, we have an ongoing program in this government that is being well cared for. It's unfortunate that the hostage situation has been the human kind of con-

cern that has been dominant in our consciousness even when we were doing our duties in other matters.

Q. There seems to be a growing impression in this town that your national security adviser [Zbigniew Brzezinski] is gaining influence at the expense of your Secretary of State—even speculation that that may have been a factor in Mr. Vance's resignation. Would you care to comment on this?

A. That's an erroneous report. I think we have a very good and proper balance of advisers who comprise the National Security Council—who work with me on military and foreign affairs. I think that Secretary Vance expressed, as an honorable man, very meticulous in his language, his reason for resignation. I regretted his decision. Under the circumstances, I think it was the proper one, but never in the past and never in the future while I'm here will there be any unwarranted intervention in the carrying out of the foreign policy under the aegis of the State Department.

But I reserve the right to receive advice and counsel from my advisers. That's the best way I can make the proper decision once I have all the facts and all the advice that I seek.

Q. You've been widely applauded, judging by the polls, for having made this effort with regard to freeing the hostages. And it seems to me that if there are any lingering misgivings among the American people, it is among those who wonder whether the whole plan could have worked without serious danger to some of the hostages and perhaps to our international interests. Secretary Vance has been too meticulous, in your words, to have expressed objections, but he's supposed to have had objection to the whole operation. Within the limits of security, could you tell us enough about the further planned phases of this operation so that Americans will understand that it could have worked?

A. It would be inadvisable for me to describe the operation beyond the point that actually did occur. We had intended to place the rescue team in an isolated region within a proper distance of Tehran, and then if everything was satisfactory, if they were undetected, if there was no apparent change in the circumstances within the compound itself, if the weather conditions warranted and equipment was in a satisfactory condition, only then were we to undertake the actual rescue operation.

There's a general consensus, with which I think no one disagrees, that the actual rescue operation would have been the easiest of the three phases. The most difficult, the intrusion into Iran and the placement of those forces, and the second most difficult, the actual extraction of our hostages and men from Iran after the rescue itself, from the compound.

But the details of what would have been undertaken is something that I would prefer not to comment on since it did not occur.

Q. I'd like to follow up an earlier question. Were there aspects of the military plan that we are not familiar with that perhaps provided the basis for Secretary Vance's dissent, perhaps air strikes, and if not, could you tell us what your understanding is of just what his dissent was about?

A. I think it would be better to ask him about the specifics. I think I can say accurately that Secretary Vance preferred that we not take any kind of action inside Iran that might have had any connotation of a military nature. His preference was to wait longer instead of mount the rescue operation, but I made the decision based on the overwhelming recommendation and concurrence with other advisers. I have no doubt at all in my mind that it was the right decision.

Had the operation been successful or even had it been concluded without complete success, it would have ended a continuing crisis that is destabilizing for the people of Iran, that's causing them immense political and economic suffering at this very moment, and it would have made unnecessary the upcoming economic pressures on Iran which will be much more severe when our major allies impose those same kinds of economic sanctions on Iran the middle of next month. It would also have meant that we could have begun restoring Iran as an accepted nation in the world structure and remove the reasons for condemnation of them.

So in my opinion the operation had a very good chance of success. And it would have brought to a conclusion this unfortunate holding of our hostages and ended what is a very destabilizing political situation in that region of the world.

Q. Just to be specific, there was no other aspect of the plan with which we are not familiar that provided the basis of his dissent; it was just a broad and general dissent?

A. I believe that's accurate, but you might want to follow that up with Secretary Vance later, but I believe that to be a completely accurate statement.

Q. When you were planning the rescue attempt did you believe that all the hostages could have been removed from Iran safely or did you feel that some could have been killed in the process? And secondly, do you think that the United States would be better off to end the crisis now even if it means extreme danger to the hostages?

A. Obviously an operation of this kind would have had some risk, but we were convinced that the hostages could be removed successfully and safely.

Q. Does it seem to you that if you cannot resolve this crisis soon it may cost you your renomination or reelection? And does it seem to you that, as Larry Truman said and as you have said, the buck stops there, that that could be a fair judgment?

A. The political connotations of the holding of our hostages is not a factor for me. I've had to make decisions that on occasion might very well have been unpopular, and some that I have made may prove to be well advised in the judgment of the American people. But I've had to make those decisions under the most difficult circumstances, dealing with a nation's leaders who cannot speak for their own country and who constantly change their position and even constantly change their own identity. But I see no relationship to this effort that I am continuing with the prospects or lack of prospects of political benefit to me or approval in a political circumstance.

Q. As we look at the situation in Iran in terms of what they may understand and you might do, what have you led Iran's leaders to believe would happen if they harmed the hostages? Do you think such fear is saving the hostages? Or does now, and, if there is such fear, does that encourage you to refrain from further military action that could endanger them?

A. In November, I think it was November the 20th, we were constantly hearing from the terrorists who held our hostages that they would be immediately tried for war crimes and executed. We yelled out to the public and therefore to Iran the extreme adverse consequences to them if such action should be taken without being overly specific but letting them know that there would be serious

consequences for their nation and their people. We specifically spelled out one step in that process short of military action and that was the interruption of commerce to Iran.

Our nation is firm in its resolve. It's remarkably united. Our people have been surprisingly patient. But I don't think there's any doubt among the leadership in Iran, in the government, or among the terrorists themselves that it is to their advantage not to physically harm the hostages whom they hold. And I hope they will be convinced as time goes by—not much time, I pray—that the adverse consequences of the action that we have already taken, with diplomatic and political isolation and with economic sanctions, is fragmenting their own structure of government and dividing their own nation and preventing Iran from making the progress that was envisioned when they had the revolution itself.

It's a remarkable commentary on this fragmentation that in spite of the deep commitment of their new Constitution, the Ayatollah Khomeini, and their public officials, they have not even been able to hold an election in Iran after months of effort.

So I believe that being joined by our allies in similar kinds of economic sanctions might very well be a factor that would bring the Iranians to realize that it's much better for them to release the hostages unharmed and to resolve this crisis.

Q. Can you tonight assure the American people that there is no connection between the inability of the American military to retain highly skilled maintenance and technical personnel and the abnormally high failure rate of the helicopters on the rescue mission? And in a broader sense, does this high failure rate worry you if it came to a showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf?

A. There is no connection, because we focused the enormous resources of our nation and its elaborate military capability on this particular equipment that was used in this operation. Had there been some shortage of either technicians or spare parts or maintenance capability, it would not have been permitted in the particular case of the helicopters, the C-130s, or the equipment the men took in for the rescue operation. So there is no connection between those at all.

Q. Could you explain why you appointed Senator Edmund Muskie to succeed Cyrus Vance when Senator Muskie has limited foreign policy experience and holds only a secondary position on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate?

A. Senator Muskie has more than 20 years experience in the Senate. He's been heavily involved in foreign affairs there as a member, as you point out, of the Foreign Relations Committee. He's played an active role in nationwide campaigns throughout this country as a vice presidential candidate and also as a presidential candidate himself. He's familiar with our entire nation. I think he's highly sensitive about the aspirations and ideals of our country that ought to be mirrored in its foreign policy.

He's also had a remarkable position in the Senate as the chairman of the Budget Committee, where every single proposal made for the expenditure of Federal funds in the foreign affairs field or the military field or the domestic field has to come before his committee for careful analysis before it goes to the appropriations committees.

So, because of that broad range of experience and the esteem with which Ed Muskie is held in this country by Democrats and Republicans and, indeed, because of his international reputation, I consider him to be extremely well qualified to serve as Secretary of State.

Text from White House press release of April 29, 1980. ■

Interview With Foreign Correspondents

President Carter was interviewed in the Oval Office on April 12, 1980, by Fred Emery (British Broadcasting Corp.), Winifred Schartau (North German Television—ARD), Andre Celarie (French Television's Antenna 1), and Antonello Mareschachi (Italian RAI-TV).¹

Q. It's apparent there's great disappointment in this country over insufficient support of your policy in the Iran crisis. What is it exactly that you want your European allies to do?

A. I think the most important aspect of the Iranian and the Afghanistan problems is not the disappointment that we feel with our allies but the consistency and unanimity that we all share, in this country and in Europe, about the threat to peace that has been put forward, not only by the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan but by the terrorist attack on our Embassy and its officials in Iran. There has been a unanimous condemnation of these two acts as a threat to peace.

Our country has obviously moved forward much more aggressively in Iran, because our people are directly involved. We have tried for the last more than 5 months, through every peaceful means, through every diplomatic means, to bring about a resolution of this crisis, to protect the honor and integrity of our country, and to secure the safe release of our people back to freedom.

We've now found that because of many reasons, the Iranian Government—what there is of it—has not been able to deliver on their commitments to transfer the hostages to safe care and then to release them altogether.

We do need the full and aggressive support of our allies. What we ask specifically of them is that they carry out now two basic proposals. One is to honor the sanctions against Iran that were voted and supported by all of them in the U.N. Security Council earlier this year. The final action of the U.N. Security Council was stopped by a Soviet veto. And secondly, if this should prove to be unsuccessful, then to join us in strong diplomatic moves against Iran, to show them that we all do stand together in this condemnation of terrorism, a threat to our country, to

all of them, and particularly the smaller nations which don't have the economic or political or military power to protect their interests.

Q. With reference to what you just said, Mr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs], said that "if all the allies gave their solidarity, such solidarity could render unnecessary the application of other measures." But that means that if they don't give their full solidarity, you'll think of enforcing other measures. Which ones, and when?

A. Yes, we do, and we don't have much time left. The American people are ready and eager to see this matter resolved. Under international law we are a seriously aggrieved party, and we have a breadth of options available to us—economic, diplomatic, military options as well.

To the extent that the allies can join with us in making effective the diplomatic and economic pressures that might cause the Iranians to release the hostages, then we can forgo the requirement that we take additional, stronger action. We prefer to keep our action nonbelligerent in nature, but we reserve the right to take whatever action is necessary to secure the safe release of our hostages.

Q. You said you have not much time. Can you give us an idea of timing?

A. It's not a matter of many weeks or certainly not a matter of months. It's not appropriate for me now to set a specific date. But we have sent to the heads of nations—all of those represented by you—a specific date, at which time we would expect this common effort to be successful.

Q. Mr. Powell [Jody Powell, White House press secretary] said yesterday that the next moves won't be military. But if the militants take action against the hostages—physical action or a trial—what will be your action?

A. Our action would be very strong and forceful and might very well involve military means.

What Mr. Powell said is consistent with my policy that we do intend to

exhaust not only our own diplomatic and economic action—and there are other actions of an economic nature that we can take against Iran—but also to exhaust the common effect of concerted action on the part of our allies, which we have requested very clearly both privately and publicly. And following that, we will be required to take additional action which may very well involve military means.

But if our hostages are injured or if any of them are killed, then we would not delay in taking much stronger action of an incisive nature.

Q. Yesterday the European Foreign Ministers have been received by President Bani-Sadr [of Iran], and they hinted the possibility of a sanction. Is that step enough for you?

A. I think I've answered that question already by saying that economic sanctions, as supported by all of your nations in the U.N. Security Council, would be one of the steps, and we would expect additional diplomatic steps to be taken unless an immediate favorable response is received from the Iranians.

I have talked to the leaders of the countries represented here—some within the last 2 or 3 days, some within the last 2 or 3 weeks—and have made it plain to them that the experience that we have suffered with the Iranians is constant misleading statements, constant delay, constant failure to carry out commitments made, either because of a deliberate attempt to mislead or because of timidity and a failure to have authority enough to carry out a commitment even if it was made in good conscience.

But I think that we have now an opportunity, if strong and concerted action is taken by our allies in Europe and our friends and supported by additional economic measures that we are now contemplating, to avoid the military action or other stronger belligerent action that would be always an open option for us.

Q. In pursuing what you've said is an aggressive or a more aggressive policy toward Iran, and if we also were to join in with you in that, aren't you not only failing to get the hostages back but also driving Iran and its oil into the arms of the Russians?

A. I don't think anyone could find fault with me because I have not been adequately patient. We have seen 53 innocent Americans held by terrorists,

...st of all, and then later supported by ...d condoned by the official Govern- ...ent of Iran in complete contravention ... every standard of human decency ... and morality and in contravention of ...diomatic procedures and international ...w. This has been a situation con- ...cerned on two occasions by the entire ...embership of the U.N. Security ...ouncil; the International Court of Jus- ...tice has confirmed this opinion.

And we have been extremely pa- ...tient. Our patience is running out. And ...it have been criticized in my own ...untry for any aspect of my behavior, ...it has been because we have been too pa- ...tient, not too precipitous.

Q. Yes. I wasn't really question- ...ing that you've been too patient. I was ...suggesting, now that you've switched ...from the patience to a course that is ...pushing up against Iran, that you ...might get to a point now where you ...would have to, say, choose between ...the American national interest and ...the lives of the hostages. How would ...you choose in a situation like that?

A. I have tried to avoid making ...that choice, and I think it would be in- ...appropriate for me in a public forum to ...describe what I have done. But I don't ...think that, at least at this date, we ...have taken any action or made any de- ...cision on that is inimical to our nation's ...best interest and also to the interest of ...the hostages and their lives.

Obviously, the paramount interest ...is to be what's best for our nation and ...its security, but we are trying to honor ...that commitment without endangering ...the lives of the hostages.

Q. In grappling with this crisis, ...where you ever come to the point, in ...your heart, where you thought you ...should devote all your time to it and ...not seek a second term of office?

A. I don't see any incompatibility ...between the two. I have devoted an ...enormous amount of time to the hostage ...question. It never leaves my mind for ...a waking moment. It's a question and ...a problem that permeates the con- ...sciousness of our entire nation.

What we have tried to do is to act ...with moral decency, with restraint, ...with sensitivity about the revolutionary ...and chaotic nature of the situation in ...Iran, to protect our nation's interest, to ...do as best we could the sensitivities ...of other countries, and to protect the ...lives of the hostages. This is a very ...complicated question. At the same ...time, obviously, I have to deal with the ...normal matters that fall on the shoul-

ders of a President here in the Oval Of- ...fice, and, in addition, I have been man- ...aging the campaign for reelection. But I ...have never let the Iranian question ...suffer because of unwarranted atten- ...tion to a campaign effort.

Q. Have your decisions to break ...off diplomatic relations and to en- ...force sanctions based on the belief ...that the moderates in Tehran can be ...written off?

A. No. Some of the moderates in ...Tehran, I think, have made an honest ...effort to secure the transfer of the hos- ...tages from control of the terrorists and ...subsequently to achieve their release to ...freedom.

Quite often we have been informed, ...on several occasions, that the Revolu- ...tionary Council has made a unanimous ...decision to make this transfer, that the ...transfer was approved by the militants ...in the compound, and we have been in- ...formed by the top Iranian officials that ...this action had the approval of Kho- ...meini himself. Subsequent events have ...proven that this degree of unanimity ...which seems to be required under ...President Bani-Sadr's government has ...not been achieved.

It has been a very frustrating ex- ...perience, but we've not written off any ...element of possible support that might ...be available to make the crisis come to ...an end.

Q. Coming to another subject, ...Afghanistan: You surely knew what ...was going to happen; you surely knew ...about the buildup. Why didn't you ...warn anyone, and by warning, maybe ...prevent it or have the Russians think ...twice about it?

A. I didn't know what was going to ...happen.²

Q. You were not informed that ...there was buildup at the border with ...Afghanistan?

A. Yes, we obviously had ex- ...tremely good intelligence about the ...placement of Soviet troops around the ...border of Afghanistan and the Soviet ...Union. They had been there for a long ...time—months, even years, some of ...them. We also knew about the in- ...creased Soviet presence in Afghanistan ...of military personnel, in the nature of a ...few hundred.

It was only Christmas Eve when a ...massive airlift began to move strong ...Soviet troops into the area around ...Kabul, and it was only a day or two ...later, as you know, when the Soviets ...had the leader of Afghanistan, Presi-

dent Amin, assassinated, along with ...some of the members of his family.

This was the first time that the ...Soviets had used their own very pow- ...erful military forces for an invasion of ...a neighboring country since the Warsaw ...Pact itself was formed. It was an un- ...precedented action on their part, ...therefore, for the last quarter-century.

I have tried since I've been in this ...office not only to strengthen the con- ...stant moral commitment of this nation ...and to strengthen that commitment on ...the part of other nations—human ...rights, the preservation of democracy, ...the honoring of international borders, ...the effectuation of peace among dis- ...puting parties—but also to increase our ...military strength, in NATO and in ...other places in the world. I think we've ...been successful in that.

What is required now, with this ...gross violation of the principles of de- ...tente and this gross violation of human ...decency and the principles of interna- ...tional law on the part of the Soviet ...Union, is a clear message to them, uni- ...fied if possible, that they will not be ...permitted to continue this invasion with ...impunity, that the consequences of ...their invasion will be very severe for ...them.

I had, in the most powerful nation ...on Earth, the options of acting eco- ...nomically or politically or militarily. We ...chose to exercise, along with many ...other nations, a political and economic ...route and to hold in reserve stronger ...action in the future, if necessary, to ...preserve peace in that troubled region.

A hundred and four members of the ...United Nations joined in condemning ...the Soviet invasion, calling for their ...withdrawal. They have not withdrawn. ...As a matter of fact, within the last few ...days they have moved additional major ...military units into Afghanistan. They ...are in direct violation of international ...law, and they are also threatening the ...advantages of detente, now and in the ...future.

To the extent that the Soviets are ...convinced not only that the United ...States is going to take economic action ...against them but other nations as well ...will take action against the Soviet ...Union—to that extent we believe that ...ultimately they will withdraw from Af- ...ghanistan. But they have certainly ...shown no evidence at this stage of any ...inclination to withdraw their forces. ...They are steadily building up their ...forces instead.

Q. Chancellor Schmidt [of West ...Germany] said yesterday that the

comparison between the present international situation and the situation which led, after Sarajevo, to the First World War, is not totally wrong. Nobody wanted war; nobody was able to avoid it. What do you think of that?

A. Chancellor Schmidt is a very wise statesman, and I think he's analyzed the situation accurately. To the extent that an unclear signal is sent to an aggressor nation, to the extent that a step-by-step increasing escalation of aggression is permitted by the rest of the world, the temptation comes for that aggression to reach proportions such that the vital interests of other countries are not only endangered but severely damaged.

We've got a volatile situation in the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asian region under any circumstances. And for the Soviets to exercise their massive military power to completely subjugate another nation, to kill literally thousands of its people every week, to wipe out villages, is a clear signal to the rest of the world that they have no regard for the advantages of detente and that they are not willing to live in accordance with international law.

And I believe that unless we let a clear signal go to the Soviet Union that we allies stand united in not only condemnation of this action but that we are going to take firm actions to show the Soviets that they will suffer because of it, that might lead to increasing encroachment by the Soviet Union against other countries.

Q. Four years ago your campaign message was an act of faith. You were speaking of love and friendship between nations, and we were moved by this. But won't you be forced by the events of the 1980s to speak in totally different terms?

A. No, the terms are not totally different. It's the Soviet action which has violated moral principles and human decency and international law. It's the Iranian terrorist action which has violated moral decency and international law and human principles.

We have combined a commitment to peace, a commitment to morality, the protection of human rights, the honoring of good relationships with all countries in every aspect of foreign policy that we pursue. This has been exhibited in our effort in the Middle East to bring about peace, to honor democratic principles and majority rule in Africa, the opening up of China to new friendship

with our country, and in other areas around the world.

At the same time, however, we have seen that it is necessary to have a strong and consistent strengthening of the military capability of the United States and our allies. Six to 10 years ago there was a feeling in even my own Democratic Party that NATO could be partially abandoned, that we could draw down at least half our troops or maybe, some advocated, all of our troops and that we could let our military strength deteriorate.

I have reversed that. And I think we've had extremely good response from the members of NATO who've now committed themselves to a long-term defense commitment, also made a decision on the theater nuclear force, which was difficult for some nations in Europe, who've committed themselves to build up the budget allocation for defense purposes on a steady, moderate, but sustained basis.

So, the relationship between strong moral commitments to human decency and human rights on the one hand and strong and adequate and predictable and sure and steady buildup in our military capability to match an enormous buildup in the Soviet Union are, I think, completely compatible one with another.

Q. After the invasion of Afghanistan, you said in a television interview then, and I quote: "My opinion of the Russians has changed more drastically in the past week than in the previous 3 years." Now, are you saying that you believe the Russians never themselves believed in detente?

A. I think the Soviets would like to avoid any sort of major confrontation with powerful nations like ourselves, including all those represented here.

The Soviets have shown a consistent inclination to extend its own influence, through violence, into other areas of the world. They've done this primarily through surrogates.

In Vietnam now, they are encouraging the Vietnamese to invade and to subjugate and to destroy the fabric of the nation in Kampuchea. In Angola, through their surrogates, the Cubans, they have 30,000-40,000 troops there to prevent the full expression of free will by the Angolan people to choose their own government. In Ethiopia, as you know, there are several thousands of troops there by the Cubans, supported financially and otherwise by the Soviet Union.

What happened in Afghanistan was, as I said earlier—this is the first time in more than a quarter of a century when the Soviets have used massive troops of their own to invade and to dominate a freedom-loving, deeply religious, and independent nation. They now have more than 100,000 heavily armed troops devoted to the subjugation of Afghanistan. And this is a radical departure of the Soviet Union from their more recent policy as far as using military force is concerned.

Q. But in suggesting that there can't be any normal East-West relations until they've now withdrawn from Afghanistan, aren't you in fact suggesting that we really have to return to a sort of semipermanent cold war?

A. I would hope that our clear commitment to avoiding any acceptance of the status quo while the Soviets are involved in the violation of international peace and international law would send a clear signal to the Soviet Union that the consequences of their action will be severely adverse to themselves.

As you know, the leaders of some of your nations have made direct appeals to the Soviet Union to withdraw their troops and to establish a nonaligned or independent or neutral country or government in Afghanistan acceptable to the people of that country. We would support this effort. But the Soviets, contrary to the assurance given to me by [Soviet President] Brezhnev and given to, I know, at least, [French] President Giscard by Brezhnev, have not withdrawn their troops. In my judgment, they have no inclination to withdraw their troops at this time; they've shown no evidence that.

And only by the Soviets realizing finally, that they cannot prevail in this unwarranted aggression will they be induced to restore the previous boundaries and to let Afghanistan have a peaceful nation with a government of their own choosing. I would prefer that the government and the nation be nonaligned.

There is another very important, tangible, and symbolic action that we must take without delay, and that is make it clear to the world that we will not send our nation and our nation's flags to Moscow for the Summer Olympics while the Soviets are invading Afghanistan. This is a morally indecent act on their part, and I cannot imagine the democratic or freedom-loving nations adding an imprimatur of approval.

to the Soviets' invasion by sending teams to the Moscow Olympics. Our Olympic team will not go to Moscow, and my hope and expectation is that the other nations represented here will take similar action.

Q. Getting back to the problem of detente, we are, of course, close allies, and there's no doubt about it. But we have different positions; we in Europe live close on the East-West border. And do you take into account the fact that America may live with a serious deterioration of East-West relations, but Europe, particularly Germany, is much more strongly affected.

A. Yes, I am very clear in my knowledge of that difference. Each country has a different problem and a different need to have an independent reaction to the threats that do present themselves to us all.

We know very clearly that Germany is a divided nation with 16 or 17 million people living under communism, a totalitarian government imposed upon them. We recognize the vulnerability of Berlin. We recognize the importance of trade, exports in particular, to Germany, which are greater than our own dependence upon exports. I recognize those things.

But still, we feel that within the bounds of complete independence of decision by each government to make, that a consistent approach must be made to the Soviet Union to let them know that we do want to have arms control, we do want to have the advantages of detente, but we are not going to accept armed aggression in a vital area of the world—where the interests of Europe are much more seriously threatened even than our own because of a heavier dependence on exported oil from that region—and that further aggression will be severely met by a more consistent and a more forceful action.

This is what we advocate. Exactly what action we have taken, at substantial sacrifice to us, we do not expect but to be exactly mirrored by action among other nations.

Farmers are very similar to one another all over the world. I happen to be a farmer. We have taken action to eliminate 17 million tons of grain sales to the Soviet Union. This was a difficult decision for me to make, particularly in an election year. But I think the American farmers have decided, as constrained by votes in key agricultural States, that they are willing to make this sacrifice—a financial

sacrifice—in order to let the signal go clearly to the Soviet Union.

So, I believe that if we want to have peace, want to have future trade, want to have a perpetuation of the advantages of detente, if we want to have a consistent commitment to controlling weapons and to lessening tensions in the world, we have got to respond effectively and forcefully and, I believe, peacefully to Soviet aggression when it's so blatant and so immoral as is taking place at this very moment in Afghanistan.

Q. Coming back a moment to what you said a moment ago about the American team not going to Moscow. Does this mean that you may apply those legal measures to prevent them to go, and will you expect the European countries to do the same?

A. I have had indications from all of the European leaders represented by you distinguished news reporters that we share a common commitment not to add our voice of approval to Soviet aggression by going to the Moscow Olympics.

The U.S. Olympic Committee has already made a public statement quite early this year—I think in February or March—that they would honor the decision made by me and an almost unanimous vote in the U.S. Congress in both Houses and also by overwhelming public opinion in this country that we should not attend the Moscow Olympics because of the invasion. I have no doubt that the U.S. Olympic Committee will make this decision.

Q. But then you will enforce, legally, if some athlete will try to go on his own. As I understand, France and England have such a situation.

A. My understanding of Olympic rules and principles is that athletes are not recognized for competition in the Olympics representing themselves, that they must represent a nation. And therefore, a decision made by a nation's government or a nation's Olympic committee is a final decision, and individual athletes are not recognized as competitors in the Olympics.

Q. Yes. Public opinion in Europe is not so sure that boycotting the Olympic Games will be an effective measure to challenge the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Europe agrees with your ultimate aim in Afghanistan, but it doesn't necessarily agree with the means you suggest. It feels

that going to the games and boycotting only the parade and all the ceremonial events will be more effective with the Russians. Wouldn't you agree?

A. No, I don't agree with that at all, but obviously each nation would have to make its own decision. We're not trying to force our will upon others, but we make our position clear.

The Soviets have, obviously, a great interest in the propaganda benefits to be derived for itself by an expression of participation with them in the Olympics in Moscow. Their own official publications and handbooks say that the granting to Moscow of a right to have the Summer Olympics is an endorsement, in effect, of the Soviet foreign policy and a recognition of the peaceful nature of the Soviet Government.

I think for a country to go to Moscow to participate in the Summer Olympic Games, to raise its flag in the Olympic stadium when the host government is engaged at that moment in an unwarranted and inhumane invasion of a free and independent country is abhorrent to the normal principles on which democracy is founded. I feel very strongly about this subject, and I believe that the overwhelming number of American citizens do as well. The opinion of Europeans may or may not be different; I have no way to know that.

But I know that it will be a very difficult problem for the Soviet Union to explain to the rest of the world and to explain to its own citizens why 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 or maybe 70 other nations refuse to participate. As a matter of fact, when the United Nations voted earlier this year to condemn the Soviet Union, I think 104 countries voted in this way. The Soviet citizens never knew about the outcome of the U.N. condemnation. The Soviet Government is misleading its own people.

My own judgment is that many Soviet citizens do object to invasion of other countries, do object to a direct threat to peace that might bring great adverse consequences to themselves. And I believe that this would be a very clear signal to the world and to the Soviet people that the Soviets have made a serious mistake in Afghanistan.

I don't claim that not going to the Summer Olympics will be the single factor that would result in a withdrawal of their troops, but I believe that going to the Soviet Union is, in effect, an endorsement of the invasion and an endorsement of the violation of morality, human decency, and international law.

Q. I wanted to get you right, there, on the numbers you think countries might not be going; you said 50 or 60 or 70. Is that just a hope on your part, or do you have some indication? Because I think if as many countries as that were to boycott, it would possibly affect arrangements in all countries.

We have a problem in Britain, where we're split right down the middle. The government supports your boycott totally, and the British teams want to go. Public opinion is not so sensitized as in America. Probably most of the public think they should go. But if you could bring some evidence that as many countries as that would stay away, I think it would have an effect.

A. The evidence is in the final action. I think I gave a broad range of countries which might join us. I think 20 or 30 nations have announced already that they would not go.

Q. As many as that?

A. Yes. And the question is: How many of the European countries will go to the Olympics, and how many are willing to announce their decision, hopefully, as early as possible?

I know that the Olympic Committee in Great Britain has announced that they prefer to go, but that they would assess future developments before they make a final decision. My understanding is that one of those future developments that they would assess is the willingness of the Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

I have no expectation at all that prior to the deadline date for the acceptance or rejection of the Moscow Olympics invitation—I think the 24th of May—that Soviet troops will be withdrawn. The contrary is the evidence. They are increasing their military involvement in Afghanistan. And it may be that when your own Olympic Committee assesses this fact that they might reverse themselves and decide not to send a team.

I have seen news reports that some of your superb athletes, whom I admire very much, have announced that they would like to go individually. I understand that the International Olympic Committee rules do not permit an athlete competing on his or her own, that it must be part of a national team.

But we are seeing very shortly the evolution of commitments. We have private assurances from some other nations that they will join in the boycott

of the Olympics, but I am not trying to speak for them. They can speak for themselves.

Q. The Olympic question is just one example of diversity between the United States and Europe. You expect the Europeans to follow suit. It is a surprise to you that there is what you might call a lack of solidarity, if no proper and real consultation prior to your announcement of the boycott has taken place?

A. Let me correct the premise that seems to be the basis for your question. In the first place, there is no evidence that there are differences between us in whether we will or will not go to the Olympics. The U.S. Olympic Committee is going to decide very shortly, maybe today, that they will or will not go. Other Olympic committees will be deciding in the future. I don't think we'll have any clear evidence of either complete compatibility or incompatibility before May, when the final decisions are made.

There is a sharp difference of opinion in my own country. The athletes themselves, many of them, do prefer to go to the Olympic Games. I believe the U.S. Olympic Committee itself, the Congress, the American people, and myself do not believe that we should go to the Olympics. And my statement to you is that we will not go.

On your other premise, we do not expect compliance with a decision made by us because we demand unanimity or demand some sort of action by other countries. Each country must make its own decision. We make our position very clear, and it's predicated not on what other nations might do but on our own decision. If all of the nations go to the Moscow Olympics, we will still not go. But each country, including your own, must make that decision for itself.

I think in action concerning Iran we have let our allies and our friends know very clearly what our position is. We've tried to keep them informed about action that we would take before it was taken.

Sometimes it's not necessary or advisable to have complete consultation, because events change so rapidly that that's not possible, and sometimes we need to take unilateral action without complete consultation with anyone. But I would guess that in my own Administration—in the last 3 years—we've had at least as good consultation as has ever been the case with our European allies and particularly during a time of peace.

Q. You said that the allies have freedom of choice, and yet Thursday you were a little bit disappointed about the fact that the allies ask for protection, for leadership, and then they want to do whatever they want, which puzzles a little bit, with due respect, our governments, about American foreign policy—some lack of communication, some mistakes, like the one Ambassador McHenry [Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.] did at the United Nations. Now, don't you think that makes all our governments think that such a government is accident prone, incident prone?

A. I think every government makes mistakes. And I would guess that there have been decisions made by all of your countries and their governments that didn't get my immediate approval or the approval of the American Congress or the approval of the American people or the approval of the American media.

We live in a pluralistic society, and each country is strong, forceful, independent, and also each country has a different perspective, depending upon its particular relationships with its neighbors and with other countries around the world. We expect that diversity. We're not the Warsaw Pact, where complete conformity is demanded and achieved within a group of nations. We recognize the necessity for diversity, and I think this diversity is very beneficial.

For instance, Germany has taken the leadership in strengthening the economy of Turkey. We follow this leadership, with appreciation of the initiative that Germany has taken. The French have been extremely effective in some elements of development of democratic principles and the protection, for instance, of the integrity of Zaire. Great Britain has done an extraordinarily good job, in my opinion, in bringing about majority rule in Rhodesia, soon to be Zimbabwe. We look to Italy to help us with the entire Mediterranean area and to give me advice on how we can better have a policy for the southern regions of NATO.

So, each country is different. We have taken the leadership in the Mideast. Some of our decisions, some of our policies have been criticized within your own countries and also, I might say, within my own country. But we've made good progress: the present situation in the Mideast, with peace between Egypt and Israel, the two most pow-

ful nations, the two nations aligned with the West, the two nations which are very strong, stabilizing factors here, and the present effort to move forward now with the preservation of Palestinian rights in the West Bank/Gaza area, of full autonomy there, the realization of a solution to the refugee problem, the enhancement and protection of the security of Israel behind recognized borders—this effort is the only one that has a chance for success.

And even those who have criticized our own effort, for instance, in this particular instance have not put forward any alternative proposal that might even get the attention or participation of the parties who are in dispute. Obviously this is sometimes a fumbling, sometimes a disappointing, sometimes a frustrating, sometimes a highly argumentative relationship; all of these efforts were. But we're making progress.

And we recognize the independence and the autonomy and difference among our countries. But the common bond which holds us together, a belief in freedom, a belief in democracy, a belief in basic human morality, the preservation of human rights, a common, strong commitment to security—these kinds of things are much more important than any small differences that might exist among us as each nation tries to do the best it can to protect its own interests and to enhance those principles that have just outlined to you.

Q. But you yourself wish to see the Camp David agreement fully implemented. Unfortunately we seem still very far away from that end. How do you intend to make Mr. Begin change his mind?

A. We all change our minds. I think it would be a mistake for me at this point to predict what's going to happen in the future. I'll be meeting with Prime Minister Begin this next week. I start with President Sadat this week.

If you would go back 2 years to the situation then and compare what has been accomplished during this period, it's indeed almost a miracle. Then no Arab nation would even speak to Israel or recognize its right to exist nor negotiate with it. Now we have the most powerful Arab nation of all recognizing Israel as a country; ambassadorial exchanges have been made; the borders are open; trade is being enhanced and negotiating taking place on a daily basis.

The commitment has been made by Prime Minister Begin himself to grant full autonomy to the Palestinians on the West Bank, to resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects, to give the Palestinians a voice in the determination of their own future.

These are the kinds of things that were inconceivable 2 years ago. I know how difficult it was for Prime Minister Begin to agree, for instance, to withdraw from the Sinai and to commit himself to give up oil wells that were vital to Israel's security and also to agree that the Israeli settlers in the Sinai would be withdrawn in the next phase.

The Egyptian-Israeli treaty has been honored meticulously by both sides. And I don't anticipate any ease of success in future negotiations between Israel, Egypt, and all its neighbors, but we're making the best effort we can. And there have been very good and very profound concessions made on both sides in an effort to achieve peace in this vital area of the world.

Q. With the settlement policy, particularly on the West Bank, your government has told Israel that you oppose that, and yet they go on snubbing you, if you like, even humiliating the United States by keeping on the settlements, like even in Hebron and so on. Why don't you actually take a step like reducing aid to Israel by the amount that it costs for the settlements?

A. We have a respect for Israel's independence and autonomy as a nation, just as we respect the independence and autonomy—

Q. But the West Bank is not an independent nation, is it?

A. The decision made by Israel in their government is worthy of respect as an independent nation, just as we respect the right of Great Britain to disagree with us, or other nations as well.

Our position on the settlements is very clear. We do not think they are legal, and they are obviously an impediment to peace. The Israeli Government, however, feels that they have a right to those settlements.

Under the Camp David accords, the Israelis have committed themselves to withdraw their military government and its civilian administration and then to redeploy military forces in selected security locations. When and if this is done, in my judgment, the basic question of the settlements will effectively be resolved. The Israelis will still maintain that Jewish citizens, Israeli citi-

zens, have a right to live wherever they choose. As you know, many Arabs live in Israel itself.

But the ultimate status of the West Bank and Gaza is to be negotiated among Israel, the people who live in the region, the Jordanians, and the Egyptians. And this is what has been already prescribed in the Camp David agreement. There are obviously very strong differences of opinion between Israel and its neighbors, and between Israel and us on this particular instance, but we have to honor those differences and work as best we can to resolve those differences peacefully.

Q. Can America regain credibility militarily without reintroducing the draft system?

A. Yes, of course. I don't think, again, the premise of your question is well founded. We have no absence of credibility militarily. Our nation is the strongest nation on Earth militarily.

We have been concerned for the last 15 years by the extraordinary buildup in Soviet military strength. Year by year they have had a substantial real addition in commitment in their budget to their military forces. In the last 3 years, beginning in 1977, we have joined with our allies, including your country, in building up the strength of our own nations to match that extraordinary additional threat from the Soviet Union.

We are, at the same time, pursuing an effort to control weapons, including nuclear weapons. The SS-20, which is a severe threat to all the nations represented here except our own—it can't reach us yet—is to be matched now, finally, by an increase in theater nuclear force commitments. We consider this a very strong step forward.

We are maintaining an adequate military force without a draft. I see no reason to have a draft. We will commence registration this year in order to prepare for some eventuality in the future that might bring about a military crisis calling for a draft, but whether we have a draft or not is not an important issue at all as far as the overall strength of our country is concerned.

Q. In the context of your slight dissatisfaction about the behavior of the allies, how do you consider the possibility of success to our many economic problems at the forthcoming economic summit in Venice at the end of June?

Southern Rhodesia: Eve of Independence

by Richard M. Moose

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 27, 1980. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.¹

A. We all share the same basic problems: an extraordinary threat to our own security because we are so heavily dependent on imported oil; an almost unprecedented level of inflation, certainly within this generation; the threat that as we control inflation in the future effectively that the unemployment rate will go up in our nations; the need to avoid protectionist steps in international trade; the proper treatment of the less developed countries, which are often dependent on a single commodity and haven't let the advantages of a technological world be extended to them.

These kinds of problems are common among us, and it's extremely beneficial to me—I'm sure it's beneficial to the other participants in the economic summits—to share these problems with one another. In Venice, I think we'll have another opportunity to discuss these problems. I think we've made very good progress in the other three summits with which I have been involved, and I have no doubt that the beautiful setting in Venice and the hospitality of the Italian people and the common realization of our purposes and challenges and opportunities will make this next summit conference also effective.

Q. You refer to the French action in Africa. What about the Middle East? President Giscard d'Estaing has made a statement, and it looks like the European countries agree with his conclusions. According to your opinion, is that policy helping or damaging your own policy in that situation?

A. I don't agree with the statements made by President Giscard d'Estaing, but I certainly recognize his right to make them. And I'm not sure that all of the European countries agree completely with what he has said.

In my opinion, the best opportunity for the realization of our hopes, which are common among all of us, in the Mideast, surrounding Israel, rests in the further progress to be envisioned under the Camp David accords. It is a basis for an adequate peace settlement for Israel and all its neighbors. I don't believe that President Giscard d'Estaing has put forward an alternative negotiating process that would be acceptable by the parties in dispute, that might replace the Camp David accords.

The Palestinians have legitimate rights, which we are trying to honor. They have a right to a voice in the determination of their own future. These

It is always a pleasure to meet with you to exchange views on Rhodesia. However, I am particularly pleased to be asked to discuss that country with you today in the wake of elections which most observers have agreed were reasonably "free and fair" and on the eve of independence when Rhodesia will become Zimbabwe.

The realization of an independent Zimbabwe under a democratic constitution following free and fair elections was one of the primary goals of the Administration's policy in southern Africa. We undertook to offer the leaders and the people of Zimbabwe an opportunity to realize their aspirations through a peaceful, negotiated settlement. We wanted to create an alternative to armed struggle. Through what began as a joint U.S.-U.K. negotiating effort and ended in a brilliant and daring U.K. negotiating effort, our objectives were attained.

Transition Period

I will not dwell on the transition period which is already very familiar to most of you. In spite of some very tense moments, elections were held as scheduled February 27-29, and all the parties participated. The Commonwealth observer group, which had been designated an important role at the August Com-

monwealth conference in Lusaka, issued an interim report which stated essentially that under difficult circumstances the elections were "free and fair." Other official and nonofficial groups reached generally the same conclusion; this information accorded with our own appraisal which was reflected in the Secretary's statement of March 2, following the election but before the results were announced. That statement said, "... our own assessment [was] that the results of the election will reflect the will of the people of Zimbabwe."

The statistics are impressive: A record 2.7 million people, 94% of the electorate, voted. Robert Mugabe's ZANU/PF [Zimbabwe African National Union/Patriotic Front] party won a clear-cut majority of 57 parliamentary seats, obtaining 63% of the vote. Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front party won 20 seats (24% of the vote), mostly from the Matabele area, and Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Council won but 3 seats (8% of the vote). The other parties were shut out.

Few predicted that Robert Mugabe's appeal would be as strong as it was. His strength resulted from various factors, including:

- His image as a nationalist who organized the principal and most successful fighting force;
- His identification with the majority Shona tribal group;
- His ability to project himself as a winner; and
- Muzorewa's relatively lackluster performance during his period in office and his close identification with the whites and with South Africa.

of the U.N. Resolution 242 and also recognize Israel's right to exist. This is a clear policy of ours which will be honored.

But we are as determined as others to see the refugee question resolved, full autonomy established in the West Bank/Gaza, a secure Israel, recognized borders, and peace.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 21, 1980.

²The President misunderstood the last part of this question. Beginning as early as Oct. 1979, the United States did publicly and privately warn the Soviet Union against invading Afghanistan. [White House clarification] ■

two statements, among others, have been recognized by not only ourselves and the Egyptians but also by the Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Begin.

So, I believe that it would be better for the European countries to give us a chance to continue the Camp David process unless there is a clear vision or delineation of a preferable alternative, and I see no prospects of this being put forward.

Some have moved toward a recognition of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. We have no intention of recognizing the PLO nor of negotiating with the PLO until they first acknowledge the effectiveness and authenticity

In the past, Prime Minister Mugabe has labeled a dedicated Marxist in many roles. His former rhetoric has on occasion been somewhat strident. However, I believe we should judge him in an African context and deal with him both on his recently stated intentions and his future actions. As the leader of a guerrilla, nationalist movement, he accepted assistance from wherever he could obtain it. The People's Republic of China was a principal supporter, as was Yugoslavia, Romania, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and some African states. However, the Soviet Union did not forge a close relationship, principally because of Mugabe's insistence on being independent of outside powers and also because the U.S.S.R. was a staunch backer of Nkomo's ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union].

Government's New Approach to African Reactions

It is impossible, of course, to predict the exact course Mugabe will take. However, he has adopted a moderate and conciliatory approach in recent months, and his initial steps in the postelection period have been encouraging. For instance, he has indicated:

- His recognition of the important role whites play in Zimbabwe and his desire for them to remain;
- His intention to work within the white enterprise system and to bring changes gradually so as not to jolt the productive capacity of the economic structure;
- His plan to concentrate on underutilized land for redistribution for Africans and leave highly productive European farm land intact;
- His nomination of General Peter Moyo to preside over the integration of the armed forces and his appointment of prominent whites in his Cabinet; and
- His allocation of four Cabinet portfolios to ZAPU to broaden the base of his government.

The reaction throughout black Africa to developments in Zimbabwe has been positive. Zimbabwe is expected to become a member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the OAU, and the front-line states soon. The Prime Minister has also stated his intention to pursue hominized foreign policy, and that he will seek good relations with all Zimbabwe's neighbors.

Through his public acknowledgment at South Africa "is a reality," Mr. Mugabe indicated he will seek to work out a pragmatic relationship with that

country, perhaps along the lines which now exist between Mozambique and South Africa. In this connection, however, Mugabe has made a distinction between not allowing Zimbabwe to be used as a forward base for military activities directed against the republic and opposition to apartheid which he has forthrightly condemned.

The South African reaction to date has been reserved, but nevertheless encouraging. The dire predictions which

U.S. Aid to Zimbabwe

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APR. 14, 1980¹

When Zimbabwe becomes independent, it will need considerable external assistance for postwar rehabilitation and broad-based development. The British have appealed to a number of countries, including the United States, to meet these needs. The United States is prepared to respond.

During the Lancaster House conference on a Rhodesian settlement, we indicated we would join a multidonor effort to assist in the agricultural and economic development of an independent Zimbabwe within the framework of a wider development concept for southern Africa.

In keeping with that commitment, the United States plans to make available \$15 million in assistance for Zimbabwe. We have already pledged \$5 million to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees for use in its ongoing repatriation of an estimated 250,000 Zimbabwean refugees from neighboring countries. This will make a total U.S. contribution of \$20 million this fiscal year. In the next fiscal year beginning October 1, 1980, subject to congressional appropriations, we expect to make assistance available amounting to \$25-30 million.

Independent Zimbabwe will be a key element in the future stability and economic development of the entire southern African region. The United States is committed to helping the people of Zimbabwe achieve the peaceful and prosperous future they so richly deserve.

¹ Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III. ■

many made about the consequences of a Mugabe victory have not materialized. There is growing comprehension within the South African Government that it is in its own self-interest to establish a realistic relationship with the new government in Zimbabwe, and that to have a relatively stable, effective administration in Zimbabwe is far preferable to economic and political turmoil with all its negative consequences for that country. The front-line countries, especially Zambia and Mozambique, have a real interest in insuring that things work out well in Zimbabwe. These states suffered enormously from the Rhodesia conflict and are now anxious to concentrate on nurturing their own national development.

The British have stressed to us repeatedly Mozambique's past splendid cooperation in helping to move the entire Zimbabwe settlement process forward and the need for Maputo's continued positive role as an influential actor in the region. Lord Soames [U.K. Governor in Rhodesia until April 18, 1980] just completed a visit to Maputo where he was warmly received. Zambia, too, has played a constructive role in the context of the Rhodesia settlement.

Prime Minister Mugabe has witnessed at first hand the severe difficulties which confront newly independent governments which attempt radical change too quickly. Therefore, he is likely to move cautiously, and will seek Western cooperation as he charts his country's future. The new Prime Minister understands that to succeed, his government must enable the people of Zimbabwe to improve their own well-being. He knows that his government must produce results and he is looking to us and others in the West to help. He has already spoken of his high esteem for the United States and his desire to form genuine bonds of friendship with America. He will also be looking to the United States to honor its pledge at Lancaster House to cooperate with a multidonor effort for economic and agricultural development for Zimbabwe in a regional context.

The Need for Assistance

One of our first steps to assist the new process has been a \$5 million contribution to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for refugee repatriation. We also plan to get underway a modest, but highly visible, assistance program as soon as possible after independence. We have already sent a congressional notification on reprogramming \$2 million from FY 1980 regional economic support funds. While we will have to work out details

with the new government in Zimbabwe, these funds are intended for use for rural rehabilitation, principally for health units in the "tribal trust lands."

The British have indicated, however, that there is an immediate need of some \$40-45 million for reconstruction in Zimbabwe and have announced they will initially be contributing more than \$15 million for this purpose. At the same time, the British have launched an international appeal to obtain assistance for Zimbabwe and have approached us to make a substantial contribution. We are examining how we can further expand the amount of our assistance since the short-term need is so great. Our review is not yet complete, but we hope to be able to increase our commitment during this fiscal year.

On a longer range basis, the British have pointed out that Zimbabwe will need significant help for economic development and continuing reconstruction. They underscore that this is a particularly good investment since the infrastructure has the potential to reach the take-off point within a comparatively short period of about 5 years. With the backing of the Congress, and we will be looking to each of you for support on this matter, we intend to develop a more sub-

stantial assistance program for FY 1981 for Zimbabwe.

We contemplate that these resources will be drawn from the southern African regional economic support fund account. We have not yet made any specific determination as to amounts, but are very much aware of this committee's recommendation and would hope to do even better. The utilization of these funds, of course, will depend upon many factors, including how the new government sorts out its own priorities and how Zimbabwe desires us to cooperate. We envisage that a significant portion of our aid might be directed at agricultural development, but this would not, of course, be used for any "buy-out" scheme.

It is our expectation that the present liaison office in Salisbury will be upgraded to Embassy status after independence. We also hope to have an ambassador nominated soon thereafter.

Implications for Southern Africa

Another point which I would like to stress is that the Rhodesian settlement has important implications for the southern African region as a whole. I have already referred to the interests of the front-line states in insuring that the

settlement works. With regard to Namibia, how events evolve in Zimbabwe will certainly have considerable influence. It has been argued that because of the success at the polls of the parties representing the former guerrilla forces, South Africa will seek to delay for some time implementation of the U.N. settlement plan. Others reason that there will be considerable pressure for South Africa to opt for an internal settlement which it can more readily control. On the other hand, assuming the situation develops relatively smoothly in Zimbabwe, responsible officials in Cape Town and Pretoria should come to realize that a negotiated settlement among all the parties is the best way for a peaceful, lasting transition that will be in the long-range best interests of South Africa.

A stable society in Zimbabwe, which can effectively accommodate all of the races living there, can also provide an important model to South Africa. There are already some signs that those South Africans who were initially perturbed are taking a second look at Mugabe's stunning victory and are beginning to draw some conclusions for their own internal situation. There could be a greater sense of urgency in promoting domestic reform.

The Rhodesian settlement, therefore, has enormous implications for the southern African region as a whole—for Namibia, South Africa's internal system, and the direction of the front-line states. There are also potential pitfalls to be sure; but there are likewise great opportunities which we must seize. Our adversaries will seek to promote division and turmoil and to exploit any openings we offer them.

We must deny them such opportunities. Instead, we must lay aside our own past differences over our policy toward that area of the globe and join in recognizing that there is now an entirely new situation in Zimbabwe. To delay could be highly detrimental to our interests. We are on the verge of a widely accepted legal independence and government by majority rule for Zimbabwe. We, the Congress and the executive branch, must work together with the British and other concerned states in consolidating this impressive achievement.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Zimbabwe Becomes Independent

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
APR. 18, 1980¹

Zimbabwe is now an independent nation. The official U.S. delegation to the independence ceremony in Salisbury, led by Governor [W. Averell] Harriman and Ambassador [Andrew] Young, has extended the congratulations of the American people and President Carter to the people and new leaders of Zimbabwe. It is our deep hope that Zimbabwe will set an example for further peaceful change in this important area of the world.

The United States established diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe today. This was accomplished at an official ceremony in Salisbury. Mr. Jeffrey Davidow, who has headed our liaison office in Salisbury, will be our charge d'affaires.

On April 14 we announced our plans for assistance to Zimbabwe. Today in Salisbury, Governor Harriman and Ambassador Young signed our first agreement, which will provide \$2 mil-

lion to the government for the repair of rural health clinics damaged by the war. We will soon enter into discussions with the government on the best uses for the further \$13 million which we will make available during this fiscal year.

We take this moment to congratulate those who have made this important development possible. This includes the British Government led by Prime Minister Thatcher and [Foreign Secretary] Lord Carrington, the leaders of the African front-line states, and the parties to the negotiations. We are also proud of the constructive role played by the United States in this historic accomplishment. Because of these efforts, Zimbabwe now has peace, international acceptance, a government of majority rule, a constitution which protects the rights of all citizens, and an opportunity for economic growth and prosperity.

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston. ■

Visit of Secretary Vance

*Secretary Vance was in Ottawa April 23, 1980. Following is a news conference held by the Secretary and Secretary of State for External Affairs Iqbal MacGuigan that day.*¹

Secretary MacGuigan. I'll just say several words about the treaty—or protocol more exactly—which we have just signed. It has the effect of extending for 20 years, to the year 2000, the Canada-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. I think its symbolic importance is more than that because in this protocol we actually increased the nuclear safeguards which were initially established to take account of the increased safeguards which both our countries now apply to the transfer of nuclear technology with other countries. In other words, we apply exactly the same standards to each other that we apply to other countries in the world. Given our longstanding partnership and the trust which we have in each other, it is a significant step that we are absolutely even-handed in this and that we are adding to ourselves, as well as to others, these additional nuclear safeguards.

Secretary Vance. I too am very pleased to sign this protocol which lends our agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. We value most highly the close cooperation which we enjoy with Canada in the nuclear area and our shared commitment to nonproliferation. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs has said, it is significant that the amendment which we signed incorporates the stronger nonproliferation requirements that both Canada and the United States have adopted in recent years. This is a very important step forward, and I am very proud to be here to sign this protocol with you.

Q. While you were having lunch with the Prime Minister, the House of Commons approved a unanimous resolution calling for early ratification of the fisheries treaty as a matter of great importance for Canada and for Canadian-U.S. relations. I was wondering whether you were able to give any assurances at all about ratification, early or otherwise, of the treaty?

Secretary Vance. We discussed at some length this morning—indeed, it was the first item on the agenda—the question of the fisheries treaty. I believe that the treaty which we

negotiated very carefully over a period of a year and a half was, and is, a fair agreement. We will continue to support that treaty as drafted.

The hearings on the treaty have commenced in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I have written a letter subsequent to those hearings to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and to the leading Republican member, Senator Javits, and have indicated to them the extreme importance which I and my government attach to the ratification of the treaty.

The next step which will take place is that the committee will be sending me a number of questions it has which I will be answering very promptly. I cannot, at this point, give assurances on when the committee, or indeed the Senate, will act upon it, but I can assure you that I and the executive branch of the government attach the highest importance to it. As I said at the outset, I consider this to be a fair and proper treaty which I fully support.

Q. Is your government taking any initiatives toward the North American economic community or any kind of arrangement that would foster more common decisionmaking among the three countries on the continent?

Secretary Vance. Our relationship with Canada is close, strong, and, I think, growing ever stronger. We deal with probably more issues than any other two countries, not only in this hemisphere but anywhere in the world, as far as the United States is concerned. I believe that the mechanisms which we have adopted, and are working on, are good and satisfactory and will continue to develop.

We also have a good relationship with Mexico. We have there, next to Canada, the largest number of issues to deal with of any country in this hemisphere and one of the largest in the world.

I do not think it is necessary at this point to talk about any trilateral relationship or common market-type situation. There are people in the United States in private organizations which have been studying this issue, and I assume they will continue to do so, but I am satisfied with the relations which exist now.

Q. I assume that you and Mr. MacGuigan talked about the Iranian situation today. Last week British

newspapers were very critical of the way the United States has gone about organizing sanctions against Iran, feeling they're being backed into a corner by some ineffective sanctions.

I wonder, how much consultation has your government had with other countries, including Canada, to come up with a coordinated and effective wide-ranging group of sanctions against Iran which countries are not only enthusiastic and eager to follow but are going to do it?

Secretary Vance. I think you have to go back to January. In January the question of sanctions was discussed at great length. There were extensive consultations which went on for a period of not only days but weeks in preparation for the vote in the United Nations on sanctions against Iran if the hostages were not released. The vote was taken, 10 nations on the Security Council voted in favor of the sanctions as spelled out in the resolution before the Security Council. That, as you all know, was vetoed by the Soviet Union and, therefore, did not go into effect. Certainly, there was clear and full and extensive consultations at that time.

What we are urging now, and have been urging with our allies and which we discussed again today, is the putting into effect of those sanctions which were only blocked by the fact that the Soviets previously vetoed them.

Q. As you know, the people of Quebec are voting in an historic referendum on May 20 on a question relating to Quebec's place in the confederation. In 1977 when Prime Minister Trudeau was in Washington, President Carter said in a television interview that if he were making his own preference, it would be that the confederation continue. Is that still the clear view of the Administration in Washington, and was it re-expressed to Prime Minister Trudeau today by yourself?

Secretary Vance. Our view is that this is an issue which should be decided by the Canadian people and will be decided by the Canadian people.

Q. Was it raised in your discussions with Prime Minister Trudeau today?

Secretary Vance. Not with Prime Minister Trudeau, no.

Q. The Canadian representative to the U.N. conference on the sea was, a few weeks ago, very upset

against the United States, accused to take steps with U.S.S.R. against Canada on the mineral exploitation of the seabeds. Now that Canada took good positions on Iran and Afghanistan, is your government ready to express in this field a new "thank-you, Canada"?

Secretary Vance. We have a disagreement on the question of the seabeds. As friends do, from time to time, we cannot agree on everything. We do not agree on how the seabed issue should be handled in the Law of the Sea Conference.

Secretary MacGuigan. I might just add a word. We've had an excellent day in which we've had not only a good exchange of views but have reached an understanding, at least, in a general form on a great many points.

One of the few issues in which we actually had disagreement was with that issue. Here our national interests appear to be in collision because the amount of nickel to be produced is the matter of a differing kind of concern to Canada and the United States. So we have not agreed on that point, but we have agreed on many others.

Secretary Vance. Let me second that. We've had an excellent meeting today. We have covered a tremendously broad variety of bilateral issues as well as a very wide range of international issues. There has been a common view of almost all of these issues.

There are, however, as I said, times when friends and allies may have differing issues because of differing national interests on certain points. This was just one of the very few that took place.

Q. One of the questions which Mr. Beasley raised, who is our Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, was the lack of consultation on the issues, partly a disagreement of the substance but also the process that was going on. Can you give an undertaking that the consultations would be much closer on proposals that are developed in the Law of the Sea after these meetings and others?

Secretary Vance. Yes, you can be fully assured that the consultations will be full, complete, and that we look forward to further consultations. I do not accept the proposition that consultations in the past have been inadequate.

Q. Moving on then to the fishing treaty. The issue there seems to be that the treaty is in some jeopardy in

your Senate ratification. Amendments have been proposed. Do you view in any way that the treaty may be jeopardized? And if so, what can your Administration do to help the treaty go through in the form it was signed originally?

Secretary Vance. There were, at the hearing which was held the other day, dissenting views expressed by several of the people who were present at that hearing. I have made very clear, however, the position of my government; namely, that we support the treaty as negotiated and signed. We will do everything in our power to see that it is ratified in that form.

Q. If Quebec decides to become independent, is the United States prepared to recognize its right to self-determination?

Secretary Vance. That is a speculative question on which I do not wish to comment. I have already stated that this is a question for the people of Canada to decide. That is all I wish to say.

Secretary MacGuigan. The only discussion we had of that issue today was my warning Mr. Vance that he would probably receive a question of that kind.

Q. Canada joined with other NATO allies today in reducing the size of our Iranian Embassy here by 50%. That's one person. Considering the actions the Europeans took, are you pleased as you can be with the help you're getting from your European allies and Canada in terms of tougher sanctions against Iran, and is it everything you had hoped for?

Secretary Vance. I am pleased with the steps which have been, and are being, taken. I think it is of the utmost importance that the actions which were announced yesterday with respect to the adoption of the sanctions contained in the resolution which was in the Security Council be adopted. As you know, under what the European nations decided yesterday, this will have to go to their national parliaments in some cases, but they said this action would be completed by May 17. I think it is of the utmost importance that parliamentary action be taken and that the countries then be prepared to put those sanctions into place if the hostages have not been released.

Secretary MacGuigan. Perhaps I might add that the release which we

made today was in response to the actions of the European Community yesterday. For those of you who heard me say yesterday that I didn't expect to announce such actions so soon, I wasn't aware at that time, being preoccupied with the Olympics yesterday, that the European Community had taken the steps that it had.

Q. During your visit here, have there been any expressions of reservation or warning from the Canadian side about the possible use of U.S. military action against Iran?

Secretary Vance. We have discussed Iran in great depth. We have discussed the various actions which have already been taken and the economic sanctions that we hope and expect will be taken by our allies in the very near future. We merely said that there are other options as well which exist. There is no need at this point to comment on them.

Q. Given the fact that Canada and Mexico are charging the United States the same export price for natural gas, is there any feeling in the Carter Administration of being caught in a squeeze through a price-fixing agreement between Canada and Mexico, and was this discussed today?

Secretary Vance. We did not discuss this today. This was discussed when Secretary [of Energy Charles W. Duncan was up here previously. We were pleased by the action taken which I believe, indicated that the current prices would be maintained until October.

Q. What assurances does the United States expect to offer Canada in order to get Canada to proceed with the building of the Alaska highway pipeline before the Alaskan sections are financed?

Secretary Vance. We did discuss the question of the Alaska pipeline. We discussed the problems that exist with respect to it in the fact that these matters are being worked upon in our two governments by those who have the responsibility for it. That is not in my area of responsibility. That is for others in my government to deal with.

Q. Canada and West Germany yesterday said they would join the boycott of the Moscow Olympics. How do you think that whole movement is going, and what more do you expect from America's allies in this matter?

Secretary Vance. I was very pleased to hear of the action taken by Canada and by the Federal Republic of Germany. I think the steps which were announced are very important.

It is my belief that the action taken by Canada and Germany will have a major effect on other nations which, having seen that action taken by them and similar action having been taken by the United States and many other nations, will also conclude that this is the right and proper step for us to take in light of the naked aggression which has been carried out against Afghanistan.

Q. What do you think of the fact that we continue to heavily subsidize petroleum products at a time when the United States is attempting to cut back?

Secretary Vance. I'm afraid that I'm going to have to hand that question over. Can you answer that?

Secretary MacGuigan. She was asking for your opinion concerning our domestic policy.

Secretary Vance. That's what I thought she was doing.

Secretary MacGuigan. Naturally, I'm going to defend that policy, and, naturally, you're going to say "no comment."

Q. Have you discussed with your Canadian counterpart or maybe with Mr. Trudeau the possible measures to be undertaken against the Soviet Union in regards to Afghanistan?

Secretary Vance. We discussed at length the question of Afghanistan and the steps which have been taken by the United States, and by other nations as well, in response to the action taken by the Soviet Union in invading Afghanistan and continuing to increase the number of troops in that country. We discussed also the consequences of the actions which have been taken.

I expressed my deep conviction of the need to maintain the actions which we took in response over an extended period of time. This is necessary in my judgment for two purposes.

One, I think it has to be very clear to the Soviet Union, as a nation which is invaded by a neighboring nonaligned nation, that it must pay a cost for doing so.

Secondly, to make sure that it understands that a cost will have to be paid if there should be similar steps tried elsewhere and, therefore, that it would act as a deterrent to further

aggression. We have to be prepared, in addition to that, to continue to maintain those actions or sanctions which have been taken in place until such time as Soviet forces are totally withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Q. Are you going to envisage some new actions or measures or sanctions against the Soviet Union, and what are they?

Secretary Vance. At this time, we are not contemplating any additional sanctions.

Q. I'd like to come back to this referendum question. You don't seem to be prepared to go as far on this subject as President Carter. In his interview in 1977 he said he recognized the distinct American national interest in the outcome of this referendum and that he felt it was in the interest of the United States that

Canada stay together. Are you now saying you're not prepared to endorse that statement?

Secretary Vance. I am not repudiating anything the President said. I'm saying that this is a question for the Canadian people to decide.

Q. For 2 days earlier this week, Friday and Monday, in the Commons Mr. Trudeau said that basically the reason we wouldn't go along with the Olympic boycott was that Canada's getting in on it wouldn't make much difference. Then Canada suddenly decided to go along with it. Can you explain to me what difference it does make, why Mr. Trudeau was wrong, why we're going to have some effect?

Secretary MacGuigan. May I first put that question in perspective. What Mr. Trudeau said is that single action

U.S.-Canada Discuss Fuel Conversion Proposals

Discussions on U.S. plans to reduce reliance on foreign oil, involving proposals to convert some oil-fired power plants to coal or other fuels, were held in Washington on February 29, 1980, between U.S. and Canadian officials.

The meeting was held at the invitation of the State Department in response to Canadian concern that these proposals could lead to a worsening of the transboundary air-pollution problem now facing both countries.

U.S. officials explained the implications of the various proposals now under consideration within the Administration and the need to accelerate the reduction of reliance on foreign oil. Canadian officials indicated they fully supported this objective but expressed their concern that the program be carried out in an environmentally sound manner, pointing out that the President of the United States and the Canadian Prime Minister joined other leaders in pledging at the Tokyo summit conference last June to develop increased use of coal without damage to the environment.

Officials agreed that the transboundary air-pollution problem is a shared concern of both Canada and the United States and that all proposals should be examined closely with this problem in mind. They also reiterated

their determination to make progress toward a cooperative air quality agreement to reduce transboundary air pollution as envisaged in the July 1979 announcement by the U.S. and Canadian Governments.

U.S. officials explained that plans under consideration by the Administration would address environmental concerns. Canadian officials emphasized their view that the coal conversion program should be implemented in a way which would maximize opportunities to reduce emissions of pollutants causing acid rain in both countries.

The U.S. officials undertook to convey Canadian views to the President before any decision is taken and to consult with Canada as details of the U.S. programs are developed in keeping with the long-established practice of both countries.

The meeting was attended by representatives of the U.S. State Department, Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and Council on Environmental Quality. Canada was represented by the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, and Environment Canada.

Press release 46 of Feb. 29, 1980. ■

control of spare parts for U.S. equipment will enable us to monitor these agreements. Let me also note that we have not yet authorized any exports under these new guidelines.

To lend perspective to the list of articles we are prepared to consider licensing for export to China, let me read you a partial list of articles we do not intend to export to China: firearms; artillery; ammunition; explosives; naval vessels of war; tanks; combat aircraft such as those designed for gunnery, bombing, or missile launching; and aircraft designed for refueling.

Let me now say a word about the role of Congress. Our relationship with China is so important that we intend to take special care to consult with Congress as we move ahead in improving our relations with that country. The Congress has established by law an elaborate reporting system with regard to the sale of articles on the Munitions Control List, and we will, of course, comply with all requirements of law regarding exports of Munitions List articles to China. Meanwhile, we will continue to keep Congress informed of significant developments in other areas of U.S.-China relations.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Crisis in Indochina

*Statements before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, 1980, by Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.*¹

MR. HOLBROOKE

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee again to follow up my testimony of last September on the crisis in Indochina. I propose to outline the current military situation in Indochina, describe the impact that the continuing war in Cambodia is having on the region, and set out the actions and policies we and our friends in East Asia and the international community are following to try to deal with the crisis. Ambassador Palmieri will be discussing the refugee and relief issues involved. Although they will be discussed separately, they are obviously closely intertwined with the political and military questions. It is appropriate, therefore, that you have asked both of us to appear here together.

Conflict in Cambodia

The conflict in Cambodia continues, with Hanoi now maintaining 180,000–200,000 soldiers in Cambodia, 50,000–70,000 of whom are operating along the Thai-Cambodia border. During the last 6 months an intensification of small-scale Vietnamese military sweep operations has occurred throughout the country but primarily in western Cambodia near the Thai-Cambodia border, where the remaining resistance is concentrated.

The situation remains perilous. If Vietnamese military operations were to strike at, or even brush against, the refugee concentrations along the border, either intentionally or inadvertently, they could force tens of thousands of Khmer to flee into Thailand. Such an event would add further to the desperate plight of these people. It would test the resources and capabilities of Thailand—which deserves great credit for its humanitarian response to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have already arrived on its border—as well as those of the international community as a whole.

Furthermore, we remain concerned about the possible spillover of the fighting itself into Thailand and the potential for regional destabilization and wider conflict such an expansion of the fighting would have. We have urged both Moscow and Hanoi to insure that Vietnamese forces exercise restraint along the Thai-Cambodia border. And we have noted their assurances that the Vietnamese will not attack or invade Thailand.

We do not have a clear picture of the situation inside Cambodia. We know that small-scale, scattered military resistance to the Vietnamese occupation exists throughout much of the country, with occasional clashes. Most visitors to Cambodia report a pervasive sense of insecurity and a lack of firm military control outside the major towns.

The limited nature of the Vietnamese military drive in western Cambodia and the tenacity and commitment of the Khmer Rouge soldiers indicated that the Khmer Rouge will survive the dry season as a viable fighting force. It appears likely to emerge with roughly 20,000 troops able to operate effectively in western Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, throughout the country.

The failure of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia to engage and reduce significantly Khmer Rouge forces during the current dry season, the increasing hemorrhage of high-ranking Heng Samrin officials who seek refuge in Thailand from Vietnamese domination, and the continuing clashes and insecurity throughout the country make it most likely that Hanoi will be unable during this dry season to establish full control throughout Cambodia. At this point Vietnam seems trapped into either a humiliating withdrawal from Cambodia or, in order to maintain control, the maintenance of a large garrison force of soldiers and administrators in Cambodia for an indefinite period.

China-Vietnam Confrontation

The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (S.R.V.) continue a tense confrontation. Earlier this month the Chinese terminated the second round of Vietnamese-Chinese negotiations which took place in Beijing, proposing that talks resume in the second half of 1980. The Vietnamese have responded with

harp criticism but have suggested that he talks resume in Hanoi on July 15.

The two rounds of talks thus far have failed to move the two sides toward any sort of accommodation. Vietnam has stressed limited measures to stabilize the border, mutual withdrawal of forces from the border region, creation of a demilitarized zone, and prisoner exchanges, while making only passing reference to the broader range of S.R.V.—P.R.C. relations. Of these only the prisoner exchange has been concluded. The Chinese, for their part, have insisted that "crucial and fundamental problems," such as Vietnam's ties to the Soviet Union, Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and Laos, and conflicting claims in the Paracels and Spratlys, will have to be resolved before relations can be improved.

The underlying differences in the two positions appear to offer little hope for rapid resolution. Over the near term, at least, Sino-Vietnamese relations will continue to be characterized by acrimony and distrust.

To launch its attack last February, China positioned roughly 500,000 troops along its border with Vietnam; apparently we believe there are less than half that number stationed along this border. Vietnam, on the other hand, is considerably strengthened its forces in the border region, roughly doubling the 100,000 it had prior to the Chinese attack last February. Thanks to Soviet assistance, Vietnam has also significantly strengthened the firepower of its forces as well.

For the time being, however, the test of strength and wills between the two nations is being conducted in the political, diplomatic, and psychological arenas and, of course, in Cambodia.

Aggression in Laos

Aggression in Sino-Lao relations has tightened considerably in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the fighting between Vietnam and Laos last year, with Vietnam following Hanoi's political and diplomatic lead. The Lao requested the termination of Chinese roadbuilding programs in northern Laos and the departure of all Chinese aid technicians. Lao propaganda has echoed Hanoi's anti-Chinese lines, and the Lao have continued to support Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia. In January the foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Laos, and the Heng Samrin regime met in Phnom Penh and affirmed their solidarity.

Despite Lao and Vietnamese charges, we see no evidence of a Chinese military buildup along the Sino-Lao border at this time. The Lao appear to have reinforced their forces on the border slightly. The Vietnamese, who now have about 45,000 troops in Laos, appear to be selectively relocating various units but do not appear to have significantly reinforced them. Current dispositions, as well as terrain factors, suggest little likelihood of major military action in the near future.

Insurgency continues, however. This brings me to an issue which concerns us deeply: the reports of the use of poison gas in Laos, primarily against the Hmong insurgents.

I know that you, Mr. Chairman [Senator John Glenn], have cosponsored with Senator Weicker a resolution condemning the reported use of lethal chemical agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and calling on the United States to raise its concerns with other countries and to take urgent diplomatic action to halt any such use of lethal chemical agents. We have made some suggestions as to language on that resolution, and we support it.

When we began to receive the first reports of the use of poison gas in Laos in 1978 we raised these reports and our concern about them directly with the Lao Government. I expressed our concern directly to the Acting Lao Foreign Minister when I visited Laos in 1978. We have increased our activity as more reports have come in. In June and September of last year we sent study teams to Hmong refugee camps specifically to interview those who claimed to have been the victims of a gas attack or to have witnessed one. Other refugee testimony has been collected regularly as we have continued to monitor the situation closely and to examine all reports and other information.

To this point, we have been unable to obtain tangible evidence of the use of poison gas. We believe, however, that refugee testimony is persuasive that some kind of lethal chemical agent has been used and that such reports themselves fully justify our raising our concern.

Accordingly, we have continued to raise our concerns repeatedly and directly with the Lao Government, as well as with Hanoi and Moscow. The Lao have categorically denied any such use, and Hanoi and Moscow have echoed their denials. We have shared the reports of the study teams with them and with the international com-

munity generally. We have raised the issue in the last two sessions of the U.N. Human Rights Commission and in the current U.N. Disarmament Committee meetings.

We will continue to raise with other governments and with international organizations our concern about the reports we receive, pressing for adherence to the 1925 Geneva convention on chemical warfare, urging that any use be stopped and arguing for the establishment of an international commission to investigate the charges.

The question of poison gas, Lao support for Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia, Lao statements of support for the militants holding our diplomats hostage in Iran and for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the lack of progress in resolving MIA [U.S. soldiers missing in action] issues have precluded improvement in our relations with Laos. We are, however, working actively to engage the Lao in a continuing dialogue on issues of mutual concern in the hope that at some point progress will become possible.

Impact of the Conflict

Obviously two of the main ramifications of the conflict have been in the refugee and relief fields, which Ambassador Palmieri will be addressing. The response of the American people and government to the needs of the refugees expelled from Vietnam, to the pressures such huge numbers of refugees placed on the countries of first asylum, and to the basic human needs of the starving hundreds of thousands of Khmer has reflected the highest values and traditions of our nation. Our efforts in these fields have been recognized by the countries of Southeast Asia as among our most important contributions in East Asia. We can take pride in what we have done, while recognizing that there is much left to be done.

Vietnam

There are other victims in East Asia today, and one of the major victims of Hanoi's aggression in Cambodia is the Vietnamese people themselves. The diversion of economic resources from development to military aggression against a neighbor, the termination or reduction of foreign aid programs, the reconversion of army units which had been shifted to economic reconstruction back to regular military service, the requirement for the average young male Vietnamese to continue to fight

Political and Economic Interests in Africa

Addresses by Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), and Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, on December 13, 1979, in Detroit before a regional foreign policy conference on Africa cosponsored by the Department of State and the Economic Club of Detroit; more than 35 other organizations in the Detroit area—representing business, organized labor, and educational, ethnic, civic, and professional groups—also cooperated in the conference program.

MR. BENNET

We are about to enter the last two decades of the 20th century. Looking back, the last two decades have been tumultuous ones for sub-Saharan Africa.

Today there are 46 independent states; in 1955 there were only two. In the past two decades political, social, cultural, and economic changes of enormous magnitude have swept across the continent. Change came so fast that in the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. policymakers found forces racing ahead of their ability to adjust to the unfolding of African nationalism and the breakdown of colonial empires. Although Africa had emerged as an important global factor in the early 1970s, U.S. policy still tended to view Africa as weak and economically and politically unimportant. U.S.-Africa trade was minute, and our economic assistance to Africa decidedly token—only 6% of our worldwide totals. U.S. policy held that Africans should find their own answers to worsening problems.

Since 1976 a more active and sensitive U.S.-Africa policy has emerged. In contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s when policy was largely a series of reactions to events, today we see the United States taking a positive and activist role in searching for peaceful solutions to conflicts that persist in several corners of Africa. Relations with most African states have improved markedly. U.S. economic assistance to Africa had risen to \$443 million in FY 1979, a doubling of 1975 levels. This still represents only 9% of our total worldwide assistance. However, our fastest growing economic aid program today is in Africa.

As our own policy has been maturing, we have seen a maturing of African nationalism which permits closer cooperation. In the immediate postcolonial period, it was natural for African leaders to concentrate on the politics of independence, and we were sometimes viewed as adversaries-by-association with excolonial masters.

Now, however, African leaders must turn time and more attention to economic and social development. Their people are pressing hard for results. We are able to provide some of that help, and most African governments are becoming more expert as well at tapping foreign private investment in ways compatible with their own natural development goals.

Today African leaders are committed to economic and social development, to gaining political and economic equality among the nations of the world, to limiting, where possible, foreign or outside meddling in African affairs, and to ending once and for all minority rule where it stubbornly resists inevitable change. The United

... it costs more to move a bushel of grain 700 miles into the interior of any African country than it does to ship it 7,000 miles from New Orleans.

States today supports those goals.

Moreover, we realize that the long-term success of U.S.-African policy depends on the not-too-distant realization of African development aspirations. This is where we confront the most difficult challenge to the United States' Africa policy of the 1980s and 1990s. Just when U.S. policy has caught up with Africa's vision of itself, serious and unmet development needs and economic deterioration portend new crises and instability.

Challenges Facing Africa

In 1978, the average per capita GNP growth for all non-oil-producing African states was near zero. There are indications that the situation in 1979 is worse. Africa is projected to fall much farther behind the rest of the developing world during the next 10 years.

Consider these trends, their potential aggregate impact on Africa, and the challenge they present for U.S. policy in the near future.

First, per capita food production in Africa is now declining by 1.4% annually. During the period 1960-79, there has been no significant shift from Africa's highly vulnerable and predominantly subsistence agriculture. Average per hectare production in Africa lags far behind other developing regions. The increased production that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s came through expanding the area under cultivation rather than through increased yield. International research groups now estimate a food grain deficit in Africa of 23 million tons in 1990. Niger alone will then have to import as much grain as India. Even assuming sufficient world supplies, balance-of-payments trends suggest that most African nations will have insufficient foreign exchange to finance the food imports they require.

Second, desertification, deforestation, and erosion are threatening the essential agriculture resource base of the majority of the continent's countries. LANDSAT satellite photos show that 52% of Africa's land is now desert or subject to serious desertification. The capacity to produce food and meet basic human needs could be permanently and irreversibly damaged if this land degradation continues.

Third, population and urbanization growth rates, at 2.65% and 9.5% respectively, are the highest in the world. We can anticipate accelerating movements of migrant workers and refugees that will further aggravate food shortages and unemployment, possibly leading to serious social conflict.

Fourth, despite substantial progress in eradicating selected communicable diseases, the majority of Africa's population still has no access to basic health services. The presence of some debilitating disease in most of the African adult population is a predominant factor in the low productivity of labor. Life expectancy averages 45 years in Africa compared with 53 years in the developing world overall and 72 years in the United States.

Fifth, the World Bank forecasts a real per capita growth of less than 1% in Africa during the 1980s.

Sixth, accelerating rates of inflation and deteriorating terms of trade fueled largely by recent energy price

increases, will further undermine Africa's fragile economies. An estimated debt service burden in 1990 of 27.6% of export earnings, more than any other geographic region, will seriously reduce Africa's capacity to import food and required capital resources.

Seventh, transportation systems are poor, developed largely for extractive industries with little regard for internal needs and domestic populations. Africa ranks last of all the continents in transport systems. The limited capacity that does exist is so expensive that it discourages investment and raises prices. For instance, it costs over \$100 to move a bushel of grain 700 miles into the interior of any African country than it does to ship it 7,000 miles from New Orleans.

In summary, for 70% of the African countries, per capita growth was lower during the 1970s than in the previous decade. This group was, in other words, *undeveloping*. Unless reversed, the trends I have cited could turn today's development plans into nothing more than tomorrow's short-term, crisis-oriented relief programs.

Importance of Development U.S. Interests

With such serious economic problems in Africa, not to mention here at home, we might legitimately ask: Is there anything we can do to help, even if we want to? Is Africa's development really at all important to U.S. interests? The answers are clearly yes, for several reasons.

First, with ever-increasing global interdependence during the 1980s and 1990s, the United States will become considerably more dependent on regular, dependable supplies of Africa's natural resources. The region, the most unexplored of the continents, holds great promise of mineral and petroleum wealth. Today more than 25% of our imported petroleum comes from sub-Saharan Africa, five times what we used to import from Iran.

Several of the poorest African countries are only now discovering or beginning to develop important deposits of the strategic minerals uranium, manganese, vanadium, cobalt, chrome, niobium, and bauxite. These are essential to us for the production of high-speed metals for jet engines, for aircraft, and for defense and nuclear energy uses, and the earnings they represent are just as essential to the future prosperity of Africa.

Second, despite the discouraging economic and environmental trends, Africa, with untapped major river basins and extensive land, does have the physical potential to produce surplus food grains late in this century, when global deficiencies are projected to reach new records. Africa has the potential for increasing annual production of food grains by 16 million tons from rain-fed agriculture and 9 million from irrigated land. This would represent a 47% increase over the approximately 55 million tons of cereal produced in 1979. In addition, from another energy standpoint, most of the world's undeveloped hydroelectric power is in Africa.

Third, we are seeing today important and encouraging political transitions in Africa. Nigeria and Ghana have recently moved from military to civilian rule. Upper Volta and Mali are moving in similar directions. A peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe may now be a reality. These transitions are encouraging to all who believe more strength lies in democracy than in totalitarianism. These changes should mean more human rights and more human energies liberated for the task of development. They also make it all the more imperative that the African people see some tangible benefits of development progress.

Fourth, we should not forget that it was the rapidly rising U.S. exports to the developing world that played a key role in pulling the U.S. economy out of the 1973 recession. Africa is potentially a very important part of that market, depending on the continent's growth and capacity to import.

Moreover, with one-third of the independent nations of the world being African, and all of them voting members of the United Nations, Africa plays a major role in the ongoing North-South dialogue that is vital to our future welfare as well as to Africa's.

But clear interests do not constitute a policy. A policy expressed in material terms is narrow, short-sighted, and too much like the colonialism and paternalism that held Africa back for years.

A U.S.-Africa policy for the 1980s and 1990s must offer much more. It must start out with a shared hope for the future of the continent which is painfully far behind the rest of the world in unlocking its enormous human and physical potential. It must con-

cretely support African aspirations in the drive for racial justice and economic and social development. An affirmative U.S.-Africa policy for the 1980s and 1990s must state with clarity that we, the most developed of the world's nations, will not allow Africa's alarming economic and environmental decline to continue, because it portends a loss of human potential and political instability that are contrary to both U.S. and African interests.

Our country has the wealth and the know-how in both its public and private sectors to help Africa move forward.

Today more than 25% of our imported petroleum comes from sub-Saharan Africa, five times what we used to import from Iran.

We know it, the Africans know it, and the world knows it.

Some say African development will take many decades, because they are so far behind. I say we no longer have the luxury of such patience. As we look back at the turn of the century, the test of the realism and effectiveness of our Africa policy in the 1980s and 1990s will certainly be whether we had the capacity to craft, in full partnership with Africa and with other donors, comprehensive solutions that will reverse the decline in Africa's development progress.

With this in mind, what new initiatives can be undertaken? Ideas will emerge from your deliberations here today particularly in the individual workshops on "African Economic Prospects" and on "U.S. Strategic Interest and Africa's International Role." We look forward to studying the results of your deliberations.

There are some important areas in which African nations can help themselves substantially.

There is room in some countries for cautious decentralization and greater local initiative in the development process. A strong central authority may have been necessary in the first stage of nationbuilding but can become a dead end if a few ministries attempt to manage all aspects of the development process. The greatest single development resource in any country is the liberated energies of its people.

One factor that is particularly important in liberating these energies is seeing that farmers receive economic prices for their labor. We frequently see farm prices held down artificially in

and die after four decades of fighting and dying have produced economic stagnation and popular malaise throughout Vietnam.

We do not see any signs that such difficulties are yet causing a rethinking of Hanoi's course in Cambodia. Hanoi continues to refer to the situation in Cambodia as "irreversible." There has been no letup in Vietnam's military commitment or any suggestion of interest in a political settlement.

Nevertheless, the current economic difficulties and the popular unease must continue to weigh on Hanoi's mind. Recent changes in the Hanoi leadership, in which Interior Minister Tran Quoc Hoan and State Planning Commission Chairman Le Thanh Nghi were both replaced, suggest that Hanoi is aware of these pressures. Hanoi may eventually come to realize that the interests of its own people can best be served by focusing the energies of the Vietnamese nation on its own development.

The Soviets and Vietnam

As is true in certain other regions of the world, the Soviet Union must bear a major part of the responsibility for the human suffering and the increased instability in the region.

The Soviet Union is providing Vietnam essential support for its military activities in Cambodia. Soviet shipments of military equipment to Vietnam more than quadrupled from 1978 to 1979. Soviet support, which costs the Soviets close to \$3 million a day, has included some new sophisticated military equipment but consists primarily of replacement and resupply for existing weapons, as well as petroleum and food. Soviet technicians and dockworkers have played a key role in the functioning of Haiphong, Vietnam's major port. The Soviets have placed 12 AN-12 transport planes, with Soviet crews, in Hanoi's service. These planes fly extensively between Ho Chi Minh City and western Cambodia bringing in military supplies essential to Vietnam's military activities there. Without such Soviet support, the Vietnamese would be unable to maintain their effort in Cambodia at anything like its current level.

As a result of their support for the Vietnamese the Soviets have gained access to naval and air facilities in Vietnam. Soviet ships and submarines call at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet long-range aircraft operate out of Danang on an increasingly regular

basis. Earlier this month a Soviet frigate made a precedent-setting call at the Khmer port of Kompong Som, thus projecting a Soviet naval presence further into Southeast Asia. Through their increased access to these facilities, the Soviets have significantly enhanced their military capabilities, not only in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific but also in the Indian Ocean.

Soviet activities, such as the recent concentration of over 10 ships in the South China Sea off Vietnam, introduce a new destabilizing element into Southeast Asia, a region whose nations wish to exclude big-power rivalries and to create a stable system of independent nation states in which all nations could concentrate their energies and resources on nation-building and economic development.

Vietnam's close alignment with the Soviet Union has also served increasingly to isolate Vietnam in the region, in the nonaligned movement, and in the international community generally. The 91-21 vote on the U.N. General Assembly resolution concerning the situation in Cambodia last November testifies to Hanoi's isolation. In time such isolation may help bring Vietnam to reconsider the price it is having to pay in terms of its oft-proclaimed dedication to its independence and sovereignty, as well as in terms of its relations with its neighbors, the nonaligned community, and with the rest of the world.

U.S.-Vietnamese Relations

Another reflection of the isolation which Vietnam has created for itself is that movement toward normalization of relations between Vietnam and the United States remains suspended. Vietnam is the third most populous Communist nation and maintains one of the world's largest military establishments. As recent events in Southeast Asia have all too well demonstrated, Vietnamese actions impact directly on the United States.

We want to be in the best possible position to exert a positive influence on Vietnamese policies and actions. In particular we want to encourage the Vietnamese to act on their pledge to provide the fullest possible accounting of missing U.S. personnel, to implement an orderly departure program to help resolve refugee and family reunification issues, and to move toward the observance of international accepted standards of human rights.

At the beginning of this Administration we made it clear that in order to

put the hostility of the past behind us and to enhance the peace and stability of Southeast Asia, we were ready to normalize our relations with Vietnam. That remains our objective. From the first meeting in May 1977, we stressed to the Vietnamese that we could not agree to economic aid as a precondition to normalization and that progress toward normalization would inevitably be affected by Hanoi's policies toward its neighbors.

Vietnam's insistence that we agree to provide direct economic assistance as part of any agreement to establish relations blocked progress for a year and a half. In the fall of 1978 Hanoi stated that it would no longer demand a U.S. commitment to bilateral economic assistance as a *quid pro quo* for normalization and that it would continue its efforts to provide an MIA accounting.

These statements were followed, however, by the massive forced expulsion of the boat people and the December Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. In these circumstances, we halted further movement toward U.S.-Vietnamese normalization as not being appropriate or conducive to regional stability at this time.

While normal relations between our two countries remains our ultimate objective, we cannot move in this direction under current circumstances. The Vietnamese are well aware of our views. We have periodic talks with them on such issues as MIAs, refugees, and the famine and the conflict in Kam puchea to insure that they fully understand our views and in the hope of moving them to more responsible courses of action. We will continue these contacts and keep Congress fully informed.

Dealing With the Crisis

We have worked closely with our friends and allies to meet the dangers and difficulties posed by Vietnamese and Soviet policies in Indochina. In response to the pressures and tensions in the region created by the overwhelming number of Vietnamese refugees pouring into the countries of first asylum in the region, last July we doubled our intake of refugees for resettlement in the United States to 14,000 a month. Our move stimulated a broad international response and has significantly eased the tension in the region.

We continue to urge the Vietnamese to treat their own people humanely so that they no longer feel compelled to flee and to stress to the

Vietnamese the importance of the maintenance of the moratorium on the government-sponsored mass illegal exodus. We have made every effort, working through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, to establish an orderly departure program out of Vietnam which will allow Vietnamese with ties to the United States to leave.

Faced with the threat to Thai security posed by Vietnamese military activities along the Thai-Cambodia border, we have expedited deliveries of previously ordered military equipment to Thailand and, with the cooperation of this committee, increased our foreign military sales credits to the Thai as well.

We have publicly stressed the importance we place on Thailand's security and territorial integrity and noted the continued relevance of the Manila Pact, most recently in last month's ANZUS [security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and United States] communique.

We have contributed over \$80 million to the international relief effort to respond to the desperate famine in Cambodia. We are working with international agencies and other countries to pressure the Vietnamese to permit wider distribution of food within Cambodia and greater international access to the country. We are consulting closely also on how to respond to the continuing requirement for large amounts of food and medicine in order to keep the Khmer people alive; the next meeting will be in New York only 2 days from now.

Faced with the continuing violations of human rights in Cambodia and the reports of the use of poison gas in both Laos and Cambodia, we have pressed bilaterally for any use of poison gas to cease and, at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, for international action to look into both situations.

In addition to dealing with these symptoms, we have also sought to deal with the root political causes. In November last year the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 91-21, approved a resolution proposed by the five ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] and 26 other nonaligned nations on the situation in Cambodia. This resolution:

- Appealed for humanitarian relief to the civilian population of Cambodia;
- Urged all parties to the conflict to facilitate humanitarian relief efforts;
- Called on all parties to observe fundamental principles of human rights;

- Called for a cessation of hostilities and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia;

- Appealed to all states to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia;

- Resolved that the people of Cambodia be enabled to choose democratically their own government without outside interference, subversion, or coercion; and

- Requested that the Secretary General explore the possibility of an international conference on Cambodia.

In addition to the concerns reflected in our refugee policy and relief effort, we have steadfastly supported ASEAN in the face of the insecurity and tension stemming from the Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia and the threat to the region posed by the expanding Soviet access to the region. In response to these concerns, we have fully endorsed the ASEAN-U.N. General Assembly resolution as providing a base for progress toward peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

We and our friends and allies have worked unceasingly to promote a political solution to the crises. In February I visited all the ASEAN capitals and conferred with their leaders. We met with our ANZUS partners here in Washington at the end of February. Australian Prime Minister Fraser, Japanese Foreign Minister Okita, and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang have all visited Washington in the past month, as has Prince Sihanouk. These meetings, which have covered a wide diversity of issues, have also provided the opportunity for intense exchanges of views on the situation in Indochina.

Others have been active as well. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers recently met with the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community; they reviewed the threat to the peace posed by both Vietnamese-Soviet actions in Cambodia and Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and called for early implementation of the ASEAN-U.N. resolution on Cambodia.

We have explored with all how we might proceed toward a political settlement which at a minimum would promote the key goals of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, the emergence of a genuinely independent and neutral Cambodia at peace with its neighbors and with a government which represents its people and respects their rights, and the return to regional sta-

bility and balance by the elimination of the Soviet military intrusion in the region.

Although none of the active participants in the fighting yet seem interested in a peaceful settlement of the issues, we will continue to see what role we can play in the promotion of a peaceful and stable Cambodia. Meanwhile, we believe it is vital to persist in our response to the humanitarian needs of the region to the best of our means and abilities—knowing as we all do that the ultimate resolution of the painful and tragic situation, however distant, can only come as a result of the mutual efforts of all concerned.

AMBASSADOR PALMIERI

I appreciate this opportunity to bring you up to date on the refugee and humanitarian relief situation in Southeast Asia. Since my confirmation by the Senate in December, I have made two trips to Southeast Asia during which I inspected the refugee camps and border settlements in Thailand and the other countries of first asylum and consulted with ministers of those governments, international relief officials, and voluntary agency workers. Wherever I went I interviewed refugee families and became a witness to the suffering they have endured. In recent weeks I have also made trips to a number of cities throughout the United States where Indochinese are being resettled. There I held discussions with mayors and other local and state officials and the sometimes frightened but always determined people—"strangers in a strange land"—who are seeking to make the difficult transition from Asian refugee to American resident.

Based on these observations, I have the greatest concern about the situation in Kampuchea and the Southeast Asian refugee crisis, and I welcome this opportunity to share this concern with you and the members of the subcommittee.

First, despite the efforts of the international community, the desperate human needs for food and medical assistance within Kampuchea are being only partially met, and there is the grim prospect, now that the last wet season's small rice harvest has been fully consumed, that renewed famine and disease will lay waste again to that tortured population.

Second, there is no end in sight to the refugee flow from Indochina, and there is no reason to expect to see one so long as the people of Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam lack either food or future.

Third, the scale of the relief and resettlement effort required to meet the human needs of the refugees and the political needs of the first asylum countries in Southeast Asia is rapidly outstripping the resources of the international community. When one takes account of the equally compelling refugee needs of Africa and Pakistan and Central America, it becomes clear that there is a worldwide refugee crisis and that it poses not only a humanitarian dilemma but a massive financial dilemma as well. To place these concerns in proper perspective, let me sketch briefly the background of the present situation in Kampuchea.

Background of Situation in Kampuchea

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was launched at the time of the primary annual harvest in December 1978. Both the Vietnamese and the defending Democratic Kampuchea forces under Pol Pot used crop destruction and crop denial tactics, resulting in the loss of most of the nation's rice supply. Continued fighting and Pol Pot's retreat to outlying regions led to massive population shifts, which in turn disrupted planting in May and June 1979. Only about 10% of the arable land was planted in August for the annual harvest. International observers reported in the fall of 1979 that malnutrition and disease had taken a heavy toll and that large numbers of Khmer civilians were foraging for food across much of the country. By October there were 200,000 displaced Khmer pressing against the Thai border.

The United States began forecasting food shortages as early as March of 1979, and we urged international organizations to begin contingency planning against the expected famine in Kampuchea. In July, Secretary Vance called for an international humanitarian relief program to aid the Khmer people. The United States and potential donor countries agreed that distribution of relief supplies should be made under effective international supervision, monitoring, and control to insure against diversion of relief goods to military use, and that aid should be afforded to all Khmer in need regardless of the political control under which they existed. Negotiations with the Heng Samrin and Pol Pot authorities began in July but did not result in agreement to allow relief operations inside Kampuchea until September. Meanwhile, some border feeding programs had quietly begun in Thailand in June. These were expanded considerably in October to care for the large numbers

Indochinese Refugee Program Summary (April 1975 through February 1980)

	No. of Refugees*
Total arrivals in countries of first asylum	758,526
Departures for resettlement to:	
United States	326,675
France	60,998
Canada	45,779
Australia	35,298
Germany	11,783
Other	34,773
TOTAL	515,306

* Figures do not include new Khmer refugees on the Thai border or the 270,000 Vietnamese who have sought to resettle in the People's Republic of China.

SOURCE: UNHCR, March 1980.

of Khmer fleeing into Thailand after food shortages became acute and the Vietnamese renewed efforts to crush the Pol Pot resistance forces.

The breakthrough came in late September when the mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF in Phnom Penh finally secured agreement to begin operations. Since November, shipments of food and medical supplies have been arriving at Phnom Penh and Kampong Som by ship, by airlift from Bangkok and Singapore, and by barge up the Mekong. Until the start of the year, however, the bulk of these stocks remained in the warehouses. Whether because of military priorities, logistical difficulties, or mere ineffectiveness of the Phnom Penh authorities, few if any international relief supplies were being moved to provincial depots for distribution to villagers.

During January and February, ICRC/UNICEF food supplies finally began to move out of Phnom Penh and Kampong Som to provincial depots. However, there remains a concern about equitable distribution. We are receiving reports that military personnel and government cadre are receiving an adequate food ration (which is the principal currency in Kampuchea and hence may represent a form of salary), while apparently other Khmer receive significantly smaller quantities. The issuance of a new currency in Kampuchea, expected shortly, may improve the distribution situation

and reduce the importance of rice as a form of wealth.

To deal with the problem of distribution we have urged the international relief organizations to press the political authorities in Kampuchea for better operating arrangements to assure more equitable and more frequently monitored distribution. In considering our contribution to the Secretary General's recently announced \$262 million appeal for Kampuchean relief through the balance of calendar year 1980, we have stated that important factors are improved cooperation on the part of the political authorities in Kampuchea with the relief effort, better monitoring of distribution of relief supplies, as well as the contributions of other donors in the general issue of humanitarian need. We would hope these discussions would produce sufficient pledges from the international community to meet the short-term needs of the relief program, as well as lead to support for the balance of the year. Our hope is that we can specify objective benchmarks to determine the effectiveness of the program.

Meanwhile, the key to the survival of the Khmer people may well have been the border feeding operations in Thailand. To date over 150,000 Khmer have crossed into Thailand where they remain in holding centers under the care of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Additional large numbers of Khmer have gathered along the border to await improved conditions in Kampuchea and to receive food. Up to 15,000 tons of food per month are provided not only to Khmer along the border, but also to those who come from the interior to receive supplies and carry them back to villages. While most of the transients are from Battambang Province, some come from as far east as provinces along the Vietnamese border. Perhaps 500,000 people in the interior of Kampuchea have been fed by what has become known as the oxcart and bicycle brigade.

While the border feeding program to date has played an indispensable role in the infusion of food into western Kampuchea, since early January it has been disrupted in the major border agglomerations by outbreaks of fighting between armed Khmer factions who control the settlements. Since the border is ill-defined in the area of these settlements, it has been difficult for the Thai military authorities to maintain order, especially in light of the risks of contact with Vietnamese forces. It has also been difficult for the international organizations to

create controls insuring an equitable distribution of food within the settlements.

The bottom line, however, is that the bulk of Khmer in the border concentrations, without money or other resources, has been sustained by international relief efforts. We have been pressing the international organizations to make food distribution more equitable; but we must also recognize the enormously difficult circumstances under which this entire program is being carried out. News reports last week of continued internecine battles and civilian casualties among the Khmer groups underline the urgency of the situation.

The Need for Continued Support

To sum up the situation, we face a major dilemma and an expensive one. Until we are assured that the relief program within Kampuchea can prevent renewed famine, we cannot reduce border feeding operations. Accordingly, we must continue to support both programs while we bring very possible diplomatic pressure to insure the most effective and equitable use of the relief supplies.

A combination of the last wet season's small harvest and external aid have temporarily alleviated the severe food shortages and health problems evident inside Kampuchea last fall. But now that the principal harvest has been consumed, famine and disease will certainly re-emerge before the next major harvest in December. International aid is essential to insure the survival of the Khmer people during the coming months and to discourage the movement toward the Thai border of additional large numbers of Khmer seeking food.

Since October of 1979 the United States has contributed almost \$79 million toward the international relief effort for Khmer inside Kampuchea and for those who have fled to and across the border. In total, the international Kampuchean relief effort through mid-March has cost almost \$206 million. In addition to our contributions to the Khmer feeding programs, we have also contributed \$30 million to UNHCR for the care and maintenance of other Indochinese refugees in countries of first asylum, maintaining a 1% share of support for refugee assistance and Khmer relief.

International aid currently in the pipeline is scheduled to run out in May. As noted above, U.N. Secretary General Waldheim has issued an appeal for \$262 million to continue the relief pro-

gram for Kampuchea for the remainder of the year. Donor countries will meet in New York on March 26 to consider pledges as well as issues of accountability, monitoring, and general effectiveness.

In addition to continuing feeding programs, our support is also essential for agricultural rehabilitation within Kampuchea. We have recently allocated an initial \$3 million for an international program covering five key rice-producing provinces contiguous to the great lake (Tunle Sap). Two voluntary agencies are undertaking similar programs in two separate provinces, and we have contributed over \$2 million to their efforts. If successful, agricultural rehabilitation should significantly reduce the need during 1981 for food supplies from abroad.

Developments Affecting Other Refugees

I would like to turn now to recent developments affecting refugees in Southeast Asia, other than the Khmer. As was outlined in testimony before this subcommittee last September, the Geneva meeting convened by U.N. Secretary General Waldheim on July 20-21, 1979, brought both worldwide attention and immediate humanitarian relief for the refugees and the beleaguered countries of first asylum. New contributions to the UNHCR relieved the financial strain of providing care and maintenance to a refugee population that had rapidly expanded to 370,000 in July. Offers of resettlement climbed to about 290,000 for the following year, reassuring the countries of first asylum of outside support. The Vietnamese pledge to stem "illegal departures" for a "reasonable period of time" resulted in a dramatic drop in the arrival rates of "boat people."

Within a short period after the Geneva meeting, this combination of factors had contributed to a restoration of the principle of first asylum improvement of camp conditions, a substantial decline in camp populations, and a general lessening of tensions throughout Southeast Asia. Today, 8 months later, there are still relatively high third-country resettlement rates and low arrival rates of boat refugees. But in the interim, the development of the Kampuchean crisis has added to the concerns of the Southeast Asian nations and strained international relief organizations.

At the same time, the recent deterioration of refugee problems in Pakistan and Somalia have further drained international resources for humanitarian relief. In addition, there remains an under-

lying uncertainty about future refugee flows from the countries of Indochina. Without renewed pledges of financial contributions and resettlement offers, the countries of first asylum could conceivably revert to the drastic measures they took last spring, particularly if there is a new influx of refugees from Vietnam. Let me review the trends of the last 6 months and our role in encouraging greater international support for efforts to deal with this pressing problem.

Before the Geneva meeting last July, non-Communist countries had resettled approximately 315,000 Indochinese since 1975. The United States accepted about 210,000 and France, Canada, and Australia accepted about three-fourths of the remaining 105,000. Since Geneva, the resettlement rate to third countries has more than doubled. During the first 5 months of this fiscal year, when we admitted 70,000 refugees, other non-Communist countries admitted nearly 60,000. Non-Communist third country resettlement of Indochinese since 1975 now totals almost 200,000. Additionally, another 250,000 people from Vietnam, most of them ethnic Chinese, are now resettled or in process of resettlement in the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). The P.R.C. has also agreed to accept 10,000 refugees from first asylum countries as its contribution to the international effort to meet the Indochinese refugee problem.

The sustained, high resettlement rates of third countries in the past 6 months have clearly been influenced by the U.S. rate. Maintaining the resettlement flow to third countries beyond the next few months will require energetic efforts on the part of the UNHCR, which only a few weeks ago issued an appeal to that end. The United States strongly supports the appeal and will continue diplomatic activities to encourage third country participation.

These efforts are particularly important because the decline in arrival rates of boat refugees since the Geneva meeting has mistakenly led some to think the problem is under control. Despite the drop in boat arrivals from a high of 45,000 in May and June to an average of less than 4,000 a month since October, land arrivals in Thailand from Laos have not abated, and arrivals from Kampuchea threaten to overwhelm the Thais. The total number of refugees in regular camps in Southeast Asia has dropped about 130,000 since July, but it still remained dangerously high at 243,000 on March 1, 1980. We expect that the flow may continue at about 15,000 refugees a month during the remainder of FY 1980. Even

at our resettlement rate of 14,000 a month, plus approximately equal departures for other countries, there would still be about 150,000 refugees in camps by October.

I hasten to add that this picture assumes there is no change in the present circumstances. We know from our previous experience in this part of the world that changing conditions could easily produce an increased boat flow again, and that we could face another crisis as in the spring of 1979. Additionally, there are the hundreds of thousands of displaced Khmer on the border of Thailand.

We hope that most Khmer will seek to return to their homeland, but significant numbers from the Khmer holding centers may seek resettlement. This is an extraordinarily delicate situation, which is intimately related to the availability of foodstocks in Kampuchea, the continuing presence of Vietnamese forces in that country, and the desire of the Thai Government to see these displaced Khmer return to their country. If necessary, at an appropriate time we would be prepared to work with the UNHCR to address the problem of the residual Khmer population in Thailand and to seek resettlement opportunities for some of them elsewhere.

I do not wish to leave this matter of Indochinese refugee flows without pointing out that our attention has been focused on those events, the tragedies of the boat people and the Khmer, which by their sheer magnitude have dramatized this situation. These overshadow the steady, smaller flows of clandestine departures from Vietnam and of Lao and Hmong people from Laos. These people continue to risk their lives in fleeing the repression they find in their countries. I would hope that the governments of these countries would create conditions so that no one would feel compelled to flee and that those who wish to leave would be allowed to live under tolerable conditions until eligible to leave legally.

In this regard, we have made every attempt to work out arrangements under the orderly departure program negotiated by the UNHCR with Hanoi to facilitate the departure from Vietnam of those people who have close associations with the United States. Such associations would include persons with close relatives in the United States, former employees of the U.S. Government or other U.S. organizations, and other persons formerly associated with U.S. policies or programs.

We have long urged Vietnam, as I did when I met the Vietnamese Charge in Bangkok in January, not only to provide us the names of persons they will allow to leave that country but also to specify what their ties are to the United States. This would allow us to determine whether they appear to qualify for admission as immigrants or refugees. They are now providing this information, and we are moving, albeit slowly, toward a procedure of processing these persons.

It would be foolhardy to forecast that active implementation of the program can be anticipated shortly, but it is not outside the realm of possibility. We have been forthcoming in agreeing to most of Vietnam's conditions, and it is now up to the Vietnamese to implement the arrangements. If the program gets underway, then we may bring into the United States not only immigrants but as many as 1,000 refugees a month from Vietnam within the present allocation of 14,000 Indochinese refugees a month.

Such a development, I believe, will be a positive step toward resolving some of the factors which impel people to flee Vietnam. I would hope that the opening of a legal channel for departures to this and other countries would encourage people in Vietnam to wait there rather than to flee as boat refugees which has led both to the loss of many lives and burdened the countries of first asylum. Vietnam has also indicated that the continuation of its moratorium on assisting boat refugee departures hinges on the willingness of other countries to admit people directly from Vietnam under the orderly departure program. Developments such as these would reduce this particular problem to a manageable scale for ourselves, our ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] friends, and the Vietnamese.

Just as important to me as coping with the refugee challenge in Southeast Asia is improving the quality of resettlement of refugees in this country. To date the Indochinese program has been very successful on balance, thanks primarily to the commitment and generosity of the voluntary agencies. But now that we have greatly accelerated admissions and arriving refugees are no longer predominantly urban Westernized middle class with long ties to the United States, we are beginning to encounter problems in some areas of the country. We are working closely with the voluntary agencies, state and local service agencies, and community leaders to try to ease the

transition of the refugees into American society without placing the burden unfairly on anyone.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

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Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

by *Matthew Nimetz*

Address before the joint meeting of the Rotary Clubs of Franklin County in Columbus, Ohio, on February 26, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.¹

Ever since the end of the Second World War, the most dangerous factor in world politics has been the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. I would like to say a few words today about the relationship between the two superpowers, about the East-West balance in the third month of 1980, and about what it portends for the future.

But before addressing my main topic, I will express my belief that the long-term survival of this planet as a habitable environment for men and women will depend on our facing up to a series of other challenges. These include the population issue—you know that we are adding 1 million people every 5 days and expect a world population of 6-6.5 billion by the year 2000. They include the problem of providing food, shelter, and jobs to this exploding population; developing new sources of energy and using what we have more efficiently; controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons; protecting the international environment from threats to human health and the productivity of our oceans and land; accommodating ourselves—the richest nation on our Earth—to the needs and aspirations of the Third World nations. These are some of the most difficult problems we face. I leave them for you to ponder during the next decade or two.

An Unsuccessful Image

The challenge we face from the Soviet Union is, in some senses, much easier than those I have just touched upon. It is easier because, I believe, we have been largely successful in dealing with the Soviet challenge in all respects but one—and we can be successful in dealing with that threat as well if we have the determination and persistence to do so. The Soviet challenge is a broad one. It involves ideological, economic, and military challenges to Western ideals, to Western political and economic systems, and to Western security.

I say we have had significant successes in meeting this challenge because I think it is quite clear that the Soviet Union—and the Communist ideas it seeks to promote—has not attracted support in the world at large. Communist thinking is stagnant. Even Communist Parties in other countries, whether in power—such as Yugoslavia, Albania, China, and North Korea—or in opposition—Italy, France, and Spain—reject the Soviet Union as a model for their own futures.

The communism of the Soviet Union, established by revolutionaries to be the model for a future world, is generally regarded as empty rhetoric, as arid scholasticism, as an increasingly shabby facade for a brutalized and dispirited social system.

On the other hand, the West, for all our faults, remains dynamic, creative, and attractive. I find most revealing one phenomenon so obvious that most people ignore it, and that is the direction in which people migrate.

One of the Soviet Union's major problems is to keep its people locked in: They build walls, mine borders, and fill prisons—but still cannot suppress the wish of millions to escape Communist rule. Their most creative people—for example, their greatest writers and their greatest scientists—must be suppressed or exiled. On the other hand, one of our major problems is restricting entry into our country because of the attractiveness and freedom of our society. People vote with their feet—and they are walking, better, running, westward, not to the east.

Economic Model

As a method of organizing a complex advanced economy, the Soviet Union has also failed as a model. We estimate that last year the Soviet Union had just about the lowest growth rate in its postwar history. The Soviet Union has failed to create a successful modern agricultural sector; it faces serious energy problems in the future; its labor supply is not expanding rapidly enough, and productivity is difficult to increase in a system that lacks real incentives; bureaucratic mismanagement is endemic.

Even East European members of the Warsaw Pact experiment with more flexible economic techniques that intro-

duce elements of the free market system. Communist economies, such as those of Cuba and Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union, face shortages now and will continue to do so in the future. The economic predominance of the West is overwhelming. If we take the United States, the West European nations, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand and compare them with the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and Cuba, we find that the West's total GNP is about \$6 trillion (1978) compared with about \$2 trillion for the Soviet bloc.

I do not want to appear complacent about the United States or the West. We must pay attention to the vitality of our democratic traditions and insure that human and civil rights are freely and widely exercised; we must deal with difficult and deep economic problems, particularly energy and inflation; we must improve coordination among our allies; we must strengthen ties with the less-developed world and be more responsive to their needs and aspirations wherever compatible with our long-term interests.

Soviet Military Challenge

However, my main point is this: Unfortunately and dangerously, the primary Soviet challenge today and for the future is neither ideological nor economic but military. Although our GNP is nearly double that of the Soviet Union, the Soviets outspend us on defense. They dedicate approximately 13% of their GNP to their military—the U.S. defense share of GNP is about 5%.

This steady buildup of Soviet power over two decades, beyond what they reasonably need for defense, is ominous. The buildup is both quantitative and qualitative. Soviet weaponry has emerged in the last decade as among the finest produced in the world. Perhaps even more ominous is the skewing of the Soviet economy to provide the ever-growing industrial base for this massive effort—at a time when funds are so desperately needed for development of natural resources east of the Urals, not to mention raising the Soviet living standard.

In the strategic area, the Soviet Union has achieved parity with us; here the SALT Treaty recognizes this balance and prevents a dangerous round of competition for strategic nuclear superiority. In the European theater, the Soviets have developed and are deploying nuclear delivery systems—the SS-20 and Backfire Bomber—as well

as modern tanks. For this reason the NATO allies took an historic decision last December to develop long-range nuclear forces and to proceed with the modernization program. The Soviet Navy has grown from a coastal defense force into a formidable fleet capable of worldwide operations.

This buildup in Soviet military forces has been accompanied by a lessening of restraints in the Kremlin with respect to the use of this military power. The U.S.S.R. has stockpiled weapons in large numbers and has shown little restraint in recent years in sending arms abroad, along with advisers and surrogate forces, with the effect that whole regions like the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia have been destabilized. In the past year we witnessed Vietnamese troops, with extensive Soviet support, invade the nonaligned state of Kampuchea where they sentenced the existing rulers to death *in absentia*, installed a puppet government, drove hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighboring Thailand, and then positioned themselves to threaten and pressure Thailand, a longtime friend of the United States.

The Afghan invasion followed a similar pattern. This time Soviet forces themselves invaded the nonaligned state of Afghanistan, executed the existing ruler, installed a puppet government, forced hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighboring Pakistan, and are positioning themselves to threaten and pressure Pakistan, a longtime friend of the United States, as well as other countries in the region.

In both the Kampuchean and Afghan situations, Soviet power has been used to enter a relatively weak, nonaligned, buffer state, with the result that strong Vietnamese and Soviet forces are now deployed right up against the border of a traditional friend of the United States. The West bears not only the humanitarian burden of the refugees but must face new security problems for its friends. These two invasions are a clear lesson to the world about the dangerous situation we are all in.

It is noteworthy that both victims—Kampuchea and Afghanistan—were nonaligned countries. Although it is not fashionable in many parts of the world to be "aligned" these days, it is instructive that the Soviets have not chosen to attack our allies but rather to direct their forces against weak nonaligned countries with vaguely Marxist governments.

I believe these two invasions will cause many around the world to reassess the bases of their security. It seems clear to me that the experience of the recent past justifies the years of effort we and other free nations have put into our Western alliances and into the development of close defense relationships.

The U.S. response to the Afghan invasion has been prompt and decisive. I will not go into the catalog of steps that have been taken:

- The President's unmistakable warning about our vital interests in the Persian Gulf;
- Increase in our defense budget;
- Restrictions on sales of grain, fertilizer, and high technology items to the Soviet Union;
- Redeployment of forces to the Indian Ocean;
- Accelerated development of a rapid deployment force and discussions with several nations about access to facilities on and near the Indian Ocean;
- Suspension of scientific and other exchanges and the boycott of the Moscow Olympics; and
- Coordination with our allies and others on political and economic support for our efforts.

Canada, F.R.G. to Boycott Olympic Games

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
APR. 23, 1980¹

We welcome the decisions of the Canadian and West German Governments over the past 24 hours on the issue of nonparticipation in the Moscow games. Both governments have asked their national Olympic associations not to send teams to Moscow. This reflects their recognition that, given the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Moscow remains wholly inappropriate as a site for the Summer Olympics.

We also welcome the Canadian call for a worldwide boycott, and we are hopeful that other nations of the world will heed this call and keep their teams home this summer.

¹ Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston. ■

We welcome the decisions of the U.N. General Assembly and the Islamic conference; we welcome the strong opposition to the Afghan invasion among Third World nations and the growing isolation of Soviet surrogates such as Cuba. I believe this trend will continue as the world watches the bravery of Afghan resistance forces fighting for their freedom of their country and the right to worship in their religion.

Curbing Soviet Military Power

The critical factor in curbing Soviet military power, in my opinion, is not what we do now but whether we are prepared to be firm and principled during the next decade. An increase in the defense budget does not result in deliveries of hardware this year—but it does lead to the development of needed weapon systems for the late 1980s. An effective rapid deployment force is not created in a month or a year. Thus, a serious defense program involves a long-term commitment, both for us and our allies. It requires attention to strategic systems like the MX and cruise missiles, theater systems like those NATO is developing for Europe, a strong Navy capable of worldwide action, and adequate conventional forces to meet a variety of contingencies. It involves new weapon systems, but just as important less glamorous investment in maintenance, spare parts, training, and readiness. This is why I put such a premium on a sustained and coherent approach to meeting the Soviet military challenge.

Just as important as a strengthened defense program is the need to pursue a credible international diplomatic initiative that is consistent in approach and steadfast in purpose. Whatever threat we face, the United States is in the long term relatively invulnerable except to an all-out nuclear attack. Other nations, however, are much more vulnerable to subversion, threats, limited attacks, economic sanctions, and regional instability.

Friends abroad who put their trust in us are entitled to know that we will stand by them. They need assurances about their own security and about the extent of our commitment to help them. Adversaries abroad also act more rationally, and thus less dangerously, when they see clearly that U.S. policies are articulated coherently and consistently.

For these reasons, it is of paramount importance that friends and adversaries abroad take note that the

Refugee Admissions and Resettlement

by Secretary Vance

Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 17, 1980.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to consult with you, in accordance with the Refugee Act of 1980, on our plans for refugee admissions and resettlement assistance for FY 1980.

The Administration has long shared the views of this committee that a uniform, coherent, manageable policy governing refugee admissions to this country is necessary. The Refugee Act of 1980 represents a cooperative effort by the Congress and the Administration to establish the legal framework for such a policy. It is an accomplishment of which we all may be justly proud.

At the same time, the Refugee Act of 1980 is the beginning of the long and challenging task of formulating a more comprehensive and equitable basis for our refugee programs. We look forward to continuing to work closely with you in implementing the act.

I would like first to discuss with you briefly this morning our basic approach to the growing refugee problem, and then to address the major considerations which underlie our proposed FY 1980 refugee admissions.

U.S. Approach

Let me begin with a few words about our overall approach to refugee problems. Through an active diplomacy, through economic and security assistance programs, through practical support for

denance and a relaxation of tension can develop.

While we wait for the Soviet leadership to demonstrate such an intent, we should be prepared to be patient, pursuing the long-term strategy—to which I alluded earlier—of strengthening the West and engaging the Third World in common pursuits. We may have to wait a decade or more, but what better alternative do we have, given my premise that time is on our side—so long as we use it wisely. ■

human rights progress, we shall persist in our efforts to resolve the conflicts and ameliorate the underlying conditions that give rise to large numbers of refugees. At the same time, it is both in our national character and in our national interest to respond compassionately and sensibly to a mounting refugee problem.

Events around the world in the past few months vividly illustrate the magnitude and the complexity of the refugee problem confronting the international community. From Kampuchea, from Afghanistan, from Ethiopia, from many other countries, refugees totaling in the millions have fled their homes in the face of external aggression, political and religious persecution, and civil strife. They constitute a vast sea of uprooted, homeless, aggrieved people. We cannot be blind to their suffering, or to the consequences for stability and peace if we leave them to languish without hope.

In nearly every instance, an enormous burden has fallen on countries of first asylum—a burden most have borne with extraordinary compassion and generosity. But it would be unrealistic and unwise to expect that these nations can bear this burden alone. International efforts are essential, both to alleviate human suffering on a massive scale and to lessen the unsettling political, economic, and social tensions that large refugee populations can create for first-asylum countries.

Our initial objective in responding to specific refugee situations has been to join in international efforts to provide relief to the refugees in place—that is, in the countries of first asylum—and to promote voluntary repatriation of refugees where possible. Many nations have contributed generously—through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and in other ways. The United States has been in the forefront among contributors to these international relief efforts. Often, the leadership of the United States has been instrumental in generating the broad international response these situations require.

In some cases, however, resettlement of refugees is a practical necessity. Last spring, for example, thousands of Indochinese fled their homes—by sea and by land—only to be turned back by neighboring countries already overwhelmed by large refugee populations.

executive branch and the Congress are working together harmoniously, that the vast majority of Americans support our firm policies, that our President has authority to make decisions and to execute them, and that this country is prepared to back its commitments with adequate resources in the critical decades to come.

Conclusion

I believe we now have achieved a national consensus in this country that can serve as the basis for a serious foreign policy for the coming decade. That foreign policy is based on several factors:

- National strength—military and economic—that assures our security and that of our allies;
- An acceptance of our responsibility to provide leadership to the Western world in meeting a common threat;
- Recognition of the fact that our leadership role requires that we engage ourselves actively in solving international problems, not as the world's day-to-day policeman but as a serious and permanent participant in a common effort to maintain the peace, assist our friends, and preserve our vital interests;
- A willingness to meet the ideological challenge of the left by making explicit our Western values and seeking improvements in the observance of basic human rights around the world; and
- By insisting that the principles of the U.N. Charter be observed and that there be no compromise with aggression.

But this is not all: We are not committed to a cold war with the Soviet Union. We are willing to engage in arms control negotiations to preserve the peace and maintain the military balance; we have an interest for greater cooperation with the Soviet Union because we recognize that, living on the same planet, it is in everyone's interest to work out our problems peacefully. But given the events of the recent past, it is the responsibility of the Soviet Union to demonstrate, clearly and convincingly, that it wants cooperation with us based on the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, that it is prepared to demonstrate self-restraint and respect for our interests, so that mutual confi-

President Carter's pledge to double our rate of resettlement of Indochinese refugees to 14,000 a month was a critical factor in generating new resettlement pledges by over 20 countries at the Geneva conference last July. This demonstrated willingness on the part of the international community to share the burden led the nations in the region to resume granting of first asylum.

Against this general background, let me outline for the committee how we propose that the United States participate—consistent with the Refugee Act of 1980—in international resettlement efforts during the remainder of this fiscal year. By eliminating the previous geographic and ideological restrictions on granting of refugee status, the act enables a more flexible system for refugee admissions and assistance. We intend to avail ourselves of this flexibility to establish admissions criteria that are as comprehensive and equitable as possible. In doing so, we will pay close attention to the resettlement needs of refugees in regions not explicitly encompassed by the prior legislation.

Let me be frank in pointing out, however, that it will take time to translate the goal of greater equity into a workable system. Many of the factors which contributed to our previous refugee admissions practices will of necessity continue to play an important role for some time. Indeed, these factors should be taken into account as we strive to define the elements of a more equitable system.

Among the considerations which have helped shape our admissions proposals for FY 1980 are the following.

- We must continue to be sensitive to the needs of refugees with close ties to the United States. We shall remain dedicated to reunifying families and to aiding those who have had past employment ties to the United States.
- Where the United States has stood uniquely as a symbol of freedom from oppression for a particular group, we must respond to their understandable aspirations for safe haven in our country.
- We must consider how our participation in refugee resettlement efforts can further our broader foreign policy objectives—for instance, by promoting the stability of friendly, democratic governments in countries of first asylum.
- And we will continue to be guided by our assessment of the opportunities for resettlement in other countries and the practical limits on U.S. resources.

Refugee Admissions

In FY 1980, we propose to admit into the United States 231,700 refugees. This figure includes over 114,000 refugees admitted before April 1 under previous statutory limits and parole programs authorized by the Attorney General and approved by the Congress. For the second half of the fiscal year, we propose to admit approximately 117,000 refugees, including up to 3,500 of the Cubans at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana.

Let me briefly review the major groups of refugees we propose to admit and the considerations underlying these proposals.

Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, we face a human tragedy of staggering dimensions. The enormous Indochinese refugee burden is also a continuing challenge to the stability of neighboring nations. We propose to continue to resettle 14,000 Indochinese refugees per month in the United States—a total of 168,000 this fiscal year. This level would continue the admission rate pledged last year by President Carter and previously authorized for FY 1980 under the Attorney General's parole authority, with congressional concurrence. In addition to the major humanitarian dimension of this commitment, it is an important, tangible demonstration of U.S. support for the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] nations.

At the Geneva conference last year, the world community more than doubled its resettlement offers and the Vietnamese pledged an end to forced departures. Since the conference, the rate of new arrivals of "boat people" has declined. Resettlement in third countries has increased. This has somewhat eased the burden on first-asylum countries. Boats of refugees are not now being pushed back to sea.

Nevertheless, the situation remains grave. In addition to some 150,000 Khmer in temporary holding centers in Thailand, some 230,000 Indochinese remain in refugee camps. Many of those in refugee camps have been waiting for resettlement for as long as 5 years. Without sustained resettlement commitments from the United States and other countries, these people face a bleak future—an existence without hope. Many are haunted by the prospect of forced repatriation, with persecution or possible death in their homelands. Flagging international interest, a sharp new influx of refugees, or new tension in the region could prompt changes of policy toward the refugees by the countries of first asylum.

Most of the Indochinese refugees we propose to admit this year have ties to the United States—relatives already in this country or past associations with the U.S. Government or U.S. institutions. In addition, we propose to admit a substantial number of refugees who have been languishing for years in refugee camps and have no other resettlement prospects.

Let me note that some of the Vietnamese qualified for admission by virtue of family ties or political persecution may come directly from Vietnam to the United States, if the Vietnamese authorities permit the planned "direct departure" program to go forward.

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. From the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we propose to admit 33,000 and 5,000 refugees, respectively. It has been the policy of the United States to offer a haven to any refugee from the Soviet Union who wishes to resettle in this country. This will remain our policy. We deplore the restrictions by Soviet authorities that have resulted in a recent decline in the number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union. Should these restrictions be eased and the trend reversed, we are fully prepared to consult the Congress immediately on additional admissions and the necessary funding to accommodate all Soviet Jews who seek admission to the United States. We also anticipate admitting Soviet Armenians and other Christians who wish to resettle here, as well as Eastern Europeans of diverse backgrounds who have suffered discrimination in their homelands.

Latin America. We propose to admit 20,500 refugees from Latin America. This figure includes 19,500 Cubans. The United States has a long and proud history of aiding Cubans fleeing repression under the Castro regime. To date some 800,000 Cubans have resettled in the United States. In recent years, Cuban refugee admissions have been limited primarily to former political prisoners and their families and to cases involving family reunification. Persons in these categories will continue to comprise the bulk of the Cuban refugees we will admit.

The rush to the Peruvian Embassy compound in Havana nearly 2 weeks ago by some 10,000 Cubans seeking asylum is stark evidence of the oppressive conditions under which Cubans live. The large number of these persons who have expressed a desire to resettle in the United States is vivid proof that the United States remains a strong symbol of freedom and safe haven.

We are hopeful that the international effort begun yesterday with the movement of the first group of refugees from Havana to Costa Rica will continue at an accelerated pace—particularly in view of the deteriorating health and sanitation conditions at the Peruvian Embassy.

For our part, we have pledged to accept up to one-third of these Cubans for resettlement in the United States, to a maximum of 3,500. This figure is included in the 19,500 Cuban admissions total. We intend to give priority to refugees seeking family reunification and former political prisoners and their families.

A number of other countries have offered to accept some of these people. We anticipate that additional pledges will be forthcoming.

It is our hope that arrangements can be made to move these Cubans to Peru or a third country where they can be processed for final resettlement in an orderly manner.

In addition to Cubans, we anticipate admitting 1,000 other refugees from various parts of Latin America. These include Central Americans fleeing civil strife in their homelands.

Africa. We are strongly committed to expanding admissions of refugees from Africa. The geographical restrictions in the previous legislation severely limited the number of Africans who could qualify for refugee status. Nearly all of those who did qualify came from the Horn of Africa, defined by the prior legislation as part of the Middle East. The Refugee Act of 1980 eliminates this restriction, making it possible for refugees in any part of Africa to apply for admission. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) currently is developing temporary procedures for reviewing applications from Africans, pending the establishment of an INS presence in Africa.

We propose 1,500 admissions this fiscal year for African refugees. This level constitutes a three-fold increase over last fiscal year. It is our best estimate of the number who will wish to apply for and will qualify for refugee status during this fiscal year. Our experience in the coming months should provide us with a sound basis for adjusting this number in calculating FY 1981 admission levels.

Middle East. We shall maintain our longstanding policy of resettling persons fleeing political and religious persecution in the Middle East. We propose to admit a total of 2,500 refugees from this region. This reflects a growing demand for resettlement among religious and ethnic

REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, FY 1980

Area of Origin	Approximate Number Admitted First Half of Fiscal Year	Approximate Number To Be Admitted Remainder of Fiscal Year	Total Number of Admissions for FY 1980
Asia			169,200
Indochinese	84,000	84,000	168,000
Other	600	600	1,200
Soviet Union	18,000	15,000	33,000
Eastern Europe	2,000	3,000	5,000
Middle East	500	2,000	2,500
Latin America			20,500
Cubans	9,000	10,500	19,500
Other	64	936	1,000
Africa	120	1,380	1,500
SUBTOTAL	114,284	117,416	231,700
Asylum Status Adjustments			2,500
TOTAL			234,200

minorities in the region, such as Christians from Iraq. Internal repression and now the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have also created large numbers of Afghan refugees, some of whom are also seeking admission to the United States.

We recognize that there remain large regional disparities in the numbers of proposed refugee admissions. I believe the considerations I have noted compel these disparities for the present. As I have indicated, however, we are determined to develop a system which permits refugees in all parts of the world freely to apply for admission to the United States and to have their applications fairly considered.

In addition to the refugees we propose to admit into the United States from abroad, the act also authorizes an adjustment to permanent resident status of up to 2,500 persons in the United States who have been granted political asylum. These 2,500 would bring to 234,200 the total number of refugee admissions and adjustments for this year.

The cost to the Federal Government of processing, transporting, and initially resettling these refugees in the United States will be approximately \$267 million for FY 1980. We estimate that domestic assistance—funded through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare—will cost an additional \$243 million. A number of other Federal agencies will incur lesser expenses for providing services to these refugees.

It is important to note that the private sector, particularly voluntary agencies, contribute generously to refugee resettlement programs. Our ability to work closely with dedicated private organizations and individuals has helped to make resettlement a remarkably effective process.

The U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs [Ambassador Victor Palmieri] will be working with the Departments of State; Justice; and Health, Education and Welfare—and with the Congress—to refine the admissions criteria and procedures needed to implement the new act.

The refugee admissions I have discussed constitute a major commitment by our government and by the American people. Helping these persecuted and uprooted persons begin new lives in our country will require the creative use of limited resources. But I am confident that our nation, which provided a new life for our forefathers, will faithfully uphold this humanitarian tradition and meet this challenge.

¹ Press release 92. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Attempts Rescue of American Hostages in Iran

**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
APR. 25, 1980 (1:15 AM)¹**

The President has ordered the cancellation of an operation in Iran which was underway to prepare for a rescue of our hostages. The mission was terminated because of equipment failure. During the subsequent withdrawal of American personnel there was a collision between our aircraft on the ground at a remote desert location in Iran. There were no military hostilities, but the President deeply regrets that eight American crew members of the two aircraft were killed and others were injured in the accident. Americans involved in the operation have now been airlifted from Iran, and those who were injured are being given medical treatment and are expected to recover.

This mission was not motivated by hostility toward Iran or the Iranian people and there were no Iranian casualties.

Preparations for this rescue mission were ordered for humanitarian reasons, to protect the national interests of this country, and to alleviate international tensions. The President accepts full responsibility for the decision to attempt the rescue.

The nation is deeply grateful to the brave men who were preparing to rescue the hostages.

The United States continues to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety of the American hostages.

The United States remains determined to obtain their safe release at the earliest possible date.

**PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
APR. 25, 1980 (7:00 AM)²**

Late yesterday, I canceled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to position our rescue team for later withdrawal of American hostages who've been held captive there since November 4th.

Equipment failure in the rescue helicopters made it necessary to end the mission. As our team was withdrawing, after my order to do so, two of our American aircraft collided on the ground following a refueling operation in a remote desert location in Iran. Other information

about this rescue mission will be made available to the American people when it is appropriate to do so.

There was no fighting; there was no combat. But to my deep regret, eight of the crewmen of the two aircraft which collided were killed, and several other Americans were hurt in the accident.

Our people were immediately airlifted from Iran. Those who were injured have gotten medical treatment, and all of them are expected to recover.

No knowledge of this operation by any Iranian officials or authorities was evident to us until several hours after all Americans were withdrawn from Iran.

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be difficult and it was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue operation had been commenced that it had an excellent chance of success. They were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them.

To the families of those who died and who were wounded, I want to express the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian casualties.

Planning for this rescue effort began shortly after our Embassy was seized. But, for a number of reasons, I waited until now to put those rescue plans into effect. To be feasible, this complex operation had to be the product of intensive planning and intensive training and repeated rehearsal.

However, a resolution of this crisis through negotiations and with voluntary action on the part of the Iranian officials was obviously then, has been, and will be preferable.

This rescue attempt had to await my judgment that the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative. With the steady unraveling of authority in Iran and the

mounting dangers that were posed to the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release was highly unlikely, I made a decision to commence the rescue operations plans.

This attempt became a necessity and a duty. The readiness of our team to undertake the rescue made it completely practicable. Accordingly, I made the decision to set our long-developed plans into operation. I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interests, and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many nations as this crisis has continued. It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own.

In the aftermath of the attempt, we continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety and for the early release of the American hostages who have been held so long.

The United States remains determined to bring about their safe release at the earliest date possible. As President, I know that our entire nation feels the deep gratitude I feel for the brave men who were prepared to rescue their fellow Americans from captivity. And, as President, I also know that the nation shares not only my disappointment that the rescue effort could not be mounted because of mechanical difficulties but also my determination to persevere and to bring all of our hostages home to freedom.

We have been disappointed before. We will not give up in our efforts. Throughout this extraordinarily difficult period, we have pursued and will continue to pursue every possible avenue to secure the release of the hostages. In these efforts, the support of the American people and of our friends throughout the world has been a most crucial element. That support of other nations is even more important now. We will seek to continue, along with other nations and with the officials of Iran, a prompt resolution of the crisis without any loss of life and through peaceful and diplomatic means.

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of May 20

Q. If I could begin with a two-part question. Did you leave the Vienna meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko with any feeling of hope that the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan under any foreseeable circumstances? And second, do you think that beginning dialogue with the Soviets is damaged at all, or affected at all, by the meeting between President Giscard and President Brezhnev in Warsaw?

A. With respect to the first point, there was no change in the position the Soviets have taken publicly with respect to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. There was support for the so-called Afghan proposal, which surfaced a day or two before the meeting with Mr. Gromyko; and that, presumably, was offered as a basis for consideration.

With respect to the Giscard meeting with Mr. Brezhnev, I would not think that the Giscard meeting in any way changes my perception of the Soviet position on the withdrawal of troops.

Q. Does it affect or complicate the dialogue between the United States and the Soviets to have a third-party conducting parallel discussions?

A. Until I have a report, from whatever sources are interested in reporting to us, on what took place in that meeting, it is difficult to answer that question. I may say that it seems to me that such a meeting is a proper subject for consultations.

I had no message pressed home more firmly to me from our NATO allies than the importance of consultations when it involved possible U.S. actions. Consultation to me, up until this moment, has always been a two-way street. I hope that that is what it means in connection with our NATO friends.

Q. The other night at Worcester, in a tribute to Hubert Humphrey, you spoke of two ideals of the late Vice President: one is that the United States be a haven and, secondly, his great commitment to arms control.¹ You seemed to endorse both principles. But I wonder if you could tell us in practical terms how you feel about Cuban refuge in this country, whether you feel it should be unlimited, whether you

think the Haitians should be treated as political refugees, too. And when you speak in terms of arms control and how you see them as part of a security arrangement, are you prepared to try to reverse what the Administration has done about arms control, which, of course, is to put it on a very, very back burner?

A. With respect to the refugee question, I think our ideals and our national standard for 200 years are still the American ideal of the open asylum for people fleeing political repression. We are, of course, at the moment—not only we, but other nations—overwhelmed by refugee problems, many of them associated with attempts to seek freedom and to get away from political repression. And the overwhelming nature of the problem is such as to require not only an implementation of our own ideals but also of seeking effective international cooperation in dealing with these problems.

In order to achieve ideals, one always finds it necessary to deal with practical problems for implementing them; and we certainly do face them with respect to Cuba, with respect to Kampuchea, and with respect to other areas of the world, and many of these problems, incidentally, seem to be connected with the Soviet Union in one way or another.

With respect to arms control, our objective, I think, is still clear. We think that our own national security is promoted by effective arms control agreements. The Soviet Union, with its action in Afghanistan, has had the effect of diminishing the prospect for senatorial approval of the SALT II Treaty. That does not mean that we have lost our interest in it, nor have we dropped our commitment to it. But the Soviets, by that single act, have created the problems which now have put achievement of that objective beyond reach to a greater extent than it was 6 or 8 months ago.

Q. In reference to that Afghanistan situation, you do say that there was no change in the formal position when you met with Gromyko, but did you get any hint at all that the Soviet Union may be planning to withdraw from Afghanistan before the summer Olympics?

A. I have no basis, as a result of those talks or any other information, to indicate the Soviets plan such withdrawal in that time frame.

Q. Speaking of the Olympics, the Olympic boycott appears to have collapsed. There is a rush of countries going to the Olympics now. Do you feel that your position has been undercut by many of America's friends on that?

And two, do you feel that perhaps your meeting with Mr. Gromyko, in effect, gave them an excuse for voting to go to the Olympics and undercut your own position about the boycott?

A. Taking the second part of your question first, insofar as the governments are concerned, I have no reason to believe that the meetings with Mr. Gromyko in any way undercut or diluted any support that governments were prepared to give for the boycott initiative. Whether or not they may have affected Olympic committees is a question to which I have no answer.

My impression is that the Olympic committees in various countries were inclined to exercise independent judgment—judgments independent of their governments, in any case. There were more of them in Europe among the smaller European countries in the last 24 hours than we would have liked to have seen. On the other hand, there are now 45 countries definitely committed to joining the boycott. And that surely means that this is not an Olympics. It is an athletic event, but it won't be an Olympics. And it would seem to me that that point should be very clear to the Soviets, and it should be very clear to Olympic committees which have been justifying their opposition to the boycott on the grounds that it somehow tarnishes the Olympic ideal.

My own view, of course, is that the invasion of Afghanistan is 180 degrees opposed to the Olympic ideal, and that those who seek to promote the Olympic ideal ought to be interested in deterring and dissuading countries from engaging in that kind of adventurism. So I would hope that with respect to those countries where the Olympic committees have made decisions to go to Moscow, they will reconsider them. And in some instances, there are constituent-supporting bodies within those countries which have decided to join the boycott, notwithstanding the decision of the national Olympic committee.

Q. At almost exactly the same time that you were saying the allies are wholly with us on Afghanistan, the French were planning this summit meeting with Brezhnev, apparently without any consultation or without even having told you in Vienna that the meeting was planned. What is it, in your view, that the French think that they can accomplish by holding these independent talks?

A. I suppose their objective is to underline their determination to be independent. It is frustrating at times and even more. But they seem to perceive the dangers associated with Afghanistan in the same way that we do and seem as concerned to reverse the results of Afghanistan, especially as it has affected detente and slowed down the movement toward arms control and the other objectives that we sought to pursue with detente.

But they also insist upon their prerogative of independent thinking, independent initiatives, and independent approaches that, if practiced too fully, is not as conducive as they would like, or as they themselves have asserted, to the kind of mutual confidence and consultation which we all seemed to agree last week was essential to allied solidarity and unity.

We understand, of course, that differences of opinion in free societies are rather unavoidable; but nevertheless, after an expression of differences of opinion, action must be agreed upon, and consultation must be continuing. And I must say that I'm concerned that when I was being given a lecture on consultation, that the lecturer was not inclined to practice what he was preaching.

Q. Now that you have had a chance to discuss with the President your meeting with Mr. Gromyko, can you tell us anything about where you see the future of Soviet-American relations, perhaps in meeting Gromyko again, or what do you expect to do now?

A. My expectations with respect to the meeting with Mr. Gromyko were not high if one focused on the possibility of some significant change in attitude. But I thought it was useful to hold the meetings—and, indeed, necessary—in order that there be no misapprehension or miscalculation or misunderstanding as to what our real concerns are, what our real goals are, in the hope that by clearing the air on both sides in those respects, we

might begin a dialogue that, eventually, would once again identify common interests that would serve us both.

If one were to accept the standard Soviet line, which has been stated and over again since Afghanistan, as their real perception of American activities and American policies since that time, then their perceptions needed some correction. Their perception, for example, was that we had deliberately, before Afghanistan, undermined and torpedoed—that wasn't the word they used—the SALT II Treaty.

And I thought it was important for me to make clear to him that, although the SALT II struggle was a very difficult one, the Senate had cleared its calendar of all domestic issues so we could begin debate in January or early February of this year; and that we were prepared to do that, and that we thought there was a fighting chance—and I did not try to overstate it, I said a "fighting chance"—of getting ratification. But their invasion of Afghanistan completely eliminated any prospect for getting a two-thirds vote.

I said they ought to take that into account. It's a political fact of life; it is not a precondition. It is not linkage; it is a fact of life that in order to get ratification of the SALT II Treaty, it's necessary to get a two-thirds vote in the Senate, and they have put that out of reach. And they ought to understand that.

So that if they are interested in SALT II and the benefits that this might bring to both of our countries and to the world in terms of lowering tensions and enhancing the prospect for peace, if they are truly interested in that, then they must take into account that by their act, and their act alone, they have made it infeasible in the present climate to press for ratification of the SALT II Treaty. And I thought it was important for them to know that.

Now if, in fact, detente was what many people in America think it was—simply another instrument or weapon for the Soviets to use to their own advantage and not a real commitment to the benefits of detente on a mutual basis—then they will perhaps ignore that fact. But if, in fact, they are concerned about detente, and they are really supportive of SALT II in terms of establishing equality rather than superiority on either side, if they are really concerned with lowering tensions and reducing the prospects for war and aggression, then they have got to take that fact into account. And it seemed to me very important to have this opportunity in these talks to make that point very clearly.

Now whether or not, going back home, they will consider and believe what I said to them, then perhaps they may begin to reconsider the policies which have led to this impasse.

Q. After talking to the President about this meeting, though, do you see any purpose or any prospect of a further meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

A. I think this all depends on how the digestion settles in both the Soviet Union and here. We are busy evaluating and reevaluating what was said, what was implied, what signals may have been sent, in order to get a feeling for what the Soviet reaction might be after their digestion settles down. And we'll do the same thing.

It will take a little time, I think, and additional events—the rhetoric that follows our meetings and so on. All of that could affect our final evaluation of what took place in my meeting with Mr. Gromyko.

Q. On the Palestinian autonomy talks, have you yet formulated any plans to break a stalemate? Do you think President Sadat will rejoin the talks and, if so, when? Thirdly, do you have any hopes of dissuading the European allies from recognizing the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?

A. My impression with respect to the parties to the talks, Egypt and Israel, is that notwithstanding the present situation they are both firmly supportive of the continuation of the talks. And I might say this about those talks, that for the first time the two parties, Egypt and Israel—for the first time in the history of the Middle East since Israel's independence—the parties have come to grips with the hard, central issues which stand in the way of a genuine agreement on autonomy.

There are some six of them involving land, settlements, security, and so on, and having cleared away a lot of other issues involving the authorities, or the proposed authority of the self-governing authority, it is clear that with respect to most governmental functions affecting people who would be under the jurisdiction of the self-governing authority, basically agreement is within reach.

So, we are down to the six tough issues. Now, it would be nice if we had those all settled by May 26, but they are not going to be all settled. On the other hand, the parties have no choice but to deal with these six. There is no way of backing off from them or retreating from them. They are head-to-head, and they

forced, by the nature of what has been achieved up to now and the nature of what has been agreed to up to now, to deal with these issues. And I think it would be a disservice to stability in the area, to the prospect of a further rallying support for the results of this process if we were to back off, or if initiatives were taken by other countries which undercut the process.

That isn't to say that resolving these issues is a simple matter. Obviously, it isn't; and it is going to require time and persistence and encouragement and cajoling. It is going to require all of the persuasive powers that interested parties can command in order to achieve results.

I understand, of course, that those who have not been involved in this Camp David process, including our European friends and moderate and more radical Arab countries, are dissatisfied with the process. But nothing that has been produced from the sidelines, so far as I can see, holds out a better prospect for coming to grips with these six fundamental questions and the issue of autonomy any more effectively than these talks. If any intervention or any diversion, if the effect is to dilute the concentration that we now have to force upon these issues, then we will be set back in time and probably even back in prospects for dealing with them.

I understand this is a difficult point to persuade parties other than ourselves immediately involved to adopt, but what I say with great conviction. When I took office as Secretary of State, one of the issues I wanted fully explored for my own benefit before I moved far along in my office, and this is a conclusion that I have reached after talking back our Ambassadors from Egypt, Israel and Mr. Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] and after discussing with others.

Q. The allies have done rather less than the United States had hoped for regarding Iran. Does this in any way change your strategy? And what, specially, is now the strategy for the few weeks and months regarding hostages?

A. I am not sure I caught the first of your question because I was—

Q. That the allies in Europe had done rather less regarding Iran on negotiations than we had expected, and I wonder if that will, in itself, make a difference in the strategy?

A. I would think that in order to put the response of our allies to our policies in proper perspective, one ought to focus on the fact that our policy toward Iran at this point consists of two elements—one, sanctions to keep the pressure on. It seems to us that any nation must be concerned in the long run with establishing a normal role in the family of nations for itself and for its people, a role that involves trade, commerce, the flow of goods, resources, and so on. Any nation, especially one emerging from a revolution against what they considered repression, must be concerned, because revolutions, after all, originate out of the dissatisfactions of the people who are subjected to any particular regime or government.

So the basis for the dissatisfactions is still there, and a new government once constituted is going to have to deal with it. And in order to deal with those problems—political, economic, possible threats from outside—in order to deal with those effectively the Government of Iran, as it emerges, must deal with them, must deal with other nations, and must deal with the problems of normalizing relations with at least every other nation in the world, if not the United States.

It seems to me that the sanctions are another way, and they are positive. They didn't go as far as the Community indicated it would go on April 22, but they are sanctions and they are a positive act of support. We ought to take it as such. As time passes those sanctions will have an increasing impact upon Iran.

The other part of our present posture is to pursue diplomatic channels wherever we can, not in search of surrogates for our position but in search of diplomatic initiatives designed to point out to Iran the consequences of growing isolation from the rest of the world in terms of its own well-being. At a time when authority has been fractured and divided as it has been since the taking of the hostages, it is difficult to force a sense of responsibility upon a fractured government. Once a government is constituted, then the responsibility and the accompanying accountability will fall very clearly upon those who have been elected to office. They will have to consider the relevance of a continued holding of the hostages to Iran's future and its own well-being.

It seems to me that an aggressive pursuit of the diplomatic option is called for at this point. The dynamics of the situation are working on Iran as well as upon us. It is terribly important that we keep that momentum and that we try to build on openings that are suggested. I

doubt very much that we could do much effectively through obvious American surrogates. I think through more indirect diplomatic channels there are opportunities. We get indications of suggested opportunities from time to time. I think we have got to plow that field and fertilize it and get something growing, and I think that it is very important to pursue that option. The sanctions thing doesn't stand on its own feet. It has to be taken into account with others.

Q. South Korea is now in difficult times, politically and economically, particularly in the process of political liberalization, and I think the dialogue between North and South Korea is also not going so well. As the new Secretary of State, what is your policy toward the Korean Peninsula?

A. This might be an appropriate point to say that the moment I took the oath of office as Secretary of State, I didn't suddenly give birth to a full-blown range of policies across the whole range of American concerns and interests. When you ask me for my policy, often you will get not so much a policy as a personal reaction to a situation or a problem. I would like to make that distinction in order to give myself a little maneuvering room, as I have the opportunity to dig more deeply into some of these problems, and the Korean one is one such.

I must say that my reaction to the Korean situation is one of deep concern that it is moving away from liberalization policies, which I think are essential to its long-term political health. I would hope that all elements of the society would exercise restraint in this transition period, and that those in authority will find it expedient and appropriate to move in the direction of political liberalization. Beyond that, I would not want to comment.

Q. There is a widespread perception that the general outlines of the foreign policy that you champion are comparable to those championed by your predecessor, Mr. Vance. Given the doubts in Western Europe about the Carter Administration's foreign policy and given the antagonism of the Soviet Union toward that foreign policy, how do you see yourself in the 6 months until elections making any important differences?

A. I lost a presidential election in 2 months. It seems to me that 6 months gives me a lot of time to do something more positive. [Laughter] But I am not laboring under any illusion that I am a miracle man, nor that the problems as

complex as so many of these can be quickly resolved simply because I am a new face or a new figure, however unexpected and unanticipated my arrival on the scene was.

I do have, as one might expect, after 22 years in the Senate and 26 years at the highest level available in my State to political leadership, views about the world in which I live and the values my country represents and the objectives which we should pursue. Whether or not I am a carbon copy of my predecessor is a conclusion that is easy to reach. But I never found that I was a carbon copy of anybody else, and that has been made very clear to me by what I read in the press and hear on television.

There are those who wish I were a carbon copy of Mr. A or Mr. B, but I am not. I have a different way of approaching this job. One thing that struck me on arriving in Brussels was that for the first time my colleagues in the alliance were confronted with a Secretary of State who came out of politics, and that hadn't happened for a long, long time. I got the feeling that they thought they were talking to a compatriot, because they, of course, are all politicians coming from parliamentary systems. Whether or not that gives me an advantage in terms of persuasiveness or influence or credibility isn't a question that will be answered by comparing me with somebody who is my predecessor.

I am what I am. Mr. Gromyko says he is still puzzled as to what I am. Well, I hope he remains puzzled, because I think that one of the ways to be effective, at least around the Senate of the United States, is not to drop the second shoe, to leave people in doubt about what your next step is as long as they understand what your objective is. In my own way, after I get a feel for this job, I am going to try to make it clear, as low-key initially as possible, what I think are the limits within which allies are to be expected to cooperate, the limits within which we are prepared to try to pursue detente with the Soviet Union.

I think that there is a need to clear up confusion that may not be anybody's fault in particular. I am not interested in assessing fault, but I think that the perception of a Secretary of State who has a clear sense of direction, whether or not there is agreement with the direction, is an important first contribution to make. And that is not a denigration of Cy Vance, not at all. It is just that I am a politician. I have had to defend my support for foreign policies by going to con-

stituents who could vote me in or out of office. I have had to learn to articulate my position to a mass audience who could control my viability, and I think that gives me a little different approach to the job than others.

With respect to the difference between ideals and the pragmatic next steps to take, I responded in part to that; I am going to look for the pragmatic next steps. I certainly don't expect to solve every problem, but I hope that if I do nothing else that I can give the American people a clearer perception of what this Administration and this government is trying to do, what its objectives are, what its values are and what the consequences of possible options for action may be, so that there is a clear understanding between us—those who temporarily are the governors and those who are the governed—as to what it is we are trying to do as a country to make the planet a more livable place.

Q. During the 1960s, NATO—and by that I don't mean all of the states—the leadership of NATO began a concerted attempt to orient the Western alliance along antigrowth, antiscience lines, the kind of thing that Brzezinski in that period was writing about as a postindustrial technocratic society. There has not been too much success in forcing Western Europe to orient along those lines. You, during your career, have had a public commitment to the Club of Rome, zero-growth, Malthusian perspective—the French and German leaderships have recently stated that they consider this kind of antidevelopment perspective to be a leading factor that is making the current situation very dangerous in terms of a general war danger.

What I would like a comment from you on is whether you see this kind of split in orientation as causing some of the problems now in the alliance and as one reason why Western Europe is having more success in their dealings with the Third World than we are?

A. I haven't dug deeply enough yet into the psyche of our European friends to reach any conclusion on the first part of your question. I must say that as I came to this job, Cy was quick to tell me that there was an environmental arm to the State Department. I am going to try to make it more visible, because I think that much of what we need to do to protect the environment, at the same time that we seek to insure our energy supplies, is to insure that while we are in

the process of developing energy sources we do not destroy the planet. That is life-long commitment. If there are problems with respect to attitudes in other countries, then I hope I discover what they are.

Q. I understand your reluctance to go too deeply into the matter of Korea given less than 2 weeks in office. You have, it seems, an extraordinary situation that has emerged in that country. Just this morning, the civilian government has resigned. There are widespread demonstrations and acts of violence taking place throughout the country, and many of the civilian leaders of various factions have been arrested.

Can the United States, in your opinion, continue to support a military regime in an exposed place like South Korea, which seems to have little support from any faction of the civilian populace or political spectrum over a considerable period of time.

A. As one of my professors in high school used to say, that is a very good question [laughter], and I don't mean to be facetious in responding to it. I think for me to say anything beyond what I have said this morning should be seen in a news conference but elsewhere have indicated that I am deeply concerned that the government there I moved away from liberalizing policies that I would hope it would get back track, and that in the meantime they ought to be, I would hope, restrain the part of all elements, so that the situation might be kept under some kind of stability.

I realize that I could make a statement than that, but I don't think it would be useful at this point. I would hope that the relatively low-key nature of my response is not interpreted as a lack of interest in dealing with the problem. I think your question is an appropriate one.

Press release 129.

¹ For text of the Secretary's statement at Worcester, see press release 127 of 18, 1980. ■

Editor's Note

Documentation on Secretary Muskie to Brussels and Vienna in mid-May will be published next month.

SECRETARY BROWN'S NEWS CONFERENCE, APR. 25, 1980 (12:15 PM)²

Secretary Brown. As you by now know, we ordered last night the cancellation of an operation in Iran that was underway to prepare for a rescue of our hostages. The President has already provided the general background, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I are prepared to add some more detail.

Let me say at the outset that we all can be proud of the brave men who undertook this mission. They conducted themselves with skill and courage. And we are filled with sorrow for the eight men who gave their lives trying to rescue their fellow Americans.

Let me give you a brief summary of events before we take your questions. On the late evening and early morning of April 24 and 25 (Iran time), approximately 90 U.S. military personnel, together with the air crews, embarked on an operation to prepare for a rescue of the U.S. citizens held hostage in Iran.

The eight helicopters and associated transport aircraft were en route to a remote landing site, 200 miles from Tehran in the Iranian desert, that was to be used for refueling. Depending on the success of that and other steps, a later decision was to have been made as to whether to proceed with the actual rescue attempt.

Because we knew the long, arduous trip would tax the capacity of the helicopters, we added redundancy to assure we could continue if some became unusable. Two of the helicopters experienced problems en route. One landed in the desert and its crew was picked up by another helicopter, which proceeded to the refueling point. The second helicopter had difficulties, reversed course, and landed aboard the carrier *Nimitz* in the Arabian Sea. Upon arrival at the desert landing site, a third helicopter experienced a severe hydraulic malfunction which put it out of commission. The operations plan provided for termination of the mission if there were less than six helicopters operational at this point. Therefore, we decided to call off the remainder of the operation and to extract all of the personnel.

As the aircraft were preparing to depart—and this of course was in complete darkness—a helicopter and a C-130 aircraft collided. Both immediately caught fire. Eight of our men were killed and four others suffered burns. To insure the safe evacuation of the rest of the party, the commander on the scene directed his men to leave the helicopters

and depart on the remaining C-130s. This left behind the four functioning helicopters, the helicopter that had experienced hydraulic malfunction, and the burning wreckage of one helicopter and one C-130.

No Iranian military forces were encountered at any point during the mission. However, approximately 50 Iranian civilians, who were passing by in a bus at about the time the first C-130 landed, were detained at the site. When the decision was made to terminate the rescue effort, all the civilians were allowed to depart unharmed.

As you can see from this description, the mission was complex and difficult. But it was the judgment of the Joint Chiefs and myself that it was operationally feasible. This judgment was reached after a thorough assessment, which included many practice exercises. Our plan was carefully conceived and the training exhaustive. The plan provided for the possibility of terminating the operation because of any difficulties, such as mechanical failure or detection by the Iranians of the mission. The flight to the assembly point and the refueling had been carried out with essential success, but we concluded, based on established criteria thoroughly considered earlier, that the number of helicopter failures rendered the chance of subsequent success—reduced that chance—to the point that dictated ending the mission.

I think you can understand why we felt that we had to try this difficult operation. In our opinion it represented the best course of action for getting our hostages out of Iran expeditiously. And it was also the course that raised the least risk of harming the Iranian people and the least risk of causing instability in this troubled region.

We are disappointed that the mission failed, we're saddened at the loss of our eight fellow Americans. But let no one doubt our resolve, and let no one misunderstand the meaning of these events. We will not rest until we have secured the release of the hostages. I'll take your questions.

Q. The Ayatollah has just put out a statement saying that there are 10 Americans that were killed and that there are 10 that are still wandering the desert. Can you confirm or deny any of that?

Secretary Brown. Yes, I can deny it, and I do. You know, a number of statements have come out of there, and it's naturally a time of confusion. I have no knowledge of anything of the kind he's talking about.

Q. How could you have secured the release of the hostages without massive bloodshed, given the fact that there is an estimated 150 armed Iranian militants guarding the Embassy?

Secretary Brown. I am not going to go into the details of any parts of the mission, beyond the parts that were actually carried out. I will say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thoroughly reviewed this; I reviewed it, and the team itself was convinced that that was the part of the mission of which they were most confident.

Q. Did you fly from Egypt and refuel in Bahrain on your way to this—

Secretary Brown. We are not going to say anything about other countries. None of the countries—no other government in the entire region was aware of or informed of the prospect of a rescue operation. We relied heavily on our carrier task force, and I am not going to go beyond that in saying what the operational details were.

Q. The U.S. troops were—the U.S. Army, Marines, what units?

Secretary Brown. The team included individuals from each of the four services in the Defense Department, and I don't want to go beyond that.

Q. Were they volunteers?

Secretary Brown. They all volunteered for the units that they were in.

Q. Can you explain the circumstances leading up to the collision? Was there any reason for extra urgency in getting off the ground?

Secretary Brown. I'll ask General Jones [Gen. David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] to comment on that. He and I have talked about it, but he has been in more direct contact.

General Jones. We are still examining—

Secretary Brown. What happened in the crash.

General Jones. —the details and what happened in the crash. It was complete darkness. They had night vision devices. But it was unfortunate on the lift-off, it appeared that the helicopter struck the C-130, and they were both engulfed in flames.

Q. What sort of helicopter was it?

Secretary Brown. These were R-H-53s. They are actually—they are

the big helicopters. These are designed primarily for mine sweeping, but they have been adapted for special operations of this kind.

Q. Were there civilians or non-Americans?

Secretary Brown. This team that I am talking about was a Defense Department team, from all the services.

Q. Why did you call it so close? It seems to be close, 25% error, and then you had to cancel the mission. Why weren't more helicopters put into this?

Secretary Brown. We had carried out the exercise in practice in the United States in similar or as near-similar terrain and circumstances as we could arrange, and had succeeded in having the helicopters operate properly. We believed that we could get by with six. And we could have gotten by with six. Originally, we were planning to start with seven as a spare, with one spare. Because we recognized that operationally this was the most difficult part of the mission, this particular component, the one that was going to be stressed the most, we added an eighth helicopter before we went ahead. That was really quite considerable spares.

It is difficult to get helicopters out there without revealing what was going on, and that was one limit. Even if we had more helicopters, I think at some point adding them just adds to the possibility of additional difficulty. I think—you know, in retrospect, one can, of course, speculate what would have happened if there were more.

Q. Were the helicopters flown in all the way on their own? Or were they carried in fixed-wing aircraft, and did they come from the aircraft carriers or from ground bases?

Secretary Brown. The helicopters flew from the carrier, and they had been carried into the area on shipboard.

Q. What carrier, the *Nimitz* again?

Secretary Brown. They were aboard the *Nimitz*.

Q. Who was the officer in charge of preparing and checking for mechanical malfunction on the helicopters? As I understand it, you had eight helicopters and three of them malfunctioned.

Secretary Brown. No, I said three of them were not functioning after the refueling at the rendezvous point.

Q. Who was responsible for preparing—

Secretary Brown. I'll take responsibility within the Defense Department. We will—you know, we are examining what happened in detail. This operation was just terminated yesterday, and it is going to be thoroughly and exhaustively considered. I'm not looking for goats.

Q. Could you give us some hours? What time did this happen? Either our time or their time? And were the C-130s equipped with the fuel to refuel, and did the C-130s have the soldiers on them?

Secretary Brown. Well, the question—there are several questions. We're asked about the timing of this. The helicopters went and the C-130s went across the—entered the Iranian air space shortly after dark. The decision to terminate the mission was made at about a quarter to five, our time. There is a 9½ hour difference, and you can figure out what that adds up to—about 3:15, I guess.

Q. How long were they on the ground?

Secretary Brown. My recollection is that they were on the ground 3 hours all together.

Q. Does this failure rule out any further American military effort?

Secretary Brown. We're not going to rule out, you know, we're not going to rule out any options any more than we did before. We're going to do everything we possibly can to release the hostages, and we continue to believe that a peaceful solution is the best solution. We had hoped, of course, that we could do this with minimum force.

Q. Were the Soviets informed of this, either before, during, or immediately after the operation?

Secretary Brown. We informed a broad spectrum of countries immediately after the operation. Actually, it happened after we had extracted our forces, because no one in Iran knew that our forces had been there until after they had been extracted. But we then communicated the facts and indicated that this was a rescue operation and not a military action.

Q. How was the final rescue supposed to be effected?

Secretary Brown. I've said I will not talk about elements of the operation beyond those that were actually carried out.

Q. Could you tell us when the decision was made to go ahead with the operation?

Secretary Brown. The decision to proceed with this sort of an operation—that is, to prepare for a rescue including movement of forces, movement of aircraft, and so on—was made 2 weeks ago. But the actual decision to effect a rescue would not have been made until today.

Q. Why was this operation undertaken at this time when it, in effect, "pulled the rug out" from the effort to get allied sanctions? Can you identify the dead men?

Secretary Brown. We will identify the dead after their next-of-kin have been notified, and not before. We expect that will happen today, and then we will make identification.

Why did we go ahead now? All diplomatic efforts so far had failed, and this had been going on for 6 months. There was no reason to believe that the hostages would be released at any time in the foreseeable future. Various times had been mentioned you will recall—May, June, July, the end of the year, and indefinite. There was a danger posed to the hostage by the deteriorating security situation in Iran. There clearly is armed conflict across the border between Iran and Iraq for example. There is, as those of you who have watched television lately are aware, considerable disorder in the streets of Iran.

We have considered, as you know, such things as interrupting commerce militarily. There are obvious complications with that. It further internationalizes the conflict, widens it, and might or might not have the desired effect. The crisis has been heightening tensions in what is already a volatile and vital region. There is a need to resolve that crisis. We need to remove a situation that complicates relationships among friends and allies. And the President and his senior Defense advisers—military and civilian—concluded that the rescue operation was a sound and feasible plan. We have considerable concern for the physical and psychological effects on the hostages of prolonged captivity.

All these are reasons for going ahead. The question is, why didn't we wait awhile? And the answer to that is largely operational. As time goes on in the region, temperature—physical temperature, that is—rises. The operations get more difficult; the nights get shorter. And all of that made it necessary to move relatively quickly if we were going to move at all during the next many months.

I want to say again that the courage and dedication of the members of this team really deserve, and I know will get, the support and the gratitude of all Americans. They trained well; they were professional; and they are dedicated.

Q. You said the decision to move planes and troops forward and prepare for rescue was made 2 weeks ago?

Secretary Brown. Essentially, the decision that we would make a serious attempt to prepare for rescue was made at that time.

Q. Did that decision at that time include the date that you might undertake the rescue?

Secretary Brown. That was going to depend upon weather; it was going to depend upon how fast we could move things. You know, there was an earliest date but not a firm date.

Q. You talked about exercising, training, and preparing for this in de-conditions and such, and yet you've only had 2 weeks. Did this all occur in a 2-week period?

Secretary Brown. No, no, no. The training and training has been going on since November—

Q. How do you compare this operation with the successful operations carried out by the Germans and Israelis? Can they do it, and we can't?

Secretary Brown. Tehran is not Entebbe. That's one reason. I'm not sure many of you have flown 500 nautical miles on a helicopter in one trip, but not many people have. It's a difficult task, and no other country, in my judgment, has ever attempted anything like this.

Q. Could you help me out on this issue by Secretary of the Air Force James Mark, who said that he looked at the plan you just attempted and, quote, "just wasn't feasible." This was something he said in Biloxi, Mississippi, on April 4th.

Secretary Brown. Did he say he looked at this plan we attempted?

Q. Well, he said that—

Secretary Brown. Please quote it.

Q. The United States considered sending a helicopter at its Embassy compound in Tehran to free the American hostages and rejected the idea because it, quote, "just wasn't feasible," quote, in an urban area.

Secretary Brown. I think that the plan that is described in that quotation would be very difficult. I have not described that plan, and I have not described our plan.

Q. Who commanded the operation, and where did the training take place?

Secretary Brown. I don't think we want to identify that yet, but we will be. We will be telling more about some of the people in a little while.

Q. Was this at the ultimate command of the President?

Secretary Brown. The ultimate decisions, as the President said, are his responsibility, and he takes responsibility for them. But the commander of the task force reported to General Jones, who reported to me, who reported to the President. That's the way it was done.

Q. What was the scene in the White House last night?

Secretary Brown. A number of people were working very hard, and we were very busy at it.

Q. You described the rescue operations—you said it wasn't really—you tried to—

Secretary Brown. It was not an attack on Iran in any way.

Q. Right, except that it would have been if you had gone in—you would have confronted Iranians. You also expressed concern about the tensions in the region. How come you don't see that tensions would not have risen if you didn't confront and probably kill a few Iranians?

Secretary Brown. It is, I think, not fruitful to speculate about how a successful rescue would have affected things in the region. I am convinced that a successful rescue would have affected them favorably.

Q. You have said that planning and training on this has been going on since November.

Secretary Brown. Yes.

Q. This was ordered by President Carter, this planning and training?

Secretary Brown. Oh, yes.

Q. I see. This is at the same time he is telling the American people that there would be no military action?

Secretary Brown. I, again, want to characterize this as a rescue operation, as I would characterize any attempts to rescue hostages.

Q. Did the personnel, as described in some reports, dress in some sort of Iranian garb?

Secretary Brown. No.

Q. Did you have any sense that you had been detected by Iranian military forces any time during this mission?

Secretary Brown. No.

Q. Do you have any radio communications between the operation and the White House last night?

Secretary Brown. There were communications between the task force and the Pentagon. There were separate communications between the Pentagon and the White House.

Q. How many people were involved on the ground in Iran, and how many worldwide; do you have a figure for us?

Secretary Brown. I think, as I said, they were on the order of 90 in the rescue force. There were, perhaps, a comparable number of air crews and support personnel involved there. How many worldwide is a much more difficult question, because you'd have to include all the carrier personnel, although they were not all directly involved, and so on. I think probably several times that number.

Q. Does the United States still have a viable military [inaudible]

Secretary Brown. I am not going to talk about specific options. I am saying, and I have said, and I will repeat that we continue to keep all our options open. We want to settle this peacefully, if we possibly can.

Q. Did the plane carry Iranian markings?

Secretary Brown. No.

Q. How many C-130s were there?

Secretary Brown. There were six C-130s.

Q. Was the Strategic Air Command warned of this ahead of time? And were the hostages aware that it was coming?

Secretary Brown. No, neither the hostages nor the militants who had captured—who are holding them hostage—were aware, and the Strategic Air Command was not put on higher alert.

Q. Can you tell us where the force is located now? Where it has fallen back?

Secretary Brown. No. It has been extracted from Iran, and it is on its way back.

Q. Did anyone visit the sites before the actual landing, or was there a team—

Secretary Brown. We knew from photography and other methods that the site was a salt desert, very similar to many areas in the southwestern United States, on some of which the team had practiced. So we knew it was suitable. And, indeed, it proved so to be.

Q. Have the bodies of the servicemen been returned also?

Secretary Brown. The bodies of the dead have not yet been returned. During the extraction it was concluded that the mission would be jeopardized if an attempt had to be made to recover them. But other efforts are being made; diplomatic efforts are underway.

Q. Were any of our NATO allies notified beforehand? And if not, why not?

Secretary Brown. The secrecy of this mission would have been compromised by informing others about what we were in the process of doing. Secrecy was vital to avoiding alerting of the Iranians to it. And in the event secrecy was preserved, and it was preserved by confining knowledge to a very, very small group of people. Only those who had an absolutely essential part in the preparation, even within the Defense Department. And even they knew only the minimum necessary to carry out their duties. For that reason, I can't say how many people, because different people knew different numbers.

Q. How can you say that you are not going to rule out any options, no more than you did before, when, in fact, you have just blown one of your options and you couldn't conceivably—

Secretary Brown. I will just repeat what I said. We have not ruled out any option. And we want, still, to resolve this as peacefully as we can.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, APR. 26, 1980³

Because of my desire that Congress be informed on this matter and consistent with the reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (Public Law 93-148), I submit this report.

On April 24, 1980, elements of the United States Armed Forces under my direction commenced the positioning stage of a rescue operation which was designed, if the subsequent stages had been executed, to effect the rescue of the American hostages who have been held captive in Iran since November 4, 1979, in clear violation of international law and the norms of civilized conduct among nations. The subsequent phases of the operation were not executed. Instead, for the reasons described below, all these elements were withdrawn from Iran and no hostilities occurred.

The sole objective of the operation that actually occurred was to position the rescue team for the subsequent effort to withdraw the American hostages. The rescue team was under my overall command and control and required my approval before executing the subsequent phases of the operation designed to effect the rescue itself. No such approval was requested or given because, as described below, the mission was aborted.

Beginning approximately 10:30 AM EST on April 24, six U.S. C-130 transport aircraft and eight RH-53 helicopters entered Iran airspace. Their crews were not equipped for combat. Some of the C-130 aircraft carried a force of approximately 90 members of the rescue team equipped for combat, plus various support personnel.

From approximately 2 to 4 PM EST the six transports and six of the eight helicopters landed at a remote desert site in Iran approximately 200 miles from Tehran where they disembarked the rescue team, commenced refueling operations and began to prepare for the subsequent phases.

During the flight to the remote desert site, two of the eight helicopters developed operating difficulties. One was forced to return to the carrier Nimitz; the second was forced to land in the desert, but its crew was taken aboard another of the helicopters and proceeded on to the landing site. Of the six helicopters which landed at the remote desert site, one developed a serious hydraulic problem and was unable to continue with the mission. The operational plans called for a minimum of six helicopters in good operational condition able to proceed from the desert site. Eight helicopters had been included in the force to provide sufficient redundancy without imposing excessive strains on the refueling and exit requirements of the operation. When the number of helicopters available to continue dropped to five, it was determined that the operation could not proceed as planned. Therefore, on the recommendation of the force commander and my military advisers, I decided to cancel the mission and ordered the United States Armed Forces involved to return from Iran.

During the process of withdrawal, one of the helicopters accidentally collided with one of the C-130 aircraft, which was preparing to take off, resulting in the death of eight personnel and the injury of several others. At this point, the decision was made to load all surviving personnel aboard the remaining C-130 aircraft and to abandon the remaining helicopters at the landing site. Altogether, the United States Armed Forces remained on the ground for a total of approximately three hours. The five remaining aircraft took off about 5:45 PM EST and departed from Iran airspace without further incident at about 8:00 PM EST on April 24. No United States Armed Forces remain in Iran.

The remote desert area was selected to conceal this phase of the mission from discovery. At no time during the temporary presence of United States Armed Forces in Iran did they encounter Iranian forces of any type. We believe, in fact, that no Iranian military forces were in the desert area; and that the Iranian forces were unaware of the presence of United States Armed Forces until after their departure from Iran. As planned, no hostilities occurred during this phase of the mission—the only phase that was executed.

At one point during the period in which United States Armed Forces elements were on the ground at the desert landing site a bus containing forty-four Iranian civilians happened to pass along a nearby road. The bus was stopped and then disabled. Its occupants were detained by United States Armed Forces until their departure, and then released unharmed. One truck close, followed by a second vehicle also passed by while United States Armed Forces elements were on the ground. These elements stopped the truck by a shot into its headlights. The driver ran to the second vehicle which he escaped across the desert. Neither of these incidents affected the subsequent decision to terminate the mission.

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue phase of the operation had been commenced, it had an excellent chance of success. They were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them. I share with the nation the highest respect and appreciation for the ability and brave of all who participated in the mission.

To the families of those who died and who were injured, I have expressed the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran. It was not directed against the people of Iran. It caused no Iranian casualties.

This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(d)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 28, 1980.

²Text from White House press release.

³Identical letters addressed to Thomas O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation of May 5). ■

Additional Sanctions Against Iran

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
APR. 17, 1980¹

Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1705, I hereby report to the Congress that I have today declared a further national emergency and exercised the authority granted by this Act to impose other prohibitions on transactions with Iran.

I am enclosing a copy of an Executive Order I have issued today making this declaration and exercising these authorities pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1641(b).

1. The circumstances necessitating the exercise of this authority are the continuing events in Iran, including the actions and omissions of the Government of Iran in violation of its obligations under international law, which caused me to declare a national emergency on November 14, 1979, to take the action set forth in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979, and Executive Order No. 12205 of April 7, 1980, and the additional unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States created by events subsequent to November 14, 1979, in Iran and neighboring countries, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

2. The events in Iran and neighboring countries threaten the strategic and vital interests of the United States. The occupation of the United States Embassy in

Tehran and the taking and holding of American citizens hostage there and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan are flagrant violations of the international order upon which the security of all nations and international peace are based. Such actions in a region of such vital importance to the United States, and most of the world, constitute a grave threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States.

3. For these reasons, I find it necessary to prohibit the following:

(a) Effective immediately, the direct or indirect import from Iran into the United States of Iranian goods or services, other than materials imported for news publication or news broadcast dissemination.

(b) Effective immediately, any transaction with a foreign person or foreign entity by any citizen or permanent resident of the United States relating to that person's travel to Iran after today. (I am simultaneously authorizing the Secretary of State to institute passport and departure controls to restrict travel to Iran by citizens and permanent residents of the United States.)

(c) Effective seven days from today, the payment by or on behalf of any citizen or permanent resident of the United States who is within Iran of any expenses for transactions within Iran.

The prohibitions in paragraphs (b) and (c) will not apply to a person who is also a citizen of Iran or a journalist or other person who is regularly employed by a news gathering or transmitting organization and who travels to Iran or is within Iran for the purpose of gathering or transmitting news, making news or documentary films, or similar activities.

4. Effective immediately, I have also amended Executive Order No. 12205 to prohibit payments, transfers of credit or other transfers of funds or other property or interests therein to any person in Iran, except for purposes of family remittances. This prohibition also does not apply to news gathering activities.

5. I have also directed the Secretary of the Treasury, effective fourteen days from today, to revoke existing licenses for transactions by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States with Iran Air, the National Iranian Oil Company, and the National Iranian Gas Company previously issued pursuant to regulations under Executive Order No. 12170 or Executive Order No. 12205. This will have the effect of closing down the offices in the United States of those entities.

6. In addition, I have ordered that all undelivered military equipment and spare parts purchased by Iran through the Department of Defense under the Arms Export Control Act now be distributed to our own Armed Forces or transferred to other buyers. The delivery of these defense articles was suspended in November 1979, and they are presently in storage or in the procurement pipeline.

7. This action is taken with respect to Iran and its nationals for the reasons described in this report.

JIMMY CARTER

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12211,
APR. 17, 1980¹

Further Prohibitions on Transactions With Iran

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, Sections 1732 and 2656 of Title 22 of the United States Code, and Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), in order to take steps additional to those set forth in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979, and Executive Order No. 12205 of April 7, 1980, to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States referred to in those Orders, and the added unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States created by subsequent events in Iran and neighboring countries, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with respect to which I hereby declare a national emergency, and to carry out the policy of the United States to deny the use of its resources to aid, encourage or give sanctuary to those persons involved in directing, supporting or participating in acts of international terrorism, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1-101. Paragraph 1-101(d) of Executive Order No. 12205 is hereby amended by the addition of a new subparagraph (v) as follows:

(v) Make any payment, transfer of credit, or other transfer of funds or other property or interests therein, except for purposes of family remittances.

1-102. The following transactions are prohibited, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order:

(a) Effective immediately, the direct or indirect import from Iran into the United States of Iranian goods or services, other than materials imported for news publication or news broadcast dissemination.

(b) Effective immediately, any transaction with a foreign person or foreign entity by any citizen or permanent resident of the United States relating to that person's travel to Iran after the date of this Order.

(c) Effective seven days from the date of this Order, the payment by or on behalf of any citizen or permanent resident of the United States who is within Iran of any expenses for transactions within Iran.

The prohibitions in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section shall not apply to a person who is also a citizen of Iran and those prohibitions and the prohibitions in section 1-101 shall not apply to a journalist or other person who is regularly employed by a news gathering or transmitting organization and who travels to Iran or is within Iran for the purpose of gathering or transmitting news, making news or documentary films, or similar activities.

1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby directed, effective fourteen days from the date of this Order, to revoke existing licenses for transactions by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States with Iran Air, the National Iranian Oil Company, and the National Iranian Gas Company previously issued pursuant to regulations under Executive Order No. 12170 or Executive Order No. 12205.

1-104. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated, and authorized to exercise, all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*) to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal government.

1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure that actions taken by him pursuant to the above provisions of this Order, Executive Order No. 12170 and Executive Order No. 12205 are accounted for as required by Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641).

1-106. The Secretary of State is delegated, and authorized to exercise in furtherance of the purposes of this Order, the powers vested in the President by Section 2001 of the Revised Statutes (22 U.S.C. 1732), Section 1 of the Act of July 3, 1926 (22 U.S.C. 211a), and Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1185), with respect to:

(a) the restriction of the use of United States passports for travel to, in or through Iran; and

(b) the regulation of departures from and entry into the United States in connection with travel to Iran by citizens and permanent residents of the United States.

1-107. Except as otherwise indicated herein, this Order is effective immediately. In accord with Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641) and Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), it shall be immediately transmitted to the Congress and published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

JIMMY CARTER

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 21, 1980. ■

Secretary Brown Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was interviewed on CBS's "Face the Nation" on April 27, 1980, by George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Ike Pappas, CBS News; and Henry Trewhitt, Baltimore Sun.

Q. The Iranian militants and their Ayatollah have put the bodies of the dead Americans on display at the American Embassy. Is there an Administration reaction to this event?

A. You will recall that yesterday President Bani-Sadr said that the bodies of our fallen who died in this mission would be returned without condition. Apparently we now have a suggestion that there is going to be a barter for those bodies. That is something in which we do not propose to engage. We find this another very disappointing and troubling example of the difficulty of dealing with this situation.

But it is a long tradition even among enemies—and we are not enemies of the Iranian people—that the bodies of fallen soldiers are returned.

Q. In view of this newest atrocity by the militants and their public gloating display of our dead and the suggestion that they be exchanged for Iranian money funds held in this country, what do you think now about the safety of our hostages in the wake of our abortive attempt to rescue them?

A. We continue to hold Iran responsible for the safety of the hostages, and for that reason we believe that our hostages will not be harmed. One can never tell in this kind of situation.

It was, in part, our concern for the deteriorating security situation in Iran—as you know, they have significant hostilities across the Iranian-Iraqi border and those of you who have seen pictures of the riots that were taking place recently in Tehran, I think, will agree with me that that security situation is deteriorating. That's part of the reason that we felt we should make an attempt at rescue at this time.

So that security situation is not good. There is a danger. There has been danger, but we're going to continue to hold Iran responsible for the safety of those hostages.

Q. What is your course from here? I know the Administration is

still holding its options open theoretically for another rescue attempt if necessary. That seems to be more remote now than it might have been a couple of days ago.

But don't you have to do something? Isn't the United States seen to be immobile in this situation now as it does the politics—and I don't mean in a political sense—but doesn't the politics dictate action?

A. The hostages, as you know, have been there for almost 6 months. We have followed every possible path and kept open every option. We will continue to keep open every option, and we will spare no effort in the attempt to get our hostages returned.

We need to see what we've done and what we're doing as two parallel paths. We attempted to solve the situation quickly and by rescue operation, but at the same time we were proceeding and will continue to proceed along the other track, the diplomatic-economic track.

That one, of course, now becomes even more important. We intend to pursue the line of sanctions. Of course in that attempt the cooperation of our allies is particularly important and indications are that they are going to continue to cooperate.

Q. Do you feel now that the rescue option has been eliminated, that you have no chance now of rescuing the hostages since they have been dispersed to other areas outside of the Embassy in Iran? And also, there seems to be some suggestion this morning that the hostages may be better off because they have been taken out of the American Embassy that there may be a chance now to get them out by peaceful means.

A. We're still not going to foreclose any option, any option in terms of U.S. actions. You will recall in the past, a number of us downgraded the rescue possibility and now you know one of the reasons why. That was part of the element of surprise. So if I say now no rescue is impossible you may not believe me anyway. But I'm not going to say anything about individual options except to say that they will all be kept open.

As to the movement of the hostages, I don't really want to speculate what effect that will be or what that will have. I will note this, however;

that if, indeed, the hostages have been moved out to a number of separate locations, and we're not really sure of that—we know what we've been told—if they've been moved out to a number of separate locations, then what you have for everyone to see is a group of kidnapers holding groups of Americans in various parts of another country—Iran—and the government not doing anything about it—the Iranian Government not doing anything about it.

That dispersal, if it takes place, makes it even clearer what the nature of the action in holding the hostages is. It's not a political action in terms of the usual sense. It clearly is a set of kidnappings.

Q. Why now? Did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have anything to do with delaying this operation?

A. No, the timing is the result of the following factors. First, the question is why didn't we wait? And the answer to that is that as the summer goes along, it gets hotter, and helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft range and payload go down as the temperature goes up.

Moreover, the winds shift pattern in a way that produces a headwind going into the rendezvous point, and the helicopters were stretched as regards their range already.

And finally, the nights get shorter, and this operation had to be carried out at night. So if it had gone another week or two or more than a couple of weeks into the summer or later into the spring and on into the year, it would have gotten harder and harder to the point of impossibility.

The other question is, okay, why not earlier in that case? The answer is that it took time to plan and to practice his operation. New equipment had to be developed, and modifications had to be made to some of the aircraft. People had to be selected and trained. We had to develop new communications equipment and so on.

Moreover, the plan itself changed. Some of the earlier plans that we looked at really looked to us to have a rather small chance of success. This was judged by me and by the senior military people—by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others—to have a good chance of success, but that was only after the plan had changed a number of times and had been practiced in its latest form.

Q. You've been asked an awful lot of questions about the operation itself, but there are still an awful lot left and we'll try a couple on you. Did

the plane compass also the rescue of Mr. Laingen and his two colleagues? [Charge d'Affaires L. Bruce Laingen being held in the Iranian Foreign Ministry?]

A. I don't want to talk about any part of the plan that wasn't carried out. I'll talk about what happened up to the point that the operation aborted or perhaps a little after, but I don't want to go into the whole thing for obvious reasons.

Q. I understand. Let me try another one somewhat along the same line. This was an operation by considerable American force in an area quite close to the Soviet Union. Did we have, for example, any contact with the Soviet Union on the hot line to assure them that there was no massive invasion?

A. We did communicate with other countries at a point when it became clear that the operation had aborted so that they would not mistake its nature. Until that time, that is, until it had aborted, until all our forces were out, no one else knew about it, and we're really quite sure about that.

Q. We know about the helicopter failures. We know about the dust storms, about all the fine details. In your opinion, what was the one reason for the failure of this mission?

A. I don't think you can give a reason, a single reason, because there was no single effect on the helicopters. Various helicopters had different difficulties. They all encountered substantial quantities of swirling dust which caused vertigo. There was one pilot who was actually on the ground and thought he was moving and had vertigo. Another helicopter had a hydraulic failure and so on. One helicopter turned back, and we have not yet had a debrief on that and so we can't really tell. There were several different factors that came together and caused the number of helicopters available to drop below that which had previously been established as the level of prudent risk to continue.

Q. But we were told that it was just bad luck. Now I don't think that's a scientific enough explanation or a professional enough explanation.

A. I haven't used the word bad luck. I've given you several things that happened each of them independent of the other.

Q. But these elements were not

factored into the planning, the possibility of dust storms or what?

A. All the possibilities were factored in. The events proved to be worse than we had expected, not worse than we could have conceived. It would have been possible to conceive even more adverse conditions, but in setting an operational plan of this sort, what you do is you decide how bad things are likely to be and then you put in a prudent safety factor. And then if things are much worse even than that safety factor has allowed for, then you abort the operation.

If you try to account for everything that might conceivably happen, then the operation grows in size and scope and starts to produce difficulties merely by nature of its size.

Q. Since you mentioned the safety factor, did you have any other helicopters available to you on the *Nimitz* or on any of the other carriers?

A. No, we went to—six was the number that we needed in operating condition at the refueling point after the refueling to have good confidence of proceeding on. We, therefore, started with seven, which is the standard factor for large helicopters. We then decided to take an additional safety factor and go with eight. And that's how many went over the coast.

Q. But did you have more on the carrier?

A. There were not more, but even if there were more, by that time it would not have been possible to add helicopters because you're already getting quite late in the operation. You would have had to add additional refueling and so forth. And under those circumstances had there been additional helicopters on the aircraft carrier, we would still not have been able to go on with the operation.

Q. Do you draw any general lessons from this about the quality of personnel, the quality of maintenance? You lost a third of your assets really in this operation.

A. We started with eight helicopters. At the refueling point we had six, one of which lost a hydraulic line and could not go on. One of the other ones that dropped out of the mission dropped out for mechanical reasons, different mechanical reasons. One turned back because of operational difficulties. And as I say, we haven't finished the debriefing on that. So far as we know, a quarter of them suffered mechanical difficulties.

But you have to remember again that this is a very, very taxing mission. These helicopters have a range with the additional fuel tanks that we added long enough to go this distance but not with any margin of safety—not with much margin of safety. And they were flying low to the ground in order to avoid discovery.

Q. Soviet radar?

A. Iranian radar. They were flying under very difficult conditions, more difficult than the weather forecast had shown.

You put all those things together, and I don't draw any conclusions about the general quality of our maintenance. I draw the conclusion, which I knew before, that helicopters are more difficult to operate and maintain than fixed-wing aircraft. We knew that before, and that's why we had a margin of safety here.

As for the quality of our personnel, they were brave, they were dedicated, they were well-trained, and naturally they ran into some difficulties, but I have no fault to find. We're going to have to again investigate, a debrief, and so on. I think it would be a bad mistake for us to try to find goats among our personnel at this point.

Q. The allies feel betrayed because they weren't informed. We know why, you've explained why the allies were not told beforehand, but can we, do you think, count on them to support our sanctions now? Do you feel that they're going to go with us across the board on this?

A. All of our allies understand why they were not consulted and informed of this kind of operation. They had expected to be informed or consulted and discussed with before there was a military operation of the kind that had been talked about a great deal in public—blockade, mining. But naturally they understand that security cannot be maintained if a lot of people outside those who are actually doing the operation are informed about it.

With respect to their actions from now on, I believe they fully understand that it is important in order to avoid having to go to more extreme actions that they cooperate with us on the diplomatic front and the economic front and move forward on the sanctions.

And as I said earlier, the indications are that they are going to continue to do that as they have been doing.

One thing is clear from this rescue operation. The United States feels very

strongly about the hostages and getting them back. Our allies understand this better now even than they did before, and I think the Iranians understand it better now even than they did before.

Q. This is a question the answer to which is not known to me but I'm sure must be known by now to the Iranians, and that is the nightmare in any operation of this kind where six, seven of our craft are left on the ground is, are any secret documents left in usable condition. Is any secret equipment left behind in usable or studiable condition?

A. There may well have been some equipment left in studiable condition, but it's too early to say because although, as you say, the Iranians know and you don't know, I'm not sure myself. Some of the helicopters were burning. We don't know for sure whether others might have caught fire or been destroyed even by the Iranians before they got to look inside. So we don't know for sure. It's a possibility, but I don't want to go further than that.

Q. Just to clarify one point you made earlier, you said we are continuing to hold Iran responsible for the safety of the hostages. Now is that a threat to use military action if they're harmed?

A. It's a simple statement and I'll repeat it, but I won't expand on it. We do hold Iran responsible for what happens to the hostages.

Q. There's a little interpretation also.

A. I'm sure you'll be willing to give it at great length, but I'm going to simply repeat it. We hold Iran responsible.

Q. Let me try to get at it this way if I may. There was a time when we were talking about—

A. You know, we're moving forward on the peaceful front. That's what we want. We want to get the hostages back peacefully, but we're going to hold Iran responsible for what happens.

Q. At one point, we were discussing the possibility of military action apart from the rescue mission.

A. Yes.

Q. Roughly mid-May or sometime later.

A. Yes.

Q. You say today that allied cooperation is at least as important as before and perhaps more so.

A. Yes.

Q. The allies say that they're going to take additional sanctions against Iran on May the 17th. Now doesn't this imply that you really are ruling out any further military action until sometime considerably after May the 17th to give their sanctions an opportunity to work?

A. I don't want to set forth the schedule or a deadline. I think that this is a time to stress peaceful ways of resolving a problem and I want to do—that's what I'm doing.

It is going to take time to resolve it peacefully. That's been clear from the beginning, and we want to press forward on that line without ruling anything out completely.

Q. Before you go altogether on the peaceful side, let me ask you, try one more time on the operation without asking you any of the details.

Are you worried about some friends of the United States in Tehran who might be threatened or damaged might have been willing to help us of plans to help us, who might be damaged by the failure?

A. If you're talking about political elements in Iran favorable to the United States—

Q. I was being a little more specific. Some people who might have been either prepared or in the plan to help us in this operation.

A. I don't want to talk about the plan or the effects of the plan beyond the point at which it aborted.

Q. I understand.

A. There were additional parts to the plan. I just don't want to go into them now except to say that we weren't going to leave everybody there after the refueling. They were going to move to another place and hide out.

Q. So some people were not moved in the plan and is there some—have you heard anything that gives you reason to worry about them?

A. I'm simply not going to talk about the parts of the plan that we didn't execute.

Q. Does that apply also for the possibility that some of the hostages may have known that you were coming and how were they—

A. I would not want to say anything about that. That, I think—again the best way to answer that is the way

ve answered, and I'm not going to go beyond that.

Q. The Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. Ghotbzadeh, has said that if the United States tries something, they will block the Persian Gulf. Can they? Can we stop them?

A. That, I think, is one I can answer. Attempts to block the Persian Gulf, as has been suggested, by sinking ships in it, in the Straits of Hormuz, are not really feasible. That's a wide strait, and there's a wider one next to it. Here is, of course, the possibility of military action. I suppose, implied in Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh's statement—a blockade of the United States or of the other countries in the Gulf. I don't really think he means that, and I think, therefore, that this is not one of our more serious concerns.

I don't want to dismiss anything, but I would say that we're able to handle that from its military aspects. We have a very large and substantial and strong naval force in the area.

Q. Does the Administration still think it was a couple of months ago, still think of quickly restoring relations with Iran once this situation is resolved—and I realize I'm looking for forward now—in order to preserve the Persian Gulf for the Western democracies?

A. If we can resolve—and I deeply hope we can—this hostage issue, then I think the way is open to and we're quite eager to establish good relations with Iran. They are obviously not going to get from what they are to deep friendship, but it's—and we don't expect that. But we do want to be friends with the Iranian revolutionary government. And we believe that a stable, unified, a strong Iran, neutral, Islamic, something that we could have good relations with. And we believe that could help the stability of the region. We believe it would help to block Soviet expansionism.

Q. Do you see anything that worries you about Soviet expansionism in Iran? You have worried about it publicly before.

A. Yes. I still do because it is clear that there are elements in this political cloth in Iran that are really Soviet oriented and would like to turn Iran into a Soviet satellite or into another Afghanistan. That would be disastrous for the region. It would be very harmful to us and it would be terrible, indeed, for the Iranians. ■

United States Security Adviser Brzezinski Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was interviewed on ABC's "Issues and Answers" in Washington, D.C., on April 27, 1980, by Bob Clark and Sam Donaldson of ABC News.

Q. The situation in Iran appears to have taken a potentially dangerous new turn with the removal of the hostages from the Embassy to other locations and the threats that the Americans who died in the rescue mission—their bodies—will not be returned without concessions from us. Can you tell us how seriously you view the situation at the moment and just how much you know about it?

A. Let me say, first of all, that what the President ordered to be done was morally right and politically justified. We needed to take this action to help to relieve the situation. Our countrymen needed help. We had a moral obligation to do what we could to help them and we will persist in this effort.

Politically the region is stagnating, and Iran's political situation is deteriorating. It is important to bring this issue to resolution. What is now happening in Iran is unclear. We have no confirmation that the hostages have been removed. It is not clear if they are removed, in whose custody they would be retained. In any case, we continue to hold the Iranian Government responsible for the safety and well-being of these people.

Insofar as the bodies are concerned, President Bani-Sadr said, and honorably, that they will be retained—removed and returned to us immediately. We hold him to his word and will see whether the events, literally, within the next hours or days, justify our faith in his word.

Q. If the hostages have, indeed, been removed to other locations, how seriously would you view this, and is there anything we can do about it?

A. Obviously, there's nothing we can do about it because we do not have control over the hostages. Much depends in whose custody they will be retained. We will continue our efforts—all efforts—to obtain their release, and I believe that one of the very important lessons to be drawn from the events of the last few days, by everyone concerned, is that the United States, and the President of the

United States, is prepared to do all that is necessary to obtain their release and will persist in these efforts; I repeat, will persist in these efforts.

Q. He can do all that is necessary, but what can he do? He's played a card. It failed. You said it was an honorable card, and I'm not arguing with that, but it failed. What next?

A. First of all, there is the longer term track which involves collective actions designed to bring home to the Iranians, and particularly to those Iranians who are responsible for the fate of their country, that the continued political paralysis and international isolation of Iran, which the hostage situation is engendering, is bringing ruin to Iran itself. The country is gradually disintegrating.

Q. Now, you have said that for a long time.

A. Its peripheries are falling apart.

Q. Excuse me, you've said that for a long time.

A. Its enemies are gathering force. Responsible Iranians have to contemplate the consequences of this for Iran. And if a peaceful resolution is to be found, they have to play the role.

Q. If I may just ask about that, you and the President, and other Administration officials have made that point for a long time. It seemed to get us nowhere. Apparently you didn't believe enough at that point to let it play out. You took this action which failed.

A. We have made that point for a long time, but we're playing the situation here that unfolds slowly. We have adopted certain steps ourselves to bring home to Iran that Iran's well-being is being adversely affected by what it had done. More recently these steps have been strengthened by allied solidarity. The fact that Iran is increasingly ostracized in the world is a psychological, political, and economic situation which no responsible Iranian can ignore.

Q. Are you now conceding that it is a long-term proposition that those hostages will be there a long time?

A. We are not conceding anything of the sort. What I'm saying is that one has to have a long-term strategy for dealing

with a problem which may last a long time or which might be resolved more rapidly. In addition to that, one has the obligation to consider alternative courses of action which might resolve this problem more promptly. The rescue operation which the President ordered undertaken was planned literally from the first week of the hostage seizure. We undertook it at a time when we thought it was opportune. We certainly intend to work peacefully, if possible, to resolve this problem.

Q. But hasn't the failure of that rescue mission effectively ended any prospect for early release of the hostages?

A. I would not draw that conclusion. I hope that it brings home to Tehran a very important message, which until a week ago the Iranians were inclined to discount, and the message is this: Do not scoff at American power, do not scoff at American reach. It is in Iran's interest to resolve this problem peacefully. It is our preference to resolve it peacefully.

Q. Do you think that the failure of the rescue mission and the angry reaction of the Iranians to that mission increases or decreases the prospects for use of military power on our part?

A. I cannot answer that question, because I do not know exactly how the balance of rationality versus irrationality plays out in Tehran. My hope is that there are enough Iranian leaders within the revolution which recognize now as a fact who are concerned about Iran's well-being and realize that a perpetuation of this situation is likely to produce conditions for Iran which might be disastrous for its national well-being.

Q. You speak of the support we're now receiving from our allies, but hardly anyone believes that economic sanctions are going to effect early release of the hostages. Wouldn't you agree with that?

A. I'm not sure whether everybody feels that way. Our allies have concluded that a somewhat different sequence in steps than we would have preferred is now to be applied—namely, political sanctions first followed by economic sanctions.

Our collective judgment is that this is the best way to bring home to the Iranians the reality that they live in a very vulnerable part of the world, to remind them that in the past they have been subject to foreign domination, particularly Russian Soviet, and they are therefore

creating conditions which may end up being very painful to themselves.

Q. Are you saying in all of what you have said so far that we are going to attempt another type of military operation against Iran or an attempt to free the hostages, and, if so, how can we do that?

A. I'm weighing my words very carefully. I'm saying that we are pursuing a collective policy designed to bring home to the Iranian leaders, those who are responsible, the advantages of a peaceful solution, a peaceful resolution to an illegal, abhorrent act which the entire international community rejects. We reserve to ourselves the right to pursue every course of action open to us to redress a situation in which we are the victims of an illegal, indeed, of a belligerent act.

Q. But to do what? Let me say to you that Secretary Brown—Defense Secretary Brown—yesterday, in discussing this problem, said one of the reasons why you didn't mine the harbors or attempt the blockade was because that would internationalize the problem, perhaps widen it, and perhaps not have the desired effect. Has that changed today? Can you go back now to a blockade strategy?

A. I will not discuss specific options, because specific options depend in the utility or disutility on the particular circumstances in which they are applied. All I can say is that the United States has a political and a moral obligation to do what it can to redress this issue. We undertook the rescue operation, knowing full well that it was risky.

We calculated very precisely its chances of success. We felt they were sufficiently high to warrant this activity, because we had a moral obligation to help our people. We have the political obligation to try to resolve this problem to an end if the Iranians, themselves, are not capable of reaching the requisite decision.

Q. We know that Secretary Vance had very grave doubts about this operation, and Secretary Brown had some also. What were they?

A. Everyone recognized that the operation was risky. We also know from history that there are moments in which a certain amount of risk has to be taken. We calculated very closely what the risks were. We knew that we were undertaking something which involved risk.

We also knew that the stakes involved were very high. After the full

weighing of this, after many exercises, after many tests, after weeks of meticulous planning, after extensive discussion in the National Security Council, in which all of the President's advisers took part, the President took the right decision, took the courageous decision. And I believe that this is a decision which the American people support. I will say for myself that I am proud to have been associated with it, I'm proud of what we tried to do and particularly proud of the American men who volunteered to go and to what was necessary to be done.

Q. Was it just bad luck that it failed? It was not a question of a bad plan?

A. I believe the plan was good. The plan was extremely complex because of the difficulties involved, the enormous distances involved. Some of the precautions taken by the other side had to be taken into account. In an operation of this sort, you always have luck on your side to some extent to succeed, and bad luck can abort a situation.

This situation was aborted initially without any loss of life. The loss of life, unfortunately took place during the evacuation process due to an air collision. These things happen sometimes. Yesterday's headlines spoke not only of eight American dead but of some 140 English men dead who died in a plane crash in Canary Islands. These things do happen.

Q. Our allies, as you well know, have been concerned from the start that we would take some sort of military action that would inflame the situation and escalate the risk of confrontation even more with Iran or the Soviet Union.

They now seem more concerned than ever after this rescue mission or its failure. If we do get to the point where we have to take—feel we have to take military action, would you inform the allies so there would not be this feeling again?

A. Let me differentiate, first of all between a sustained military operation and a rescue operation which is necessarily of shorter duration—

Q. I'm thinking of the seeding of mines in Iranian harbors as a serious military action.

A. I think an action of a more sustained kind would be an action which would lend itself to advance consultation. Insofar as allied reactions are concerned let me say this. Our initial judgments a

at public opinion abroad understands the necessity for a rescue operation, and, indeed, some of our allies themselves had undertaken such rescue operations—the Germans did, the French did.

Secondly, the President has already received a number of extremely warm personal messages from his associates, the leaders of our principal allies indicating their close support and understanding for the action we took.

Q. You said that you would consult our allies in a sustained military operation, if that was something that the President contemplates. I assume you would also consult Congress.

A. Of course.

Q. In advance?

A. Of course.

Q. Let me ask you a question about the bodies that we asked earlier. It is said now by the Ayatollah Beshiti that we have to pay a price, some sort of price to get the bodies back or for dead. Is that acceptable?

A. If that is true, it's another step down in the moral degradation of a country which has had actually a very impressive, occasionally glorious, tradition. In addition to trading hostages, if the Iranian authorities now begin to trade in lives, I think it is an indication of the path to which they have sunk, and this will further contribute to their international condemnation and isolation.

Q. But, in fact, I take it there is nothing we could do about it, or would we be willing to do something if they asked for a price?

A. Your questions keep pointing to the fundamental dilemma we face—namely, that a group of terrorists, apparently with some complicity of the government, are holding our fellow countrymen. Our efforts over the last few months have been designed to obtain their release. These efforts will persist. We'll use whatever is necessary to obtain their release. I believe we have demonstrated last week how determined we are and how far we can reach.

Q. Is the answer to my question?

A. This applies to the bodies. Obviously we cannot get the bodies out any more easily than the hostages.

Q. Would we pay a price for them?

A. We're not in the body-buying business. We are willing to do what is necessary through intermediaries or di-

rectly to obtain a dignified and humane resolution of the body issue if that is a new issue which the Iranians wish to create. I find it, simply as a human being, from a moral point of view, degrading to think that anyone would do that. Traditionally, even enemies return the bodies of warriors. I hope we don't embark on excessive speculation on the subject until we know for a fact that this degrading reality confronts us.

Q. If we can return to the question of our allies' concern that the situation in the whole Persian Gulf area is getting out of hand, and that we may, indeed, be heading toward a very serious confrontation with the Soviet Union, will our decision on whether or not to take any military action—will it be based on a very careful appraisal of how the Soviets might react to this?

A. I think it's important to look at the situation in the region in a wider perspective. We're dealing not only with the hostage issue in Iran, we're dealing with the progressive disintegration of Iran as a political entity. The country is polarized and to some extent increasingly radicalized. At the same time, the Soviets are in the process of occupying Afghanistan.

We are dealing, therefore, with a significant expansion of Soviet power southward. This does pose, potentially, a significant danger to the Persian Gulf region, a region of vital interest to Western Europe and to Japan and to us. This is why there is a wider dimension, a strategic dimension to this problem.

Q. There are many who think it also poses a very significant danger to us and even Barry Goldwater, this past week, who has been one of the leading hawks in Congress over the week—over the years—said that he fears we are being pulled toward a confrontation with Russia and a war for which we are not prepared.

A. I think it's important to remember that since World War II there first emerged the central strategic zone of Western Europe. The second central strategic zone for us was the Far East. In both places we have permanently stationed American forces. The third central strategic zone is southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf. There are no forces there. Iran, Turkey, to some extent Pakistan, Afghanistan as a buffer, were the protective shield. That shield is now being pierced. As a consequence, our friends in the region and our vital interest in this third central strategic zone are beginning to be threatened. This is why this is becoming a strategic problem.

Q. You say there are no forces today in the Persian Gulf area. Isn't that the whole nub of the problem that we may be moving toward a war for which we simply are not prepared?

A. First of all, it is not true to say that there are no American forces in the area. We have taken, under the President's leadership in the course of the last several months, deliberate steps to augment our military presence. We now have two aircraft carrier task forces in the area with considerable air punch. We are developing a search capability so that we

EC Invokes Sanctions Against Iran

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 23, 1980¹

We welcome the EC Nine Foreign Ministers' decision [on April 22] to support our efforts to free the hostages by invoking the sanctions against Iran embodied in the U.N. Security Council resolution, vetoed by the Soviet Union last January.

Some of the European Community member states will require legislation to give effect to sanctions, and they have undertaken to obtain that legislation by May 17. We are hopeful that the necessary legislation will be promptly enacted so that the nations will be able to carry out their commitments to impose sanctions unless decisive progress has been made toward releasing the hostages, which we assume means release from Iranian control.

In the meantime, diplomatic staffs will be reduced, and visas will be required for Iranians traveling to EC countries. Military sales will be banned. We are awaiting the necessary parliamentary action as we give great importance to the joint action of all the European Community countries in this effort.

I just might add to that that this action by the European Community does underscore to the Iranians the extent to which continuing to hold the hostages isolates them in world opinion.

¹ Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 28, 1980). ■

can inject our forces rapidly. We are intensifying our political-military consultations with some of the countries concerned. We are working closely with those who are not directly involved in our military efforts but would benefit from them—for example, Saudi Arabia, which is a staunch friend and in whose leadership we have high confidence—

Q. But Saudi Arabia is also very concerned about our taking any military action that might upset the balance.

A. You didn't let me complete my thought. Saudi Arabia, which is a staunch friend and which has a leadership in whom we have high confidence, has been extremely helpful to us on international economic issues. We recognize the need to create an environment which is secure, while respecting the Arab desire to protect their sovereignty through the absence of foreign bases on their soil.

Q. Some of the American allies and some of the American public have been saying that President Carter is really not competent and this is another indication that he's not up to the job. I assume that you do not accept that, but does that not complicate the problem now of working with our allies and also of trying to formulate a new policy?

A. Now that's such an absurd statement that I don't think one should spend too much time refuting it. But I'll take a minute or two just to remind that you this is the President who obtained the Panama Canal treaties against enormous odds. This is the President who obtained the first peace treaty ever between Israel and an Arab country. This is the President which moved us in a position to influence genuine reconciliation in southern Africa on the basis of majority rule. This is the President who bit the bullet on normalization of relations with China, thereby very greatly improving our strategic position in the world. This is the President who provided the leadership strength in NATO for a long-term development program. This is the President who has taken difficult decisions to increase the defense budget in peacetime. It's a pretty good record in 3 years. Much better than some of our predecessors.

Q. I did not want to interrupt you because I thought it was only fair for you to be able to make that case, but the polls seem to suggest that people are not confident in this President's ability to handle this particular crisis. That curve has been going down. Let

me ask you the auxiliary question. Wasn't one of the reasons Mr. Carter took the action that you took this past week because of the political factor that he saw he had to do something?

A. Absolutely not. We took it because with the refinement of the rescue plan—at some point we concluded that the rescue plan was a viable option. Once the negotiating track had run out of steam, toward the end of March, and once we had indications from the other side that they were determined to continue holding the hostages indefinitely, we knew we had a narrow window left for the rescue option before the nights became too short and also the temperature too hot for an operation which included air breathing machines over long territory.

Q. You do seem to agree, in what you have just said then and previously, that the rescue option is no longer there.

A. No, I do not agree that the rescue option is not there. I'll not speculate in rescue options. One particular aspect of that rescue option has obviously been compromised, but I will not speculate on what can be done. I'll only repeat what I have said many times before: Let everyone draw an important lesson from this. This President and this country will do what is necessary, and we have the means for doing it, and one setback doesn't shape the future.

Q. We wouldn't go to war with Iran would we?

A. We will take actions which are appropriate. We prefer to resolve this problem peacefully through collective pressure. We hope, as I have said many times in this program, the Iranians will reach the right conclusion. But we're not going to sit indefinitely and have belligerent action imposed upon us.

Q. The 15 diplomats who have been held hostage for the past 2 months in Bogota, Colombia, apparently have been removed from the Embassy there, this morning, and are en route somewhere by plane. Can you tell us what you know about that?

A. Yes. We are very hopeful that within hours there will be a resolution, a positive resolution of this issue. And we expect to have good news including our own principal representative very, very shortly.

Q. Is this some sort of a compromise that has been struck with the militants or the terrorists who have

held them so that some of their imprisoned leaders would be released from jail?

A. The Colombian Government was responsible for handling these negotiations, and I do not wish to preempt the specific information that will be released at the time when the good news—and I trust it will be good news for all of us—made public.

Q. Do you know whether it is true that some of the diplomats are being flown to Cuba?

A. It may be the case, but I don't want to go beyond confirming the fact that I think that good news will shortly be released.

Q. By the way, back to Iran, Iran is claiming that the Government of Iran has been overthrown and its President been killed. Do you know anything about that?

A. I haven't heard any information to confirm that. I don't believe that Rad Tehran has an established standard of accuracy and veracity.

Q. Another question on the hostages. The militant terrorists are once again threatening to try them. What would be our response?

A. Our position on the subject has been known previously. I believe public on November 20th of last year, we stated by that. And the action we undertook last week probably reinforces the credibility of our position. ■

Iran Chronology, April 1980

April 1

President Carter, hoping for a transfer of the hostages from the militants to the Iranian Government, defers plans to impose new economic and political sanctions against Iran.

President Bani-Sadr states that the Revolutionary Council would accept control of the hostages only if the U.S. formally pledges not to do anything "provocative" until after Iran's new Parliament is elected.

April 2

President Carter publicly pledges to maintain silence about hostages as long as progress is being made to resolve the crisis.

April 3

Revolutionary Council fails to reach agreement in a debate over transfer of the hostages.

April 4

A leading clerical member of the Revolutionary Council, Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei, threatens to deny Persian Gulf oil to the U.S. if it orders sanctions against Iran.

April 6

Khomeini rules that the hostages will remain in militant hands until their fate is decided by the yet-to-be-elected Parliament.

Four clergymen celebrate Easter with the hostages. They report that the hostages are in good health.

April 7

U.S. breaks diplomatic relations with Iran and imposes a formal embargo on U.S. exports.

President Carter announces that he will ask the Congress to permit America to settle claims against Iran by drawing on \$8 billion in Iranian assets that are frozen in U.S. banks.

April 8

Khomeini welcomes breaking of relations with U.S. as a "good omen" and calls the Iranians to "celebrate."

April 9

Militants threaten to "destroy all hostages immediately" if U.S. begins military actions against Iran.

Shah is discharged from Cairo military hospital.

April 10

Meeting in Lisbon, Foreign Ministers of nine Common Market countries decline to impose economic sanctions against Iran or scale down or close their embassies. They, instead, issue a new condemnation of the Iranian Government for detaining the U.S. hostages.

April 11

Iranians hold a Unity Day rally celebrating the breaking of diplomatic ties by the U.S., at the same time calling for the overthrow of the neighboring Iraqi Government.

April 12

In response to President Carter's plea for greater support, Ambassadors from the Common Market countries and Japan meet with Bani-Sadr to press demands for release of the hostages.

In a hostage resolution, the Inter-Parliamentary Union Council votes 80-0, with 20 abstentions, condemning the continued detention of U.S. hostages in Iran and denouncing the complacent attitudes of Iranian authorities.

April 13

Eight Common Market countries (Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland) announce they will withdraw their Ambassadors temporarily from Iran in protest against the holding of U.S. hostages.

U.S. urges allies to impose economic sanctions against Iran later this month and break diplomatic relations by mid-May, if progress has not been made toward the hostages' release.

April 14

Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross spend 8 hours interviewing the hostages.

April 18

In spite of President Carter's announcement banning all American travel to Iran, Mrs. Barbara Timm, mother of one of the hostages—Marine Sergeant Kevin Hermening—and her husband fly from Paris to West Germany en route to Iran to plead with Iranian authorities to allow her to visit her son.

April 20

Public notice is issued restricting the use of U.S. passports for travel to, in, or through Iran. The notice is effective for 1 year unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

April 21

Secretary Vance submits a letter of resignation to President Carter stating that he could not support the President's decision to attempt a rescue mission of the hostages in Iran.

Britain recalls its Ambassador, stating that there would be a major cutback in Embassy personnel and advising British nationals to leave Iran.

April 22

Common Market Foreign Ministers vote unanimously to impose full economic sanctions against Iran on May 17 unless "decisive progress" is made by them on freeing the hostages.

Four members of the Family Liaison Action Group (FLAG) leave for Europe to meet with British Prime Minister Thatcher, French President Giscard, German Chancellor Schmidt, and in Rome, the Pope.

April 23

Iranian Government announces new trading agreement with the Soviet Union, Romania, and East Germany. It also announces that in the event of a U.S. naval blockade, the Soviet Union had agreed to supply Iran by land.

The government also announces that American journalists would have to leave the country once their current visas and credentials expire.

Japan's Cabinet announces its decision to impose those diplomatic and economic measures recently announced by the EEC members.

April 24

Iran warns U.S. that if it tried to block Iranian harbors, Tehran might seek to cut off all oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.

Swiss Foreign Ministry announces, in the absence of formal diplomatic relations, it will represent U.S. interests in Iran.

U.S. agrees to Iran's selection of the Algerian Embassy to protect its diplomatic and consular interests in this country.

April 25

A mission to rescue the hostages—in planning since November—was aborted by President Carter because of equipment failures.

Khomeini denounces Carter for a "stupid act" and warns that a second attempt could endanger the hostages' lives.

April 26

Hostages are reportedly moved from the Embassy and dispersed throughout Iran to thwart further rescue attempts by the U.S.

April 27

Iranian officials publicly display the bodies of eight U.S. servicemen killed in the rescue attempt.

April 28

President Carter accepts Secretary Vance's resignation stating that he "respects the reasons" for Vance's decision.

April 30

Religious services are held in Iran for the eight U.S. servicemen.

Iran's London Embassy is seized by three armed men. Holding 20 hostages, they demand more rights for the Arab minority in Iran and the release of 91 political prisoners being held there. ■

Ambassador Linowitz Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations, was interviewed on CBS's "Face the Nation" on April 20, 1980, by George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Robert Pierpoint, CBS News; and Terence Smith, The New York Times.

Q. After the visits of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, the President sounded reasonably optimistic about further progress in the Middle East, but Mr. Begin, when he returned to his homeland, said he had given away nothing. Can there be progress unless somebody gives away something?

A. First let me say a word about why the meetings that were just held were deemed by the President to be successful, to have been very productive.

The object of the meeting with Prime Minister Begin, as with President Sadat, was to come together in order to talk frankly about issues of greatest consequence, to exchange ideas, to see whether there might be some room for finding new answers to questions that thus far had eluded answers.

So there was an agreement that the May 26th date ought to be reconfirmed as the objective, that efforts ought to be made to accelerate the negotiations, that new mechanisms ought to be explored and new ideas discussed, and this was precisely what the President had hoped for.

Now against that backdrop, the answer to your question is, yes, there can be progress because what is called for is not the kind of major concessions that were perhaps suggested by Prime Minister Begin when he repeated his position but rather give and take here and there in a manner that will insure that we move toward the autonomy that both parties have sought and for which they've committed themselves.

Q. Let me amend my first question with some language that I picked up from your first answer and try it again.

In your meeting with Prime Minister Begin, and I suppose also with President Sadat, did you find, as you said, new room for solutions, and

was there, as you said, a little give and take here and there by both sides?

A. Yes. I think it's fair to say that there was a recognition on the part of each of the leaders that there had to be some flexibility if we are to reach an agreement.

Prime Minister Begin feels very strongly, as he has asserted again and again, about some critical issues.

It was possible in the course of these discussions, however, to put before him the concerns of President Sadat and those of President Carter with respect to those issues and see if there might not be some way of finding a common way which would meet his concerns and yet move us forward. That did take place in the course of our discussions with him, as indeed it did when we talked with President Sadat.

Q. Coming off of those discussions, do you see enough ground to suggest that the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza would be encouraged sufficiently to come into this process? They so far have not.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think they will?

A. I don't know, but I hope they will. As you know, we have long been trying to get the Palestinians to become involved in these discussions and these negotiations. When the Camp David accord was entered into, it was with the anticipation and with the hope that Palestinians might join the negotiations as a member of the Jordanian or Egyptian team. This they have adamantly refused to do.

When I first became involved in these negotiations some 4½ months ago, I then said that if I were a Palestinian at that time I would not have wanted to join the negotiations.

What I meant was that at that time there had only been discussions, semantics, and procedural matters and no substantive areas that are of real consequence to the Palestinians.

Today I believe there is reason for them to look long and hard at what we've done. We have made progress. We have come to some agreement on substantive issues. We are moving in the direction of establishing full autonomy, and, therefore, I hope we can interest them in joining the talks.

Q. You talk about some flexibility. You talk about some give and take. You say you are moving forward in a substantive way. Did you, for instance, make any progress at all on autonomy, and, if so, what does it now mean to the Israelis versus what does it mean to the Egyptians?

A. Let me first point out the basic problem we have in these negotiations. The phrase "full autonomy" has never been defined under the circumstances with which we're dealing. So what we're up to really is trying to fashion definition which will be acceptable to both parties.

You may know the story of the little girl who was once drawing a picture and the man said, "What are you drawing?" She said, "I'm drawing a picture of God." The man said, "No one knows what God looks like." And the kid said, "They will when I'm through."

Well, in a sense, if we want to know what full autonomy is, they'll know when we're through. We're trying now to put meaning into that phrase, and I think as a result of these discussions we did move closer to a mutual acceptable understanding as to what autonomy ought to mean, and, therefore, I think we've made some progress.

Q. All right, but let's be specific. Does it mean anymore than the right to decide who sweeps the streets in the Arab villages and the Arab cities or does it really mean that they will have the right to rule themselves as they and the Egyptians want?

A. Unless this full autonomy does give the Palestinians the sense that they are going to have a very substantial measure of control over those things which are important in their lives, they won't enter these talks. They won't become involved in the negotiations, and, therefore, they won't be participants.

Therefore, it's clearly understood by both sides that the autonomy plan that emerges must be credible, must be viable, must really make sense in terms of the language used.

Q. When Mr. Begin returned just the other day to Israel—I mean I'm looking at the article here and he ticked off areas in which he did not give, he said to his people, obviously playing to his constituency as well, but if you look at them—no concession on sovereignty in east Jerusalem, no concession on continuing construction of Israeli settlements, no

oncession on the question of security and control of the security situation in the West Bank—what does that have you? Where do you go from here?

A. It's very important to differentiate areas of agreement and areas of disagreement. Nobody was suggesting Prime Minister Begin when he was here that sovereignty be divided in Jerusalem. The only question that ever arose was whether or not the Arabs in east Jerusalem ought to have some way of participating in the election of the self-governing authority. That was it.

And the President reaffirmed again and again Jerusalem will remain undivided. So that is not an issue that caused any concern, nor was there disagreement on that.

Q. But he says there was this historic debate in the Cabinet Room for hours on the question of east Jerusalem. Was that on the question of voting in east Jerusalem?

A. Yes. I'm flattered by the historic designation, but it was an interesting discussion back and forth, and was on that question of should the Arabs in east Jerusalem have the right to participate, should they be encouraged to participate in the vote?

Q. How did it come out?

A. We still have differences of opinion on that.

Q. Then there really wasn't any progress after this historic debate.

A. No. I said that we still have differences of opinion. I didn't say there had not been any progress.

Q. What was the degree of progress? Or give us an example of what progress was made on that issue.

A. I think the progress that was made was a clearer understanding on both sides of the positions of each.

For example, Prime Minister Begin understands why the Egyptians feel so strongly that it would not be wise for us to assume that you could elect a self-governing authority without participation in some form of the Arabs in east Jerusalem.

And I think with that awareness we're now going to go back and enter into these negotiations starting a week or so now hoping that his discussion will be more helpful as we move forward.

Q. You say the President said again and again that Jerusalem would remain an undivided city.

A. Yes.

Q. Under Israel?

A. He didn't say that. That is not the issue. The issue at the moment is to leave Jerusalem aside. And the President has committed himself that Jerusalem be undivided with free access to members of all the faiths to their holy places. That issue is now over to the side, and nobody is trying to talk about how it ought to be touched at all in the future. At some point later on we'll have to look at that issue.

Q. There was a report on Israel radio that a mutual defense pact between the United States and Israel was discussed in these talks. Is that correct?

A. I heard that report, too. I was not present when any such discussion took place. If it did, it may have been raised between the President and Prime Minister Begin. I was not a party to any such discussion.

Q. Another way to approach that is whether either Prime Minister Begin or President Sadat laid out expectations or things that they want to see for their countries as a result of agreeing on autonomy.

A. You mean was there bargaining?

Q. Yes.

A. No. I was not present at any point where there was any bargaining in return for moving forward in these autonomy negotiations.

Q. What about the very difficult issue of the settlements? President Carter has said again and again that the continuation of the Israeli settlements is a roadblock to peace. Was that said again to Mr. Begin, and what was his reply, and was any progress made on that issue?

A. It was said again to Mr. Begin who asserted again and again as you say. I have had occasion to say it to him various times. The President has. The Secretary of State has and so forth.

Prime Minister Begin believes that both security considerations and as of right Israel ought to be able to continue with these settlements.

Prime Minister Begin recognizes we believe it is an obstacle to the negotiations. We think it unwise from

Israel's point of view to be taking these steps at this moment when we are trying to find an answer to the autonomy.

I can't say there was any give on his part in connection with that issue.

Q. But if you were a betting man, would you bet that Israel will establish or at least or even name new settlements in the time between now and the expiration of this deadline, May 26th?

A. I really don't know, but I deeply hope not.

Q. Is this a domestic political issue on which the United States and the Egyptians can bring pressure on Mr. Begin—the settlements issue?

A. I don't think we ought to talk in terms of pressure on Mr. Begin. Our role in this case is that of the full partner, the catalyst if you will, the party trying to bring the two closer together.

I don't think it's going to be productive to try to flex muscle or use pressure on Mr. Begin in order to get him to adopt a position that we believe is in Israel's own best interest.

I think what we have to do is work with him, make sure that he fully understands why we feel as we do, that we are committed to Israel's security, that we want to do everything we can to ensure that Israel's future is not prejudiced in any respect, and we hope that on that basis he will agree that we can make progress.

Q. Aren't we—we, including the United States—a little bit in a dangerous situation on this question of negotiating the future of the Palestinians? It sort of reminds you of Britain and Germany dividing up Czechoslovakia without even a representative of Czechoslovakia at the bargaining table. That's what is happening to the Palestinians in a sense. Their future is being determined without their presence.

A. Only because they don't want to be there. The thing that's most distressing—

Q. But you yourself said that up until recently had you been a Palestinian you would not have come.

A. Up until 3½–4 months ago I would have hesitated because, as I said, we had not yet begun to get into the substantive issues. This has now happened. And, therefore, I am hoping that today the Palestinians will take a

good hard look at what we're doing and will want to join in these negotiations.

It is, indeed, difficult for us to be sitting at that table trying to fashion an autonomy plan that should be acceptable to people who are not even represented.

Q. Are we in any kind of direct contact with them or is this going through Israel or how do we sort of invite them?

A. I've talked to Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza myself when I've been in the Middle East and tried to elicit their points of view. I've talked to some here in this country. The Egyptians are talking to the Palestinians and so are some of the Israelis. We are all trying to elicit their point of view and I think all trying to encourage them to become participants.

Q. Another missing partner in the negotiations as conceived at Camp David is King Hussein of Jordan. Is there any prospect of drawing him into this process? Are you going to go and see him and fill him in after these talks?

A. As you may know, I did see him in January, and at that time we did have a very good and thorough discussion about the situation as it then stood and what our plan was for the future. It is my hope, and pursuant to his invitation, that I will have further opportunities to talk with him and fill him in on what's going on.

Q. Will you do that on this next trip that you're going to make?

A. I don't expect on this next trip. On the other hand, I want to keep flexible on that. If it seems desirable under all the circumstances, it might be worth doing, but at the moment I don't have that on my schedule.

Q. I find myself a little puzzled. You keep saying that it's not proper to bring pressure on Prime Minister Begin. But after all, the United States spends a great deal of money helping the Israelis, perhaps more than any other per dollar investment we make anywhere in the world. Is it not proper because of domestic American politics? Is that what you're saying?

A. No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that what we're trying to do is help the Israelis and the Egyptians find common ground because it's in their own best interests.

Look, they've got a Peace Treaty now which is working which they've implemented completely and scrupulously. They have committed themselves to these ongoing negotiations in which they are deeply involved. They both have indicated in the Camp David accord that they think a comprehensive peace ought to come to the Middle East.

What we ought to try to do in every way possible—using our good offices, using our persuasion, using everything we can in the way of being a helpful partner—is to bring them together and give them the opportunity to see why it's in their own best interests to make an agreement in accordance with the Camp David accord.

It's not in their own best interests or ours to begin swinging a cudgel or acting as though they can be forced into doing something, because they won't unless they are convinced that it's right for them to do it.

Q. Wouldn't a little conviction come from suggesting that the United States taxpayers have an interest in this and that Prime Minister Begin might show a little more flexibility on, for instance, the settlements issue or he might not get so much U.S. aid?

A. They are aware, of course, of the relationship between our country and theirs and the money that we have made available to them, and they are properly appreciative of that, but I'm back to the fundamental question: What is it we're trying to do?

We're trying to help the parties understand why it's in their own best interests to continue these negotiations and come up with an agreement. That's the course we ought to be on, and that's the question to which we are committed.

Q. Let me ask you about President Sadat and the posture he took in the talks that preceded these last by a week. Did he suggest, as he did in a press conference at Blair House, that if no significant progress was made by May 26th that he would pull out of this process and go for the European initiative which basically is to take the matter to the United Nations and try to get recognition of Palestinian rights there?

A. No, he did not. What he did say—

Q. But he did raise that with reporters in a rather conspicuous way when he was talking to them.

A. I thought what he had said, as I got the report, was that if there were no progress by May 26th he would have to look at other alternatives, including the European initiative. That, I guess, does reflect what I believe is his position, but he was very clear in his commitment to the Camp David accord and to this process in his hope that progress would be made, in his belief that progress would be made, and that his conviction that this present course of action was the best one for Egypt, the best one for Israel, and the best one for the Palestinians.

Q. So he has a decision to make then about or around May 26th which is whether or not sufficient progress in his opinion has been made to justify going on.

A. I think that's true of both parties, but what we are hoping for is that there will be sufficient progress so that both will want to continue the negotiations.

Q. Wouldn't it be, I suppose, simple and maybe politically expedient since there are elections here, and Mr. Begin has problems of his own and Mr. Sadat, for the parties to simply agree to go on for another 6 months and get past the electoral period; in other words extend the deadline of negotiations for 6 months?

A. I believe they will if they are convinced that progress is being made and more progress can be made. I think that's exactly what may evolve, but both of them want to be sure that the are on a course which promises success.

Q. You said you talked and we know you talked to some Palestinian—mayors and so forth. Some of them probably were secret leaners toward the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. Fairly soon now former Ambassador [to the United Nations] Andrew Young is to meet with Yasser Arafat in his travels in the Middle East.

Would you expect that former Ambassador Young, as an old friend of the President and as a friend of this Administration, will communicate with you what he learned from Yasser Arafat? Will there be some indirect connection through Mr. Young?

A. I did not know that Andrew Young was going there, and I don't know whether—

Q. They're both in Kuwait, and the report from there is that they are probably going to have a meeting.

A. I have no anticipation that Andrew Young will come back and have anything that he wants to report to me about.

Q. Or to the President?

A. I don't know. As I said, I don't know about that. So far as I know from what you've said this is not an official mission. I have never heard of it before. It sounds to me like a private meeting between him and Mr. Arafat if it's scheduled to take place.

But our position is entirely clear and has been reiterated and needs to be said again perhaps that we—the United States—is committed not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO unless and until it accepts Resolutions 242 and 338 of the United Nations and recognizes Israel's right to exist in peace and free of terrorism. Unless and until that happens we're not going to enter into negotiations with the PLO.

Q. Have we had any indication at all that the PLO is willing to give on that point?

A. We have had occasional whispers in that direction and then they die out. So I don't know where that stands. It may well be that there are problems within the PLO if they come up against that decision. But so far as I know, nothing has gone beyond a whisper.

Q. What role are they playing behind the scenes here? Are they actively discouraging the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza from participating or are they neutral on the point? What is the function and the role right now of the PLO?

A. I can't say I really know. I do know this: That to the extent that there are others dangling other prospects before the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza instead of the current negotiations—

Q. You mean such as the Euro-pan initiative?

A. For example, this could be unhelpful to our efforts because it suggests that if you don't join now perhaps something better will come along months from now.

There's not substance as far as I know to these hopes, but it does perhaps distract the Palestinians from wanting to come in and join the negotiations.

I can't say specifically what the PLO is doing, nor what the relationship may be between the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza and the PLO. But the central fact is the one that I want to stress, that right now the most helpful thing that could happen would be to keep us moving in the direction of trying to implement the Camp David accord.

Q. This is probably a question that the Israelis are asking their government, but I'm an American and let me ask my government. Is the political turmoil inside the other country—Israel in this case—complicating your job, the fact that there are various people trying to get Prime Minister Begin's job away from him?

A. No. Obviously we're aware of the political situation as they are aware of ours. On the other hand, we are dealing with the government of Prime Minister Begin. This is the man charged with the responsibility on behalf of his nation for going forward in these negotiations. This is the man who entered into the Camp David accord, who committed himself to full autonomy and self-governing authority. And, therefore, we are committed to working with him as the representative of the Israelis.

Q. But next week you sort of have an anchor out to windward. You're meeting with the leader of the Israeli opposition.

A. When Mr. Peres comes over next week, in accordance with a long established policy, the opposition leader of Israel will be meeting with government leaders in this country. I think he'll be meeting with the President, but this is something that we've done consistently. And he is, indeed, an important figure in this country, and we're looking forward to having an opportunity to hear his views.

Q. Let me try the Israeli side of the question. Are they showing any unhappiness over the possibility of a change of government in the United States?

A. I have never got into any political discussion in the course of these negotiations, and I've never heard that political aspect raised. Certainly when they were here they were aware that we're in an election year, and what effect this has on their thinking I don't know.

Q. You don't see any "Ronald Reagan in '80" buttons in Israel when you go there?

A. No, I haven't.

Q. I just wonder if the President seeing Shimon Peres, the leader of the opposition, is not a little of that pressure that you say we don't want to apply to Begin, what in effect is going to be pressure on him?

A. I really don't think it is. I know there's a chance it may be so construed, but I think it's a genuine effort to talk to a man who is important in Israel and who has ideas and who in the past has had an opportunity to talk to the President and is being asked to do so.

Q. There is a theory that there is really going to be no progress made in this whole autonomy for the Palestinians issue until after Israel has its next parliamentary election in 1981, next year. Do you subscribe to that?

A. No. I think that we are going to be able to make progress if there is the will to do it on the part of the respective governments. We have their commitment. We have the desire on the part of both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to move toward the May 26th date, and I am unwilling to believe that they're not serious when they tell us that.

Q. Do you find a similar feeling on the part of other people in Israel when you go there?

A. To move forward toward this?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, indeed. A number of people I talked to—people in high places—believe that we ought to do everything possible to try to move toward agreement. ■

INFCE-Final Plenary Conference

by Gerard C. Smith

Statement at the final plenary conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) in Vienna on February 25, 1980. Ambassador Smith is Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters.

I am pleased to represent the United States at this concluding plenary conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). President Carter has asked me to deliver the following message:

The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, now completed, was a valuable forum in which to examine a number of the economic and technical issues, as well as the question of nonproliferation, as they relate to the development and continued use of nuclear energy. The evaluation's final reports contribute greatly to increased understanding among members of the international community.

I would like to express appreciation to the representatives of the participating governments and international organizations for their hard work over the past 2 years. The United States will carefully review the evaluation's results and take them into account in implementing its national and international policies with regard to the development and expansion of nuclear energy.

We all share the conviction that nuclear power is needed to conserve valuable nonrenewable resources and, in many countries, to reduce intolerable dependencies on imported fossil fuels. I believe we all seek to assure that nuclear power will be generated only under conditions serving to minimize risks of nuclear proliferation.

Working Group Reports

For over 2 years, since the INFCE Organizing Conference in Washington, representatives of the countries and organizations gathered here have labored jointly and diligently in an unprecedented undertaking in international cooperation. We have pooled our analytical talents to examine the various fuel cycles, their risks, and the ways in which such risks might be minimized through institutional and technological measures. We have explored ways in which nuclear supply assurances can be improved and have given attention to the special needs of developing nations.

We were not asked to negotiate solutions but rather to offer governments our collective analyses of the implications of different approaches.

The United States believes that INFCE has been a success. I would hope that all participants will join in accepting the working group reports with appreciation and in forwarding them for study by governments, the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and other appropriate international organizations. I propose that our special thanks be expressed to the IAEA for its essential help and to Professor Abram Chayes [Chairman of the Technical Coordinating Committee], whose leadership played a crucial role in assuring the successful and timely completion of this evaluation.

When I say that we believe that INFCE has been a success, I do not wish to imply that the United States, or any other nation, agrees with every statement in the reports. The participants in INFCE have worked as experts seeking consensus. Accordingly, the reports reflect a wide range of perspectives, judgments, and viewpoints. These include the views of developing countries eager to assure themselves of access to the benefits of nuclear power; the perspectives of both exporters and importers of uranium, enrichment services, and reactors; the views of those now engaged in developing breeder options; and the views of nations, like mine, which believe they can prudently defer moves implying a commitment to "a plutonium economy." All interested nations have had their views considered and reflected in the reports.

On most matters of substance, the members of the working groups and of the Technical Coordinating Committee were able to reach agreement on a single view. On some matters, however, such convergence was not achieved and the residual differences are expressed in the reports.

Without justifying or finding fault with the nuclear power policies of any nation or group of nations, the process has produced a common factual background and findings which should inform our thinking, facilitate new international understandings at the political level, and help achieve a more orderly international community as we seek to

realize the benefits of nuclear power under conditions consistent with non-proliferation policies.

With the firm belief that INFCE has been constructive, I should like to refer to a few matters that strike us particularly useful and also to mention briefly a few areas where we believe some cautions are warranted.

INFCE Process

I start with a word about the process INFCE itself. Before its start there was understandably a very wide range of perspectives and insufficient mutual communication. The international nuclear community was in a state of disarray. Tensions were developing between suppliers and consumers, and there were widespread misunderstandings of each other's problems and concerns.

INFCE has helped to remedy this situation. We now better understand each other's objectives, needs, and interests. All of us have a better appreciation of global nuclear energy needs and resources, worldwide concerns about nuclear proliferation, at the technical and institutional problems and possibilities that lie before us. We hope that the IAEA will review our findings with the participation of all interested states, so as to identify the INFCE matters that merit follow-on IAEA actions. And, we should strive to preserve the spirit, tone, and momentum of this effort.

The clear recognition in INFCE of dual objectives is important. The continued value that nuclear power has and will have for many of our economies is emphasized. There is also broad agreement that there are proliferation risks associated with nuclear power as well as measures that can and should be taken to make such risks more tolerable and manageable.

We all recognize that proliferation is basically a political matter and that if a nation elects to develop nuclear explosives, it can do so without misusing civilian nuclear power facilities. However, INFCE points out that such facilities can be misused and that for this reason, it is important to plan future fuel cycles with careful attention to proliferation risks. The United States recognizes that there are such risks in every fuel cycle. INFCE has not identified any technical solution that will eliminate such risks, but it has identified several major positive factors useful in future planning.

We accept INFCE's judgment that is not appropriate to make broad generalizations about the comparative proliferation risks of different fuel cycles. For example, we appreciate the fact that comparison of the proliferation resistance of the once-through light water reactor cycle, with alternatives, must also include consideration of the location and types of uranium enrichment facilities and how they are to be safeguarded.

I believe we have all come to share the assessment that there are substantial risks associated with weapons-usable materials and the technologies that can produce them. Our collective acceptance of this premise should help steer the future of nuclear power in several directions. New protective measures, including but not limited to improved safeguards, will be required to cope with fuel cycles involving ready access to significant amounts of weapons-usable materials.

We are now more conscious of the long-range implications of near-term decisions, and we already are moving to restrain the use of weapons-grade materials in reactors when such use is not essential. The recent move to convert research reactors to use lower enrichment fuel is an example.

A single fuel cycle will not satisfy nations' needs. Clearly, different national situations require different choices. For example, the need for and timing of breeder development will vary among countries depending on their technical infrastructure, electric load size, confidence in access to uranium resources, and other factors. Especially important is the relationship between demand for power and the availability and price of uranium.

Demand-Supply Relationships

On the resource side, I believe that INFCE did a good job in evaluation of factors bearing on prospective availability of natural uranium.

On the demand side, there will be a need for periodic revision of the estimates developed in INFCE. For example, since these estimates were prepared over 2 years ago, there have been large reductions in reactor orders and lengthy delays in construction schedules. This has resulted for the United States, which makes a major contribution to total demand, in a reduction in projections for 1995 nuclear capacity of about 30%. Since the urgency for construction of additional fuel cycle facilities and the introduction of new technologies depend on demand-supply

relationships, it is important that estimates be kept up to date. This underscores the need to insure that such estimates are revised periodically.

Demand-supply relationships are also important in considering the adequacy of enrichment services. We appear to agree that there will be sufficient enrichment capacity through at least the mid-1990s, and new capacity can be brought on stream in sufficient time to meet demand that develops thereafter.

Major INFCE Issues

Reprocessing, recycling of plutonium in thermal reactors, and the need and timing for breeders were key issues in INFCE. From our perspective, several important insights emerge.

While reprocessing has been preferred by some nations as the way to deal with spent fuel, the evaluation makes it clear that other choices are feasible. Spent fuel can be safely stored on an interim or long-term basis, and terminal disposal without reprocessing appears to be a realistic option for either economic or nonproliferation reasons. I stress this point since I believe nuclear power can only benefit if flexibility exists in the choice of approaches.

The great majority of participants shared the view that, for economic reasons, when reprocessing plants are built they, like enrichment plants, should be large in scale. And, apart from economics, scale is an important consideration for nonproliferation reasons.

It is worth noting that all agreed that the economic advantage of plutonium recycle in light water reactors will at best be small.

Effective International Safeguards

INFCE working groups concluded that effective international safeguards are an essential feature of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Stress was laid on the special need to apply effective safeguards, particularly for the sensitive fuel cycle steps involving enrichment, reprocessing, and fabrication of fuel using plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Inclusion of safeguards planning at the earliest stages of plant design is called for. The importance of giving high priority to the testing and optimization of new improved safeguards methods for sensitive fuel cycle steps was emphasized.

In that connection, I would stress the importance the United States attaches to applying effective IAEA safeguards to all civilian nuclear facilities and to providing the IAEA with the additional funds, trained manpower, and policy support it needs to carry out its expanding safeguards responsibilities.

While safeguards alone will not be sufficient to minimize proliferation risks from sensitive fuel cycle activities, we are convinced that comprehensive safeguards coverage will be necessary if nuclear power is to play its proper role in meeting global energy needs.

Comprehensive Safeguards Coverage

The participants appeared to agree that constraints that now apply to reprocessing and to separated plutonium need to be reinforced by other protective mechanisms. For example, in addressing the particular concerns associated with separated plutonium, it was recommended that as one follow-on mechanism, special attention should be given to placing excess plutonium under international oversight. The United States is prepared to work cooperatively for an effective international plutonium storage regime. We are also participating in the IAEA study of international arrangements for spent fuel storage.

Breeders

The need and prospects for breeders understandably are given considerable attention in light of their promise and the interest that some nations have in this technology. There is no question that, over the long term, breeders could extend uranium resources in a dramatic way. This accounts for the heavy investments that the United States and other nations are making in developing the breeder and in assessing the feasibility, economic, and proliferation implications of its technology.

But the breeder is not without its costs, risks, and uncertainties. Some of these are identified in the report of working group 5, although that report focuses much more on the positive features of the technology. We note that the report concludes that breeder development and deployment are not likely to be economically attractive to nations with modest nuclear power programs.

INFCE has provided useful insights on the special needs of developing nations. As part of the IAEA's

follow-on activity, we would hope that the agency would give special emphasis to its recommendations of particular interest to the developing world.

Conclusion

In examining potential proliferation risks that arise from various approaches to nuclear power, the INFCE reports dealt extensively with possible measures to reduce such risks. It was generally found that a combination of new safeguards, technical, and institutional measures, such as multinational ventures, constitute a promising approach.

It will take major efforts by many nations to implement such measures by the time they are needed to deal adequately with the proliferation risks which are inherent in such sensitive facilities as reprocessing and enrichment plants. We hope such efforts will get underway promptly. We have for too long contented ourselves with merely talking about them.

Finally, INFCE has also formulated a number of important recommendations in the area of nuclear supply that should be given great weight in future governmental decisions. INFCE recognized in a variety of ways that a country pursuing a nuclear power program needs to be able to plan ahead with confidence regarding, for example, reactor fuel supply and disposition of spent fuel.

We all agree that it will be crucial to preserve a high degree of confidence and stability in nuclear supply relations if nuclear power is to remain a viable energy option and if the premature spread of sensitive facilities is to be avoided. Pointed observations may be found in the working reports about the need for greater predictability in non-proliferation conditions and the prejudicial results of abrupt or unilateral changes in supply conditions.

On the other hand, the reports recognize that suppliers cannot be expected to freeze their policies or to ignore situations that might seriously aggravate efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The call in the reports for a greater degree of confidence and predictability in the terms of nuclear trade presents us with a major challenge. The United States believes that this goal is achievable, and we intend to devote our energies and ingenuity to meeting this challenge in the immediate future. ■

Security Assistance Programs—Promoting U.S. Interests

by Matthew Nimetz

*Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 27, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.*¹

In his appearance before the full Committee on Foreign Affairs February 5, Secretary Vance described how security assistance programs promote U.S. foreign policy, national security, and development objectives. He observed that now, perhaps more than ever, active leadership by the United States requires that we support our words with resources.

We have taken concrete steps to accomplish this end. The President has recommended an increase in our defense budget to insure that our military forces are sufficient to meet the challenges we face. Complementing our defense programs are our foreign assistance programs, a major component of which is designed to promote U.S. security by helping our allies and friends strengthen their defenses and preserve the independence.

Both of these efforts—strengthening our own military capabilities and enhancing the capacity of our friends to defend themselves—must go hand in hand. Our friends and allies depend upon the United States to maintain a stable strategic balance. The steps we are taking to improve our strategic forces will insure that the balance is maintained.

Moreover, the force improvements underway with our NATO allies—both in theater nuclear and conventional capabilities—will assure that there is no imbalance in that critical part of the world. And, we are also moving to increase our capabilities to project our forces to other vitally important regions to improve our capacity to react promptly and effectively in crises situations.

A sound national security policy must be built upon a willingness and ability to protect and further our vital interests. It is also clear that we share mutual security interests with our friends and allies and that we must work with them in defense of those

interests. A policy which concentrates solely on our own military capabilities and fails to take into account the legitimate security needs of our friends would be more than foolish; it would be dangerous. For not only do our security assistance programs help other nations defend themselves, and thus maintain local military balances, but they also constitute a tangible sign of the U.S. commitment to their continued independence. In this way, these programs provide the best available insurance that conflict and confrontation can be avoided.

In noting that we cannot fulfill our leadership role without adequate resources, the Secretary also stressed that the requests we are presenting are admittedly austere and were prepared with full regard for their budgetary impact. He noted in this regard, however, that we intend to keep these levels of our allocations under continuing review to insure that they are adequate in view of the challenges with which we must deal. In the last few weeks, we have been examining the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on our own national interests and for the security of our friends. In addition, as you are aware, we have been consulting with various governments in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean region, as well as with our allies and friends in other regions, regarding cooperative responses to threats to the area. As a result, it is possible that we will be coming to you with additional requests to respond to these challenges or to meet especially pressing needs elsewhere. In any event, I assure you that we will not hesitate to request the resources we believe necessary to meet these tasks at hand.

The Administration's proposed FY 1981 foreign assistance legislation now before you, and I should like to summarize the individual security assistance programs we are proposing for FY 1981. Later, I will discuss several of the more important substantive provisions we are proposing in legislation governing these programs.

Since the Department's regional Assistant Secretaries are appearing before appropriate subcommittees to address our various country requests, I propose this morning to examine the overall scope and purposes of our requests on a program-by-program basis.

For FY 1981, the Administration is requesting authorizations of appropriations of \$2.98 billion to finance security assistance programs totaling \$5.1 billion. As in past years, our FY 1981 request will provide funding for five major programs: foreign military sales (FMS) financing, the grant military assistance program (MAP), the economic support fund (ESF), peacekeeping operations, and the international military education and training (IMET) program.

IS Financing

To assist friendly countries to meet their legitimate defense needs through foreign military sales financing program by providing credits and loan repayment guarantees to enable eligible foreign governments to purchase defense articles and services, including training. In this way, FMS financing has facilitated the gradual transition in the military assistance program (MAP) as increasing numbers of nations come able to purchase military equipment and training when appropriate financing is available.

For FY 1981, we are requesting an appropriation of \$734 million to fund a total FMS financing program of \$2,840 million. Of the \$734 million in appropriations, \$500 million is intended for direct FMS credits for Israel, of which payment would be forgiven. The remaining \$234 million will be used to guarantee loans totaling \$2,340 million to 35 countries, including \$700 million for Israel.

Approximately 62% of the FMS financing program is for Israel and Egypt, both to finance needed defense purchases and to support our efforts to secure a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.

Over the years, FMS has constituted the major source of U.S. security assistance which has allowed Israel to maintain a military capability adequate to meet the threat to its security. The FY 1981 FMS financing program, totaling \$1.2 billion, will enable Israel to continue to fund its priority military requirements for air defense, armored vehicles, artillery, missiles, and ammunition. Of this amount, \$200 million could be available only for sales related to relocation from the Sinai.

For Egypt, the proposed FMS financing program of \$550 million will assist that country in maintaining and modernizing its existing military forces. It will also enable Egypt to continue its efforts to fill the gap left by the break

in its earlier military supply relationship with the Soviet Union, terminated 6 years ago.

The third largest FMS program—totaling \$250 million—is for Turkey. Turkey has great need of assistance to maintain its defense capabilities in support of NATO.

Other major FMS financing programs include \$180 million for Greece, \$175 million for Korea, \$120 million for Spain, and \$50 million each for Thailand, Jordan, and the Philippines.

In examining the FMS financing program, it is important to note that this is a loan program, with obligations being repaid as new financing is extended. In FY 1981, we anticipate receiving \$1.59 billion in principal and interest from prior year loans. It is also important to recall that, except for the \$500 million credit I have mentioned for Israel, all FMS appropriations are used as a guaranty reserve to support FMS-guaranteed loans from the Federal Financing Bank (FFB), with \$1 in FMS appropriations being used to guarantee \$10 in FFB loans. Since these loans are eventually paid back with interest at the cost of money to the U.S. Government, currently 11-3/8%, they result in no net cost to the taxpayer over the long run. I think you will agree few government programs can boast such an enviable attribute.

Military Assistance Program

Under the military assistance program (MAP) we provide defense articles and services to eligible countries on a grant basis. For FY 1981 we are proposing grant material programs for only three countries—Portugal, Spain, and the Philippines. We have important military bases and facilities in all three, and in the case of Spain and the Philippines, program levels result directly from negotiated agreements. The \$105 million requested for FY 1981 will fund grant material and services programs totaling \$79.6 million and, in conjunction with reimbursements, finance \$56 million of program management expenses and delivery expenses for previously funded MAP material.

Economic Support Fund

The economic support fund (ESF) is used to provide economic assistance—in the form of loans or grants—to selected countries of special political and security interest to us. It serves to support U.S. foreign policy interests in political and economic stability in a number of regions. ESF can finance commodity

import programs, economic infrastructure projects, or provide general budget support, in addition to funding projects that meet basic human needs in areas such as agriculture, health, family planning, and education.

We are requesting \$50 million in unallocated ESF funds for use in meeting unforeseen developments where small amounts of ESF assistance can support important foreign policy interests. The need for such funds is clear. In recent years, we have had to rely on supplementals or reprogramming from current programs to respond to developments unanticipated at the time of our budget request. Neither we nor the Congress believe supplementals to be desirable to meet unexpected emergencies. Supplemental requests, however small, are time consuming and consequently lessen the political and economic impact of our assistance. Reprogramming is also a cumbersome device, which has the disadvantage of requiring the sacrifice of one important interest or policy goal—recognized by the executive and legislative branches alike—in order to satisfy another.

I can assure you that these unallocated funds will be used only to meet unanticipated, priority needs. They will not be used simply to fund programs beyond levels set by the Congress. All uses of these funds would be notified in advance to the Congress, in accordance with standard reprogramming procedures.

For FY 1981, we are requesting an ESF program totaling \$2,080.5 million. Of this amount \$1,268.5 million will be for grant assistance and \$812 million for loans. Over 70% of our ESF request is allocated for Israel and Egypt. As with FMS financing, the third largest ESF program, totaling \$200 million, is for Turkey. This amount, together with amounts provided by other countries, will help Turkey to meet its critical balance-of-payments problems. Other major features of our request include \$90 million for a southern Africa regional program to improve the prospects for reconstruction and peaceful growth following the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia peace settlement; \$50 million for Sudan for balance-of-payments support; \$50 million for Jordan for the Maqarin Dam; \$30 million for the Philippines where we have important military facilities; and \$25 million for Nicaragua for assistance in recovering from the ravages of civil strife.

International Military Education and Training

Over the years, the international military education and training (IMET) program has been an important, cost-effective element of our security assistance program. IMET provides instruction and training on a grant basis to military personnel from friendly countries. For FY 1981 we are proposing IMET programs of \$32.5 million to train personnel from 61 countries.

Our posts in the field, particularly those in smaller nations with which we have no military ties other than IMET, repeatedly stress the importance of this program and the access it provides to key military figures in the host government.

Another advantage of the IMET program is the exposure to American human rights values afforded by time spent in training in the United States and the impact which this has on the countries participating in the program. Although hard statistics are difficult to come by in this area, our experience leads us to believe that considerable periods in the United States in contact with our society has had a positive effect on those who have participated in these training programs. I would ask that this factor be given careful consideration in determining the appropriateness of our overall IMET request.

Moreover, IMET provides the only direct exposure available to many foreign military officers to the role armed forces play in a democratic nation. Again, I believe that this has a positive impact on the political evolution of their own countries.

And finally, I think it is important to keep in mind that military training constitutes only one small facet of a broad range of U.S. Government-funded exchange programs. According to a July 1978 General Accounting Office study, five government agencies—Agency for International Development; Department of Defense; Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the National Science Foundation; and the Department of State funded the bulk of U.S. exchange and training programs. These programs, in addition to military training, also focus on a wide array of education, technical, scientific, and cultural needs. In FY 1977, the latest year for which such data were available, these programs involved some 19,000 participants at a cost of approximately \$147 million.

IMET accounted for \$25 million of these costs and approximately 5,000 participants.

Peacekeeping Operations

The peacekeeping operations program provides assistance to fund the Sinai Field Support Mission and the U.S. contribution to the U.N. Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). For FY 1981 we are requesting a total program of \$25 million. Of this, \$16 million will be for the Sinai Field Support Mission to maintain the U.S. role in facilitating the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and \$9 million for the U.S. contribution to UNFICYP, an amount equal to approximately 15% of total estimated costs for this activity.

Revisions in Legislation

Having discussed the various security programs we are proposing for the coming fiscal year, I should like to turn to the substantive revisions we would suggest be enacted in the legislation governing these programs.

As this subcommittee is aware, over the years the foreign assistance legislation has grown increasingly complex as new limitations, conditions, and prohibitions have been added and discretionary powers and funding have been reduced. The cumulative effect of these changes has been to make it more difficult for the United States to respond promptly and effectively to rapidly changing circumstances. In addition, the sheer volume of these restrictions and the passage of time sometimes cause them to operate in ways that were never anticipated when they were enacted.

Over the longer term, I propose that the executive branch initiate consultations with the Congress to determine how we might work together to revise current legislation governing security assistance programs. Our objective would be to produce a comprehensive revision of the security assistance legislation, designed to clarify and simplify its provisions in the context of the challenges facing us and our friends in today's world.

For FY 1981 our goals are necessarily more modest, and the legislation before you contains proposals for a few rather limited revisions in applicable legislation. These revisions, in our view, will provide for better management of our security assistance programs. They also recognize that our national interests require that the Pres-

ident be able to respond promptly and effectively to emergency situations endangering our security. At the same time, they reflect the responsibilities the Congress for policy formulation and oversight.

Drawdown Authority

The first proposal would be to increase the President's military assistance "drawdown" authority under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Currently, the President is authorized, subject to making certain findings and reports to the Congress, to draw up to \$10 million in defense articles and services from the Department of Defense to furnish emergency military assistance in advance of appropriations. This authority provides the only real flexibility available to the President to meet a crisis with grant military assistance. The current limit of \$10 million is simply too small to be effective, given today's inflation and the type of crises which may face. We recommend increasing the limit from \$10 million to \$50 million.

If approved by the Congress, the use of the \$50 million Presidential drawdown authority would be subject to the tight limitations currently applicable to section 506, namely, that the President provide the Congress with prior, written notification that an unforeseen emergency exists and that an emergency requirement cannot be met under any other authority available to him. I should note that although this authority has not been used in the past several years, it remains an important factor in considering our response to contingencies and a deterrent to those who would doubt our ability and willingness to support our friends promptly and effectively.

Presidential Waiver Authority

Our second proposal in the legislation before the committee would extend the President's waiver authority under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to other security assistance legislation such as the Arms Export Control Act and annual authorization acts.

The present scope of section 614(a) can lead to anomalous results. The President may use section 614(a) to waive limitations applicable to grant programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, but not those applicable to sale and financing programs under the Arms Export Control Act. The Pres-

ent may use this section to waive limitations in the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act but not an identical limitation contained in an annual authorization act. These essentially arbitrary results have the effect of narrowing the President's ability to react quickly and effectively in emergency situations affecting our security.

Moreover, it must be remembered that when section 614(a) was enacted in 1961, it applied to the whole of our assistance programs—grant, loan, and lease, whether developmental or security—which were then all carried out under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The enactment of a separate authority for military sales and financing programs in 1968 removed that element of our overall program from the reach of section 614(a). It must also be recalled that in 1961, our military programs were overwhelmingly grant programs, rather than sales and financing programs; the opposite is true today. If our proposal would reflect the original purpose of section 614(a) by restoring its applicability to our entire foreign assistance program.

If the President is to have a broadened general waiver authority, we believe one is clearly required if we are to protect our foreign policy interests in rapidly changing situations. The scope should not be so circumscribed at its availability depends upon such arbitrary conditions as the form and location of a particular restriction. We believe it vitally important to demonstrate—to friend and foe alike—that the U.S. Government is willing and able to work together harmoniously to undertake decisive and effective actions in support of our interests.

Personnel Performing Defense Services

Firstly, the Administration's FY 1981 legislation proposes a modification of the Arms Export Control Act to clarify the meaning of the limitations upon the performance of defense services for a country that may become engaged in self-defense or other military operations. Under the current Section 21(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, personnel performing defense services under FMS may not perform duties of a substantial nature. This restriction is broadly defined in statute to include training, advising, or otherwise providing assistance regarding combat activities . . . in connection with the performance of those defense services."

We believe that serious questions are raised concerning whether services being performed for a friendly country must be abandoned at a time when they are most needed—to insure its military forces are able to defend that nation and our own security interests protected—even where there is no possibility that the performance of such services would involve U.S. personnel in any form of military action.

The Administration's proposed FY 1981 bill retains the prohibition against the sale of combat services, conforming it to a comparable limitation on defense services performed on a grant basis under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It must be stressed that the change proposed to section 21(c) would in no way constitute, and could not be construed as constituting, an authorization for U.S. military personnel to engage in military action. Moreover, it in no way affects the scope or applicability of the war powers resolution which is the legislation that deals with this issue in a comprehensive and authoritative manner. We believe that by deleting the unduly narrow qualifying language from section 21(c) the potential effectiveness of the law would be significantly enhanced without any detriment to U.S. interests or to U.S. personnel.

Military Construction

The Administration's proposed FY 1981 bill would amend the Arms Export Control Act to establish a separate chapter authorizing military construction. Section 36(b) now requires that the Congress be notified of all proposed FMS sales of defense articles or services over \$25 million, including construction services. A separate chapter authorizing foreign military construction sales would recognize the different nature of construction, as opposed to other defense items or services.

Construction services, as you are aware, generally involve infrastructure-type projects, which while perhaps impressive in terms of total value, do not include weapons or arms. Moreover, since construction services are normally managerial in nature, their costs are only a small fraction of the overall construction transaction. Most of the actual construction services are performed by subcontractors from other nations.

And finally, the current requirement that proposed construction sales be subject to what, in practice, amounts to at least a 50-day congressional review period has been an irritant in our

relations with purchasing nations and leads to higher final costs by delaying the start of projects.

We believe that a separate chapter authorizing military construction sales would be in keeping with other provisions dealing with the sales of construction services, such as Section 25(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, which requires a report providing an annual estimate and justification for our military sales program, but which excludes construction sales. It would also conform to our arms transfer policy, which recognizes the difference between military construction sales and other sales under FMS by not including construction within annual arms transfer ceiling levels.

Under the proposed separate chapter authorizing construction sales we would preserve the present requirement for quarterly reports listing sales made during the quarter, including an estimate of the value of the sales and a full description of the facilities to be constructed. Thus the Congress would be in a position to continue to monitor construction sales to insure that they are in keeping with overall U.S. foreign policy interests.

Arms Transfers

The final proposed modification contained in our FY 1981 authorization bill involves congressional review of proposed transfers under Sections 36(b) and 3(d) of the Arms Export Control Act. Existing law requires congressional review of a wide range of arms transfer proposals. As you know, all FMS cases over \$25 million—no matter the equipment or services involved—all FMS cases over \$7 million of major defense equipment, and virtually all third-party transfers—irrespective of value—are subject to 30 days' advance certification to the Congress. In the case of sales, this period is extended by an informal 20-day advance review and is often further drawn out, when notifications are deferred, to take into account scheduled congressional recesses.

We would propose to exempt from the requirement for 30 days' advance certification and review FMS cases involving transfers to NATO, any NATO member nation, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition, the Administration's proposed legislation would exempt from advance certification all third-country transfers to these countries. It would also set a threshold on

congressional review of all other third-party transfers similar to that on direct sales, i.e., transfers of \$7 million or more in major defense equipment and all transfers valued at \$25 million or more.

These proposed changes would bring legislation affecting security assistance programs more nearly into line with our arms transfer control policy, which exempts NATO countries, our ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States pact] allies, and Japan from its controls. In view of our close security ties with these nations and the fact that sales involving them have rarely, if ever, generated controversy; we believe that an exemption of this sort is fully justified. In addition, these changes would have the effect of applying similar criteria to third-country transfers under section 3(d) as those applicable to direct FMS sales under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. We would be prepared to report to the Congress, on a quarterly basis, all third-country transfers involving less than \$7 million in major defense equipment or non-major defense equipment items less than \$25 million.

The modifications contained in the Administration's proposed FY 1981 legislation have been carefully designed to provide for better management of our security assistance programs and to afford the President the flexibility to respond promptly and effectively to unforeseen foreign policy and security emergencies. I hope they will gain your support and approval.

I look forward to working with you and the other members of the subcommittee in the months to come to insure that our security assistance programs continue to serve our vital foreign, economic, and national security interests.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The following paper, developed by the Department of State, examines the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as well as the U.S. and international response to it.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, following months of domestic political turmoil and growing Soviet involvement. This involvement grew steadily after the Marxist coup led by Nur Mohammad Taraki overthrew President Daoud's nonaligned republican government in April 1978. Although the Soviet Union played little if any role in this coup, the Russians afterwards moved quickly to establish predominant influence in Afghanistan.

Throughout 1979, they had sought to establish an effective government in Kabul. However, the instability of Afghan politics, the ineffectiveness of the new leadership, and a growing, internally based insurgency threatened the pro-Soviet regime's control over the country. As internal resistance grew to a regime perceived as anti-Islamic and Soviet-dominated, the Soviets steadily expanded their military presence and tightened their control over the government. Following a mid-September 1979 shoot-out which may have resulted from a Soviet attempt to remove then-Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, Taraki was murdered and Amin took over the government.

During the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Amin was killed during an attack by Soviet troops on his palace. Babrak Karmal, in exile in Eastern Europe, was installed by the Soviets as President. The initial announcements of Amin's overthrow, although ostensibly broadcast by Kabul Radio, actually came from a transmitter in the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union now exercises almost complete control over all significant areas of Afghan Government activity. Babrak Karmal has virtually no independence or authority. Soviet advisers have gradually assumed greater authority over the government and now make many day-to-day decisions. Police and security forces are under tight Soviet control, with KGB (Committee for State Security) officers directly involved in their operations.

There are now some 80,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, with another 25,000-30,000 poised across the Soviet border. Soviet military advisers may now number as many as 5,000, compared with about 350 before Daoud was overthrown. As their number has increased, their role also has changed. Soviet influence is seen in most aspects of government policy. The Soviets are in virtual command of the Afghan Army from the Defense Ministry down to battalion level and, except for minor local operations, determine the activities of the Afghan Armed Forces. Some Afghan army units have been disbanded.

Despite Soviet and Afghan statements that the Soviets will remain in Afghanistan for only a short time, there is overwhelming evidence that Moscow is planning a prolonged occupation. The movement of additional forces to the Afghan border indicates that the Soviets plan to augment their forces. They are building permanent barracks and other installations within Afghanistan. Reservists originally sent to Afghanistan are being replaced by troops with longer terms of service. The decision to mount large-scale counterinsurgency operations suggests that they are determined to wipe out nationalist resistance. Given the determination of the resistance forces, this portends a long, bloody struggle.

All three of the Soviet-backed Marxist governments have engaged in brutal repression. When Taraki came to power in 1978, many officials of previous governments were executed; entire families were jailed; thousands were imprisoned with no pretense of judicial process. Executions at Pol-i-Charki prison near Kabul averaged about 50 a night. Amin stepped up repressive measures and maintained order by terror. Thousands were detained in nightly sweeps in Kabul. Although Babrak has promised major reforms, few political prisoners other than Babrak's followers have been released; executions continue; and there are now Soviet guards at Pol-i-Charki.

In the countryside, the successive Afghan governments have tried to stoke insurgency. Villages have been destroyed. There were several mass executions, some in the presence of Soviet advisers.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, they tried initially to avoid military actions that would antagonize the population. Frustrated in their efforts to win popular acquiescence in their intervention, however, they have begun to turn to more brutal methods. In the recent offensive in Konarha Province, they leveled villages with napalm and high explosives and forced thousands to flee to Pakistan. There is evidence that the Soviets have used chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

Afghan Resistance

Despite overwhelming Soviet military superiority, resistance has increased dramatically since the Soviet invasion. Resistance forces operate in the countryside and have been joined by Afghan troops. In some cases, entire units have defected to the resistance. Other units have mutinied, killed their advisers, and fought Soviet troops. Even those units that remain ostensibly loyal have been weakened by desertions; occasionally they have refused to engage in offensive operations.

Government control of the cities has declined sharply since the Soviet invasion. At various times, the government has lost almost all control in Herat, Qandahar, and Jalalabad. Most cities and many smaller towns have had general strikes and demonstrations. In Kabul, where previous Marxist governments had no significant problems, there was a popularly supported 6-day strike, accompanied by anti-government demonstrations, in February.

The Babrak government has virtually no popular support, and there is a widespread perception that his government is ineffective. The government is badly divided.

Over 700,000 Afghans have fled their homes, with most going to Pakistan. This is about 5% of the population; it may reach 10% by summer.

Soviet casualties probably have averaged about 500 a week, most of them the result of attacks on small groups of troops and convoys and of clashes with the Afghan Army. By the beginning of April, total casualties may have reached 10,000.

U.S. Policy

A stake in Afghanistan first is the freedom of a nation and a people. The Soviets are seeking to impose their control over

Afghanistan and to destroy its independence and its right to self-determination.

Vital U.S. interests are involved in southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. We now depend on the Persian Gulf for roughly 25% of our annual oil imports. Our allies and others—developing nations as well as industrial—are even more dependent on oil from the area. About 66% of Western Europe's oil imports and 75% of Japan's come from the Gulf.

Our interest in the region goes beyond economics. Peace and stability in the region are also critical to the future of the nations there. The strength and skill the United States and others show in supporting their independence will demonstrate to them and to others the constancy of our purpose.

We cannot know with certainty Soviet intentions in the region—whether their motives in Afghanistan are limited or part of a larger strategy. The fact is that tens of thousands of Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. Soviet actions have increased the potential threat to the security of nations in the region and to the world's access to vital resources and shipping routes.

To respond firmly to this potential threat is not to be apocalyptic; it is simply to be prudent. As the President has said: "Aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease."

The actions we have taken in response to the Soviet invasion serve five broad objectives.

- Our first purpose is to impose a heavy price for Soviet aggression—because of our abhorrence of what is being done to the Afghan people and to help deter similar actions elsewhere. The steps we have taken—on grain, on technology, on the Olympics, on fisheries, and in other areas—convey our determination in the clearest terms. Indeed, the Soviets are paying a heavy price, not only in the measures we have taken but also in the condemnation they have received from an overwhelming majority of nations in the world and on the ground in Afghanistan.

- Our second goal is withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan. The sanctions we have undertaken will remain in force until all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. When Soviet troops are withdrawn, our intention is to remove the sanctions.¹

To encourage withdrawal, the President has made clear that we are ready to support international efforts to restore a

neutral, nonaligned Afghan Government responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. With prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the United States would be willing to join with Afghanistan's neighbors in a guarantee of Afghanistan's true neutrality and of noninterference in its internal affairs. But the Soviets have shown no interest in such proposals; nor do we see any signs at this time of a Soviet withdrawal.

- This makes our third goal all the more important: to manage East-West relations, during a period of heightened tension, in ways that preserve their essential framework.

We will maintain the penalties of aggression for as long as necessary, but we seek no return to the indiscriminate confrontation of earlier times.

We will continue to pursue our national interest in balanced and verifiable arms control. The President has made clear our continuing commitment to ratification of the SALT II Treaty. The treaty serves our security interests. In accordance with international law, we intend to take no action pending ratification that would defeat the object or purpose of the treaty, so long as the Soviets act in a similar fashion.

We will not abrogate formal agreements with the Soviets.

We will continue to prepare for the Madrid CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) review meeting.

We will continue to build stronger relations with the East European nations.

And we remain prepared to build a more stable and productive relationship with the Soviets when circumstances permit.

- Our fourth goal is to work with the nations of southwest Asia and others to strengthen regional security, stability, and independence. These efforts include helping nations in the area to strengthen their defense capabilities and their political and economic stability, and strengthening our own ability to respond militarily to contingencies that would threaten our vital interests and those of our friends.

We will continue to work toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East that would strengthen Israel's security, enhance the security of Israel's neighbors, and give greater stability to the entire region.

• Finally, recent events in southwest Asia must renew our commitment to building our nation's basic military and economic strength.

We cannot escape the clear message that we must lessen our dependence on foreign oil.

Furthermore, our overall defense modernization programs will proceed expeditiously, including improvements in our ability to respond swiftly and effectively to military contingencies. We have no desire for military superiority, but we will maintain a military balance.

The Soviet Union has been increasing its defense expenditures by about 4% annually, in real terms, for well over a decade. There has been a substantial increase over this period in Soviet strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional capabilities. For most of that same period, U.S. defense investments, after inflation, were declining. Beginning in 1976, we have reversed the pattern of declining U.S. defense expenditures. We are proceeding with a comprehensive modernization of our strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional forces.

For over a decade, the United States has sought to broaden areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union that could make our relations more reciprocal and productive. Detente, however, must be a two-way street. The Soviet invasion has increased tensions and precluded business as usual with the U.S.S.R.

International Reaction

On January 14, 1980, the U.N. General Assembly condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by a vote of 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions—one of the largest majorities in U.N. history on an issue of this kind. The overwhelming vote stripped away any pretensions the U.S.S.R. may have had that the world community would remain indifferent to its aggression.

Western Europe. European leaders have unambiguously denounced the Soviet invasion and supported efforts to bring about a Soviet withdrawal. In a joint February 5 communique, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt stated that the invasion "creates serious dangers to stability in the region and to peace." They noted that "in the light of events in Afghanistan detente has become more difficult and uncertain, and

that therefore withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan is a necessity."

European political cooperation on Afghanistan has been focused in the European Community (EC). Meeting on January 15, the EC Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their "grave concern" over the Soviet invasion, which "represents a serious violation of the principles . . . of the United Nations," a "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of a nonaligned country," and "a threat to peace, security and stability. . . ." They agreed to cancel the 1979 EC food aid program for Afghanistan and committed themselves to emergency aid for Afghan refugees through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The EC adopted the principle that its agricultural supplies should not directly or indirectly substitute for those denied by the United States to the Soviets.

Various European states have taken unilateral economic measures against the Soviet Union. These include reduced diplomatic contacts, cancellation or postponement of exchanges, and concrete economic measures such as the British reduction in export subsidies to the Soviet Union.

Asia. Australia and New Zealand have imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union, reduced contacts with the Soviets, and supported the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games. Australia is increasing defense expenditures and has ordered its aircraft carrier into the Indian Ocean in support of our presence there.

The Japanese Government has publicly condemned the Soviet invasion. The Japanese are cooperating in the boycott of the export of high technology and new export credits. They have offered to increase aid to Pakistan and they have canceled aid to Afghanistan. The government also supports the Olympic boycott.

South Korean Foreign Minister Pak Tong-chin, in a recent public statement, voiced deep concern over the Soviet Union's growing military profile in the world.

Chinese media and official statements repeatedly have condemned the Soviet invasion, demanded a Soviet withdrawal, and called for a united response to the Soviet action. China has stated that it will join an international boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

ASEAN States. The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) states have publicly condemned the Soviet invasion, most recently in the March communique issued during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting with the European Community.

India. India favors an early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Islamic World. On January 27-28, 35 Muslim countries attending the extraordinary ministerial session of the Islamic Conference in Islamabad strongly condemned the "Soviet military aggression against the Afghani people." The conference's final declaration called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet forces, not only from Afghanistan but also from the Horn of Africa.

In a resolution proposed by Saudi Arabia, the conference also:

- Suspended Afghanistan's membership in the Islamic Conference organization;
- Invited member states to withhold recognition of the Babrak Karmal regime and to sever diplomatic relations with Afghanistan until the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops;
- Called on all member states to stop all assistance to the present Afghan regime;
- Called on Islamic member states to support the Islamic countries neighboring Afghanistan and assist their efforts to safeguard their sovereignty, national independence, and territorial integrity and
- Suggested that member states consider not participating in the Moscow Olympics until the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The Iranian Government has strongly condemned the Soviet invasion. It has expressed its concern that the U.S.S.R. might some day take the same action against Iran.

Latin America. Almost all Latin American countries have condemned the Soviet intervention. All voted for the January 14 U.N. General Assembly resolution except Cuba and Grenada, which voted against, and Nicaragua, which abstained.

Africa. In the General Assembly, African countries voted for the resolution, 18 abstained or were absent, and voted against (Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia).

Nonaligned Group. The nonaligned countries generally have registered disapproval of the Soviet intervention (roughly two-thirds voted for the General Assembly resolution). The nonaligned group itself, however, has been unable to agree on a censure resolution.

Eastern Europe. Reactions to the invasion range from strong Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German support for Soviet actions to criticism of the intervention by Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Hungary and Poland have been more reserved and less vociferous in backing Moscow.

Asian Communist Nations. Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos, and the Heng Sam government in Kampuchea have publicly supported the Soviets.

North Korean officials have made no public statement. At a conference of parliamentarians from 12 Communist countries in early February, however, the North Korean delegation refused to support a resolution expressing solidarity with the regime in Afghanistan and implicitly backing the Soviet invasion.

"Because there are fixed deadlines in connection with the Olympics for which we must act now, the President made clear that if the Soviets had not withdrawn by February 20, we would oppose participation in the Olympic Games to be held in Moscow. That date having passed, we will oppose such participation under any circumstances. Similarly, it would be our intention to remove the tighter criteria recently announced governing exceptions from controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union. But the changes proposed in the full list of items to be controlled would, if adopted by the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy, remain in place; such changes were being considered before the invasion of Afghanistan as necessary to reflect the state of Soviet technology. ■

U.S. Perspective of the 34th General Assembly

The 34th session of the U.N. General Assembly, opening on September 18, 1979, and completing all but one item of its work on December 20, made strides in a number of areas important to the United States and the entire world community. To a considerable extent these attainments were made possible by proposals made by Secretary General Waldheim for rationalizing the procedures of the General Assembly and by the increasing efficiency with which the General Assembly operated under the able leadership of the President of this General Assembly, Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania.

The international crisis created by the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranians and the taking of 63 American hostages overshadowed much of this session. Within this atmosphere, the United States directed its efforts in the United Nations toward supporting the work of the Secretary General and the Security Council in peacefully resolving the dispute arising from this breach of international law.

Convention Against the Taking of Hostages

At this trying time, when American officials continue to be held hostage in Iran in clear violation of international law and practice, it is particularly gratifying to take note of one of the outstanding achievements of the 34th General Assembly—the adoption by consensus of the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.

The convention is the result of 3 years of negotiations, initiated by the Federal Republic of Germany. Through the adoption of the hostages convention, the international community affirms that there is no valid excuse for the taking of hostages and no circumstances whatever in which hostage-taking can be condoned. On December 21 the convention was signed by the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Donald F. McHenry, on behalf of the United States, and it will now be submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent prior to ratification.

Kampuchea

The General Assembly helped to focus world attention on continued Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea and on the humanitarian crisis in that country by adopting a resolution proposed by the five member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The resolution appeals for increased international humanitarian assistance, respect for the human rights and political aspirations of the Kampuchean people, the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces and the cessation of hostilities, and calls on states to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other states. In addition it asks the Secretary General to use his good offices toward a peaceful solution and to explore the possibility of an international conference on Kampuchea.

At the November 5 pledging conference for emergency humanitarian relief to the people of Kampuchea, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance announced U.S. contributions of \$60 million for international relief efforts in Kampuchea plus \$9 million for Khmer who have fled to Thailand. These funds were in addition to substantial contributions made already to the refugee program and to continuing support for the efforts of the United Nations, UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and private voluntary groups.

Moon Treaty

The United States supported the adoption of "The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" (also referred to as the Moon treaty) after 7 years of negotiation. The agreement is concerned with such matters as safeguarding human life on celestial bodies, promotion of scientific investigation and exchange of information, and provides that the Moon (and other celestial bodies) are to be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of military maneuvers on the Moon shall be forbidden."

The United States believes that this agreement provides the best possi-

ble structure for regulating activities which governments may now or in the future engage in on the Moon or elsewhere in space.

Human Rights

In this session the United States worked to support human rights efforts and to strengthen the human rights mechanism of the United Nations. Among the chief accomplishments of the 34th General Assembly in this area are:

- The adoption, after 5 years of negotiations, of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women;
- The establishment of a code of conduct for law enforcement officials;
- The adoption of a resolution promoting *habeas corpus* or similar remedies worldwide;
- The adoption of a Ugandan proposal calling for immediate U.N. action in cases of massive and flagrant violation of human rights;
- The adoption of a Nigerian resolution promoting regional human rights machinery;
- The adoption of a resolution calling upon Chile to improve its observance of and respect for human rights; and
- The adoption of resolutions calling for the review and coordination of the human rights system within the United Nations and the upgrading of the human rights division.

The United States was disappointed that efforts to reach a compromise on a resolution concerning economic human rights failed. As a result the United States voted against the resolution because we considered it heavily weighted against the developed world.

Development Issues

This Assembly inaugurated a period of intense international activity on economic and development issues which will culminate in the 11th Special Session on Development in 1980. The United States was pleased at the renewed commitment by both developed and developing countries to complete, as part of this session, an international development strategy on schedule although much difficult work remains for the objective to be met.

If the preparatory work for the special session proceeds as planned, this important meeting will also launch global negotiations on international economic issues (energy, trade, development, money, and finance).

After vigorous negotiations in the Assembly, two resolutions on global negotiations were adopted by consensus which should give a sound basis for preparations for global negotiations.

The United States will participate in the preparations fully and constructively. All other participants must equally be committed to reconcile their respective interests if the new negotiations are to make a major contribution to improve international economic relations.

In a major step aimed at stimulating the development process in the Third World, the General Assembly established a 2-year, \$250 million interim fund for employing science and technology for development, established an intergovernmental committee open to all nations to determine policy for the interim fund, and established a new Center for Science and Technology within the U.N. Secretariat which will coordinate science and technology efforts throughout the U.N. system.

Although the United States believes that the overall record of the 34th U.N. General Assembly on economic issues was commendable, we were disappointed in some aspects of the Assembly's work on economic issues. We saw again the revision of resolutions which had been passed in subsidiary bodies without giving those bodies a reasonable opportunity to act on them. We were also disturbed by the tendency not to preserve the results of negotiations aimed at reaching consensus resolutions but to force the adoption of the originally unacceptable text when a consensus proved not to be possible.

Disarmament

The General Assembly adopted 40 disarmament-related resolutions during this session. Two were offered by the United States; one, jointly sponsored with the U.S.S.R., requesting the Committee on Disarmament to pursue agreement on a radiological weapons convention and one reflecting the U.S. approach to the question of security assurances to non-nuclear states. Of particular concern to the United States were the resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation. Despite often wide differences between the United States and some non-nuclear weapons states criti-

cal of the existing nonproliferation regime, most resolutions on this prior issue were negotiated into a form which the United States could support.

Among other actions taken, the General Assembly declared the 1980s a disarmament decade and requested the U.N. Disarmament Commission to prepare a draft resolution on the subject for the 35th General Assembly which would embody "targets during the disarmament decade for accomplishing major objectives and goals of disarmament. . . ."

In general, the tone of the debate and resolutions offered on disarmament during this session reflected an increasing concern of a growing number of nations over the slowness of such bilateral efforts as the SALT and a comprehensive test ban negotiations and an interest in initiating multilateral negotiations.

Middle East

The United States voted against several resolutions adopted under agenda items on "The Question of Palestine" and "The Situation in the Middle East" which we found detrimental to the cause of peace in the Middle East. Ambassador Richard W. Petree explained the U.S. position: The resolutions sought "to undermine the only viable peace framework [Camp David accords] for negotiations which exists today, a framework which Israel and Egypt agreed to enter into negotiations with representatives of the Palestinian people to achieve legitimate Palestinian rights." We remain a full partner in these negotiations.

The United States did support several General Assembly resolutions concerning the applicability of the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the territory occupied by Israel as a result of the war and disapproval of Israeli settlement policies in the occupied territories. These votes reflected longstanding U.S. policy that Israeli settlements on the West Bank are detrimental to the overall peace process underway in the Middle East.

Namibia

The General Assembly adopted several resolutions on the question of Namibia. The United States, one of the five contact group of nations involved in negotiations on Namibian independence, abstained on substantive proposals on this issue. In a statement on behalf of the five nations, the Repre-

ve of Canada explained: "Our governments have undertaken and are fully committed to pursue our initiative to bring about an internationally recognized independence for Namibia. We do not want it complicated by our taking a position on the substance of main resolutions before us. Consequently, on purely procedural grounds . . . our delegations . . . remain."

Colonization

The United States, while agreeing with the basic goal of the omnibus resolution on decolonization, voted against it. The United States opposed the suggestion in the resolution that terrorism may be a legitimate means of political change. It objected to implicit approval of a resolution adopted by the Assembly's decolonization committee that seems to call for "the complete transfer of all powers" in Puerto Rico without any reference to the wishes of the people of Puerto Rico. U.S. policy remains that the people of Puerto Rico are free to decide at any time their relationship to the United States and how they wish to be governed.

Procedural

During the current session of the General Assembly, the United States noted with concern attempts to appropriate funds for activities that do not appear to be "expenses of the Organization" as required by Article 17 of the charter. We objected to the funding of U.N. Secretariat activities that benefit one group of members and exclude or ignore others and the funding of units whose purpose is to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. This General Assembly also witnessed the introduction of several resolutions which would call for what the United States regarded as a hasty and ill-considered amendment of the Charter.

Security Council Overview

The Security Council during the September-December 1979 period, the United States demonstrated its continuing support for the U.N. peacekeeping role by voting for resolutions which renewed the mandate of U.N. forces in Cyprus, Lebanon, and Golan Heights. It also supported a resolution calling for the lifting of economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

However, the overwhelming concern of the United States during this period was with U.N. efforts to settle the crisis caused by the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the taking of 63 American hostages on November 4, 1979, 53 of whom still remain in captivity.

On November 25 Secretary General Waldheim, invoking Article 99 of the U.N. Charter declared this crisis a serious threat to international peace and security and requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

On December 1, during the Security Council debate following the Secretary General's call, Ambassador McHenry noted that all governments retain the right to expel foreign diplomats from their territory but that international law and tradition support the principle of diplomatic immunity.

He also stated: "None of us is deaf to the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry out against past wrongs, and that ask for understanding. There is not a single grievance alleged or spoken in this situation that could not be heard in an appropriate forum . . . as we have said from the beginning, the United States remains ready, upon the release of the hostages, to discuss with the Iranian authorities the differences which exist between us and to seek their resolution."¹

On December 4 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 457 calling upon the Government of Iran to release immediately all the hostages, provide them protection, and allow them to leave Iran safely. The resolution also called upon the Secretary General to use his good offices to seek a resolution of the crisis and upon Iran and the United States to resolve peacefully "the remaining issues" between them.

On December 15 the International Court of Justice issued an order calling for the "immediate release, without any exception," by Iran of all Americans held there and their safe departure from Iran.²

On December 22, noting that the efforts of the Secretary General and other international appeals and actions had not met with a "positive response" the United States requested that the Security Council meet again at an "early date" to consider "the measures which should be taken to induce Iran to comply with its international obligations."

On December 31 the Security Council adopted Resolution 461 which

reaffirmed Resolution 457, urgently called on the Government of Iran to release all the U.S. citizens being held hostage, requested the Secretary General to intensify his good offices' effort and took note of his willingness to go to Iran (which he subsequently did), and asked for the Secretary General to report back to the Council before it met again on January 7 "to review the situation and in the event of non-compliance with this Resolution, to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations."

On January 7 the Security Council held informal consultations to hear the Secretary General's report on his trip to Tehran. On January 13, the Council then met again to vote on compliance with Security Council Resolution 461. Only a veto by the Soviet Union prevented Security Council approval of economic sanctions. The Secretary General continues his good offices' effort aimed at securing the safe and immediate release of the hostages.

USUN press release 12 of Feb. 8, 1980.

¹For full text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1980, p. 50.

²For text of Court order, See BULLETIN of Feb. 1980, p. 49. ■

Cuban Refugees

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 11, 1980¹

The President remains deeply concerned for the safety and freedom of the 10,800 Cubans who are seeking asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana.

In the last year and a half, the Cuban regime has released over 3,900 political prisoners, and President Carter has implemented a program which permitted these prisoners and their families to come to the United States. This program will bring a total of more than 10,000 Cubans to the United States.

In dealing with the immediate problem in Havana, the United States fully supports the efforts of the five countries of the Andean pact to bring about a quick, humanitarian solution. The problem of Cuban refugees is one for all the Americas as well as the world. The President is encouraged by the efforts of several Latin American and European nations to give tangible help to the victims in the crisis. The decision made by Costa Rica to serve as a staging area for the refugees to assure a rapid evacuation is an important one, and we welcome it.

As a contribution to this international effort, under the authority of the Refugee Act of 1980 and after consultations with the Congress, the President has decided to admit from one-quarter to one-third, or up to 3,500, of the Cubans who have sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy. These people will be admitted according to the requirements of the act.

The United States, moreover, calls on other nations in the region and elsewhere to make their own contributions without delay. This humanitarian crisis requires an immediate international response.

The world also looks to Cuba to assure humanitarian conditions for the refugees pending their evacuation and to cooperate with Peru and international organizations to facilitate the prompt, safe, and peaceful exit of the Cubans from the Embassy.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APR. 23, 1980²

Small craft from Florida are currently proceeding to Cuba to bring to this country a portion of those Cubans who

have sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy from the present Cuban system.

Those boat owners and captains who are taking people out of Cuba and trying to land them in the United States are playing into the hands of the Cuban authorities. The Cuban Government does not permit free emigration from Cuba and arbitrarily determines who may leave the country through issuance of exit permits. It has, furthermore, not held to its earlier agreement to permit those who were in the Peruvian Embassy to proceed to any country willing to receive them.

While we are deeply sympathetic with those in this country who want to expedite the departure from Cuba of those who are seeking freedom from Castro's regime, we cannot condone this procedure.

The transportation of undocumented persons to this country is contrary to U.S. law and policy. It is a felony to bring into the United States any alien not duly admitted by an immigration officer and is punishable by penalties of up to 5 years in prison, fines of \$2,000, and the forfeiture of the vessel.

The Governments of Peru and Costa Rica, working with international refugee organizations, have made clear to the Cuban Government their willingness to receive all the persons who sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy. The United States has agreed to take 3,500 as part of this international effort.

We strongly desire to resolve the question of the Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy in a manner thoroughly consistent with the humanitarian needs and in accordance with U.S. law.

We strongly urge that the illegal transit of undocumented persons by boat from Cuba be suspended and that the Government of Cuba permit the resumption of flights to Costa Rica or other countries immediately.

VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, APR. 27, 1980³

At the President's request, I chaired a meeting April 26 with the Attorney General, the Secretary of HEW, the Deputy Secretary of State, and heads of other U.S. departments concerned with the very serious humanitarian

problem we are confronting with the plight of growing numbers of Cuban refugees. There is no better proof of the failure of Castro's revolution than the dramatic exodus which is currently taking place.

At the same time, we are witnessing a callous, cynical effort by Castro to play on the emotions of the Cuban-American community in the United States to lure members of this community into extraordinarily dangerous and unlawful boat trips, with the very real threat of loss of life at sea. Castro has evaded his responsibility to his citizens and has broken the commitment he made earlier to help with an order prompt, and humane evacuation of refugees.

The President has directed U.S. Navy and Coast Guard units in the region to render all possible assistance to those at sea. We call upon the Cuban-American community, which has contributed so much to our country to respect the law and to avoid these dangerous and illegal boat passages. The world will hold Castro responsible for the safety of these Cubans.

Cuba must agree to a policy that permits the orderly, safe, and humane evacuation of refugees. We have stated before, and I repeat again, that the United States will contribute to this international effort. I would point out that if Castro wants to expel his people let him begin by releasing the *plataformas*—those brave Cubans in Borinquen prison. These people have suffered for their freedom. The moment they are released, we will have aircraft standing ready to bring them to freedom.

The Deputy Secretary of State and other Administration officials also met Saturday with leaders of the Cuban-American community to continue our consultations. We will continue to give the highest priority to this humanitarian problem.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAY 2, 1980²

About a thousand Cubans—former prisoners—who had gathered this morning in the parking lot outside the U.S. Interests Section in Havana complain about the slowness of processing them for emigration under the new Refugee Act, were set upon by about 300 people with clubs—i.e., who by fours—who had been brought to the scene in Cuban Government buses. The police stood idly by until we protested to the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

As a result of the protest, more police did show up and cordon off the area, but they have not stopped the beatings. Some 400 victims are now in the Interests Section. Several are injured, some seriously. Doctors in the crowd are caring for the seriously injured.

The Interests Section building has some broken windows but is otherwise intact. U.S. personnel are safe and unharmed.

This is not an attack on the Interests Section; however, it is a demonstration clearly permitted, if not sponsored, by the Cuban Government. First, the demonstrators arrived by government bus from the Cuban Institute for Friendship to Peoples (ICAP). Second, Cuban police have not stopped the beatings, although there are enough people on the scene to do so.

The head of our Interests Section has protested vigorously to the Cuban government, asking that Cuban authorities disperse the crowd immediately, guarantee the safety of those who have sought sanctuary inside the mission, and issue an expression of regret for this incident.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAY 2, 1980³

The White House announced today that the Federal Government is taking additional actions to respond to the current emergency precipitated by the Cuban government. More than 5,000 Cubans have already arrived in Florida in more than 170 small boats, and the Coast Guard estimates that as many as 2,000 additional boats are either loading passengers in Cuba or are en route to the Florida coast.

The President has directed Jack Watson, his assistant for intergovernmental affairs and secretary to the Cabinet, to work with Ambassador Hector Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in managing the Federal Government's overall response to the emergency. Watson outlined the following actions.

- A processing and screening center will be established at Eglin Air Force Base in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, to supplement the receiving and processing facilities already located at Key West and Miami. The Eglin facility will accommodate approximately 1,000 persons within 24 hours and will be expanded to accommodate

between 5,000 and 10,000 within 10 days. Additional facilities will be added as needed.

- Reception facilities at Key West are being expanded to accommodate daily flows of between 2,500 and 3,000, and other Federal services are being made available there, including those of a Public Health Service medical assistance team.

- Several hundred Federal personnel have been directed to the Miami/Key West area, so that more than 1,000 personnel from eight Federal agencies are now actively engaged with volunteer organizations and State and local governments in receiving, processing, and assisting the arriving Cubans. Tom Casey, deputy associate director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has been assigned responsibility for on-site coordination of all Federal Government activities.

- The Coast Guard has expanded its capability to provide rescue and assistance missions between the Florida and Cuban coasts and, within the last few days, has performed approximately 300 rescue missions in the area. As announced earlier this week by the Department of Defense, U.S. naval vessels which had been intended for Operation Solid Shield are now being made available to assist the Coast Guard in rescue operations.

- Because the Cuban Government is including individuals with criminal records in the boatloads of departing Cubans, careful screening of all arrivals is being conducted by appropriate Federal officials. Under U.S. immigration laws, individuals with records of criminal activity who represent a threat to the country or whose presence would not be in the best interests of the United States are subject to arrest, detention, and deportation to their countries of origin. The United States will enforce these laws.

- State Department officials will be working with national voluntary organizations to provide additional reception and resettlement assistance to Cuban, Haitian, and other groups seeking political asylum which are so heavily affecting the Miami area.

The President appreciates the extraordinarily effective efforts of the State and local governments in Florida in dealing with this extremely difficult situation.

"The responsiveness, cooperation and diligence demonstrated by Governor Graham, agencies of the State government, and local government leaders

in South Florida, especially in Dade County and Miami, have been exemplary," Watson said. "In addition, the round-the-clock efforts of voluntary organizations and members of the Cuban-American community have been invaluable. Without their support and help, the situation could not have been managed."

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAY 5, 1980⁴

On Friday, May 2, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana provided sanctuary to over 400 men, women, and children who were being beaten by a mob immediately outside. Some have since left our Interests Section voluntarily, but 385 remain. Since then we have been seeking Cuban Government guarantees for all those in sanctuary.

Meanwhile we have suspended the immigrant visa and refugee program for Cubans at the Interests Section until such time as the Cuban Government can guarantee the safety of people who come to the Interests Section to conduct normal business. Until we have that guarantee, we are withdrawing from Cuba the personnel in the Interests Section working in those programs.

On Sunday, May 4, the Cuban Government-controlled newspaper, *Granma*, reported that the women and children in sanctuary at the U.S. Interests Section would be given safe conduct but that the men would not. The newspaper said that the men had to turn themselves over to Cuban authorities "without any type of condition." Our Interests Section later confirmed that this was the official Cuban Government position.

The United States will continue to seek guarantees for the safety of those who have been given sanctuary at the U.S. Interests Section. Since all of them have been documented by the Interests Section and since most of them already have Cuban exit permits, we are trying to obtain Cuban Government agreement to allow them to depart Cuba.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, MAY 14, 1980⁵

I'd like to make a statement to you and to the nation about the extremely critical problem with the Cuban citizens who are escaping from their country and coming to our shores in a very haphazard and

dangerous way. Tens of thousands of Cubans are fleeing the repression of the Castro regime under chaotic and perilous conditions.

Castro himself has refused to permit them a safe and orderly passage to the United States and to other countries which are also willing to receive them. Repeated international efforts to resolve this crisis have been rejected or ignored by the Cuban Government. At least seven people have died on the high seas. The responsibility for those deaths and the threat of further loss of life rests on the shoulders of Fidel Castro, who has so far refused to cooperate with us, with those escaping his regime, or with other countries in establishing a legal and orderly procedure for dealing with this Cuban problem.

In keeping with the laws and traditions of our own country, the United States has provided a safe haven for many of these people who have arrived on our shores. Since the beginning of this crisis we have been operating under three basic principles. First, to treat the escaping Cubans with decency, fairness, and humanity; second, to observe and to enforce the existing U.S. law; and third, to work with other countries and with international organizations to develop an orderly and legal solution to this very painful human dilemma. That is still our fundamental approach.

But now we must take additional steps to end Cuba's inhumane actions and to bring safety and order to a process that continues to threaten lives. Therefore we will implement a five-point program to permit safe and orderly passage from Cuba, for those people who sought freedom in the U.S. Interest Section in Havana first of all; for political prisoners who have been held by Castro for many years; for those who sought a haven of freedom in the Peruvian Embassy, some of whom are still being held there; and for close family members of Cuban-Americans who live in this country and who have permanent resident status. Those four categories will be given priority in their authorization to come to our country.

First, we are ready to start an airlift and a sealift for these screened and qualified people to come to our country and for no other escapees from Cuba. We will provide this airlift and sealift to our country and to other countries as well, just as soon as the Cubans accept this offer. The U.S. Government will have aircraft ready and will immediately charter ships, one of which will be standing by in Key West to

bring the first group of Cubans, after they are screened, to our country. These ships and the Key West planes will be ready to go to Cuba to receive properly screened Cubans for entry to the United States and to other countries, to help in their resettlement.

To insure legality and order, all people will have to be screened before departure from Cuba. We will work with the Congress, the Cuban-American community, interested nations, and the Cuban Government to determine the total number of people that we will receive, both on a monthly basis and during the next 12 months.

Second, tomorrow we will open a family registration center in Miami, and later perhaps in other communities, to begin receiving the names of people who are eligible for immigration to our nation because they are close members of Cuban-American families who have permanent residence here.

Third, the Coast Guard is now communicating with all boats which are en route to Cuba and those in Mariel Harbor in Cuba to urge them to return to the United States without accepting additional passengers. No new trips to Cuba by these unauthorized boats should be started. Those who comply with this request or command will have nothing to fear from the law, but we will insure that the law is obeyed. Persons who violate this requirement, and who violate U.S. immigration custom laws by traveling to Cuba to pick up additional passengers, will be subject to civil fines and to criminal prosecution. Furthermore, boats used to bring people unlawfully to this country will be seized. I have directed the various law enforcement agencies to take additional steps as necessary to assure that this policy and the law are obeyed.

Fourth, in an unprecedented and irresponsible act, Castro has taken hardened criminals out of prison and forced some of the boat owners who have gone to Cuba from our country to bring these criminals back to the United States. Thus far over 400 such persons have been detained. I have instructed the Attorney General to commence exclusion proceedings immediately for these criminals and others who represent any danger to our country. We will ask also appropriate international agencies to negotiate their return to Cuba.

Fifth, these steps are fully consistent with the consensus which was reached by 22 nations and 7 international organizations in the San Jose conference

on May the 8th this last week. In addition, the Secretary of State will continue consultation with other nations to determine additional steps that the international community can take to resolve this problem. We will seek the help of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and other international organizations as well.

The Cuban-American community has, of course, contributed much to Miami, to Florida, and to our own country. I respect the deep desire to reunite divided families. In the interest of that great and valiant ethnic community, and in the interest of our country, we will continue to work closely with the Cuban-American community to bring about a safe and orderly resolution of this crisis.

I continue to be greatly concerned about the treatment of Haitians who have also come to this country recently on small boats. I've instructed all appropriate Federal agencies to treat the Haitians now here in the same, exact, humane manner as we treat Cubans and others who seek asylum in this country. Our laws never contemplated and do not adequately provide for people coming to our shores directly for asylum the way the Cubans and the Haitians have done recently.

I will work closely with the Congress to formulate a long-term solution to this problem and to determine the legal status of the boat people once this current emergency is under control.

Q. Will you take a question? Do you think this will be a damaging issue in the campaign?

A. I don't know about how it will affect the campaign. We've had this as a very serious problem now for several weeks. We've tried to deal with it in accordance with our laws, with customs, with traditions, and, of course, in a humane fashion. And we also have tried to work, both with Castro, unsuccessfully, and with other nations and international organizations. We've done the best we could. This is a much firmer and more consistent approach. And, in my judgment, after advising with all of my Cabinet advisers involved and with the international organizations as well and with the Congress, I believe this will resolve this problem in a legal, orderly, safe, humane, and proper fashion.

Q. Do you think that Castro will go along with it?

A. I don't have that assurance.

Q. But if he doesn't go along with it's stopped, period?

A. We'll carry out our part of the policy as I described it.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAY 14, 1980⁵

ter consultations with senior advisers and Congress, and in the spirit of the San Jose conference, the President has decided to take the following steps to welcome the Cuban refugees in a legal and orderly process:

1. We are prepared to start an airlift of sealift immediately as soon as President Castro accepts this offer. Our government is chartering two large, seaworthy ships which will go to Key West to pick up and bring to Cuba. To insure a safe and orderly process, all people will have to be screened before departure for Cuba. Priority will be given to political prisoners, to close relatives of U.S. permanent residents, and to persons who have fought freedom in the Peruvian Embassy in our Interest Section last month. In the course of our discussions with the Congress and with the Cuban-American community, the international community, and the Cuban Government, we will determine the number of people to be taken over the next 12 months. We will fulfill our humanitarian responsibilities, and we will encourage other governments to adjust their policies to resettlement of Cuban refugees to take into account the larger problem that has developed. This will provide a safe and orderly way to accommodate Cubans wishing to enter the United States.

2. Tomorrow, we will open a family reunification office in Miami to receive names of close Cuban relatives of U.S. permanent residents who will be eligible for immigration.

3. The Coast Guard is now communicating with these vessels illegally en route to or from Cuba and those already in Miami Harbor to tell them to return to the United States without taking Cubans aboard. If they follow this directive, they will have nothing to fear from the law. We will do everything possible to stop these illegal trips to Cuba. We will take the following steps to insure that the law is obeyed:

(a) The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will continue to issue visas of intent to fine those unlawfully bringing Cubans to this country. As fines come due, they will be collected.

(b) All vessels currently and unlawfully carrying Cubans to this country will henceforth be seized by the Customs Service.

(c) Anyone who tampers with or seeks to move a ship to Cuba which has been seized will be subject to separate criminal prosecution.

(d) The Coast Guard will continue to review each vessel that returns to the United States for violations of boat safety law. Those found to be in gross violation of the law will be subject to criminal prosecution and additional fines. Furthermore, boats which are found to be safety hazards will be detained.

(e) Any individual who has been notified by INS for unlawfully bringing Cubans into the country and who makes another trip will be subject to criminal prosecution, and the boat used for such a repeat trip will be seized for forfeiture proceedings.

(f) Law enforcement agencies will take additional steps, as necessary, to implement this policy and to discourage the unlawful boat traffic to Cuba.

4. Castro has taken hardened criminals out of prison and mental patients out of hospitals and has forced boat owners to take them to the United States. Thus far, over 400 such prisoners have been detained. We will not permit our country to be used as a dumping ground for criminals who represent a danger to our society, and we will begin exclusion proceedings against these people at once.

5. These steps will make clear to the Government of Cuba our determination to negotiate an orderly process. This is the mission of the three-government delegation established by the San Jose conference last week. Our actions are intended to promote an international solution to this problem. We intend to continue our consultations with the participants of the San Jose conference and consider additional steps the international community should take to resolve this problem.

In summary, the United States will welcome Cubans seeking freedom, in accordance with our laws, and we will pursue every avenue to establish an orderly and regular flow.

The President continues to be greatly concerned about the Haitians who have been coming to this country on small boats. He has instructed appropriate Federal agencies to receive the Haitians in the same manner as others seeking asylum. However, our laws never con-

templated and do not provide adequately for people coming to our shores in the manner the Cubans and Haitians have. We will work closely with the Congress to formulate a long-term solution to this problem and to determine the legal status of these "boat people" after the current emergency situation is controlled.

The Cuban-American community has contributed much to Miami, the State of Florida, and to our country. The President understands the deep desire to reunite families which has led to this situation. He calls upon the Cuban-American community to end the boat flotilla and help bring about a safe and orderly resolution to this crisis.

¹ Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 21, 1980).

² Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.

³ Text from White House press release.

⁴ Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hoddin Carter III.

⁵ Text from White House press release. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.¹

Ratifications deposited: Chile, Feb. 14, 1980; Haiti, Mar. 26, 1980; Honduras, Feb. 27, 1980; Uruguay, Nov. 15, 1979.

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment [article 50(a)] to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Oct. 16, 1974. Entered into force Feb. 15, 1980.

Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 3, 1980.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, Jan. 17, 1980.²

Ratification deposited: Holy See, Feb. 6, 1980.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Ratification deposited: Holy See, Feb. 6, 1980.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, Jan. 17, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Holy See, Feb. 6, 1980.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris Nov. 18, 1974. Entered into force provisionally Nov. 18, 1974; definitively, Jan. 19, 1976. TIAS 8278.

Extended to the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Isle of Man, Feb. 15, 1980.

Finance

Agreement establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington Apr. 8, 1959. Entered into force Dec. 30, 1959. TIAS 4397.

Signature and acceptance deposited: Portugal, Mar. 25, 1980.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Saint Lucia, Apr. 10, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental

Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1978. TIAS 8606.

Acceptance deposited: United Arab Emirates, Mar. 4, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.¹

Acceptances deposited: Hungary, Mar. 31, 1980; Saint Lucia, Apr. 10, 1980; United Kingdom, Feb. 22, 1980.²

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.¹

Acceptances deposited: Hungary, Mar. 31, 1980; Saint Lucia, Apr. 10, 1980; U.K., Feb. 22, 1980.²

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 21, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976.

Accession deposited: Malawi, Apr. 9, 1980.

Ratification deposited: U.S., Apr. 16, 1980. Enters into force for U.S.: July 15, 1980.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Ratification deposited: Turkey, Apr. 17, 1980.³

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for Chapter II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 1978.⁴ TIAS 8733.

Ratification deposited: Hungary, Mar. 27, 1980.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the U.S. Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

Acceptance deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London Apr. 11, 1962. Entered into force May 18, 1967; June 28, 1967 for Article XIV. TIAS 6109.

Acceptance deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Done at London Oct. 21, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1978. TIAS 8500.

Acceptance deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.

Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969.

Entered into force: June 19, 1975.⁴

Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1978.⁴

Notification of succession: Tuvalu, Oct. 1978.

Accessions deposited: Monaco, Aug. 23, 1979; Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Dec. 1972 on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter (TIAS 8165). Done at London Oct. 12, 1978.¹

Acceptances deposited: France, Oct. 1, 1979; U.K., Mar. 21, 1980.⁵

Postal

Money orders and postal travelers' cheques agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.

Ratification deposited: Spain, Dec. 21, 1979.

Second additional protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

Ratifications deposited: Burma, Feb. 2, 1980; Spain, Dec. 21, 1979.

Accession deposited: Gambia, Feb. 1, 1980.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 1980.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.¹

Signature: Japan, Mar. 7, 1980.

Elite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International communications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. Ratification deposited: Niger, Apr. 14, 1980.

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. Ratification deposited: Niger, Apr. 14, 1980.

International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally, Jan. 1, 1978; definitively Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664. Declaration of provisional application deposited: Colombia, Apr. 14, 1980. Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Mar. 1980.

orism

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 19, 1978. Ratification deposited: Bolivia, Mar. 25, 1980; Haiti, Mar. 21, 1980; Italy, Apr. 18, 1980; Thailand, Apr. 17, 1980.

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding international trade in textiles of 20, 1973 (TIAS 7840). Done at Geneva 14, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1978. TIAS 8939. Ratification deposited: Argentina, Feb. 18, 1980.

Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620. Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Mar. 2, 1980.

**Industrial Development
Organization**

Convention of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 28, 1980. Ratification deposited: Malaysia, Apr. 10, 1980; Bolivia, Mar. 21, 1980; Trinidad and Tobago, Apr. 14, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7532). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions. Ratification deposited: Egypt, Mar. 22, 1980; Guatemala, Apr. 28, 1980.

Wheat trade convention, 1971 (part of the International Wheat Agreement), 1971, as amended (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980, by June 30, 1980 the governments

referred to in paragraph (3) of Article III have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or declarations of provisional application, and provided that the 1979 protocol for the fifth extension of the Wheat Trade Convention, 1971, or a new Wheat Trade Convention replacing it, is in force. Signatures: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Economic Community, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., Apr. 30, 1980; Austria, Switzerland, U.S., Apr. 29, 1980; Finland, Japan, Apr. 22, 1980; Norway, Apr. 24, 1980; Sweden, Apr. 9, 1980.

BILATERAL**Bangladesh**

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 2, 1978 (TIAS 9389), with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca Mar. 7, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1980.

Botswana

Agreement providing for a radio facility for the purpose of relaying Voice of America programs to areas in Africa. Signed at Gaborone Mar. 28, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 28, 1980.

Canada

Protocol to amend the convention for the protection, preservation, and extension of the sockeye salmon fisheries in the Fraser River System of May 26, 1930, as amended (50 Stat. 1355, TIAS 3867). Signed at Washington Feb. 24, 1977.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Mar. 20, 1980.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Mar. 31, 1980.

Protocol amending the convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea (TIAS 2900), with agreed minute. Signed at Washington Mar. 29, 1979.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Mar. 20, 1980.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Mar. 31, 1980.

Colombia

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515, 9645), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Bogota Jan. 2 and 31, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 31, 1980.

Cyprus

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with related exchange of notes. Signed at Nicosia Mar. 26, 1980. Entered into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Haiti

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 17, 1979 (TIAS 9595), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince Jan. 28 and Mar. 3, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1980.

Indonesia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with agreed minutes. Signed at Jakarta Mar. 6, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 6, 1980.

Kenya

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Nairobi Mar. 6, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 6, 1980.

Malaysia

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9180, 9602), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York Jan. 8 and Mar. 27, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1980.

Malta

Agreement with respect to taxes on income, with related exchange of notes. Signed at Valletta Mar. 21, 1980. Entered into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. Provisions shall have effect in respect of income or profits arising on or after the first day of January of the year in which the agreement enters into force.

Nicaragua

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 31, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua Feb. 11 and 13, 1980. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1980.

Norway

Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1980. Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Pakistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with minutes. Signed at Islamabad Mar. 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980.

Poland

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 9 and 12, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9064, 9213, 9640), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw Jan. 22 and Mar. 17, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 9 and 12, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9064, 9213, 9640), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of

letters at Washington Mar. 31 and Apr. 1, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1980.

Singapore

Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9214, 9610), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Mar. 20 and 31, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 31, 1980.

Sri Lanka

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 25, 1975 (TIAS 8107), with agreed minutes. Signed at Colombo Mar. 18, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1980.

Tanzania

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 15, 1976 (TIAS 8310), with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Dar es Salaam Mar. 19, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1980.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 4, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9215, 9462, 9643), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York Mar. 21 and 27, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1980.

Togo

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Government and the Export-Import Bank of the U.S., with annexes. Signed at Lome Mar. 28, 1980. Enters into force upon receipt of written notice from the U.S. Government that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling concerning this agreement have been complied with.

Turkey

Agreement for cooperation on defense and economy in accordance with articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty (TIAS 1964), with supplementary agreements. Signed at Ankara Mar. 29, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 29, 1980.

United Kingdom

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Dec. 31, 1975. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980. Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Agreement amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975 for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Effected by exchange of notes at London Apr. 13, 1976. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.

Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Protocol amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Aug. 26, 1976. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980. Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Second protocol amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Mar. 31, 1977. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.

Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Third protocol further amending the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains, signed at London on Dec. 31, 1975. Signed at London Mar. 15, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.

Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of July 3, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4078, 4267, 6659, 6861, 8014), for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Washington Dec. 5, 1979.

Entered into force: Mar. 25, 1980.

¹ Not in force.

² With a declaration.

³ With a statement.

⁴ Not in force for the U.S.

⁵ Applicable to the Bailiwick of Jersey,

Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, St. Helena and Dependencies, Turks and Caicos Islands, U.K. Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Island of Cyprus.

⁶ Subject to ratification. ■

April 1980

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page 51.

April 7

Egyptian President Sadat makes official visit to Washington, D.C., Apr. 7-10.

April 11

The Reverend Canaan Banana, a close ally of Prime Minister-elect Robert Mugabe, is chosen to be first President of Zimbabwe, as Rhodesia will be called when it gains independence from Britain.

April 12

Liberian President Tolbert is killed in a coup and replaced by a 28-year-old Master Sergeant, Samuel K. Doe.

In a closed session, the U.S. Olympic Committee votes 1,604 to 797 on a resolution calling for a boycott of the Moscow Summer Olympics.

In Oslo, the Inter-Parliamentary Union Council adopts a resolution 96 to 10 with 14 abstentions, condemning the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and calls for immediate withdrawal of foreign armed forces from that country.

April 14

As a contribution to the international efforts of five Andean Pact countries seeking a humanitarian solution to the Cuban refugee problem, under the authority of the Refugee Act of 1980 and after consultation with the Congress, President Carter decides to admit 3,500 of those 10,800 Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy who are seeking asylum.

Israeli Prime Minister Begin makes an official visit to Washington, D.C., Apr. 14-17.

April 17

By depositing its instrument of ratification at a Department ceremony, Turkey becomes the 115th party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The following newly appointed Ambassadors presented their credentials to President Carter: Dr. Barry Brereton Lucas, Auguste of Saint Lucia; Regina Lightbourn Wood of the Bahamas; Sefer Elie Charles of Haiti; Cecilia Mildred Tau of Lesotho; Francisco AQUINO Herrera of El Salvador; and Yoshio Okawa of Japan.

President Carter submits a report on the first 5 years' operation of the U.S. generalized system of preferences (GSP) to the Congress.

April 18

U.S.-Spanish Council biannual meeting is held in Washington to review committees' reports on economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological, and politico-military cooperation and to discuss U.S.-Spanish relations in view of the operation of the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1981.

Zimbabwe becomes an independent nation. U.S. establishes diplomatic relations.

April 21

Secretary Vance submits a letter of resignation to President Carter stating that he could not support the President's decision to attempt a rescue mission of the hostages in Iran.

April 22

In Athens, U.S. and Greece sign a bilateral agreement on economic, scientific, and technological, and educational and cultural cooperation.

April 23

Secretary Vance makes official visit to Canada to sign an amended Canada-U.S.

ear cooperation agreement.

1 24

By a vote of 12-0 with 3 abstentions, the Soviet Union, and East Germany, the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution rebuking Israel for its recent armed incursion into southern Lebanon.

1 27

Eighteen hostages, including the U.S. ambassador to Colombia, Diego C. Asencio, who were held at the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota for 61 days, are freed.

1 28

President Carter accepts Secretary Vance's resignation stating that he "respects the reasons" for Vance's decision.

1 29

President Carter nominates Senator William S. Muskie of Maine to become Secretary of State.

1 30

Queen Juliana of the Netherlands abdicates; Beatrix, her daughter, assumes the throne.

Japanese Prime Minister Ohira makes a final visit to Washington, D.C., Apr. 1.

By a vote of 10-1 (U.S.) with 4 abstentions (France, Britain, Norway, and Portugal) the U.N. Security Council votes on a resolution calling for the creation of a Palestinian state. The U.S. vote against the resolution constituted a veto and prevented its adoption. ■

Department of State

7-30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Date	Subject
4/7	Program for Egyptian President Sadat's official visit to Washington, D.C., Apr. 7-10.
4/8	Visa revocation for Iranian officials.
4/8	U.S., Poland sign textile agreement, Mar. 31 and Apr. 1.
4/8	U.S., Haiti amend textile agreement, Jan. 25 and Mar. 3.
4/8	U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement, Mar. 20 and 31.
4/8	U.S., Malaysia amend textile agreement, Jan. 8 and Mar. 27.

*81	4/8	U.S., Thailand amend textile agreement, Mar. 21 and 27.
*82	4/8	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Apr. 28.
*83	4/8	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on ship design and equipment, May 6.
*84	4/8	U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 4, May 1.
*85	4/8	SCC, SOLAS, May 7.
*86	4/10	U.S., Colombia amend textile agreement, Jan. 2 and 31.
*87	4/14	Program for Israeli Prime Minister Begin's official visit to Washington, D.C., Apr. 14-17.
*88	4/14	Conference for young political leaders, Apr. 17-18.
*89	4/14	International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, May 7.
*90	4/15	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, working group on UN/OECD investment undertakings, May 5.
*91	4/15	SCC, SOLAS, May 7.
92	4/17	Vance: statement before Senate Judiciary Committee on the 1980 Refugee Act.
*93	4/21	Vance: statement before foreign policy conference for young political leaders, Apr. 18.
*94	4/21	Julian Nava sworn in as Ambassador to Mexico (biographic data).
*95	4/22	U.S., Greece sign agreement on economic, scientific and technological, and educational and cultural cooperation in Athens.
*96	4/23	Asian-American foreign policy conference, Seattle, May 10.
*97	4/23	Asian-American foreign policy conference, Los Angeles, May 9.
*98	4/23	SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk cargoes, May 12.
99	4/24	Vance: press conference, Ottawa, Apr. 23.
100	4/28	Vance: statement upon his resignation.

*101	4/28	Program for the official visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira, Apr. 30-May 1.
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